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NATIONALITY & GOVERNMENT

WITH OTHER WAR-TIME ESSAYS

By

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LONDON

CHATTO & WINDUS

1918

ὁ πόλεμος βίαιος διδάσκαλος

"War is a forcible teacher."—THUCYDIDES.

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TO
MY MOTHER

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	GERMAN CULTURE AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH	1
II.	NATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT	32
III.	TRUE AND FALSE NATIONALISM	61
IV.	THE PASSING OF NATIONALITY	87
V.	EDUCATION, SOCIAL AND NATIONAL	101
VI.	THE UNIVERSITIES AND PUBLIC OPINION	127
VII.	PROGRESS IN GOVERNMENT	136
VIII.	PROGRESS IN INDUSTRY	172
IX.	THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY	204
X.	RECONSTRUCTION	243
XI.	THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY AFTER THE WAR	252
XII.	CAPITALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	278
XIII.	THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE	298
XIV.	THREE DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT	331
	INDEX	363

PREFACE

THE present volume is not a book in the true sense of the word, but a collection of articles and lectures written at different times during the past few years. In preparing these for publication I have made no attempt to bring them up to date or to remove the inevitable element of repetition and minor inconsistency.

It was after a good deal of hesitation that I yielded to the suggestion that the volume should be compiled. Under ordinary circumstances I should have preferred to wait until I had the opportunity of working out the material in a more close-knit and satisfactory form. But that opportunity is not likely to occur till some time after the end of the war, when irrevocable action may already have been taken on several of the issues discussed in these pages. It seemed to me, therefore, that if I had anything to say which might be of use at the present time it would be pedantic to stand on ceremony as to the mode of saying it. So the book must be judged, not as a finished product or as embodying mature conclusions arising out of the experience of the last four years, but as a contribution to the general stocktaking and re-valuation of ideas and opinions to which the war has given rise in every thinking mind. Such unity as it can claim arises from the fact that the problems treated in it, whether international, imperial or domestic, political, industrial or educational, have been thought out in close relation to one another rather than considered, each for itself, in a water-tight compartment. Some readers may

perhaps find it helpful to have nationality discussed as a problem in education, democracy as a problem in University organisation, the future of British industry as a problem in constitutionalism, and the closer union of the British Commonwealth as a problem in practical internationalism.

All the essays have been written since the outbreak of the war with one exception, that on "Education, Social and National." I have included this partly because it seemed of sufficient intrinsic interest, and partly in order to indicate that my general attitude has not been arrived at under the stress of passing events, but that the war has on the whole confirmed rather than reversed opinions previously formed. On the other hand, I have deliberately refrained from reprinting an essay on "Seven Months in America," written in 1912, because, although in some important respects events have borne it out, it did far less than justice to the fundamental unity and idealism of the American Commonwealth.

I have also omitted, as unsuited to a book covering so wide a scope, several essays containing a more detailed treatment of some of the issues discussed here. One of them, a study of the problem of women in industry, has already been in part reprinted. Others may perhaps see the light in another form. In reprinting, as from my own pen, articles which have appeared in the *Round Table*, I take the opportunity of thanking the friends in collaboration with whom they were written.

Now that the book as a whole is before me, I may add a few words of prefatory comment.

Some readers may complain that it is pitched throughout in too intellectual and detached a tone. To that I can only answer that the detachment, if such there is, springs not from defect of feeling, but from anxiety to make as sincere and reasonable a contribution as is humanly possible to the great intellectual debate which

is being carried on side by side with the military conflict. It is one of the minor ironies of the war that those who have the most acute personal sense of the internecine character of the struggle are by that very fact the better able to take a relatively detached view of the issues at stake, not for this or that country, but for the world. I hope that there is nothing in this book, however vehemently felt or phrased, which could not be read without offence by a sincere and reasonable mind on the other side. Our differences go deep—how deep none know better than those who have sought most earnestly to plumb them. But unless the secession of Germany from the intellectual life of the West is to be permanent, plumbed they must some time be from both sides.

Another criticism that may occur to the reader is that some of the comments and judgments made in the book are already out of date. Here I would reply that if circumstances may, and indeed must, affect estimates formed on matters of practical policy, the philosophy underlying such statements of opinion may remain unchanged. Thus American readers in particular may feel that I have taken up an unduly critical attitude in the earlier essays towards proposals for a league of nations. But at the time when those essays were written, the United States was still a neutral and autocratic Russia a member of the Alliance. It seemed to me, therefore, wiser, as well as franker, to lay stress on the necessity of consolidating the constitutional fabric of the greatest existing system of international government and to interpret its underlying ideals rather than to follow the easier course of pointing out the desirability of building up a still more comprehensive system out of seemingly unpromising materials. To-day, thanks to the policy of President Wilson, the whole outlook is changed. The great schism between the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, which future historians will rank with the schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, has been

bridged over once and for all. Now that all the leading progressive states have recognised by their actions that in the modern world a man's duty to his neighbour carries with it world-wide obligations, it is possible to look forward with confidence, not merely to the final extinction of the idea of world domination by a single military Power, but to the inauguration of a new international order. Problems which were academic, and even ensnaring, two years ago, have now passed into the region of practical politics. The constitutional difficulties, of course, still remain to be surmounted; and to the statements of principle made in the two earlier essays I unreservedly adhere; but if I were rewriting them to-day I should throw the greater emphasis on the constructive side of the argument. We cannot aim at more, it is true, even under the present conditions, than at substituting co-ordination for anarchy, co-operation for competition, in interstate relations, and it remains as important as ever to remember that co-operation between independent authorities is a poor and ineffective makeshift for federal institutions. But co-operation has its uses, the most important of which are educational; and in the new era that will open after the war it is vital to the future of the world that the fullest possible scope and encouragement should be given to projects and experiments in this field.

A similar change has taken place in the outlook as regards another problem incidentally discussed in these pages—the future of the oppressed nationalities of Eastern Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has finally, as was inevitable under the system of 1867, linked its fate with that of its German masters; but the alternative to the Dual Monarchy is no longer, as it long appeared to be, the formation of a number of independent and self-regarding National States. The Conference of representatives of oppressed nationalities, held in Rome in April, 1918, is one of the most epoch-making events of

the war. It marks the solemn and definite recognition of common ideals and a common policy by the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Jugo-Slavs, and the Roumanians; and it is the herald of a new and happier era in which, however much greater the difficulties confronting them, the dwellers in the region between the Baltic and the Mediterranean will evolve for themselves institutions comparable to those enjoyed in North America by the equally mixed races dwelling between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The English-speaking peoples are vitally concerned with the reconstruction of Eastern Europe, if only because upon its stability and upon the happiness of its peoples the peace of the world in the future depends, and there is much that both Britain and the United States can do to promote their welfare. Nothing in these pages, I hope, will be taken as indicating any want of sympathy with their aspirations or of understanding for the peculiar difficulties which they have inherited from an evil past.

No English-speaking liberal can fail to cherish the same hope of free institutions and federal reconstruction, and to feel an even more compelling spur to active effort and sympathy for the great family of peoples between the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific, which, in spite of recent events, is still for us United Russia. In this connection, something must be added in explanation of the tone and temper of the concluding essay.

Since that essay was written, in January of this year, the international intellectual outlook, if I may be permitted the expression, has been profoundly modified. The winter of 1917–18 was, for the democracies of Western Europe, the intellectual crisis of the war, just as the spring of 1918 has brought the military crisis, and the moral crisis came, for the peoples of the British Commonwealth in August, 1914, and for the people of the United States between February and April, 1917. The issue at stake last winter was whether the intellectual

forces opposed to Prussian militarism should operate in one army or two, whether the war of ideas should be a simple conflict between Law and Violence, between moral idealism and corporate selfishness, or a triangular struggle between two rival conceptions of violence and a wider and more generous doctrine. Had that threatened alignment been maintained, there would have been no new order ; for even if militarism, in its Prussian form, had been overthrown (and its fall would necessarily have been postponed if not averted) the struggle would have been continued over its corpse between the two surviving combatants. Upon its issue, probably long delayed, would have depended whether the life of Europe should be rebuilt on a basis of revolutionary despotism or along the lines of the great liberal tradition. To those for whom liberalism is a political religion, the enthusiasm aroused, among certain sections of the Allied peoples, by the high-sounding proclamations of the Bolshevist leaders came as one of the most unwelcome surprises of the war. As so often, in this country at any rate, it was an enthusiasm based on illusions and attributing to its object the generous emotions of those who professed it. But for the moment the army of freedom was in real peril from its worst enemy, Ignorance.

The crisis ended abruptly with the humiliating collapse of the Bolshevist champion at the Brest negotiations, and their still more humiliating sequel. Those who had been taking Trotsky's words at their face value awoke with a shock to the realisation that the man who had deliberately cast away the arms of the flesh was equally lacking, when the test came, in the arms of the spirit. From that time forward, Bolshevism, that pale shadow of Prussianism, has been out of the reckoning, at least so far as the English-speaking countries are concerned, and the flighty group of intellectuals whose emotions were stirred by its glittering generalities have either sought

new and more sequestered shrines to worship at or silently rejoined the main body of steadfast Allied opinion.

But the interlude of Bolshevist propaganda, if it has passed as suddenly as it came, has left its lesson behind it. In its brief and meteoric course it illuminated the whole intellectual scene, throwing a glaring light on our prevailing amateurishness and confusion of mind, and revealing how unready we are to face the practical tasks of reconstruction. Unless we can clear our minds of the jungle of catchwords which still obsess them and make sure of the foundations of our liberal faith, we cannot hope, when the moment comes, to embody our ideals into concrete proposals and our cherished opinions into acts of domestic or international policy. After four years, and perhaps longer, in which to prepare for the day of reckoning, we shall be found as helpless and embarrassed, and as well-meaning, as the foolish virgins of the parable.

Let us then attempt to draw firm and clear the inexorable frontier which divides liberalism from the territories of its two opponents. I use the word "liberalism" (without a capital letter) in default of a better term[1] to describe the philosophy or attitude of mind which, if not always avowed, does in fact constitute the foundation on which the political opinions and

[1] I prefer "liberalism" to "democracy" because "democracy," although often used in a wider sense, is essentially a constitutional term, whereas "liberalism" denotes a philosophy and habit of mind. Peoples enjoying responsible self-government may, and sometimes have been, illiberal: conversely, liberalism may flourish among peoples which do not enjoy self-government, although not indeed unless they are reaching out towards it. Liberalism, for instance, is dominant in the British Dominions, which, as is frequently pointed out in these pages, are not fully self-governing communities. The British Commonwealth itself, the greatest bulwark of liberalism in the world at the present time, is not a Democracy but only the Project of a Democracy. German writers in their criticisms of liberal doctrine often use the term "Christian idealism," with a shadow of contempt resting on both words. But many liberals are not Christians, and if idealism involves refusing to face facts, this may indeed be a besetting sin of liberalism, but it is not essential or peculiar to it.

traditions of the English-speaking peoples and of the French and Italian democracies are built up.

Liberalism is more than a creed : it is a state of mind, a political religion. It has its saints and martyrs as well as its philosophers and teachers, and their numbers increase day by day. It is impossible therefore to exhaust its meaning and essence in a few cold phrases. But, viewed simply as a creed, liberalism has two fundamental articles of faith. The first is that right and wrong apply to public affairs. The second is that Justice and Liberty are the chief political goods, and Injustice and Servitude the chief political evils.

Liberalism thus interpreted covers many minds, many temperaments and many prejudices. It is a doctrine traditional among the allied peoples and common to nearly all their public men. In ordinary times to profess adherence to its tenets might be accounted a commonplace. To-day, when the future of the world is at stake, and the ranks are being closed up in despite of minor differences, it is not simply an opinion or an attitude common to the allied peoples ; it is the cement of their alliance and the hope for the future of the world. The enemies of liberalism, whether within or without the allied countries, are the enemies of the human race.

Both France and Italy are traditional homes of liberalism. In Italy the stream of political doctrine has never ceased to flow in the channel dug for it by Mazzini, himself the lineal successor, in so much of his teaching, of the great mediæval Christian exponents of political morality and obligation. Italy, like the rest of us, has her Prussians and her Bolshevists, as the sowers of tares make it their business to let us know, but never in her recent history has the liberal tradition been more firmly grounded, or proved a source of more inspiration, than at the present moment.

Of the liberalism of France it is almost presumptuous to speak. In the French intellectual tradition, the

greatest and most uninterrupted in Europe, politics and morality have never been disjoined, and, unless Prussianism dominates the Continent, they never will be. It is mere British wilfulness and insularity on the part of a certain clique of opinion to raise a heresy-hunt whenever a French estimate of the task before us, usually so much more clear-sighted than our own, does not accord with what we should like to believe. Advocacy of a League of Nations comes ill from such parochial and intolerant minds.

Among the English-speaking peoples liberalism is, and has been throughout their recent history, the prevailing and almost universally accepted political creed. The love of Freedom and the respect for Justice, the sense of the close relationship between ethics and politics, between "the dispositions that are lovely in private life," and the policy and conduct of the commonwealth, are so ingrained and traditional with us that we tend to exaggerate the differences of opinion, outlook and temperament which must inevitably arise between parties and public men who are agreed on fundamentals. Thus the most far-reaching occasion of difference in the last two centuries, that which led to the Great Schism of 1776, arose, not out of a conflict between liberalism and its opposite, but out of the clash of two rival conceptions of freedom and corporate responsibility. Thus, again, to return to our own day, men like the late Lord Salisbury and Mr. Elihu Root appear to some, on their political record, as Conservatives and even Reactionaries; while, in the eyes of others, the names of Keir Hardie and George Lansbury spell Socialism and even Revolution. In reality, however, seen, as it were, from above, the two former are merely Liberals of the Right, and the two latter Liberals of the Left. Such differences of outlook and judgment form the normal and healthy play of our political system, which could not, indeed, function at all unless both sides were prepared to accept, not simply the

constitutional framework inside which their activities are carried on, but the moral ideals and principles which created and sustain it.

There are, indeed, two small groups in the public life of this island which are avowedly and defiantly anti-liberal—which contumeliously reject one or other or both of the cardinal tenets of liberalism. There is a small group of intellectual Prussians on the extreme Right, and a small group of intellectual Bolshevists on the extreme Left. From the intellectual point of view their influence is, and always will be, negligible ; for the British people will never consciously and with open eyes embrace either the Prussian tenets proclaimed by certain politicians and journalists, or the Bolshevist tenets in fashion among a certain coterie of intellectuals. They will never be argued into seeing the world as a blood-stained panorama of nations red in tooth and claw, or as a cosmopolitan society of individuals engaged in liberating their creative impulses. They have too much humanity for the one and too much humour for the other. But the danger to which liberalism is exposed in this country is not that of direct intellectual assault : it is that of permeation, of the weakening of morale, of the gradual degradation of opinion and sapping of moral fibre by the admittance of alien and treacherous elements into the house of its faith. The two chief weaknesses of British liberalism are ignorance and amiability.

To this process of permeation many factors have contributed. Two, and two only, can be mentioned here. The first is the influence of the Press. Few civilised nations are so undiscriminating as the British in their mental appetite ; and to the fastidious observer, who knows what is good of its kind, there is something at once pathetic and unnatural in the seeming indifference of the British public as to what it will buy or borrow at a bookshop, or devour in a first- or third-class carriage. Carlyle described the Press as the pulpit of the modern

age; but within the last generation the cheapjack has climbed the pulpit stairs and used that exalted position purely as a post of commercial vantage. No one can estimate the injury inflicted on the moral and political life of this country by conscienceless vendors of printed matter. It is no palliation of their offence that, when they sold it, most of them knew no better; and it is a just punishment to some of them for their misdeeds that when, in time of national crisis, they desire to use their influence to better purpose, they are unable to undo the effects of their past either upon the public or upon themselves.

But the most conspicuous instance of British ignorance and amiability is provided by the history of the relations between British liberalism of the Left and the Continental Socialist movement. As this raises issues which may be of practical consequence in the near future it may merit a brief explanation.

Socialism, in this land of mist, is a name for something indistinctly progressive which by its very vagueness has contrived to excite a sense of romance among ardent spirits and of nervous apprehension among persons of more timorous temper. To the great middle body of British opinion it holds out the piquant attraction of the unexplored. At one moment it is the public enemy; at another, something which all sensible people are without knowing it.

Not so on the Continent, and more especially in Germany. There Socialism is not a vague opinion but an aggressive force; not an aspiration but a body of doctrine. This doctrine originated, in its essentials, with Karl Marx and has been mainly worked out by his German and Austrian followers.

This Socialism has two cardinal tenets. The first is "the materialistic conception of history"—in other words, that human history is not a record of moral effort but of a blind conflict of economic forces. The second is "the

doctrine of the Class Struggle"—in other words, that this economic conflict has always, of necessity, taken the form of a struggle between rich and poor, between those who hold the keys of economic power and those who are deprived of the control of the instruments of production.

This is the true Socialist creed, as judged by its literature and history. It is diametrically opposed to liberalism. Liberalism does not deny the importance of economic forces; but it does deny that they have not been and cannot be directed and controlled by moral action. It does not deny the inequalities of wealth or the advantages enjoyed by the holders of economic power; but it does deny that the class-struggle is the most important fact in human history, and that there is no higher principle at stake than the ascendancy of the under-dog. To Socialism, economics is the centre of life, and the conquest of wealth and power by the oppressed class the supreme aim. To liberalism spiritual forces are the centre of life; and the supreme aim is the application of moral and spiritual principles both to politics and to industry. Between these two outlooks there is no compromise. The differences go down to the depths. They can be ignored or evaded for a time by ingenious combinations of words; but sooner or later they must come to a head in questions of policy which raise fundamental issues of principle.

The Socialist gospel is a false gospel. Nevertheless, Marx, who proclaimed it, was a prophet, and, as is the case with most false prophets, much of what he said was true. The strength of his appeal lay, and lies, not in his gospel, which is sounding brass, but in his genius for propaganda and in the facts to which it can point in its support. As a working faith liberalism is to Socialism as the Sermon on the Mount to the Athanasian Creed or the mysteries of Isis; but the Socialist analysis of the existing social and economic system has armed its exponents with arguments which are all the more effective

because of the seeming insincerity and moral bankruptcy of their opponents in the more orthodox political camp.

It will rank as one of the greatest misfortunes which have befallen modern Europe, and as an important contributory cause of the war, that Socialism has displaced liberalism during the last two generations as the chief or at least the most vocal progressive influence on the Continent. It is perhaps not surprising, considering the religious history of Western Europe, that, faced with the devil of Prussian reaction, men should have turned to the Beelzebub of Socialism to cast it out. Beelzebub can always offer to his followers a full measure of bloodlust and the prospect of quick and catastrophic triumphs. But the harm done to the political and moral life of Europe by the concentration of public interest upon the struggle between two such combatants is incalculable; only those can essay to measure it who have tried honestly to assimilate the ideas of the rival partisans and have thought their way into the secret chambers of the Socialist mind, marking at every turn of the passage how close and intricate are the pathways which connect the iron fatalism of Marx with the iron militarism of Bismarck.

The North Sea, rightly called by the Germans an ocean, has ever since the seventeenth century been a more effective intellectual frontier than the Atlantic; and in Britain and the English-speaking countries overseas, where, thanks mainly to the Puritan tradition, political opinions are firmly rooted in moral ideals, the spirit and tenets of Socialism have never found secure lodgment. Germany has of late been the home of what the theologians called "reduced Christianities," which resemble the original as a stoned cherry the fruit on the tree. Similarly, England might be called the home of "reduced Socialisms," in which Nonconformist elders proclaim the doctrine of the class-struggle between a prayer and a hymn and Trade Union leaders, who know their New

Testament far better than their Marx, vainly strive to adjust their minds to the materialistic conception of history; in which, finally, the Socialist Republic, to which the orthodox continental believer looks forward on the morrow of the barricades, is replaced, in a country where Socialist parsons preach at court, by the far more solid and satisfying prospect of a "Co-operative Commonwealth."

The object of these remarks is not to poke fun at the Labour Party or to discredit the diplomacy by which Mr. Arthur Henderson and others have maintained the precarious intellectual connection between the Continental Socialist movement and what passes in this country by the same name. It is natural and right that the British working-class movement should be in contact with the parallel movement on the Continent, and, things being as they are, the Socialist bodies are the natural point of connection. We are concerned, in these pages, not with policies, but with principles, and no shadow of criticism is intended of the recent Inter-ally Conference or of the concrete recommendations there adopted. But the spectator is entitled to point out that the meeting of minds at that Conference was necessarily in many respects, as the laboured preamble proves, a meeting of opposites; nor can he repress his natural curiosity to know which side, in the event, will yield to the other when, at the moment of decision, the principles of the preamble come home to roost.

It is our British habit to sacrifice a great deal for unity; and in choosing what we shall sacrifice, we mostly begin with the generalities. But we stand at a moment in history in which a policy of intellectual opportunism will no longer avail. Already trouble has befallen us—and more is in store—owing to our thoughtless and amiable acceptance of principles drawn from the armoury of an opposing philosophy. Self-determination, for instance, to which homage is being paid by shallow

minds, is not a principle of liberalism but of Bolshevism ; and one branch of the English-speaking race waged the greatest war in its history to resist it. It is impossible to believe, at one and the same time, in the teachings of Trotsky and in the political religion of Abraham Lincoln, in Soviet manifestoes and in the Gettysburg speech. "Self-determination" may be a confused attempt to express the desire for freedom and its responsibilities ; or it may be a convenient cover for narrow-heartedness or caprice. But, in the last analysis, it is a doctrine equally alien to the liberal and to the Catholic tradition. It is a poor and unhelpful substitute for the Christian doctrine of human brotherhood and for Lincoln's great formula of dedication. "No annexations," again, which has won its way into favour, is a cynical Socialist catchword invented by those who can conceive of no relation between the strong and weak but one of rapine and exploitation. It is a formula for the priest and the Levite but not for the good Samaritan. The liberal alternative, as it is also the Christian alternative, to "no annexations" is the principle of trusteeship. Unless liberals are to be false to their deepest ideals they must have the sincerity to recognise, and the courage to proclaim, their principles in the face of the world, even at the cost of the familiar charges of hypocrisy and cant.

But if liberalism of the Left is in danger of compromising with its principles, liberals of the Right are in equal danger of forgetting their significance. Liberalism is a far deeper and more revolutionary creed than Socialism : but it has been a plant of slow growth, and we are only just beginning to descry its social applications. The war has brought them suddenly to the front of the scene. "Events are slowly making clear to us that the chief significance of the war is not political but social. . . . It will lead, by way of a new economic order, to a new order of society altogether." These words are not quoted from a Socialist politician or a Utopian pamphleteer,

but from a recent book by one of the shrewdest and most successful of German industrial magnates.[1] They are as true of Britain as of Germany. The war is bringing in its train unimagined social and economic changes. It is proving our French Revolution—but a revolution not waged for class-ascendancy or achieved as a result of civil strife, but carried through, so far, by consent in the service of a greater cause. The old Britain of social privilege and economic inequality is being consumed in the furnace of war ; and new ideas and institutions are arising in its stead. It is a world in which liberals both of the older and newer school have not yet found their bearings ; nor will serious differences be avoidable when the new social adjustments come to be made. But if the immediate task of liberalism is to make the world safe for political democracy, its next and equally necessary task is to apply its principles to the system by which the world's work is carried on. If stress has been laid in these pages on that aspect of liberalism which has been defined as "the principle of the Commonwealth," it is because, both in politics and economics, it is not only the best antidote to the peculiar temptations of our time but enshrines the most fruitful lessons for the tasks, imperial, domestic, and international which lie immediately before us.

A. E. Z.

April 30, 1918.

[1] Walther Rathenau, *Die neue Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1917, p. 6.

NATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT

GERMAN CULTURE AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.[1]

"Peace cannot become a law of human society, except by passing through the struggle which will ground life and association on foundations of justice and liberty, on the wreck of every power which exists not for a principle but for a dynastic interest."—MAZZINI in 1867.

"The greatest triumph of our time, a triumph in a region loftier than that of electricity or steam, will be the enthronement of this idea of Public Right as the governing idea of European policy; as the common and precious inheritance of all lands, but superior to the passing opinion of any. The foremost among the nations will be that one which, by its conduct, shall gradually engender in the minds of the others a fixed belief that it is just."—GLADSTONE.

THE war of 1914 is not simply a war between the Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente: it is, for Great Britain and Germany especially, a war of ideas—a conflict between two different and irreconcilable conceptions of government, society, and progress. An attempt will be made in this essay to make clear what these conceptions are, and to discuss the issue between them as impartially as possible, from the point of view, not of either of the combatant Powers, but of human civilisation as a whole.

There are really two great controversies being fought out between Great Britain and Germany: one about the ends of national policy, and another about the means to be adopted towards those or any other ends. The latter is the issue raised by the German Chancellor's plea—not so unfamiliar on the lips of our own countrymen as we are now tempted to believe—that "Necessity knows no

[1] From "The War and Democracy," published December, 1914.

law." It is the issue of Law and "scraps of paper" against Force, against what some apologists have called "the Philosophy of Violence," but which, in its latest form, the French Ambassador has more aptly christened "the Pedantry of Barbarism." That issue has lately been brought home, in its full reality, to the British public from the course of events in Belgium and elsewhere, and need not here be elaborated. Further words would be wasted. A Power which recognises no obligation but force, and no law but the sword, which marks the path of its advance by organised terrorism and devastation, is the public enemy of the civilised world.

But it is a remarkable and significant fact that the policy in which this ruthless theory is embodied commands the enthusiastic and united support of the German nation. How can this be explained?

It must be remembered in the first place that the German public does not see the facts of the situation as we do. On the question of Belgian neutrality and the events which precipitated the British ultimatum, what we know to be a false version of the facts is current in Germany, as is evident from the published statements of the leaders of German thought and opinion, and it may be many years before its currency is displaced.

This difficulty should serve to remind us how defective the machinery of civilisation still is. One of the chief functions of law is, not merely to settle disputes and to enforce its decisions, but to ascertain the true facts on which alone a settlement can be based. The fact that no tribunal exists for ascertaining the true facts in disputes between sovereign governments shows how far mankind still is from an established "rule of law" in international affairs. Not only is the Hague powerless to give and, still more, to enforce its decision on the questions at issue between the European Powers. It has not even the machinery for ascertaining the facts of the case and bringing them to the notice of neutral

governments and peoples in the name of civilisation as a whole.

But apart from divergent beliefs as to the facts, it is remarkable that thinking Germany should be in sympathy with the spirit and tone of German policy, which led, as it appears to us, by an inexorable logic to the violation of Belgian neutrality and the collision with Great Britain.

But the fact, we are told, admits of easy explanation. Thinking Germany has fallen a victim to the teachings of Treitschke and Nietzsche—Treitschke with his Macchiavellian doctrine that "Power is the end-all and be-all of a State," Nietzsche with his contempt for pity and the gentler virtues, his admiration for "valour," and his disdain for Christianity.

This explanation is too simple to fit the facts. It may satisfy those who know no more of Treitschke's brilliant and careful work than the extracts culled from his occasional writings by General von Bernhardi and the late Professor Cramb. It may gratify those who, with so many young German students, forget that Nietzsche, like many other prophets, wrote in allegory, and that when he spoke of valour he was thinking, not of "shining armour," but of spiritual conflicts. But careful enquirers, who would disdain to condemn Macaulay on passages selected by undiscriminating admirers from his "Essays," or Carlyle for his frank admiration of Thor and Odin and the virtues of Valhalla, will ask for a more satisfying explanation. Even if all that were said about Treitschke and Nietzsche were true, it would still remain an unsolved question why they and their ideas should have taken intellectual Germany by storm. But it is not true. What is true, and what is far more serious, both for Great Britain and for Europe, is that men like Harnack, Eucken, and Wilamowitz, who would repudiate all intellectual kinship with Macchiavelli and Nietzsche—men who are leaders of European thought, and with whom and whose ideas we shall have to go on living in

Europe—publicly support and encourage the policy and standpoint of a Government which, according to British ideas, has acted with criminal wickedness and folly, and so totally misunderstands the conduct and attitude of Great Britain as honestly to regard us as hypocritically treacherous to the highest interests of civilisation.

That is the real problem ; and it is a far more complex and difficult one than if we had to do with a people which had consciously abandoned the Christian virtues or consciously embarked on a conspiracy against Belgium or Great Britain. The utter failure of even the most eminent Germans to grasp British politics, British institutions, and the British point of view points to a fundamental misunderstanding, a fundamental divergence of outlook, between the political ideals of the two countries. It is the conflict between these ideals which forms the second great issue between Germany and Great Britain ; and on its outcome depends the future of human civilisation.

What is the German ideal ? What do German thinkers regard as Germany's contribution to human progress ? The answer comes back with a monotonous reiteration which has already sickened us of the word. It is *Kultur*, or, as we translate it, culture. Germany's contribution to progress consists in the spread of her culture.

Kultur is a difficult word to interpret. It means "culture" and a great deal more besides. Its primary meaning, like that of "culture," is intellectual and aesthetic : when a German speaks of "Kultur" he is thinking of such things as language, literature, philosophy, education, art, science, and the like. Children in German schools are taught a subject called *Kulturgeschichte* (culture-history), and under that heading they are told about German literature, German philosophy and religion, German painting, German music, and so on.

So far, the English and the German uses of the word

roughly correspond. We should probably be surprised if we heard it said that Shakespeare had made a contribution to English "culture": but, on consideration, we should admit that he had, though we should not have chosen that way of speaking about him. But there is a further meaning in the word *Kultur*, which explains why it is so often on German lips. It means, not only the product of the intellect or imagination, but the product of the disciplined intellect and the disciplined imagination. *Kultur* has in it an element of order, of organisation, of civilisation. That is why the Germans regard the study of the "culture" of a country as part of the study of its history. English school-children are beginning to be taught social and industrial history in addition to the kings and queens and battles and constitutions which used to form the staple of history lessons. They are being taught, that is, to see the history of their country, and of its civilisation, in the light of the life and livelihood of its common people. The German outlook is different. They look at their history in the light of the achievements of its great minds, which are regarded as being at once the proof and the justification of its civilisation. To the question, "What right have you to call yourselves a civilised country?" an Englishman would reply, "Look at the sort of people we are, and at the things we have done," and would point perhaps to the extracts from the letters of private soldiers printed in the newspapers, or to the story of the growth of the British Commonwealth; a German would reply (as Germans are indeed replying now), "Look at our achievements in scholarship and science, at our universities, at our systems of education, at our literature, our music, and our painting; at our great men of thought and imagination: at Luther, Dürer, Goethe, Beethoven, Kant."

Kultur then means more than "culture": it means *culture considered as the most important element in civilisation.* It implies the disciplined education which alone, in the

German view, makes the difference between the savage and the civilised man. It implies the heritage of intellectual possessions which, thanks to ordered institutions, a nation is able to hand down from generation to generation.

We are now beginning to see where the British and German attitudes towards society and civilisation diverge. Broadly, we may say that the first difference is that Germany thinks of civilisation in terms of intellect while we think of it in terms of character. Germany asks, "What do you know?" "What have you learnt?" and regards our prisoners as uncivilised because they cannot speak German, and Great Britain as a traitor to civilisation because she is allied with Russia, a people of ignorant peasants. We ask, "What have you done?" "What can you do?" and tend to undervalue the importance of systematic knowledge and intellectual application.

But we have found no reason as yet for a conflict of ideals. Many English writers, such as Matthew Arnold, have emphasised the importance of culture as against character; yet Matthew Arnold's views were widely different from those of the German professors of to-day. If their sense of the importance of culture stopped short at this point, we should have much to learn from Germany, as indeed we have, and no reason to oppose her. What is there then in the German admiration for culture which involves her in a conflict with British ideals?

The conflict arises out of the alliance between German culture and the German Government. What British public opinion resents, in the German attitude, is not culture in itself, about which it is little concerned, but what we feel to be its unnatural alliance with military power. It seems to us wicked and hypocritical for a government which proclaims the doctrine of the "mailed fist" and, like the ancient Spartans, glories in the perfecting of the machinery of war, to be at the same

time protesting its devotion to culture, and posing as a patron of the peaceful arts. It is the Kaiser's speeches and the behaviour of the German Government which have put all of us out of heart with German talk about culture.

Here we come to a fundamental point of difference between the two peoples. The close association between culture and militarism, between the best minds of the nation and the mind of the Government, does not seem unnatural to a modern German at all. On the contrary, it seems the most natural thing in the world. It is the bedrock of the German system of national education. Culture to a German is not only a national possession ; it is also, to a degree difficult for us to appreciate, a State product. It is a national possession deliberately handed on by the State from generation to generation, hall-marked and guaranteed, as it were, for the use of its citizens. When we use the word "culture" we speak of it as an attribute of individual men and women. Germans, on the other hand, think of it as belonging to nations as a whole, in virtue of their system of national education. That is why they are so sure that all Germans possess culture. They have all had it at school. And it is all the same brand of culture, because no other is taught. It is the culture with which the Government wishes its citizens to be equipped. That is why all Germans tend, not only to know the same facts (and a great many facts too), but to have a similar outlook on life and similar opinions about Goethe, Shakespeare and the German Navy. Culture, like military service, is a part of the State machinery.

Here we come upon the connecting link between culture and militarism. Both are parts of the great German system of State education.

"Side by side with the influences of German education," wrote Dr. Sadler in 1901,[1] "are to be traced the influences of

[1] "Board of Education Special Reports," vol. ix. p. 43.

German military service. The two sets of influence interact on one another and intermingle. German education impregnates the German army with science. The German army predisposes German education to ideas of organisation and discipline. Military and educational discipline go hand in hand. . . . Both are preserved and fortified by law and custom, and by administrative arrangements skilfully devised to attain that end. But behind all the forms of organisation (which would quickly crumble away unless upheld by and expressing some spiritual force), behind both military and educational discipline, lies the fundamental principle adopted by Scharnhorst's Committee on Military organisation in Prussia in 1807 : 'All the inhabitants of the State are its defenders by birth.'"

Here at last we have come to the root of the matter. It is not German culture which is the source and centre of the ideas to which Great Britain is opposed : nor yet is it German militarism. Our real opponent is the system of training and education, out of which both German culture and German militarism spring. It is the organisation of German public life, and the "spiritual force" of which that organisation is the outward and visible expression.

Let us look at the German ideal more closely, for it is worthy of careful study. It is perhaps best expressed in words written in 1830 by Coleridge, who, like other well-known Englishmen of his day (and our own) was much under the influence of German ideas. Coleridge, in words quoted by Dr. Sadler, defines the purpose of national education as "to form and train up the people of the country to obedient, free, useful, and organisable subjects, citizens and patriots, living to the benefit of the State and prepared to die in its defence." In accordance with this conception Prussia was the first Power in Europe to adopt a universal compulsory system of State education, and the first also to establish a universal system of military service for its young men. The rest of Europe perforce followed suit. Nearly every state in Europe has or professes to have a universal

system of education, and every State except Great Britain has a system of universal military service. The Europe of schools and camps which we have known during the last half-century is the most striking of all the victories of German "culture."

Discipline, efficiency, duty, obedience, public service: these are qualities that excite admiration everywhere—in the classroom, in the camp, and in the wider field of life. There is something almost monumentally impressive to the outsider in the German alliance of School and Army in the service of the State. Since the days of Sparta and Rome, there has been no such wonderful governmental disciplinary machine. It is not surprising that "German organisation" and "German methods" should have stimulated interest and emulation throughout the civilised world. Discipline seems to many to be just the one quality of which our drifting world is in need.

"If this war had been postponed a hundred or even fifty years," writes a philosophic English observer in a private letter, "Prussia would have become our Rome, worshipping Shakespeare and Byron as Pompey or Tiberius worshipped Greek literature, and disciplining us. Hasn't it ever struck you what a close parallel there is between Germany and Rome?" (Here follows a list of bad qualities which is better omitted.) . . . "The good side of it is the discipline; and the modern world, not having any power external to itself which it acknowledges, and no men (in masses) having yet succeeded in being a law to themselves, needs discipline above everything. I don't see where you will get it under these conditions unless you find some one with an abstract love of discipline for itself. And where will you find him except in Prussia? After all, it is a testimony to her that, unlovely as she is, she gives the law to Germany, and that the South German, though he dislikes her, accepts the law as good for him." And to show that he appreciates the full consequences of his words he adds: "If I had to live under Ramsay MacDonald (provided that he acted as he talks), or under Lieutenant von Förstner" (the hero of Zabern), "odious as the latter is, for my soul's good I would choose him: for I think that in the end, I should be less likely to be irretrievably ruined."

Here is the Prussian point of view, expressed by a thoughtful Englishman with a wide experience of education, and a deep concern for the moral welfare of the nation. What have we, on the British side, to set up against his arguments ?

In the first place, we must draw attention to the writer's candour in admitting that a nation cannot adopt Prussianism piecemeal. It must take it as a whole, its lieutenants included, or not at all. Lieutenant von Förstner is as typical a product of the Prussian system as the London policeman is of our own ; and if we adopt Prussian or Spartan methods, we must run the risk of being ruled by him.

"No other nation," says Dr. Sadler, "by imitating a little bit of German organisation can hope thus to achieve a true reproduction of the spirit of German institutions. The fabric of its organisation practically forms one whole. That is its merit and its danger. It must be taken all in all or else left unimitated. And it is not a mere matter of external organisation. . . . National institutions must grow out of the needs and character (and not least out of the weakness) of the nation which possesses them."

But, taking the system as a whole, there are, it seems to me, three great flaws in it—flaws so serious and vital as to make the word "education" as applied to it almost a misnomer. The Prussian system is unsatisfactory, firstly, because it confuses external discipline with self-control ; secondly, because it confuses regimentation with corporate spirit ; thirdly, because it conceives the nation's duty in terms of "culture" rather than of character.

Let us take these three points in detail.

The first object of national education is—not anything national at all, but simply education. It is the training of individual young people. It is the gradual leading-out (e-ducation), unfolding, expanding, of their mental and bodily powers, the helping of them to become, not soldiers, or missionaries of culture, or pioneers of

Empire, or even British citizens, but simply human personalities. "The purpose of the Public Elementary School," say the opening words of our English code, "is to form and strengthen the character and to develop the intelligence of the children entrusted to it." In the performance of this task external discipline is no doubt necessary. Obedience and consideration for others are not learnt in a day. But the object of external discipline is to form habits of self-control which will enable their possessor to become an independent and self-respecting human being—and incidentally, a good citizen. "If I had to *live under* Ramsay MacDonald, or the Prussian Lieutenant," says our writer, "I would choose the latter, for my soul's good." But our British system of education does not proceed on the assumption that its pupils are destined to "live under" any one. Our ideal is that of the free man, trained in the exercise of his powers and in the command and control of his faculties, who, like Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior" (a poem which embodies the best British educational tradition):

> ". . . Through the heat of conflict, keeps the law
> In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw."

Neglect for the claims of human personality both amongst pupils and teachers is the chief danger of a State system of education. The State is always tempted to put its own claims first and those of its citizens second—to regard the citizen as existing for the State, instead of the State for its citizens. It is one of the ironies of history that no man was more alive to this danger than Wilhelm von Humboldt, the gifted creator of the Prussian system of education. As the motto of one of his writings he adopted the words, "*Against the governmental mania, the most fatal disease of modern governments*," and when, contrary to his own early principles, he undertook the organisation of Prussian education he insisted that "headmasters should be left as free a hand as

possible in all matters of teaching and organisation." But the Prussian system was too strong for him and his successors, and his excellent principles now survive as no more than pious opinions. The fact is that in an undemocratic and feudal State such as Germany then was, and still largely is, respect for the personality of the individual is confined to the upper ranks of society.

"I do not know how it is in foreign countries," says one of Goethe's heroes,[1] "but in Germany it is only the nobleman who can secure a certain amount of universal or, if I may say so, *personal* education. An ordinary citizen can learn to earn his living and, at the most, train his intellect; but, do what he will, he loses his personality. . . . He is not asked, "What are you?" but only, "What have you? what attainments, what knowledge, what capacities, what fortune? . . . The nobleman is to act and to achieve. The common citizen is to carry out orders. He is to develop individual faculties, in order to become useful, and it is a fundamental assumption that there is no harmony in his being, nor indeed is any permissible, because, in order to make himself serviceable in one way, he is forced to neglect everything else. The blame for this distinction is not to be attributed to the adaptability of the nobleman or the weakness of the common citizen. It is due to the constitution of society itself."

Much has changed in Germany since Goethe wrote these words, but they still ring true. And they have not been entirely without their echo in Great Britain itself.[2]

But man cannot live for himself alone. He is a

[1] Wilhelm Meister's "Lehrjahre," Book v. chapter iii.

[2] The contrast which has been drawn in the preceding pages, as working-class readers in particular will understand, is between the *aims*, not the achievements, of German and British education. The German aims are far more perfectly achieved in practice than the British. Neither the law nor the administration of British education can be acquitted of "neglect for the claims of human personality." The opening words of the English code, quoted on p. 11 above, are, alas! not a statement of fact but an aspiration. We have hardly yet begun in England to realise the possibilities of educational development along the lines of the British ideal, both as regards young people and adults. If we learn the lesson of the present crisis aright, the war, so far from being a set-back to educational progress, should provide a new stimulus for effort and development.

corporate being ; and, personality or no personality, he has to fit into a world of fellow-men with similar human claims. The second charge against the German system is that it ignores the value of human fellowship. It regards the citizens of a country as "useful and organisable subjects" rather than as fellow-members of a democracy, bound together by all the various social ties of comradeship and intercourse.

The Prussian system, with its elaborate control and direction from above, dislikes the free play of human groupings, and discourages all spontaneous or unauthorised associations. Schoolboy "societies," for instance, are in Germany an evil to be deplored and extirpated, not, as with us, a symptom of health and vigour, to be sympathetically watched and encouraged. Instead, there is a direct inculcation of patriotism, a strenuous and methodical training of each unit for his place in the great State machine. We do not so read human nature. Our British tendency is to develop habits of service and responsibility through a devotion to smaller and more intimate associations, to build on a foundation of lesser loyalties and duties. We do not conceive it to be the function of the school to *teach* patriotism or to *teach* fellowship. Rather we hold that good education *is* fellowship, *is* citizenship, in the deepest meaning of those words ; that to discover and to exercise the responsibilities of membership in a smaller body is the best training for a larger citizenship. A school, a ship, a club, a Trade Union, any free association of Englishmen, is all England in miniature.

"To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society," said Burke long ago, "is the first principle, the germ, as it were, of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love to our country and mankind. . . . We begin our public affections in our families. No cold relation is a zealous citizen. We pass on to our neighbourhoods, to our habitual provincial connections. These are

inns and resting-places . . . so many images of the great country, in which the heart found something which it could fill."[1]

There is one fairly safe test for a system of education: What do its victims think of it? "In Prussia," says Dr. Sadler, "a schoolboy seems to regard his school as he might regard a railway station—a convenient and necessary establishment, generally ugly to look at, but also, for its purpose efficient." The illustration is an apt one: for a Prussian school is too often, like a railway station, simply a point of departure, something to be got away from as soon as possible. "In England a boy who is at a good secondary school cares for it as an officer cares for his regiment or as a sailor cares for his ship," or, we may add, as a Boy Scout cares for his Troop.[2]

Democracy and discipline, fellowship and freedom, are in fact not incompatible at all. They are complementary: and each can only be at its best when it is sustained by the other. Only a disciplined and self-controlled people can be free to rule itself, and only a free people can know the full meaning and happiness of fellowship.

Lastly, the German system regards national "culture" rather than national character as the chief element in civilisation and the justification of its claim to a dominant place in the world. This view is so strange to those who are used to present-day British institutions that it is hard to make clear what it means. Civilisation is a word which, with us, is often misused and often misunderstood. Sometimes we lightly identify it with motor cars and gramophones and other Western contrivances with which individual traders and travellers dazzle and bewilder the untutored savage. Yet we are seldom tempted to

[1] "Reflections on the French Revolution," pp. 292, 494 (of vol. iii. of "Collected Works," ed. 1899).

[2] "Special Reports," ix. p. 113. Dr. Sadler's article deals with secondary schools only. Unfortunately, no one can claim that the idea of fellowship is as prominent in English elementary schools, or even in all secondary schools, as the quotation might suggest.

identify it, like the Germans, with anything narrowly national; and in our serious moments we recognise that it is too universal a force to be the appanage of either nations or individuals. For to us, when we ask ourselves its real meaning, civilisation stands for neither language nor culture nor anything intellectual at all. It stands for something moral and social and political. It means, in the first place, the establishment and enforcement of the Rule of Law, as against anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other; and, secondly, on the basis of order and justice, the task of making men fit for free institutions, the work of guiding and training them to recognise the obligations of citizenship, to subordinate their own personal interests or inclinations to the common welfare, the "commonwealth." That is what is meant when it is claimed that Great Britain has done a "civilising" work both in India and in backward Africa. The Germans reproach and despise us, we are told,[1] for our failure to spread "English culture" in India. That has not been the purpose of British rule, and Englishmen have been foolish in so far as they have presumed to attempt it: England has to learn from Indian culture as India from ours. But to have laid for India the foundations on which alone a stable society could rest, to have given her peace from foes without and security within, to have taught her, by example, the kinship of Power and Responsibility, to have awakened the social conscience and claimed the public services of Indians in the village, the district, the province, the nation, towards the community of which they feel themselves to be members, to have found India a continent, a chaos of tribes and castes, and to have helped her to become a nation—that is not a task of English culture: it is a task of civilisation.

Law, Justice, Responsibility, Liberty, Citizenship—the words are abstractions, philosophers' phrases, destitute

[1] For evidence of this see Cramb's "Germany and England," p. 25.

it might seem, of living meaning and reality. There is no such thing as English Justice, English Liberty, English Responsibility. The qualities that go to the making of free and ordered institutions are not national but universal. They are no monopoly of Great Britain. They are free to be the attributes of any race or any nation. They belong to civilised humanity as a whole. They are part of the higher life of the human race.

As such the Germans, if they recognised them at all, probably regarded them. They could not see in them the binding power to keep a great community of nations together. They could not realise that Justice and Responsibility, if they rightly typify the character of British rule, must also typify the character of British rulers ; and that community of character expressed in their institutions and worked into the fibre of their life may be a stronger bond between nations than any mere considerations of interest. Educated Indians would find it hard to explain exactly why, on the outbreak of the war they found themselves eager to help to defend British rule. But it seems clear that what stirred them most was not any consideration of English as against German culture, or any merely material calculations, but a sudden realisation of the character of that new India which the union between Great Britain and India, between Western civilisation and Eastern culture, is bringing into being, and a sense of the indispensible need for the continuance of that partnership.[1]

[1] The reader will again understand that it is British aims rather than British achievements which are spoken of. That British rule is indispensable to Indian civilisation is indeed a literal fact to which Indian opinion bears testimony; and it is the conduct and character of generations of British administrators which have helped to bring this sense of partnership about. But individual Englishmen in India are often far from understanding, or realising in practice, the purpose of British rule. Similarly, the growth of a sense of Indian nationality, particularly in the last few years, is a striking and important fact. But it would be unwise to underestimate the gigantic difficulties with which this growing national consciousness has to contend. The greatest of these is the prevalence of caste-divisions, rendering impossible the

It is just this intimate union between different nations for the furtherance of the tasks of civilisation which it seems so difficult for the German mind to understand. "Culture," with all its intimate associations, its appeal to language, to national history and traditions, and to instinctive patriotism, is so much simpler and warmer a conception : it seems so much easier to fight for Germany than to fight for Justice in the abstract, or for Justice embodied in the British Commonwealth. That is why even serious German thinkers, blinded by the idea of culture, expected the break-up of the British Empire. They could imagine Indians giving their lives for India, Boers for a Dutch South Africa, Irishmen for Ireland, or Ulstermen for Ulster ; but the deeper moral appeal which has thrilled through the whole Empire, down to its remotest island dependency, lay beyond their ken.

Let us look a little more closely at the German idea of national culture rather than national character as the chief element in civilisation. We shall see that it is directly contrary to the ideals which inspire and sustain the British Commonwealth, and practically prohibits that association of races and peoples at varying levels of social progress which is its peculiar task.

"Culture," in the German idea, is the justification of a nation's existence. Nationality has no other claim. Goethe, Luther, Kant, and Beethoven are Germany's title-deeds. A nation without a culture has no right to a "place in the sun."

"History," says Wilamowitz in a lecture delivered in 1898, "knows nothing of any right to exist on the part of a people or a language without a culture. If a people becomes dependent on a foreign culture" (*i.e.* in the German idea, on a foreign civilisation) "it matters little if its lower classes speak a different language : they, too . . . must eventually go over to the dominant

free fellowship and social intercourse which alone can be the foundation of a sense of common citizenship. Apart from this there are, according to the census, forty-three races in India, and twenty-three languages in ordinary use.

language. . . . Wisely to further this necessary organic process is a blessing to all parties; violent haste will only curb it and cause reactions. Importunate insistence on Nationality has never anywhere brought true vitality into being, and often destroyed vitality; but the superior Culture which, sure of its inner strength, throws her doors wide open, can win men's hearts."[1]

In the light of a passage like this, from the most distinguished representative of German humanism, it is easier to grasp the failure of educated Germany to understand the sequel of the South African War, or the aspirations of the Slav peoples, or to stigmatise the folly of their statesmen in Poland, Denmark, Alsace-Lorraine, and Belgium.

With such a philosophy of human progress as this, German thinkers and statesmen look out into the future and behold nothing but conflict—eternal conflict between rival national "cultures," each seeking to impose its domination. "In the struggle between Nationalities," writes Prince Bülow,[2] in defence of his Polish policy, putting into a cruder form the philosophy of Wilamowitz, "one nation is the hammer and the other the anvil; one is the victor and the other the vanquished. It is a law of life and development in history that when two national civilisations meet they fight for supremacy."

Here we have the necessary and logical result of the philosophy of culture. In the struggle between cultures no collaboration, no compromise even, is possible. German is German: Flemish is Flemish: Polish is Polish: French is French. Who is to decide which is the "more civilised," which is the fitter to survive? Force alone can settle the issue. A Luther and Goethe may be the puppets pitted in a contest of culture against Maeterlinck and Victor Hugo. But it is Krupp and Zeppelin and the War-Lord that pull the strings. As Wilamowitz reminds us, it was the Roman legions, not

[1] "Speeches and Lectures," pp. 147–148 (1913 edition).
[2] "Imperial Germany," p. 245 (1st edition).

Virgil and Horace, that stamped out the Celtic languages and romanised Western Europe. It is the German army, two thousand years later, that is to germanise it. It is an old, old theory ; Prussia did not invent it, nor even Rome. "You know as well as we do," said the Athenians in 416 B.C. to the representatives of a small people of that day.[1] "that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" ; and they went on, like the Kaiser, to claim the favour of the gods, "neither our pretensions nor our conduct being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise among themselves." There is, in fact, to be no Law between Nations but the Rule of the Stronger.

Such seems to many the meaning of the present European situation—a stern conflict between nations and cultures, to be decided by force of arms. The bridges between the nations seem broken down, and no one can tell when they will be repaired. The hopes that had gathered round international movements, the cosmopolitan dreams of common action between the peoples across the barriers of States and Governments, seem to have vanished into limbo ; and the enthusiastic dreamers of yesterday are the disillusioned soldiers and spectators of to-day. Nationality, that strange, inarticulate, unanalysable force that can summon all men to her tents in the hour of crisis and danger, seems to have overthrown the international forces of to-day, the Socialists, the Pacifists, and, strongest of all, the Capitalists, as it overthrew Napoleon and his dreams of Empire a hundred years ago. What Law is there but force that can decide the issue between nation and nation ? And, in the absence of a Law, what becomes of all our hopes for international action, for the future of civilisation and the higher life of the human race ?

But in truth the disillusionment is as premature as

[1] Thucydides, Book v. 89 and 105.

the hopes that preceded it. We are still far off from the World-State and the World-Law which formed the misty ideal of cosmopolitan thinkers. But only those who are blind to the true course of human progress can fail to see that the day of the Nation-State is even now drawing to a close. There is in fact at present working in the world a higher Law and a better patriotism than that of single nations and cultures, a Law and a patriotism that override and transcend the claims of Nationality in a greater, a more compelling, and a more universal appeal. The great States or Powers of to-day, Great Britain, the United States, France, and (if they had eyes to see it) Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, are not Nation-States but composite States—States compacted of many nationalities united together by a common citizenship and a common law. Great Britain, the United States, the German Empire, and Austria-Hungary bear in their very names the reminder of the diverse elements of which they are composed ; but France with her great African Empire, and Russia with her multitudinous populations, from Poland to the Pacific, from Finland to the Caucasus, are equally composite. In each of these great States nations have been united under a common law ; and where the wisdom of the central government has not "broken the bruised reed or quenched the smoking flax" of national life, the nations have been not only willing but anxious to join in the work of their State. Nations, like men, were made not to compete but to work together ; and it is so easy, so simple, to win their good-hearted devotion. It takes all sorts of men, says the old proverb, to make a world. It takes all sorts of nations to make a modern State.

"The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilised life as the combination of men in society. . . . It is in the cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another. . . .

If we take the establishment of liberty for the realisation of moral duties to be the end of civil society, we must conclude that those States are substantially the most perfect which, like the British and Austrian Empires, include various distinct nationalities without oppressing them."

So wrote Lord Acton, the great Catholic historian, fifty years ago, when the watchwords of Nationality were on all men's lips, adding, in words that were prophetic of the failure of the Austrian and the progress of the British Commonwealth of Nations :

"The co-existence of several nations under the same State *is a test* as well as the best security *of its freedom*. It is also one of the chief instruments of civilisation ; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism." [1]

Of the Great Powers which between them control the destinies of civilisation Great Britain is at once the freest, the largest, and the most various. If the State is a "cauldron" for mingling "the vigour, the knowledge, and the capacity" of the portions of mankind—or if, to use an apter metaphor, it is a body whose perfection consists in the very variety of the functions of its several members—there has never been on the earth a political organism like the British Empire. Its 433 million inhabitants, from Great Britain to Polynesia, from India and Egypt to Central Africa, are drawn from every division of the human race. Cut a section through mankind, and in every layer there will be British citizens, living under the jurisdiction of British law. Here is something to hearten those who have looked in vain to the Hague. While international law has been brought to a standstill through the absence of a common will and a common executive, Great Britain has thrown a girdle of law around the globe.

[1] Essay on Nationality, in "The History of Freedom and other Essays," pp. 290, 298.

What hopes dare we cherish, in this hour of conflict, for the future of civilisation ?

The great, the supreme task of human politics and statesmanship is to extend the sphere of Law. Let others labour to make men cultured or virtuous or happy. These are the tasks of the teacher, the priest, and the common man. The statesman's task is simpler. It is to enfold them in a jurisdiction which will enable them to live the life of their souls' choice. The State, said the Greek philosophers, is the foundation of the good life ; but its crown rises far above mere citizenship. " There where the State ends," cries Nietzsche,[1] echoing Aristotle and the great tradition of civilised political thought, " there *men begin.* There, where the State ends, look thither, my brothers ! Do you not see the rainbow and the bridge to the Overman ? " Ever since organised society began, the standards of the individual, the ideals of priest and teacher, the doctrines of religion and morality, have outstripped the practice of statesmanship. For the polestar of the statesman has not been love, but law. His not the task of exhorting men to love one another, but the simpler duty of enforcing the law, " Thou shalt not kill." And in that simple, strenuous, necessary task statesmen and political thinkers have watched the slow extension of the power of Law, from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the city, from the city to the nation, from the nation to the Commonwealth of nations. When will Law take its next extension ? When will warfare, which is murder between individuals and " rebellion " between groups of citizens, be equally preventable between nations by the common law of the world ?

The answer is simple. When the world has a common will, and has created a common government to express and enforce that will.

In the sphere of science and invention, of industry

[1] " Also sprach Zarathustra," Speech xi. (end).

and economics, as Norman Angell and others have taught us, the world is already one Great Society. For the merchant, the banker, and the stockbroker political frontiers have been broken down. Trade and industry respond to the reactions of a single, world-wide, nervous system. Shocks and panics pass as freely as airmen over borders and custom-houses. And not "big business" only, but the humblest citizen, in his search for a livelihood, finds himself caught in the meshes of the same world-wide network.

"The widow who takes in washing," says Graham Wallas,[1] in his deep and searching analysis of our contemporary life, "fails or succeeds according to her skill in choosing starch or soda or a wringing machine under the influence of half a dozen competing world-schemes of advertisement. . . . The English factory girl who is urged to join her Union, the tired old Scotch gatekeeper with a few pounds to invest, the Galician peasant when the emigration agent calls, the artisan in a French provincial town whose industry is threatened by a new invention, all know that unless they find their way among world-wide facts, which only reach them through misleading words, they will be crushed."

The Industrial Revolution of the past century, steam-power and electricity, the railway and the telegraph, have knit mankind together, and made the world one place.

But this new Great Society is as yet formless and inarticulate. It is not only devoid of common leadership and a common government; it lacks even the beginnings of a common will, a common emotion, and a common consciousness. Of the Great Society, consciously or unconsciously, we must all perforce be members; but of the Great State, the great World-Commonwealth, we do not yet discern the rudiments. The economic organisation of the world has outstripped the development of its citizenship and government: the economic man, with his far-sighted vision and scientific control of the resources of the world, must sit by and see the work of his hands

[1] "The Great Society" (1914), p. 4.

laid in ashes by contending governments and peoples. No man can say how many generations must pass before the platitudes of the market and the exchange pass into the current language of politics.

In the great work which lies before the statesmen and peoples of the world for the extension of law and common citizenship and the prevention of war there are two parallel lines of advance.

One road lies through the development of what is known as International, but should more properly be called *Inter-State Law*, through the revival on a firmer and broader foundation of the Concert of Europe conceived by the Congress of Vienna just a hundred years ago—itself a revival, on a secular basis, of the great mediaeval ideal of an international Christendom, held together by Christian Law and Christian ideals. That ideal faded away for ever at the Reformation, which grouped Europe into independent sovereign States ruled by men responsible to no one outside their own borders. It will never be revived on an ecclesiastical basis. Can we hope for its revival on a basis of modern democracy, modern nationality, and modern educated public opinion? Can Inter-State Law, hitherto a mere shadow of the majestic name it bears, almost a matter of convention and etiquette, with no permanent tribunal to interpret it, and no government to enforce it, be enthroned with the necessary powers to maintain justice between the peoples and governments of the world?

Such a Law the statesmen of Great Britain and Russia sought to impose on Europe in 1815, to maintain a state of affairs which history has shown to have been intolerable to the European peoples. There are those who hope that the task can be resumed, on a better basis, at the next Congress.

"Shall we try again," writes Professor Gilbert Murray,[1] "to achieve Castlereagh's and Alexander's ideal of a permanent

[1] *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1914, p. 77.

Concert, pledged to make collective war upon the peace-breaker? Surely we must. We must, at all costs and in spite of all difficulties, because the alternative means such unspeakable failure. We must learn to agree, we civilised nations of Europe, or else we must perish. I believe that the chief council of wisdom here is to be sure to go far enough. We need a permanent Concert, perhaps a permanent Common Council, in which every awkward problem can be dealt with before it has time to grow dangerous, and in which outvoted minorities must accustom themselves to giving way."

Other utterances by public men, such as Mr. Roosevelt and our own Prime Minister, might be cited in the same sense; but Professor Murray's has been chosen because he has had the courage to grasp the nettle. In his words the true position is quite clearly set forth. If Inter-State Law is to become a reality we must "be sure to go far enough." There is no halfway house between Law and no Law, between Government and no Government, between Responsibility and no Responsibility. If the new Concert is to be effective it must be able to compel the submission of all "awkward problems" and causes of quarrel to its permanent Tribunal at the Hague or elsewhere; and it must be able to enforce the decision of its tribunal, employing for the purpose, if necessary, the armed forces of the signatory Powers as an international police. "Outvoted minorities must accustom themselves to giving way." It is a bland and easy phrase; but it involves the whole question of world-government. "Men must accustom themselves not to demand an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth," the earliest law-givers might have said, when the State first intervened between individuals to make itself responsible for public order. Peace between the Powers, as between individuals, is, no doubt, a habit to which cantankerous Powers "must accustom themselves." But they will be sure to do so if there is a Law, armed with the force to be their schoolmaster towards peaceable habits. In other words, they will do so because they have surrendered one of the most

vital elements in the independent life of a State—the right of conducting its own policy—to the jurisdiction of a higher power. An Inter-State Concert, with a Judiciary of its own and an Army and Navy under its own orders, is, in fact, not an Inter-State Concert at all; it is a new State: it is, in fact, the World-State. There is no middle course between Law and no Law: and the essence of Statehood, as we have seen, is a Common Law.

Will this new State have the other attributes of Government—a Common Legislature and a Common Executive—as well as a Common Judiciary? Let us go back to Professor Murray's words. He speaks of "outvoted minorities." Let us suppose the refractory country to be Great Britain, outvoted on some question relating to sea-power. Of whom will the outvoted minority consist? Of the British members on the "Common Council" of the Concert. But the question at once arises, what are the credentials of these British members? Whom do they represent? To whom are they responsible? If they are the representatives of the British people and responsible to the democracy which sent them, how can they be expected to "accustom themselves to giving way"—perhaps to a majority composed of the representatives of undemocratic governments? Their responsibility is, not to the Concert, but to their own Government and people. They are not the minority members of a democratically-elected Council of their own fellow-citizens. They are the minority members of a heterogeneous Council towards which they own no allegiance and recognise no binding responsibility. There is no halfway house between Citizenship and no Citizenship, between Responsibility and no Responsibility. No man and no community can serve two masters. When the point of conflict arises men and nations have to make the choice where their duty lies. Not the representatives of Great Britain on the International Concert, but the people of Great Britain themselves would have to decide whether

their real allegiance, as citizens, was due to the World-State or to their own Commonwealth : they would find themselves at the same awful parting of the ways which confronted the people of the Southern States in 1861. When at the outbreak of the Civil War General Lee was offered by Lincoln the Commandership of the Northern armies and refused it, to become the Commander-in-Chief on the side of the South, he did so because " he believed," as he told Congress after the war, " that the act of Virginia in withdrawing herself from the United States carried him along with it as a citizen of Virginia, and that *her* laws and acts were binding on him." In other words, unless the proposed Common Council is to be made something more than a Council of the delegates of sovereign States (as the Southern States believed themselves to be till 1861), a deadlock sooner or later is almost inevitable, and the terrible and difficult question—so familiar to Americans and recently to ourselves on the smaller stage of Ulster—of the right of secession and the coercion of minorities will arise. But if the Common Council is framed in accordance with a Constitution which binds its representatives to accept its decisions and obey its government, then the World-State, with a World-Executive, will already have come into being. There will be no more war, but only Rebellion and Treason.

Such is the real meaning of proposals to give a binding sanction to the decisions of an Inter-State Concert. Anything short of this—treaties and arbitration-agreements based upon inter-State arrangements without any executive to enforce them—may give relief for a time and pave the way for further progress, but can in itself provide no permanent security, no satisfactory justification for the neglect of defensive measures by the various sovereign governments on behalf of their peoples. Mr. Bryan, for the United States, has within the last eighteen months concluded twenty-six general arbitration treaties with different Governments, and may yet succeed

in his ambition of signing treaties with all the remainder. Yet no one imagines that, when the immunity of the United States from attack is guaranteed by the promise of every Government in the world, America will rely for her defence upon those promises alone.

In discussing proposals for a European Council, then, we must be quite sure to face all that it means. But let us not reject Professor Murray's suggestion off-hand because of its inherent difficulties : for that men should be discussing such schemes at all marks a significant advance in our political thought. Only let us be quite clear as to what they presuppose. They presuppose the supremacy, in the collective mind of civilised mankind, of Law over Force, a definite supremacy of what may be called the civilian as against the military ideal, not in a majority of States, but in every State powerful enough to defy coercion. They presuppose a world map definitely settled on lines satisfactory to the national aspirations of the peoples. They presuppose a *status quo* which is not simply maintained, like that after 1815, because it is a legal fact and its disturbance would be inconvenient to the existing rulers, but because it is inherently equitable.[1] They presuppose a similar democratic basis of citizenship and representation among the component States. They presuppose, lastly, an educated public opinion incomparably less selfish, less ignorant, less unsteady, less materialistic, and less narrowly national than has been prevalent hitherto. Let us work and hope for these things : let us use our best efforts to remove misunderstandings and promote a sense of common responsibilities and common trusteeship for civilisation between the peoples of all the various sovereign States ; but meanwhile let us work also, with better hopes of immediate if less ambitious successes, along the other parallel road of advance.

[1] The same applies to proposals for ensuring permanent peace in the industrial sphere. Neither capital nor labour will abide by "scraps of paper" if they do not feel the *status quo* (*i.e.* the conditions under which wage-contracts are made) to be equitable and inherently just.

The other road may seem, in this hour of dreams and disaster, of extremes of hope and disillusionment, a long and tedious track : it is the old slow high-road of civilisation, not the short cut across the fields. It looks forward to abiding results, not through the mechanical co-operation of governments, but through the growth of an organic citizenship, through the education of the nations themselves to a sense of common duty and a common life. It looks forward, not to the definite establishment, in our day, of the World-State, but only to the definite refutation of the wicked theory of the mutual incompatibility of nations. It looks forward to the expression in the outward order of the world's government of the idea of the Commonwealth of Nations, of Lord Acton's great principle of the State composed of free nations, of the State as a living body which lives through the organic union and free activity of its several national members. And it finds its immediate field of action in the deepening and extension of the obligation of citizenship among the peoples of the great, free, just, peace-loving, supra-national Commonwealths whose patriotism has been built up, not by precept and doctrine, but on a firm foundation of older loyalties.

The idea of the Commonwealth of Nations is not a European principle : it is a world-principle. It does not proceed upon the expectation of a United States of Europe ; for all the Great Powers of Europe except Austria-Hungary (and some of the smaller, such as Holland, Belgium, and Portugal) are extra-European Powers also. Indeed, if we contract our view, with Gladstone and Bismarck and the statesmen of the last generation, to European issues alone, we shall be ignoring the chief political problem of our age—the contact of races and nations with wide varieties of social experience and at different levels of civilisation. It is this great and insistent problem (call it the problem of East and West, or the problem of the colour-line) in all its difficult

ramifications, political, social, and, above all, economic, which makes the development of the principle of the supernational Commonwealth the most pressing political need of our age. For the problems arising out of the contact of races and nations can never be adjusted either by the wise action of individuals or by conflict and warfare ; they can only be solved by fair and deliberate statesmanship within the bosom of a single State, through the recognition by both parties of a higher claim than their own sectional interest—the claim of a common citizenship and the interest of civilisation.[1] It is here, in the union and collaboration of diverse races and peoples, that the principle of the Commonwealth of Nations finds its peculiar field of operation. Without this principle, and without its expression, however imperfect, in the British Empire, the world would be in chaos to-day.

We cannot predict the political development of the various Great Powers who between them control the destinies of civilisation. We cannot estimate the degree or the manner in which France, freed at last from nearer preoccupations, will seek to embody in her vast dominion the great civilising principles for which her republic stands. We cannot foretell the issue of the great conflict of ideas which has swayed to and fro in Russia between the British and the Prussian method of dealing with the problem of nationality. Germany, Italy, Japan—here, too, we are faced by enigmas. One other great Commonwealth remains besides the British. Upon the United States already lies the responsibility, voluntarily assumed and, except during a time of internal crisis,[2] successfully discharged, of securing peace from external foes for scores of millions of inhabitants of the American continent. Yet with the progress of events her responsibilities must yearly enlarge : for both the immigrant nationalities

[1] The most recent example of this is the settlement of the very difficult dispute between India and South Africa.

[2] French occupation of Mexico, 1862, during the American Civil War, when the Monroe Doctrine was temporarily in abeyance.

within and the world-problems without her borders seem to summon her to a deeper education and to wider obligations.

But upon the vast, ramifying, and inchoate Commonwealth of the British peoples lies the heaviest responsibility. It is a task unequally shared between those of her citizens who are capable of discharging it. Her task within the Commonwealth is to maintain the common character and ideals and to adjust the mutual relations of one quarter of the human race. Her task without is to throw her weight into the scales of peace, and to uphold and develop the standard and validity of inter-State agreements. It is a task which requires, even at this time of crisis, when, by the common sentiment of her citizens, the real nature and purpose of the Commonwealth have become clear to us, the active thoughts of all political students. For to bring home to all within her borders who bear rule and responsibility, from the village headman in India and Nigeria, the Basutu chief and the South Sea potentate, to the public opinion of Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions, the nature of the British Commonwealth, and the character of its citizenship and ideals, and to study how those ideals may be better expressed in its working institutions and executive government—that is a task to which the present crisis beckons the minds of British citizens, a task which Britain owes not only to herself but to mankind.

NATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT[1]

The following paper was originally written to be read aloud, without thought of publication. In committing it to the printer it should be stated, to guard against any possible misunderstanding, that it is, purely and simply, a critical examination of ideas, not a condemnation of projects. Criticism of "the principle of Nationality" does not imply any want of sympathy with those who proclaim it as their watchword: nor does criticism of the "international" solutions proposed in some quarters imply any hostility towards the aims of their framers. The sole object has been to pierce below the surface to the real meaning of the ideas and phrases in question in the belief that, as confused thinking must always lead to mistakes and disillusionment, so right thinking is the necessary prelude to a wise and consistent idealism.

THERE is no more important duty at the present moment for those who can spare the time and the thought from more practical tasks than the close and searching analysis of political ideas. The war is being waged about ideas, and the settlement at its close will be determined by ideas. Yet those ideas, and the words in which they are embodied for current discussion, are often vague, confused and even contradictory: so that different words are used to express the same meaning, and the same word used to express several different meanings. My aim in the present paper is to interpret as clearly and definitely as I can what I conceive to be the meaning and importance of two such ideas, in the name of which thousands have laid down their lives in the last sixteen months—the idea of nationality and the idea of citizenship.

My object is not to persuade or convert, but simply

[1] A paper read before the Sociological Society, November 30, 1915, Professor Graham Wallas in the chair. It was republished in the *Sociological Review* for January, 1916, with the introductory note here reproduced.

to elucidate and to clarify. To many people my views on the subject, put on half a sheet of notepaper, would seem pure platitude: others may think them utterly paradoxical. I shall be satisfied if I really make them plain, and if I succeed in provoking a discussion which ends in everybody feeling clearer in their own minds as to the views they respectively hold.

Argument on abstract subjects is much more inspiriting and much easier to follow if it is enlivened by criticism. I propose therefore, not baldly and blankly to state my own views first, but to lead up to them by examining certain prevalent phrases or catch-words which have lately passed into common currency among the public, without perhaps receiving their due share of criticism and cross-examination.

The first word which I will put in the witness-box is the word "international." I am constantly meeting people who profess what they call international sympathies, who belong to international clubs or promote international causes or study international relations. Being international myself, in a precise sense of the word, I am anxious to know exactly what they mean. So far as I am able to make out, the word "international" has about seven different meanings. For the moment I only want to distinguish two of them—or rather, to divide the seven into two groups. Half the people who use the word "international" are thinking of something which concerns one or more nations: the other half are thinking of something which concerns one or more Sovereign States. When we speak of an English international footballer we mean a man who has represented England against Wales or Scotland or Ireland. We are not concerned with the purely political question whether Scotland, Ireland, and Wales are Sovereign States independent of England. Similarly, if we speak of a writer as having an international reputation we mean that his books are read by people of many different nations and have possibly

been translated into many different languages—into German, Italian, Bohemian, Polish, Finnish, Serbo-Croat, and so on. Similarly, when we speak of an international movement we mean that it has taken root in many different countries—in Germany, Italy, Canada, Finland, Syria, and so on—irrespective of the question whether these countries form part of one or more Sovereign States. But when we talk of "international law" or "an International Concert of the Powers" on the other hand, we are using the word in quite a different sense. We are dealing with a different method of classification: we are thinking of the world as consisting, not of nations, but of States. For the international football player Canada, South Africa, and Australia would all be separate units, while the various Central American States, if they wanted to produce a team, would probably have to club together to do so. But for the international lawyer Canada, South Africa, and Australia are merged in the British Commonwealth, Bohemia merged in Austria-Hungary, Syria in the Ottoman Empire and Finland in the Russian, while Nicaragua, Bolivia, Montenegro, and Liberia are classified separately, as Sovereign States, ostensibly on a level with the Great Powers. Just as Rhode Island and Texas are both equally component members of the American Union, so the representatives of Montenegro and Russia, Ecuador and Great Britain would sit side by side in a world congress of Sovereign States, from which the representatives of great civilised communities like Canada and Australia would be excluded.

This distinction between Nationality and Statehood, thus revealed in the double use of the word "international," is so simple that it seems strange that it should be necessary to call attention to it at all. Looked at in the light of concrete instances it is as clear as daylight. Scotland is a nation and not a State. So is Poland. So is Finland. So is Australia. Austria-Hungary is a

State and not a nation. So is the Ottoman Empire. So is the British Commonwealth. So is the United States. It may not be easy to define exactly what a State is. It is certainly not easy to define exactly what a nation is. But at least it ought to be easy to perceive that there is a difference between the two.

Yet how many current catchwords there are which have acquired their vogue simply by slurring that difference over! If matters which affected two or more States were always called "inter-State" instead of "international," and the word "international" confined to its strict sense, some of those who have the word most often on their lips would discover, perhaps with a shock, that much of what they are pleading for is already embodied in contemporary life. We are in fact living in what is, in the strictest sense, an international society. For good or for evil, the modern world is a large-scale world, and, as Mr. Norman Angell truly pointed out, its most characteristic institutions, those connected with finance, industry and commerce, are largely international in character. And not only business, but other departments of life have become international also. Science and art, philanthropy and even sport have followed the financiers. Toynbee Hall, the mother of settlements, has scores of children in the United States. The hats that are worn in Paris one season are worn at Athens and Bucharest the next: and if the climate forbids young Italians and Greeks from indulging in English athletic pursuits, they can at least pay tribute to the internationalism of sport by appearing in English sporting costumes. The ideas which are in vogue in London and Berlin to-day are the talk of New York and Chicago to-morrow, and long after they have been exploded in the Old World continue to form the staple of leader writers in the New. Good books, and even bad books, if sufficiently striking and well advertised, are read and quoted all over the world. Mr. Norman Angell and General Bernhardi have done

the Grand Tour together: and each is now engaged in the Herculean task of correcting what have become international interpretations or misinterpretations of their views. The modern world is in fact international to the core. Its internationalism lies in the nature of things. It is neither to its credit nor to its discredit. Internationalism is neither good nor bad in the abstract: it depends on the nature of its manifestations. The German Wolff Bureau is international; so is the White Slave traffic; so is the Anti-Slavery Society. It rests with men and women of goodwill to see that the good manifestations prevail over the evil; but, judging from past history, the devil generally has the first innings. International institutions and international philanthropic efforts have followed international abuses, as the policeman follows the malefactor or as the agents of civilised governments follow, in "undeveloped" countries, the roving emissaries of private capitalist enterprise.

Nor has this internationalism, this inter-communication between the families of mankind, been abruptly cut short by the war. On the contrary it has been immensely extended. Never before have the communities and races of men met and mingled as they are meeting and mingling to-day. The war, which has touched all five continents of the world, has turned the earth into a vast mixing-bowl where men, and to no inconsiderable extent women also, are coming together and exchanging experiences. The rival combatants and their prisoners can perhaps learn little from one another: but think of the Allied armies and their encampments on either side! For the illiterate millions of Russia, with its wonderful assortment of nationalities, war, with its camp-fire talk, has always been a great educator. The Russian army might be described as a great national and international school. But with the Western allies it is almost more so. Was there ever a more international expedition than the army at the Dardanelles? It comprised English-

men, Irishmen, Scotsmen, Frenchmen, Senegalese, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, and a contingent of Hebrew-speaking Jews from Palestine. Compare the catalogue of Sir Ian Hamilton's troops with the catalogue of the Greek and Trojan forces conveniently provided for us in the second book of the "Iliad," and you will get some measure of the increased power of man over nature since Homer's day, and of the internationalism which has inevitably resulted from it.

What then do a certain school of idealists really mean when they consider themselves a small group of internationalists in a world that will not listen to their doctrine? What they really mean, of course, is not that the modern world is not international in many of its habits and ways of thought, but that, in spite of its internationalism, it is still a tragically mismanaged place. It may be a single society, but that society has so little control over its life, or the members of it have such low ideals, that it is from time to time rent by such conflicts as we see to-day. Why, they complain, cannot the different communities of the world sit down together and cultivate the arts of Peace?

The criticism contained in remarks such as these is really a twofold one. It is one thing to say that the world is wicked. It is quite another to say that it is badly organised. The school of thought to which I am referring really combines two quite separate lines of policy. There is the policy directed towards making the world better, and the policy directed towards making the world better organised, irrespective of the fact whether or not that organisation is based on moral principles. Let us take the former policy first. The policy which seeks to make the world better aims at promoting internationalism in its better, and at counteracting it in its worse, manifestations. It seeks to promote Anti-Slavery Societies and to counteract the White Slave

traffic. It seeks to promote happier and friendlier relations between nations and to counteract the international phenomenon that has become known as "Prussianism" in whatever quarter it originates and over however many countries it may spread. It seeks in fact to serve humanity by raising its moral level. One may criticise the phraseology or note the omissions in the programme of this group of thinkers: but for their outlook and their ideals one can have nothing but admiration. Men like M. Romain Rolland and women like Miss Jane Addams are the salt of the earth; if everybody were like Miss Addams the evil manifestations of internationalism would disappear for want of a public, and world-government itself—the inter-State problem—would be greatly simplified. It is easy to pick holes in the views expressed by this school of thinkers on the questions at issue in the inter-State sphere, but it is a thankless task to do so, since those problems are not really what they are concerned about. They are not interested in the purely political side of inter-State relations. Their object is not to establish a reasonable minimum of Justice and Liberty in a world of imperfect human beings. Their object is to make those imperfect people better, to combat malice, hatred and uncharitableness among all the belligerent peoples from their rulers and foreign ministers downwards. All power to their elbow! Only let us whisper one caution in their ear as they go on their errand of mercy—the famous caution of George Washington: "Influence is not government." However good and reasonable you may make people, there still remains over, for all of us who are not theoretical anarchists, the technical political question of the adjustment of the relations between the different Sovereign States.

I pass to the second line of policy—that which is directed not towards making men better (that, it is recognised, is too lengthy a process to meet the immediate emergency), but rather to averting war by making the

world better organised—by improving the efficiency of the world's political machinery. This line of policy aims at the setting up of what is called an international or supernational organisation to ensure the peace of the world. Mr. Sidney Webb, for instance, is giving a lecture this very evening on "The Supernational Authority which will Prevent War," and Mr. J. A. Hobson has written a book on the same theme under the title "Towards International Government." A pedant might criticise Mr. Hobson's title by saying that international government is a thing we have with us already—in Russia, in Turkey, in Austria-Hungary, in the British Commonwealth. Some of these governments are good and others bad, but they are all international, or, more strictly speaking, multi-national. If he had called his book "Towards Inter-State Government" his theme would have been made clear beyond all confusion; but he would have been convicted of working for a contradiction, for there is no such thing as inter-State government. If a government cannot give orders and secure obedience to them, it is not a government: but the essence of a State is that it is sovereign and takes orders from no one above it. Inter-State government therefore involves a contradiction. What Mr. Hobson really desires is a World-Government, and I wish he had said so. Probably he did not do so because he thought the title sounded too chimerical. But in reality there is nothing inconceivable or intrinsically impossible in the establishment of a world-government. The real difficulty is to establish free world-government—to ensure universal peace without the universal sacrifice of liberty. If it is better organisation that civilised mankind desires they can have it in almost any age for the asking. The Romans were ready to give it them; so were the great Popes; so was Napoleon; so are the Germans. There is no technical objection that I can see to the practicability of schemes like Mr. Hobson's. They involve the

surrender of British, French, American, and other sovereignties into the hands of a body in which the nominees of Russian, German, Hungarian, and Turkish autocracy would have a proportionate voice. If the citizens of free States wish to surrender their heritage of freedom and to merge their allegiance with that of subjects accustomed to arbitrary rule, there is no more to be said. Peace and order and prosperity they may for a time receive in exchange. These may be goods more valuable than liberty. Many persons think they are, especially for other people. Our existing industrial order, for instance, is based upon the idea that efficiency is more important than liberty. But few Englishmen would hesitate to include liberty as an indispensable element in that "good life" which it is the sole object of politics to promote. Judged by that ultimate test and in the light of the political ideals and constitutions of the existing States of the world, Mr. Hobson's and all other similar schemes fall to the ground.

So far we have been engaged in cross-examining the word "international," and it has helped to bring out certain important distinctions. I now propose to put into the box a more combative witness, whom I think it will be useful to examine on our way to positive conclusions. I propose to take the third of the four points put forward as the programme of the Union of Democratic Control. It is not very different on the constructive side from suggestions by other writers who hold widely different views on the war. I select it because it crystallises a mass of current thought in a conveniently compact and definite form. The "plank" in question is as follows:—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 'Balance of Power'; but shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and

decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace."

This sentence contains a negative half and a positive half. I will not dwell on the negative half, as it is not relevant to our subject, except to say that it does not seem to be quite fair in its implied statement as to the object of British foreign policy in the past. I pass, therefore, to the second or constructive part of the programme, in which the Foreign Office, and the British democracy whose servant it is, is advised as to what it ought to do. The formula then runs as follows :—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be made public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace."

There is nothing much to be said about the proposal for concerted action between the Powers. There is nothing new about it. The Great Powers of Europe have constantly throughout the last hundred years acted together in matters of common concern, especially in Near Eastern questions, and no State has a better record for loyalty and persistence in this direction than Great Britain. But the Concert has never created any organisation for itself beyond temporary conferences and congresses of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, and it has never shown itself amenable to democratic control. The important part of the suggestion lies in the proposed International Council.

If this suggestion is intended to be practicable it presumably means an *inter-State* Council—that is to say, a council composed of nominees from all the States or all the leading States of the world. A real *International* Council in which Poles sat next to Russians and Armenians next to Turks can hardly have been intended.

Presumably also the council is to consist of persons nominated by their governments or according to arrangements made by each separate government, and not directly or on a uniform plan by the citizens of the States concerned. It will be a conference of governments with governments, or of superior persons with superior persons, like the British Imperial Conference which meets every four years. Again, there is nothing particularly novel in the suggestion. The two Hague Conferences have been gatherings of this nature, and their deliberations, like those of our Imperial Conference, have been made public. If our foreign policy is to be directed to getting together a deliberate body consisting of representatives from the leading States of the world, that aim can be quickly attained.

But the real crux of the formula lies in the word "decisions." In what sense is this council going to *decide* things? Are they going merely to make up their own minds and embody the results in a series of resolutions? Or are they going to legislate? In other words, are they going to be an assembly of envoys or an assembly of representatives, in other words a Parliament? If the former, I welcome the suggestion. The more discussion and interchange and sifting of views we can have between public men in different States the better. But I see in such a suggestion no "guarantee of an abiding peace." The reason why many well-meaning people grow enthusiastic over the idea of such a council is that they look to it as the machinery which will prevent conflicts between States. A body of this character may help to make war less likely; or, by revealing a deep gulf of principle between two sets of members, it may (like the second Hague Congress) make it more likely; but it cannot make war impossible. So far as machinery is concerned, it could only do so if it had an executive responsible to it and obliged to obey its orders; and if it had armed forces to carry out those

orders, backed up by a federal treasury and a federal system of taxation; if it could quench a smouldering war in Germany or the Balkans as the Home Secretary can quench a riot at Tonypandy. In other words, an International Council can only be effective as *an organ of government* if it is part of a World-Government acting according to a regular written constitution: and such a constitution could only be set going after it had been adopted by a convention representative of all peoples or governments concerned. Before the suggested council could have authority to *decide* things, in the sense in which the formula suggests, Frenchmen, Germans, Turks, Russians and citizens of other existing States must have declared their willingness to merge their statehood in a larger whole and to hand over their armed forces, or the greater part of them, to the new central government. This may be what the formula means. It may be intended to allow a government of Germans, Magyars, Russians, Turks or any other chance majority to use the British and French navies to carry out its purposes. If this is meant it should be said. If it is not meant it should be explained that the council proposed is not an organ of government but an organ of influence or advice, and it should be made quite clear, to forestall inevitable disillusionments, that, to quote Washington again, "Influence is not government." Such a body might be of very great service to mankind, both as a clearing-house of ideas and as a means for embodying agreed solutions in a practical shape. It might become at once a drafting body and an organ for giving expression to the growing unity of civilised public opinion. If it met regularly, and the world became accustomed to look to it for guidance, it might achieve more in both these directions than has been attained along this road hitherto. But it will not be a government. In matters of law and government there is no room for middle paths or soothing formulae. Two

States are either Sovereign or they are United or Federated : they cannot be half and half. A man must know of what State he is a citizen and to what authority his duty is due. We all have our duty to render to Cæsar : but we cannot serve two Cæsars at once. Not all the Parliamentary ingenuity in the world can overcome that dilemma, as Virginians found out to their cost when the inexorable question was put to them at the outbreak of the Civil War. To ask British electors to surrender their power of determining the policy of this country to a body over which they have no control is to plunge into a jungle of difficulties and incidentally to set back, perhaps for ever, the cause of free and responsible government for which the Western Powers are trustees.

The practical programme of the Union of Democratic Control and of other advocates of similar solutions thus turns out to be something of an illusion. What is practical of the suggested machinery is not new, though it is susceptible of fuller and more systematic use than in the past : and what is new is neither practical nor wholesome—or, at least, would not be regarded as such by most Englishmen if its real meaning were made clear. War cannot be abolished by inventing foolproof political machinery, for no political machinery can overcome ultimate irreconcilable differences of political principle. Political intercourse, like trade relations, may strengthen existing ties and deepen the attachment to common ideals, but it cannot create agreement where a common basis of agreement is not forthcoming. It is well for us to face the fact that there is no short cut to universal peace. War will only become obsolete after far-reaching changes have taken place in the mind and heart of the civilised peoples : and the first and perhaps most important step in that direction is that the civilised peoples should feel called upon to exercise a responsible control over their own governments and armed forces. It is useless to dream of making Europe a federated Commonwealth

till the separate units of the potential Federation are themselves Commonwealths. Interpreted as a call to the fuller exercise of responsible citizenship, every believer in free government will respond to the watchword of Democratic Control.

Let us say farewell then, once and for all, to this idea of an "International Council" as providing machinery which shall be an absolute guarantee against war. But before passing on it is worth while spending a parting shot on a phrase with which it is often associated, because it illustrates a typical confusion of thought—I mean the phrase—the United States of Europe. The constant use of this phrase shows how easily such confusions gain vogue. One can see how it originated. America is a continent. Europe is a continent. America has its United States. Why should not the States of Europe unite and so put an end to European wars? It is not an unnatural train of reasoning for a Western American who knows nothing of Europe or of the causes which tend to produce wars. It escapes his notice that he is using the word "State" in two different senses. State in the word United States means province. The separate States are provinces, or component members of a Federation. The word "State" was put into the American Constitution as a deliberate misnomer, in order to gratify the thirteen original Sovereign States when they abandoned their sovereignty in entering into the Federation. Similarly the Orange Free State retains its old name in the South African Union. The survival of the word cost the American Commonwealth dear, for the word enshrined, and rightly enshrined, a conception of citizenship and indefeasible loyalty: and it cost the Americans four years of war and a million lives before the confusion inherent in the word "United States" was cleared up and men knew for certain whether the American Commonwealth was one State or several. That is the price men pay for halting

confusedly between two opinions and trying to serve two Cæsars at once. They not only failed to avert war, but actually promoted it.

I pass now to deal with an objection which must have been in some people's minds when I drew the distinction between Statehood and Nationality. It is quite true, they will say, that Statehood and Nationality are in fact, in the present condition of the world, distinguishable and often distinct—that Finland is a nation but part of the Russian State, and so on—but this is an unsatisfactory condition of things which it should be our hope to abolish. States and nations ought, they will say, to be coterminous. All states, or at any rate most States, ought to be Nation-States: at the very least, all self-governing States ought to be Nation-States. And they will invoke the authority of John Stuart Mill, whose words on the subject in his book on "Representative Government," have passed almost unchallenged for two generations as the pure milk of Liberal doctrine. "It is," says Mill, "in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."

This theory that the Nation-State is the normal and proper area of government at which believers in free institutions should aim, is sometimes known as "the principle of Nationality": and many loose-thinking people believe that it is one of the causes for which we are fighting in the present war. My own view is exactly the contrary. I believe it is one of the most formidable and sinister forces on the side of our enemies and one of the chief obstacles to human progress at the present time.

Let us look into it more closely. What exactly does this belief in the coincidence of Nationality and Statehood mean? What is the principle underlying the theory of the National State, or of political nationalism, as it is sometimes called? The theory says that because the

Poles feel themselves to be a nation, there ought to be an independent Poland. In other words, the independent Polish kingdom will rest upon the fact that its citizens are Poles. The Polish kingdom will be a kingdom of Poles. Polishness would be its distinguishing mark: the criterion of its citizenship. Districts of the territory or sections of the population which were not Polish, or had ceased to be Polish, would therefore cease to be "national": and by ceasing to be national would lose their right to membership in the State. In other words, the State is not based on any universal principle, such as justice, or democracy, or collective consent, or on anything moral or universally human at all, but on something partial, arbitrary and accidental.

"By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the State's boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence."

These last three sentences are not my own. They were not written to point the moral of the exterminations promoted by Turkish nationalism in Armenia, or of the various degrees of servitude, oppression and propaganda enforced by German, Magyar, Russian and other dominant forms of political nationalism. They were written by Lord Acton fifty years ago, when the Nationalist doctrines which overshadow Eastern Europe and Western Asia to-day were a cloud no bigger than a man's hand. In his essay on "Nationality," published in 1862,[1] Acton remorselessly analysed its political claims and predicted,

[1] Republished in "The History of Freedom and other Essays," 1909.

with the insight of moral genius, the disastrous consequences of basing government on so arbitrary and insecure a foundation. "The theory of Nationality," he said, using the strongest language at his command, "is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of Socialism." Time softens the edge of strong language, but in this case without blunting the force of the prediction.

"Its course," he says, "will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. . . . Thus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system (Acton has been speaking of the theory of Nationality as a phase of revolutionary doctrine) makes the collective will subject to the conditions which are independent of it, only to be controlled by an accident."

Lord Acton's words were not listened to, for more fashionable doctrines held the field. In England both Liberalism and Conservatism had their own special reasons for espousing the cause of political Nationalism. To the Liberals it seemed to spell liberty, and to the Conservatives it seemed to embody the force of instinct or tradition, as against doctrines which based government on more universal considerations of Reason and Humanity. But Acton, with his eye ranging over the whole course of human history, cared more for liberty than for any of the temporary formulae in which it was sought to dress her up. He foresaw that to base government on anything less than a quality common to all the governed, in virtue of their common humanity, was for the State to surrender its moral pretensions and its rôle as a factor in the moral progress of the world. Time has borne him out : and what was in its inception little more than a pardonable aberration, a natural result

of strong feeling combined with loose thinking, has become in more than one contemporary State the mainspring of a Realpolitik which avowedly bases policy upon considerations of national selfishness and seeks to propagate a dominant nationalism through the power of the government with which it is so unhappily associated.

Am I out of sympathy then, I shall be asked, with political nationalist movements? Do I look coldly on the record of Mazzini and Garibaldi, or regret the liberation of Italy? Far from it. But I wish to make perfectly clear—what was too easily obscured by the circumstances of the time—that the reason why the people of Sicily, Venetia, Tuscany, and the rest became incorporated with Piedmont in one Italian State was not because they were Italian in speech and culture, but because they deliberately desired thus to dispose of their destiny. Italian national sentiment might, and in fact did, contribute to promote that desire; but it was not the principle underlying the union of Italy. If it had been the movement would have extended to the Italian cantons of Switzerland, which have remained firm in their allegiance to that free and supra-national Commonwealth. The sentiment of Nationality may, and often does, as in the Trentino, contribute to what is called irredentism, but it is not a justifiable basis of the irredentists' claim to a change of government. One can see that at a glance by considering what would happen if the sentiment of Nationality *were* admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government. French Canada would have to pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become the servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland. I have taken progressively impossible instances in order to show how easily the theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood can be reduced to an absurdity. But the fact that the theory is absurd does not prevent its being put into

practice, and instances as absurd as those last drawn from the New World can be drawn in actual fact from the Old. To what State ought Macedonia to belong? It depends, according to the political nationalist's theory, on the nationality of the people of Macedonia. Magicians are brought upon the scene, in the shape of ethnologists and historians, to determine the question of nationality, and the unfortunate people, instead of being asked what they do desire, are told what they ought to desire, and schools are founded to enforce the lesson. Some friends of mine stayed some years ago in a village which changed its nationality more than once in a season under the persuasion of the bayonets of rival bands of wandering propagandists. Nationality has in fact become a matter of propaganda, like religion, and the wars that it leads to partake of the aimless and blundering brutality of religious wars in which men try to save other men's souls by offering them the alternatives of conversion or the stake.

It is not the principle of nationality, as so many English people think, which will bring peace and good government to Macedonia and Eastern Europe generally, but the principle of toleration. It took Western Europe several generations after the Thirty Years' War to realise that religion, being subjective, was no satisfactory criterion of Statehood, and that a wise ruler must allow his subjects to go to heaven by their own road. It may take Eastern Europe as long to reach the same conclusion about Nationality. But in the long run the theory of a National State will go the way of Henry VIII.'s and Luther's theory of a National Church.

In reality, of course, English people when they invoke the principle of Nationality mean the principle of Democracy—the principle that a people, however constituted, whether homogeneous like the Italians, or closely related like the Southern Slavs, or not homogeneous at all, like the Belgians and the Swiss, has a

right to dispose of its own destiny according to its corporate will. If we mean Democracy, let us boldly say so. It is not indeed a magic formula. It is open to limitations obvious enough to the student of non-adult races. But it is no cause to be ashamed of.

Having thus cleared the ground, I will proceed to indicate my own view of Nationality and Statehood. I must be very brief; but, if I give little more than definitions, I hope my criticism of other views will have enabled the definitions to explain themselves.

It is clear that there is a fundamental difference between the two conceptions. Nationality, like religion, is subjective; Statehood is objective. Nationality is psychological; Statehood is political. Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a condition in law. Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood is an enforceable obligation. Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking and living; Statehood is a condition inseparable from all civilised ways of living.

What is subjective cannot be defined in strict scientific terms: it can only be interpreted; and the interpretation will only have a meaning for those who can appreciate the peculiar quality of the object interpreted. It is impossible to define the quality of a Beethoven symphony so as to make it intelligible to non-musicians. Similarly it is impossible to define the quality which makes Shakespeare's work characteristically English, or to explain to a German ignorant of England what exactly it is which has evaporated in Schlegel's translation. Jews and Gentiles both rock equally with laughter at "Potash and Perlmutter"; but the Jews know that they are laughing at the real Jewish humour of the play, while the Gentiles are only laughing at the jokes. Internationalism, in its finest and truest sense, involves an insight into the inner spiritual life of many nationalities and a sensitive palate to many various forms of national quality. A man who has no understanding of Jewish

humour may have the highest liberal principles and the best and most enlightened intentions; but he will have an incomplete understanding of Jewish nationality.

How then shall we define Nationality? Nationality, I would suggest, is a form of corporate sentiment. I would define a nation as *a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country.* Every nation has a home, though some nations, such as the Jews, the Irish, the Norwegians and the Poles, live for the greater part in exile. If the Jews ceased to feel a peculiar affection for Palestine or the Irish for Ireland they would both cease to be nations, as the gipsies have ceased to be a nation; and when an individual Jew ceases to feel affection for Palestine, or an individual Irishman ceases to feel affection for Ireland, he ceases to be a Jew or an Irishman.[1] Once an American citizen, a man is always an American citizen until either the State is destroyed or his status is altered by process of law; but Nationality, being subjective, is often mutable and intermittent. History is full of the deaths and resurrections of nations, and amid the commercialism and cosmopolitanism of to-day many diverse forms of national consciousness are struggling to maintain their hold on the minds and spirits of the scattered races of mankind. Only those who have seen at close quarters what a moral degra-

[1] It may be argued that such men still remained members of their race even though they no longer acknowledged their nationality. This is true. Race is an objective test, and no man can change his race any more than a leopard can change his spots. But this is not the same as to admit that there is such a thing as a Jewish or an Irish race. Race is an ethnological and anthropological term, and much confusion would be avoided if it were kept severely out of political discussions. The current scientific classification of race (homo Alpinus, homo Mediterraneus, etc.) has no bearing on questions of national or political consciousness, except to make it clear that political theories (like that of Houston Stewart Chamberlain) which base themselves on race differences are unscientific and worthless. The world is, of course, full of the descendants of "assimilated" Jews and Irishmen; but it is equally full of "assimilated" Assyrians, Hittites, Goths, Picts, Angles, and other forgotten nationalities. To lay stress on facts such as these is no more helpful than to recall that we are all children of Adam.

dation the loss of nationality involves, or sampled the drab cosmopolitanism of Levantine seaports or American industrial centres, can realise what a vast reservoir of spiritual power is lying ready, in the form of national feeling, to the hands of teachers and statesmen, if only they can learn to direct it to wise and liberal ends. To seek to ignore this force or to humiliate it or to stamp it out in the name of progress or western ideas is unwittingly to reproduce Prussian methods and to promote, not progress or enlightenment, but spiritual impoverishment and moral weakness. Driven from the throne and the altar, national sentiment is at last finding its proper resting-place in the mission school and the settlement and in the homes of the common people. In the world as it is to-day, as educated India is discovering, consciousness of nationality is essential to individual self-respect, as self-respect is essential to right living.

Nationality, in fact, rightly regarded, is not a political but an educational conception. It is a safeguard of self-respect against the insidious onslaughts of a materialistic cosmopolitanism. It is the sling in the hands of weak undeveloped peoples against the Goliath of material progress. The political Prussianism of a militarist government is far less dangerous to the spiritual welfare of its subjects in the long run than the ruthless and pervading pressure of commercial and cosmopolitan standards. What is imposed on them by overt tyranny men resist, and win self-respect by resisting; but the corruption that creeps in as an "improvement" men imitate and succumb to. The vice of nationalism is Jingoism, and there are always good Liberals amongst us ready to point a warning finger against its manifestations. The vice of internationalism is decadence and the complete eclipse of personality, ending in a type of character and social life which good Conservatives instinctively detest, but have seldom sufficient patience to describe. Fortunately we possess in Sir Mark Sykes

a political writer who has the gift of clothing his aversions in picturesque descriptive writing, and in his books on the Near East English readers can find some of the best examples (which might be paralleled from other continents, not least from America) of the spiritual degradation which befalls men who have pursued "Progress" and cosmopolitanism and lost contact with their own national spiritual heritage. Here is his account of one such mis-educated mind, encountered in Kurdistan :

"He said he was studying to be an ethnologist, psychologist, hypnotist and poet : he admired Renan, Kant, Herbert Spencer, Gladstone, Spurgeon, Nietzsche, and Shakespeare. It afterwards appeared that his library consisted of an advertisement of Eno's Fruit Salt, from which he quoted freely. He wept over what he called the 'punishment of our great nation,' and desired to be informed how, in existing circumstances, he could elevate himself to greatness and power."[1]

Those of us who have been teachers have known the *genus* "prig" in our time and have discovered how to handle him ; but it is not so easy to discover how to handle a whole society of prigs from which the health-giving winds of nationality and tradition have been withdrawn. No task is more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect.

But to return to the definition. National sentiment is *intense :* it makes a great deal of difference to a man whether or not he is a Scot or a Jew or a Pole. It is not a thing which he could deny or betray without a feeling of shame. It is *intimate :* it goes very deep down to the roots of a man's being : it is linked up with his past : it embodies the momentum of an ancient tradition. The older a nation is, and the more it has achieved and suffered, the more national it is. Nationality means more to a Jew and an Armenian (probably

[1] "The Caliph's Last Heritage," 1915, p. 429.

the two oldest surviving forms of national consciousness) than to a Canadian ; and, to quote a famous phrase, "it means more to be a Canadian to-day" than it did before the second Battle of Ypres. Thirdly, it is *dignified*. The corporate sentiment of a nation is of a more dignified order than the corporate sentiment of a village. It is as hard to say at what stage of size or dignity nationality begins as to say how many grains are needed to form a heap. One could go through the islands of the world, from a coral-reef to Australia, and find it impossible to say at what point one reached an island large enough for the common sentiment of its inhabitants to be described as national. Broadly speaking, one can only say that if a people feels itself to be a nation, it is a nation.

Let us follow out what follows from this definition. If a group of people have a corporate sentiment, they will seek to embody it in a common or similar mode of life. They will have their own national institutions. Englishmen will make toast and play open-air games and smoke short pipes and speak English wherever they go. Similarly Greeks will speak Greek and eat olives (if they can get them) and make a living by their wits. There is nothing in all this to prevent Englishmen and Greeks from being good citizens under any government to whose territory they migrate. The difficulty only arises when governments are foolish or intolerant enough to prohibit toast or olives or football or national schools and societies, or to close the avenues of professional life and social progress to new classes of citizens. Arbitrary government, by repressing the spontaneous manifestations of nationality, lures it into political channels : for it is only through political activity that oppressed nationalities can gain the right to pursue their distinctive ways of life. Between free government and nationality there is no need, and indeed hardly a possibility, of conflict. This is clear from the fact that, whereas in reactionary States the social manifestations of nationality

invariably tend to become political, so that literary societies and gymnastic clubs are suspect to the police and constantly liable to dissolution, in Great Britain and America manifestations of nationality tend to become more and more non-political and social in character. Languages banned and prohibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia as dangerous to the State are freely spoken in the United States ; and, though there are more Poles in Chicago than in Warsaw, and more Norwegians in the North Western States than in Norway, nobody apprehends any danger therefrom to the unity and security of the American Commonwealth. The American Commonwealth may, and indeed must, change its distinctive character and quality with the lapse of time and the change in the composition of its population ; it may even become multi-lingual. But its governmental institutions will remain untroubled, so long as it remains a free democracy, by political nationalist movements. America will have to wait long for its Kossuths and Garibaldis.

Much more could be said about Nationality ; but it is time to pass to Statehood.

What is a State ? A State can be defined, in legal language, as a territory or territories over which there is a government claiming unlimited authority. This definition says nothing about the vexed question of the relation between the State and the individual, and the rights of conscientious objectors. It only makes clear the indisputable fact that, whatever the response of individuals, the claim to exercise unlimited authority is inherent in Statehood. It is involved in State sovereignty. The State, as Aristole said long ago, is a sovereign association, embracing and superseding, for the purposes of human life in society, all other associations. The justification of the State's claim to peculiar authority is that experience shows it is mankind's only safeguard against anarchy, and that anarchy involves the

eclipse of freedom. Haiti and Mexico to-day are the best commentaries on that well-thumbed text, of which priests and barons in earlier ages, like Quakers and plutocrats and syndicalists in our own, have needed, and still need to be reminded. Freedom and the good life cannot exist without government. They can only come into existence *through* government.

But Statehood in itself does not carry us beyond ancient Egypt and Assyria, or beyond Petrograd and Potsdam. Such States have subjects, and these subjects have obligations, both legal and moral : but they are not, strictly speaking, citizens. Citizenship is the obligation incumbent on members of Commonwealths or free States.

What is a free State ? Here again one can give no exact definition ; for freedom, like nationality, is not something tangible, like a ballot-box, but a state of mind in individual men and women. A free State is a State so governed as to promote freedom. What is freedom ? Perhaps the best brief definition of freedom is that lately given by that bold psychologist, our chairman, when he spoke of that "continuous possibility of initiative which we vaguely mean by 'freedom.'" [1] A man is not free unless he feels free, and in order to feel free he must feel that there is a full range of thought and at least some range of action left open for the determination of his own will. How strong that desire for personal freedom, that sense of the importance of the possibility of initiative, is among Englishmen we have lately seen by their marked preference for being "asked" to enlist as against being "ordered" to enlist. For Englishmen, in fact, and for all men who set store by human values, the sense of personal freedom is an important factor in promoting happiness or a sense of well-being. Freedom may be hard to define in set terms ; but the man who can be perfectly happy without it enjoys the passive

[1] Article by Mr. Graham Wallas in *The New Statesman*, September 25 1915.

contentment of an animal rather than the positive well-being proper to a man. The neglect of this obvious truth in the working of our industrial government is the simplest and most potent element in the inarticulate labour unrest which has so much hampered British trade and industry of recent years. Harmony can only be restored by frankly basing our industrial life, as our political life is already based, on the principle of responsible self-government.

Freedom and self-government, as this illustration shows, are closely associated: but it is important to recognise that they are not identical. Haiti is more self-governing than its neighbour Jamaica or Nigeria, but Jamaica and Nigeria are the freer countries. If British rule and its accompanying expert knowledge were withdrawn from Nigeria and the country were in consequence ravaged by sleeping sickness, the individual Nigerian would obviously not thereby have increased his freedom of initiative or his personal well-being. At certain stages of knowledge and education free government and responsible self-government are incompatible; but it is the root principle of democracy that the right, or rather the moral duty, of self-government is an essential element in full personal freedom. No State can be described as free unless it is either self-governing or so organised as to promote self-government in the future.

If the exercise of self-government is a duty and a privilege without which man cannot grow to his full moral stature or enjoy the full sense of freedom and self-respect, it follows that the object to which it is directed is a moral object. Citizenship is more than a mere matter of political gymnastics, designed to train the moral faculties of the individual; it is civilised man's appointed means for the service of mankind. It is through the State, and by means of civic service, that man in the modern world can best do his duty to his neighbour. An ordinary old-fashioned State may be no more than a Sovereign Authority, but a free State or

Commonwealth is and must be invested with what may best be described as a moral personality. It could not claim the free service of its citizens unless it stood for moral ends. In so far as it ceases to stand for moral ends, its citizens cease to be moral agents, and, as we have seen in the case of Germany, this inevitable atrophy of moral action in its citizens means a corresponding decline in their moral freedom. Their sense of civic obligation comes into conflict with their sense of what is right and just, and the conflict ends in a degradation of personal self-respect and in the open acceptance of a two-fold standard of morality for States and for private individuals, resulting in the approbation of what is known as Realpolitik. If the unashamed Italian ministerial phrase, "Sacro egoismo nazionale" (sacred national egoism), which could be paralleled nearer home, really characterised the guiding motive of the Italian State, as it does that of some others, then the people of Italy would not only be less moral but also less free and self-respecting to-day than they were when they responded to the very different watchwords of Mazzini.

To maintain and to live up to this high conception of citizenship is no easy task. A great political tradition embodies the work of generations of effort and service. Those who lightly ask us to transcend it and become citizens of Europe or of a World-State have often not made clear to themselves what civic obligation involves, or how necessary it is that, before we ask Europe to accept us as citizens, we must have been faithful in small things, so as to bring her a gift of service worthy of her acceptance. Membership of a free State, such as the British Commonwealth, means more than mere obedience to its laws or a mere emotion of pride and patriotism, more even than an intelligent exercise of political duties: it involves a personal dedication to great tasks and great ideals: it links a man to great causes striven for in the past, and sets him a standard and a tradition to work for

in the future. The functions of government may conceivably be divided ; but dedication, like marriage, must of its nature be undivided. It can only be relinquished when it can be merged in all solemnity and in the fullness of time in a great free federation where the same causes and ideals can be brought to larger and happier fulfilment.

There is no time, at the end of this long paper, to work out a philosophy of government in detail, but this at least may be said to make clear my attitude to the inter-State problem which in my earlier remarks I have laid bare rather than attempted to solve. That problem is incapable of solution till men have come to regard States as moral personalities with duties as well as rights : till all the leading States, through the public opinion of their free citizens, have come to regard their duty to humanity as prior to the safe-guarding of their selfish purposes : and until there is a far closer agreement among the civilised peoples than seems possible to-day as to the principles which should underlie the ultimate organisation of the world on the basis of morality and justice. Government exists to promote the conditions of a good life : and the anarchy and wickedness of the present conflict are a revelation at once of the absence and of the need of a world-government which shall promote those conditions for all mankind. But until mankind are agreed as to those conditions, until they know what kind of a world they desire to live in, and have achieved freedom of action to give effect to their wishes, it is idle to look to statesmen to give us more than a temporary and precarious peace. Peace is not the birthright of the sons of men : it is the prize of right living. Let us first be clear in our minds and hearts as to what is the cause for which we stand, and where our service is due, and let us be faithful in performing it : then haply, at the latter end, when the reign of Justice and Liberty has been assured, Peace too may be added unto us.

TRUE AND FALSE NATIONALISM[1]

You have asked me to speak to you on True and False Nationalism—that is to say, on the sentiment of Nationality in its good and its evil manifestations—as the opening lecture in this week's course on International Relationships. I am very glad that you have arranged for the treatment of this subject: for the road to Internationalism lies through Nationalism; and no theory or ideal of Internationalism can be helpful in our thinking or effective in practice unless it is based on a right understanding of the place which national sentiment occupies and must always occupy in the life of mankind. If we believe, as we all of us here do, in the brotherhood of man: if we feel, more than ever at a time like this, that we are all children of one Father, and that men, women, and children, to whatever race they belong and whatever the colour of their faces, are loveable simply in virtue of their mere humanity, yet we must all also admit that "it takes all sorts to make a world." We must admit the uniqueness and individuality of every human soul, and the difficulty which most of us experience in getting behind the barriers of reserve and mutual misunderstanding which shut men and women up in little cages impenetrable to all but those who have the genius of friendship and sympathy. And we must admit, even more poignantly, the unique corporate individuality of social groups and distinctive nationalities, and the terrible difficulty of penetrating unaided through the wire entanglements behind which those whom we know and

[1] Address to the Inter-denominational Conference of Social Service Unions at Swanwick, June 28, 1915, the Bishop of Lichfield in the chair.

acknowledge to be our brothers sit in tragic and sometimes in sullen resignation. Many kind-hearted English people who talked lightly of international brotherhood a year ago have had their theories rudely challenged, not so much by the war as by the constant daily difficulty of trying to understand and to feel sympathetic towards their Belgian guests, whose modes of thought and corporate idiosyncrasies have seemed so hard to comprehend. Similarly many an enthusiastic young Englishman has gone out to India full of plans for bridging the age-long gulf between East and West and has given up the task disheartened and disillusioned. "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you" sounds such a simple and easy text in theory. You only begin to realise how difficult it is when you discover your total ignorance as to how your alien brother wishes to be treated. It is no good treating him as *you* would like to be treated. It is no good, for instance, inviting a Belgian to a cricket-match or a high-caste Indian to a dinner-party. You have to penetrate below the surface manners and customs which divide the members of different nationalities and social groups from one another to the eternal things which unite, to the rock-bottom level of our common humanity. But to do that is not easy: it cannot be learnt in a day: it conflicts with our insular habit of mind. Only a genius can do it without knowledge. Most of us can only learn it through careful study of the nations or groups with whom we are dealing and a patient training of our sympathies and insight.

A right understanding of the meaning and value of Nationality is an indispensable preliminary then to any international programme. That being so, I felt that I could not refuse your invitation to speak on it, as it is a subject which has been much in my mind for some years past. Yet I was conscious in accepting it—and the feeling increased as the date crept nearer—of the great responsibility you have thrown on me by asking me to

occupy this opening morning. I want to try to discharge it by speaking to you, quite frankly, out of my own personal experience, which is necessarily different from that of any one else present, trusting to the discussion that follows to correct what you may feel to be my one-sidedness or perhaps my excessive detachment.

Most Englishmen have picked up their ideas about Nationality from the great Liberal and Nationalist thinkers of their generation, and from those who in our own day are applying the nineteenth-century ideas to the problems of Central and South-Eastern Europe. They look upon it, that is to say, as a *political* question, and as bound up with the assertion of a political ideal. We know the Irish Nationalists as a political party, and we are now familiar with similar political parties in the oppressed or, as the Italians call them, the unredeemed lands of Central and Eastern Europe, in Poland, in Bohemia, in Croatia, and in parts of the Balkans and nearer Asia. Our statesmen have told us that our policy is one of liberation for these races, and our prophets, in the newspapers and elsewhere, have already redrawn the map of Europe so as to group the States so far as possible into national units. English people as a whole have gladly subscribed to these ideas. They may not all be equally sanguine: they may differ in their views as to their practicability, and in their attitude towards Russia; but there is no difference of opinion as regards the doctrine of Nationality itself. The bitterest opponents of Sir Edward Grey see eye to eye with him on this point. The day is irrevocably past when Bernard Shaw could raise a laugh against the upholders of the Nationalist traditions of Liberalism by declaring: "A Liberal is a man who has three duties: a duty to Ireland, a duty to Finland, and a duty to Macedonia." The whirligig of time and of events has made us all Nationalists now—at any rate as regards the Continent; while even in the vexed question of Ireland many of those who were bitter

enemies of Irish Nationalism in the past are now heard arguing that Ireland really consists of two nations, not one, and that Ulster ought, therefore, to be under a separate government from the rest of Ireland. The slow-moving English mind has thoroughly grasped the fact that the desire of national groups to live their own life and manage their own affairs is—to say the least—deserving of respectful consideration: and the behaviour of the Germans in Belgium has driven this conclusion relentlessly home. We are not now likely to ignore the political claims of Nationality either in our thinking or in the European settlement. The mistakes we are likely to make lie rather in the opposite direction. The danger of our thought at the moment, as it seems to me, is not that we should ignore the political side of Nationality, but that we should exaggerate its importance and mistake a temporary expedient and necessary stage in political progress for a permanent political solution and a satisfactory political ideal.

The danger is a very real one, and I want to join issue on it at once. The current political theory about Nationality is, I think, fairly expressed in the following sentence of Mill's "Representative Government": "It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." Mill believes, in other words, that citizenship and nationality should be co-extensive: that we should look forward to a world neatly parcelled out into National States, each under its own independent Government, and that all States, or (as we sometimes call them) empires which include different races and nations are thereby rendered imperfect and ought ultimately to break up. I believe from the bottom of my heart that Mill's idea is fundamentally wrong—wrong in fact, and wrong as an ideal, and that all forward-looking men who desire better international relations and a better political organisation of the world

must set their hope, not in the Nation-State, which is only a stage, and in the West an outworn stage, in the political evolution of mankind, but in States which, like the great governing religious systems of the past, like mediaeval Christendom and Islam, find room for all sorts and conditions of communities and nations.

Having thus thrown down the gauntlet to Mill and the theory of the National State, let me briefly indicate my own personal position towards the problem, and how I came to hold it. I approach the problem, not as a statesman or a student of politics, but simply *as a teacher:* as one, that is, whose business it is to try and draw out the hidden good and the buried truth that is in every man's soul—to try and get on the right side of people, to appeal to their higher and deeper nature in such a way that they can understand the appeal and respond to it. That is to me what Education means—not pouring in, but drawing out; and it is as one interested in education, in this true sense of the word, that I would like to interest you in the question of Nationality.

Nationality to me is not a political question at all—not a question of Sovereign Governments, armies, frontiers and foreign policy. Or perhaps, I should say it is only *accidentally* a political question, owing to the operation of certain forces which are really anachronisms in the twentieth century. It is primarily and essentially a spiritual question, and, in particular, an educational question. It is a question for the parent, the teacher, the educational administrator, the missionary, the social worker, for all who are concerned with the life and ideals of the young and with the spiritual welfare of the community. Nationality to me is bound up with the question of corporate life, corporate growth, and corporate self-respect. I learnt to value Nationality, not from reading Mazzini's essays (though I read them enthusiastically as a boy) nor from sympathising with European Nationalist movements (though no one wishes them success more

fervently or loathes oppression more whole-heartedly than I do), but from realising, as I grew to manhood, that I was not an Englishman, and from my sense of the debt I owe to the heritage with which I am connected by blood and tradition. My own particular national connexions are of no concern. But to have discovered that I was not an Englishman in the deeper side of my nature and that yet my opinions on public affairs corresponded with those of my fellow-citizens, and that my working life would be spent in England—this carried me beyond the facile philosophy held by the ordinary Englishman, that citizenship and nationality are co-extensive terms. Later experience all tended to confirm this impression. In the Workers' Educational Association I learnt that the way to give a university education to workpeople is not to impose a standardised culture or knowledge upon them from above, but to seek to understand their distinctive corporate modes of life and thought, and so, by accepting and even welcoming their differences of experience and outlook, to penetrate through to the eternal things that unite. I learnt, as the nation has learnt in these last few weeks, that the way to enlist working-class devotion is by using the corporate modes of action and organisation which they have evolved as a social group to express their own needs and ideals. Later, I spent a year in the Near East; there I saw the other side of the picture. I saw the crude and narrow side of political Nationalism, a propaganda in which all the social and ethical values, religion, morality, citizenship, were used for the promotion of one single all-absorbing political end. I heard of Macedonian bishops whose chief function was to distribute rifles to guerilla bands, and talked to peasants whom, I am sure, not even our chairman himself could have persuaded that a Turk was a human being like themselves. But I saw also another process: the gradual sapping of Nationality and all the traditional customs and restraints associated with

it by the insidious influences of commercialism. I met Levantines who were proud to belong to no nationality, who took greasy American passports out of their pockets and boasted of the immunity from ordinary legal processes which they thereby enjoyed: and I began to wonder whether the fanatical peasant, for all his Old Testament ferocity, was not preferable to the Levantine lounger along the quayside with his purely economic standards. Then I left the Balkans and spent seven months in the United States, and there, thanks to Jane Addams and some other fine spirits who have had the courage and insight to grapple with the problems of immigration, my conversion to non-political Nationalism was completed. I watched the workings of that ruthless economic process sometimes described as "the miracle of assimilation." I watched the steam-roller of American industrialism—so much more terrible to me in its consequences than Prussian or Magyar tyranny—grinding out the spiritual life of the immigrant proletariat, turning honest, primitive peasants into the helpless and degraded tools of the Trust magnate and the Tammany boss: and I realised that only by a conscious attempt to keep alive their links with the past, by an educational movement on the lines and in the spirit of the Workers' Educational Association movement at home, could America be saved from the anarchy with which she is threatened. In other words, I have come to believe in Nationality, not as a political creed for oppressed peoples, but rather as an educational creed for the diverse national groups of which the industrialised and largely migratory democracies in our large modern States must be increasingly composed. I believe in Nationality because I believe that the alternative to Nationality in the modern world is not governmental oppression but spiritual atrophy. And I think spiritual atrophy is equally disastrous whether it comes about through the action of a repressive Government or through the disintegrating influences

which are variously described by such names as Progress, Civilisation, Culture, Assimilation, and even, I fear, sometimes in old-fashioned mission schools as Conversion.

Let me now try to apply this conception of Nationality to the facts of the world as we see it to-day.

The problem of Nationality confronts us to-day in two distinct forms. There is the problem in Central and South-Eastern Europe, which, owing to the war and the long chain of events which preceded it, is primarily a *political* problem ; and there is the spiritual and educational problem which I have just described—a problem which confronts us in all parts of the world, wherever economic activity or what is called Progress is breaking up old forms of life, whether it be in South Wales or in India, in Nigeria or the United States, among the Irish in Liverpool and Glasgow or among the Jews of the East End of London.

I do not mean to dwell at length on the political problem in Central and South-Eastern Europe. The facts are familiar to you. You know how the Polish nation was divided into three parts at the end of the eighteenth century, and how both the Prussian and the Russian Governments have done their best to stamp out the Polish language and the sentiment of Polish nationality, with the result that the Poles are to-day more alive and more self-conscious than ever. You know how the German Government has behaved towards the Alsatians and Lorrainers, and towards the Danes of Schleswig, crushing out their institutions, and trying to submerge their language and traditions beneath a flood of immigrants. You know, probably, the still more intolerable behaviour of the dominant Magyars in Hungary towards the Roumanians and the various Slav races who are subject to the Hungarian State : and you know how the Austrian half of the monarchy, heir of a wiser tradition of government, has been forced into line with the

Germans and the Hungarians, to the irreparable injury of Europe. It has been difficult for English people to realise that any modern government could be so wicked or so insane as to adopt the policy which has been pursued by the politicians of Berlin and Buda-Pesth and Petrograd for many years past—a policy involving the prohibition of rights, like the use of one's own language, which we hardly realise that we enjoy: we have grown so used to taking them for granted, like the air we breathe.

This policy of forcible assimilation of Germanisation, of Russification, of Magyarisation, of Turkification is insane. It is like trying by Act of Parliament to whiten the Ethiopian or to change the leopard's spots. It is insane: and it is doomed to failure. The blood of martyrs is the seed of the Church. The Poles, the Ruthenes, the Serbo-Croats and the rest are to-day more conscious of their nationality than ever. It is insane: but we must remember that it is actually going on: and that it has for years been bearing fruit—not the fruit which the German, the Magyar, the Turkish, and the Russian Governments desire, yet not the fruit which we in the West desire either.

What is the result which the attempt at the forcible suppression of Nationality has produced in Eastern Europe?

It has produced, among the suffering Nationalists, what I fear one can only describe as an abnormal and almost diseased frame of mind. Oppression and suppression have weighed so heavily upon them that they can think of nothing else, talk of nothing else, work for nothing else. There is a certain melancholy and tiresome monotony about the representatives of oppressed nationalities: their national wrongs and their national hopes are for ever on their lips. One feels as though they were reaching out after something which was indispensable to the completion of their manhood. Till

Poland is free, a Pole cannot enter into the full heritage of the modern world, cannot work in modern movements, or take his stand side by side with the members of happier nations. He must remain an outsider, a pariah, a wandering agitator working for that for want of which ordinary life has lost its sweetness for him. When I was in Crete, before its annexation to Greece, even the shepherds on the topmost slopes of Mount Ida were discussing the secrets of the European Chancelleries and the prospects of a European war, and seeing in every stray traveller a possible wirepuller on their behalf in that diplomatic world where, as political Nationalists so fondly believe, national destinies are made or marred.

But nations cannot achieve true freedom through diplomacy or even through war. They must win it for themselves in the region of the spirit. All that statesmen and soldiers can do is to remove from their shoulders the weight of an intolerable oppression and leave them free to work out their own destiny. That oppression, we hope, will be ended, for some at least of the oppressed nationalities of Europe, by the settlement at the close of this war. But we must not fall into the error of imagining that when we have broken up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and set up a number of little National States instead the national problem will be solved. On the contrary, it will be more in evidence than ever. All that will have happened is that a great obstacle to the healthy working of national sentiment will have been removed. But the aftermath of oppression will still remain—the bitter memories and the inbred intolerance which are so often the fruit of persecution, and the habits of servility and wire-pulling, of intrigue and agitation which inevitably grow upon individuals or groups who have been living for long years amid the excitements of propaganda, instead of leading a normal healthy social existence. We must not expect too much from the liberated nationalities, or we shall be bitterly disillusioned. They have

been brought up in a bad school: and their English and French sympathisers will need to exert all their influence and use all their sympathy to exorcise the malign results of long years of oppression and agitation. The emancipated slave and the parvenu magnate do not always shine in positions of responsibility and command. History records the same of nations suddenly released from the prison-house. The evil that tyrants do lives after them, whereas, only too often, the good their persecution provoked, the heroism, the self-sacrifice, and the devotion, is "interred with their bones." It took Italy more than a generation to recover from the reaction which set in after the triumphs of Garibaldi.

So much for the peculiar national problem created by misgovernment and oppression in parts of Europe. It is, as I have tried to show, only by accident a political problem. It has become political because wicked and autocratic governments have interfered with the social and traditional life and offended the deepest instincts of the nations concerned. Misgovernment has in its turn provoked a reaction: and this reaction has transformed nationality into a revolutionary political force, which sets before itself the purely political ideal of Nationality, in the form of a national State. Unfortunately, owing to the tragic failure and blindness first of Turkish and then of Austro-Hungarian statesmanship, South-Eastern Europe seems destined to be for some time longer the home of a number of small independent national States, roughly co-extensive with nationalities. This may or may not be the least bad of the possible solutions at the present time. But do not let us imagine, like Mill, that these small national States are an advantage to the world as a whole, or that they are anything but a hindrance to the growth of that internationalism—that mutual tolerance, understanding and co-operation between nationalities—which we here have at heart. Sympathy with small nationalities has led many unthinking people to a

wholly unjustified admiration for small States, regardless of the fact that, for all practical purposes, they are as great an anachronism in the large-scale world of to-day as the stage-coach and the sailing-ship, and other relics of a vanished past. I cannot labour this point at length : nor is it really germane to our subject ; I can only refer you to the searching analysis of the political side of nationalist claims made by Lord Acton in his wonderfully prophetic essay on Nationality written in 1862, in the heyday of Mill and Mazzini.

"The greatest adversary of the rights of Nationality," says Acton, "is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilisation in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a position of dependence."

I quote this passage, not only as a forecast of Prussian and Magyar, and I fear I must add Roumanian methods, but because it points to dangers from which we are not wholly free even in this country. There are many good people who believe, with Mr. Bottomley and Lord Northcliffe, that British citizenship is in some peculiar way the monopoly of Englishmen, and that naturalised British subjects, or persons of foreign extraction, are only, so to speak, admitted into the household on sufferance and ought to apologise for their existence.

What Acton says about small States is perhaps even more prophetic in view of the sufferings of Belgium and of the smaller neutrals—

"The progress of civilisation," he says, "deals hardly with small States. In order to maintain their integrity they must

attach themselves by confederations or family alliances to greater Powers and thus lose something of their independence. Their tendency is to isolate and shut off their inhabitants, to narrow the horizon of their view, and to dwarf in some degree the proportions of their ideas. Public opinion cannot maintain its liberty and purity in such small dimensions. In a small and homogeneous population there is hardly room for a natural classification of society or for those inner groups of interests that set bounds to sovereign power. The government and the subjects contend with borrowed weapons. The resources of the one and the aspirations of the other are derived from some external source, and the consequence is that the country becomes the instrument and the scene of contests in which it is not interested."

Belgium has indeed been tragically fated for centuries ; but perhaps the worst calamity that has befallen her was the failure, through Dutch misgovernment, of the short-lived Confederation of the United Netherlands which broke down in 1839 and left her independent in name, but in fact dependent upon the good faith of her powerful neighbours. We shall none of us, I fear, live to see the sentiment of Belgian nationality delivered from the burden of hatred against Germany which the events of this war have fastened upon it.

But Europe, as the Americans rightly tell us, is in its political arrangements the most backward of the continents. Let us now turn from this stuffy little world with its medley of States and dynasties, its entrenched mediæval jealousies and antagonisms, its complicated State frontiers, bristling with fortresses and studded with custom-houses, its dog-in-the-manger economic arrangements by which three of its greatest rivers, the Rhine, the Danube and the Vistula, each run through three customs-areas that thwart the designs of nature, and its largest State is so placed as to be cut off from all free outlet for the products of its boundless plains. Let us turn from all this aftermath of the political inexperience, stupidity, and wickedness of past centuries to study the problem of nationality in those larger, wider, and, as I

think, more modern-minded States which are happily unfettered by the legacy of a bad past. In what follows I shall speak principally of the United States, because I have seen the conditions there ; but perhaps the discussion will make clear how far the line of thought I put forward applies to the problems of India, of British and French Africa, and of the larger and more stable South American Republics.

In these transatlantic communities we confront a situation which is, as regards nationality, the exact opposite of that in Europe. In Europe Nationality is an instinct which has been stung into acute and morbid self-consciousness by political oppression. In the large-scale rapidly developing States of the outer world Nationality is an instinct which, if left to itself, would slowly die of inanition, smothered beneath the pressure of the material forces which are the dominating feature in modern transatlantic life. In Europe the worst enemy of Nationality is a bad idealism : in the Americas its worst enemy is materialism pure and simple. In Europe Nationalism, whether swollen with too much feeding, as in Germany, or suppressed and embittered by persecution, as in Poland, becomes hypertrophied, and is perverted into a disease : in the non-national States of the outer world it is in imminent danger of atrophy : there it is not Nationalism but Cosmopolitanism which is the disease. In one of the wisest and wittiest books of travel that I know, "Dar-ul-Islam," by Sir Mark Sykes, the author gives a diagnosis of this disease, in a description which any one who has travelled on the confines of civilisation or mixed with an immigrant population will understand and appreciate. He has invented a name of his own for it—Gosmabaleet—and here is his diagnosis.

"*Gosmabaleet :* This word is descriptive of that peculiar and horrible sickness which attacks a certain percentage of inhabitants of interesting and delightful lands. The outward symptoms in

the East are usually American spring-side boots and ugly European clothes. Internally it is productive of many evil vapours which issue from the lips in the form of catchwords such as 'the Rights of Man,' 'Leebarty,' 'Civilisations,' 'Baleetical Offences.' The origin of this disease is to be traced to an ill-assimilated education of American or European type; the final stage is that in which the victim, hating his teachers and ashamed of his parentage and nationality, is intensely miserable."

It is a disease with which we are all familiar, whether we have followed Sir Mark Sykes in his travels along the coast-towns of Syria and met the former students of Syrian mission schools, or whether we have only had to face the problems arising from the contact of class with class at home. It is the problem arising from the contact of races and nations and social groups at different levels of civilisation and social influence and with different standards of life and conduct. Here at home, where, thanks to the essential unity of English life, we have the disease only in its milder forms, we see it in the parvenu, in the snob, in the pushing promoted workman, in the ennobled shopkeeper and his wife, or, most tragic of all, sometimes in the scholarship boy from a working-class home painfully mounting the rungs of the educational ladder. These are the types in our English life of what the French call the man without roots, the *déraciné*. Matter for comedy as they often are, in the hands of a Thackeray or an Arnold Bennett, there is tragedy enough about them to remind us that no man is sufficient unto himself alone, that man is by nature a social being, and that he can only find his full development as a personality, and his truest happiness and most useful activity, in a society where he can be truly himself, his best self. What is wrong about the snob, or the cosmopolitan, or the degenerate type of native Christian is not his ideals but his personality. The snob may rightly admire the English aristocracy: the cosmopolitan may wholeheartedly re-echo the ideals which we in this gathering

hope to promote : the mission-house Christian may have sincerely adopted the creed of which he is so poor an advertisement. Their failure is due, not to wrong ideals, but to wrong methods of pursuing them : it is a failure of education. In reaching out after something which they feel to be higher they have *lost themselves :* they have severed their links with their past : and with that past has gone a portion of their own soul and strength. They are like shorn Samsons, full of noble purposes, but devoid of the strength to carry them out. Feeling weak and helpless and foolish, cast suddenly into a new world, of which they know nothing in detail, they have no resource but to imitate those great ones whose ideals they share. So they become parasites, pale ghosts of their former selves, reflections, more or less successful, of those whom they have selected for their exemplars. As the scout-boys of Oxford and Cambridge dress up to imitate the young bloods and even bet on the same horses if they can discover their names, so does the ambitious young Boston Jew from a Russian ghetto ape the manners and customs of New England, or the nimble-witted Bengali student adopt the facile phrases and opinions of Macaulay and Mill.

But, after all, we admire men, and God perhaps judges men, not for their ideals but for their characters, not for what they profess, but for what they are. And if this process of unregulated contact and ill-assimilated education produces poor invertebrate and unamiable characters, if it takes the soul and spirit out of its victims and leaves them miserable specimens of civilisation, enervated exponents of enlightenment, in place of the young robust barbarians or heathens which they were before the Goddess of Progress laid her seductive hand upon them, the process of their education stands self-condemned. "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" What shall it profit him if he gain wealth or social estimation, or even

serve the altar of the true faith, if he lose the strength to keep his own soul alive?

What exactly is wrong about this education which, as Sir Mark Sykes says, causes the victim to hate his teachers, to feel ashamed of his parents, and to end by becoming intensely miserable himself? Can we lay our finger on the spot where the defect lies? I think we can. The defect is that it is an individual education and not a social education. It takes each man as an individual and flings him alone and unaided into a new environment. It fails to use, for the purpose of fitting him for his new life, that corporate spirit which, in some form or other, was his mainstay in the old. We all owe far more to society than we shall ever know till we are cast ashore on a desert island. The types that I am speaking of, the de-classed, de-localised, uprooted individuals who form a large and increasing proportion of modern communities, *are* cast ashore on a desert island. If you had been, as I have, to the examining station for immigrants on Ellis Island in New York Harbour, you would appreciate the full force of the metaphor. These poor souls pour out of the steerage of the great liner, and file past the officers singly or in small family groups, sad, bewildered, and hopelessly ignorant. America to them is an unknown land. It is an earthly Paradise, an El Dorado. It is a vision and an ideal. It is Liberty, Equality, Brotherhood. But it is only an abstract ideal. They have no knowledge and no power to weave it into the texture of their lives. And before they have time to look round or think over their new situation, they find themselves with luggage-labels pinned on to their breasts herded into a West-bound train, speeding towards an industrial centre as the raw material of labour for some remorseless business enterprise.

It is for this problem of the man without roots that Nationality provides a solution. Nationality is the one social force capable of maintaining, for these people, their

links with the past and keeping alive in them that spark of the higher life and that irreplaceable sentiment of self-respect without which all professions of fine ideals are but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. It is the one force capable of doing so, because it is the one force whose appeal is instinctive and universal. As a teacher I know that if you really want to influence anybody you must find something in him to work on. It is no use telling people to be virtuous in the abstract. Curates who preach vague sermons which may be summed up in two words—Be Good—generally empty their churches. What people want is to be shown how to apply general principles to the facts of their daily life, and to feel that their adviser understands their particular needs and difficulties and desires. Now the only way to teach immigrants how to become good Americans, that is to say, how to be good in America, is by appealing to that in them which made them good in Croatia, or Bohemia, or Poland, or wherever they came from. And by far the best and the most useful leverage for this purpose is the appeal to Nationality: because Nationality is more than a creed or a doctrine or a code of conduct, it is an instinctive attachment; it recalls an atmosphere of precious memories, of vanished parents and friends, of old custom, of reverence, of home, and a sense of the brief span of human life as a link between immemorial generations, spreading backwards and forwards. "Men may change their clothes, their politics, their wives, their religions, their philosophies," says a Jewish-American writer, "they cannot change their grandfathers. Jews or Poles, or Anglo-Saxons, in order to cease being Jews or Poles or Anglo-Saxons, would have to cease to be.

"At his core no human being . . . is a mere mathematical unit like the economic man. Behind him in time and tremendously in him in quality are his ancestors; around him in space are his relations and kin, looking back to a remoter common ancestry. In all these he lives and moves and has his being.

They constitute, literally, his *natio*, and in Europe every inch of his non-human environment means the effects of their action upon it and breathes their spirit. The America he comes to, beside Europe, is nature virgin and inviolate: it does not guide him with ancestral blazings: externally he is cut off from the past. Not so internally: whatever else he changes, he cannot change his grandfather." [1]

The deep truth contained in these words may be unfamiliar to English people: for to them the whole problem is unfamiliar: there is no conflict of sentiment between citizenship and nationality. Their home, their country, their nation, their State are all alike English: if here and there the Roman or the ancient Briton has left his mark on what the writer just quoted calls the "non-human environment," in the form of a place-name or an ancient road or camp, they have been English so long and fit so naturally into the scheme of things that men have forgotten that they were alien in origin. But in America it is not so. The contrast between citizenship and nationality is glaring and constant. Every large city is well-nigh all Europe in miniature, with its streets and quarters set apart, by the mysterious process of social selection, for the different races and social groups: while in some of the most important States and districts some one nationality, the German, the Norwegian, the Italian, the Polish, or the Negro, is clearly predominant. It therefore seems strange that there should be Americans who still hold firmly to the old-fashioned view of what I can only call instantaneous conversion, of the desirability and possibility of the immigrant shedding his whole ancestral inheritance and flinging himself into the melting-pot of transatlantic life to emerge into a clean white American soul of the brand approved by the Pilgrim Fathers. Yet such is the idea still widely entertained: just as a very similar idea dominated our own educational policy in India

[1] From an essay on "Democracy *versus* the Melting Pot," by Horace Meyer Kallen, published in the New York *Nation* for February 18 and 25, 1915.

until recently. I believe that in both cases the mistake is due to pure ignorance of human nature—to want of sympathy and insight into the human side of the problem.

Women are generally wiser in dealing with a human problem than men : and I do not think that I should venture to dogmatise so confidently on this problem unless I could bring up Jane Addams in support. In her book on "Newer Ideals of Peace" she gives some telling instances of the practical difficulties of turning the immigrant into an American by the old-fashioned methods. She describes how on the night of one Thanksgiving Day she

"spent some time and zeal in a description of the Pilgrim Fathers, and the motives which had driven them over the sea, while the experiences of the Plymouth colony were illustrated by stereopticon slides and little dramatic scenes. The audience of Greeks," she writes, "listened respectfully, although I was uneasily conscious of the somewhat feeble attempt to boast of Anglo-Saxon achievement in hardihood and privation to men whose powers of admiration were absorbed in their Greek background of philosophy and beauty. At any rate after the lecture was over, one of the Greeks said to me, quite simply : 'I wish I could describe my ancestors to you ; they were very different from yours.' His further remarks were translated by a little Irish boy of eleven, who speaks modern Greek with facility and turns many an honest penny by translating, into the somewhat pert statement : 'He says if *that* is what your ancestors are like, that his could beat them out.'"

Miss Addams gives one or two other similar instances, and then adds in the spirit of the true educator :

"All the members of the community are equally stupid in throwing away the immigrant revelation of social customs and inherited energy. We continually allow this valuable human experience to go to waste, although we have reached the stage of humanitarianism when no infant may be wantonly allowed to die, no man be permitted to freeze or starve, if the State can prevent it. We may truthfully boast that the primitive wasteful

struggle of physical existence is practically over, but no such statement can be made in regard to spiritual life. . . . In this country it seems to be only the politician at the bottom, the man nearest the people, who understands that there is a growing disinterestedness taking hold of men's hopes and imaginations in every direction. He often plays upon it and betrays it: but he at least knows it is there."

What an irony it is that the kindest people so often will not see what is under their noses, and that it is left for the baser journalist and the political self-seeker to discover the broken reed and the smoking flax and to use them for his own selfish purposes!

But, you will say, I am speaking to you of a specific American problem which has no reference to us here as British citizens or workers in religious movements. I believe that the American problem is very relevant indeed to our own British problems; and for that reason I would like to dwell for a few moments on the application of this conception of Nationality to the thorniest of all the many thorny problems of American life—the problem created by the presence amid the American citizen body of some twelve million negroes and descendants of slaves. If Nationality can help America there, it can help us British citizens also in the many difficult tasks that lie before us in dealing with native races in our Empire.

Here again I will not venture to dogmatise on my own authority. I will only read to you a passage from the wisest and most philosophic book that has yet been written on this problem, and indeed on the whole problem—so important to all of us as British citizens—of the relation between the black and white races. The writer is a clergyman who has spent his life in Alabama, in the very heart of the problem. He has arrived, out of his own experience, at the same philosophy of Nationality, of the value of corporate life and corporate self-respect, which I have been trying to set before you.[1]

[1] "The Basis of Ascendancy," by Edgar Gardner Murphy (Longmans, 1909), pp. 78, 79, 80.

"The deepest thing about any man—next to his humanity itself—is his race. The negro is no exception. The force and distinction of his racial heritage, even where there is much admixture of alien blood, is peculiarly, conspicuously strong. This persisting and pervasive individuality of race is the ground and basis of his essential culture—by which I mean not the formal product of a literature, a religion or a science, but that more intimate possession which a race draws into its veins and blends within the very stuff and genius of its being from the age-long school of its forests, its rivers, its hungers, its battles with beast and fever and storm and desert, that subconscious, ineradicable life which stirs beneath its deliberate will and is articulate through all the syllables of its every stated purpose. In the deeper sense, no negro can escape, or ought to desire to escape, the Africa of his past.

"In the cosmopolitan sense he has drawn much from us—and will draw still more as the years go by; just as he will also draw, through an enlarging mind from every rich or liberalising force, whether English or German or French or Japanese. It is altogether likely that he will learn in every school, and in every school gain something from and for humanity. But also in the interest of humanity, as well as in his own interest, the basis of his more fundamental culture will be naturally his own. It will take its more intimate force and quality from the depths in him which are deeper than the depths of his life here, which reach back to the store of those fathomless years in comparison with which the period of his existence on this soil is but a single hour. It is a culture which may offer him as yet no established heritage, no accomplished treasury of letters or art or science or commerce—as these are known within the Western world—but like the vast fecundities of the mysterious continent from which he comes, it holds within itself strange, unmeasured possibilities of character and achievement. No one can believe, whether he be Theist or Fatalist or Materialist, that a racial type so old, so persistent, so numerous in its representation, so fundamentally distinctive and yet with so varied a territorial basis, is likely to pass out of human history without a far larger contribution than it has thus far made to the store of our common life and happiness.

"What other human families can do; what, in their social ends, they will do, we largely know. What the negro race, as a race, can do or will do, our own race does not know. Viewing the social achievement of human groups not as a commercial or mechanical condition of affinity, but as a symbol of social self-

revelation, our race does not and cannot know what that race is. Its unforgetful mystery is itself. The white man fears and shrinks—and sometimes strikes—not primarily because he hates, but because he does not understand. The thing in the ignorant negro from which he withdraws is not the ignorance, but the negro. The subtle tendencies of social approximation, of amalgamation, of intermarriage, overcome last of all the obstacles of mystery—the barriers of the unintelligible. If there be ignorance, it can be informed ; if there be poverty, it can be enriched ; if there be merely a strange tongue or a new wisdom, these can be put to school, or we can be put to school to them ; but if the deeper genius of all relationship—the self-revealing self—be absent, we have not the clues of understanding : that which life seeks through all its seeking is shrouded and hid away. We do not blame Africa for not having created a common art, a collective culture, an efficient state. We have instinctively demanded them not because they are indispensable in themselves, but because they are the media of self-revelation. The ultimate basis of intimate social affiliation is not individual (as is so frequently asserted) but social. It is not the inadequacy of exploration which has left Africa in its isolation, so much as the confusions, the ambiguity, the inadequacy of its self-expression. Africa itself, in any of the intelligible terms of social experience or institutional achievement, has never spoken. The race is undiscovered, and its soul unfound. No language, therefore, of other races, no acceptance—however brilliant or faithful or effective—of the formulas and the institutions of other human groups, will quite avail. For that which race would ask of race—as it contemplates the issues of racial and domestic fusion—is not the culture of another, even though that other be itself ; but a culture of its own, its own as the instrument of its self-revealing. Especially is this true when the stronger race is one which, like our own, conceives its very destiny in the terms of social and institutional development."

Here, far better than I could state it, is an educational programme for our imperial administrators, our Colonial bishops and missionaries, and for all those who, in their social relations, are brought into contact with the problem.

I would leave the question here : only I feel that there is one natural objection which I must answer. Am

I not straining the meaning of the word Nationality? Am I not taking just any or every social group or large corporate body and calling it a nation? When does a social group or a community become a nation? The objection is a real one, and I admit the difficulty of framing a clean-cut definition. No one can say why it is that Wales is a nation and Yorkshire, which is more populous and about as large, is not, although it has plenty of corporate feeling. It is difficult to say whether one should describe the Manxman or the Maltese as belonging to a nationality or to a sub-nationality. Every definition involves such border-line cases. But, in general, I think the distinction between nationality and other forms of grouping is quite clear. Nationality implies two things: it implies a particular kind of corporate self-consciousness, peculiarly intimate, yet invested at the same time with a peculiar dignity, a corporate consciousness in which the element of common race is perhaps the most important factor: and it implies, secondly, a country, an actual strip of land associated with the nationality, a territorial centre where the flame of nationality is kept alight at the hearth-fire of home. "When I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget its cunning." So long as there is a real Ireland for the Irish-American whither he can return and feel himself once more among his kind, a real Poland for the Pole exiled in the mean streets of Chicago, a real Palestine, open and accessible to Jewish colonists as a home for the scattered denizens of Jewry, so long will the Irishman, the Pole, and the Jew, even when no longer persecuted, be able to retain their hold on their own past and resist the dangers of complete assimilation. It is for that reason—not because I want to get rid of the Jews from the West, but because I want to deepen and dignify their corporate life—that I am interested in the question of Zionism and in the project now being discussed for making Palestine a real homeland for the Jews.

I have talked long enough, and I have come to the end of my subject—Nationalism. I have tried to make clear to you my view that the road to Internationalism lies through Nationalism, not through levelling men down to a grey indistinctive Cosmopolitanism but by appealing to the best elements in the corporate inheritance of each nation. A good world means a world of good men and women. A good international world means a world of nations living at their best. The tragedy of international intercourse to-day is that the contact between nations too often takes place on the lower levels and from material motives. There is too little interchange of the highest ; partly because each nation has not yet enough of its best to give. The British Commonwealth and the United States will be happier places when all the latent promise and budding cultures of their component nations have blossomed out into self-expression and the brotherhood which is often so difficult a duty to-day becomes a fascinating voyage of discovery through new areas of originality and achievement.

But I should not like to close without reminding you that there is a whole political side to this subject which I have ignored. If I distinguish between Nationality and Citizenship, it is not because I decry citizenship or undervalue the task which lies before States and their governments to create and maintain the conditions without which no free social or national life is possible. If there are intimate social forces, like Nationality, which we tend to ignore or to undervalue, there are also great common interests, interests which affect all humanity alike, which it is our duty as citizens, to whatever nationality we belong, to promote and to defend. It is not because I decry political life or the democratic doctrine of the individual's civic responsibility to his State that I am interested in Nationality. It is because I think good Nationalists will be better men and better citizens. The question of the relation of the citizen to the State, and

of the growth, outside the framework of the State, of forms of Inter-State organisation, will be discussed by later speakers. All that I have tried to do is to show you that, whatever the form of political or religious organisation at which you are aiming, whether you set your hope for the future of mankind in Churches or in States, or in Leagues of Peace or Concerts of the Powers, the way to better things lies through a social education for the individual, through the patient and resolute attempt to draw out all those instinctive and subconscious powers, which we may ignore, but can never abolish, powers which we too often leave untended for the Devil to use as he likes, and to employ them to enrich, to diversify, to deepen and to spiritualise the common heritage of humanity.

THE PASSING OF NATIONALITY

A lecture delivered at the King's Hall, Covent Garden, on November 23, 1917, on the invitation of Mr. Sidney Webb, in the absence, through illness, of Mr. Graham Wallas, for whom the lecturer had previously been invited to act as chairman. The title of the lecture had been chosen by Mr. Wallas.

I MUST begin by saying how deeply sorry I am at the absence of Mr. Graham Wallas and at the cause which keeps him away. I first sat at the feet of Mr. Wallas at the age of eleven, when he taught me Greek grammar and Thucydides at a private school, and I have been learning steadily from him ever since. I venture to say that when, in after generations, the inner history of this age comes to be written, the name of Graham Wallas will stand out as that of one of the most profound, original, and influential thinkers of our time. Historians will always link it with the name of Sidney and Beatrice Webb; not because Wallas, like the Webbs, was among the early Fabians, but because together they have helped to revolutionise political thought in this country by patiently and fearlessly applying to the problems of politics and society the spirit and methods of the student of natural science.

I hope it will not be thought impertinent in me, in the presence of Mr. and Mrs. Webb, if I pursue this reflection further, and draw attention to an essential difference between Wallas' work and that of the Webbs. I do so because it is relevant to our subject this evening. I remember Mr. Wallas once saying to me, "The difference between the Webbs and me is that they are interested

in Town Councils, while I am interested in Town Councillors." Compare the titles and contents of their respective books and you will see what is meant. The Webbs have written on Trade Unionism and industrial democracy, on the Poor Law, on Central and Local Government; Wallas has written on Human Nature in Politics and on the Great Society, that is, on man's place in the great impersonal world of to-day. The Webbs are interested in administration; and Mr. Webb is Professor of Public Administration in the University of London. Mr. Wallas is interested in human nature. I can never remember what he is supposed to be Professor of, but if it is not Social Psychology it ought to be.

Both methods of study are useful and necessary; indeed, they naturally supplement one another. But, standing in Mr. Wallas' place, I intend to deal with the subject assigned to me according to his method of treatment. In other words, I shall not attempt to give any account of the outward and visible forms of nationality as manifested in institutions or otherwise, but to deal rather with its inward spirit. My subject, then, is "the sentiment of nationality," or, to put it in more concrete language, "the Nationalist."

I am the more anxious thus to follow Mr. Wallas' method, because unfortunately I disagree with what he was going to say to you, as expressed in his syllabus. Most of all do I disagree with his title. Shall I speak to you on "the Passing of Nationality" on the eve of the redemption of Jerusalem? The sentiment of Nationality, indeed, is not "passing"; it is awakening. It is stronger at this moment than it has ever been. It is one of the strongest forces in our modern life. Few other forms of corporate feeling have a firmer or deeper hold on men's minds. Socialism has not; nor has internationalism: I doubt even if it can be claimed for religion.

There has indeed, as regards nationality, been a remarkable turn of the tide. Five or six generations ago,

towards the end of the eighteenth century, the cause of nationality was discredited. Nationalism was regarded by philosophers as a mere passing foible. Cosmopolitanism was the fashionable creed. One need only recall the serenely indifferent attitude of Goethe towards the young national movements of his time. To-day the whole atmosphere is changed. Everywhere, from Ireland to India and China, from Finland and Poland to South Africa and Australia, the spirit of nationality is abroad. Its power is perhaps best exemplified by the revival of old forms of national speech. Irish, Albanian, Slovak, Bulgar, and many others have been rescued from rusticity and have assumed literary shape within living memory. It is interesting to recollect that when Kinglake rode through the Balkans in the fifties he still thought of them as Greek lands.

To what is this revival due? We shall find no answer to this question by studying the political programmes of nationalism, by looking for the sources of its strength in constitutions and Parliaments and party agitations. If we would understand the hold of nationalism over men's minds we must look beyond these to something deeper. Perhaps the best way of making clear what I mean by this is by examining an analogous and more familiar case, that of religion.

No one who wanted to know what religion was, and why it is so deep and abiding an influence in modern life, would sit down to study the Thirty-nine Articles, or the proceedings of the Free Church Council, or the list of sects in a work of reference. However little we may know about religion, we all know that it is something different from churchmanship, that membership of a Church does not *ipso facto* make a man or woman religious. Serious writers on religion to-day, whatever their own views, whether devout Roman Catholics like Baron von Hügel or detached philosophers like William James, do not concern themselves with Church organisation.

Their subject of study is the human soul and its religious needs and aspirations.

But go back three centuries, to the time of the religious wars. You will find that people then were very "religious," as intensely so as they are nationalist to-day, yet somehow they could not see that religion, which meant so much to them, was something deeper in its nature and appeal than the ecclesiastical organisation in which it was enshrined. The issue at stake in the struggle of that time seemed to them simply to be which religious body was to be in the ascendant in any given area—whether their country would be coloured Protestant or Catholic on the map. Thus it came about that at the end of the religious wars at the Peace of Westphalia there was drawn up, what we hear so much about to-day, *a new map of Europe.* It was delimited on the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio.* Sects were sorted out according to the religious opinions of the ruling prince. In the reformed communities Protestant State Churches replaced the old Catholic supremacy.

Now did this "settle" the religious question? Did it, in other words, satisfy the needs and aspirations of the human soul which constitute religion? Of course it did not. In many countries, of which Prussia is the most striking example, the institution of a State religion has proved a death-blow to religious faith. Religion fell into a decline and died of inanition. The real settlement of the problem which led to the religious wars came a century later with the spread of the idea of Toleration. Lessing's story of the three rings in his "Nathan des Weise," and the spirit it promulgated, did more for religion than all the State Establishments in Europe.

Why? Because the tale of the rings (I cannot stop to tell it to those who do not know it) taught men to see religion as something spiritual, something to be expressed in men's lives rather than in institutions, and

so set the religious spirit free to run its own course in its own sphere.

Exactly the same is true of nationality. The first step towards the settlement of the problem behind the nationality wars of the present day, towards the true understanding of nationality, is to realise that it is something deeper than political organisation, something which should command not only our toleration but our respect. Just as the basis of religious unity in the world must be a spirit of toleration tinged with reverence (the man who knowingly keeps his boots on in a mosque, or takes off his hat in a synagogue, is not worthy to belong to any religious body), so the basis of internationalism must be toleration tinged, if not with reverence, at least with heartfelt respect. The man whose heart is not uplifted on such a spot as the hill of Tara or the plain of Kossovo or the Rütli meadow, by the lake of the Four Cantons, is dead to some of the best of human feelings. Such places are the shrines of nationality. Whether consecrated or not in the conventional sense, they are sacred ground.

Tolerance, then, is the first milestone on the road towards internationalism. Historians will probably say that England is the country of all others in the modern world where this tolerant respect for other people and nations was earliest and most fully developed. There is a traditional decency in the race which causes an Englishman to respect the feelings and practices of others, even when (as is often the case) he does not in the least understand them. Yet it is humiliating to reflect how recent, even in this country, the growth of this feeling has been. We took the first step along the road towards internationalism when in 1756, at a time when we were still cheerfully persecuting Roman Catholics in Ireland, we pledged ourselves to respect the French language and customs and the Catholic faith of the people of Canada. Yet three generations later even Lord Durham, the far-sighted

statesman to whom the development of the great experiment of Dominion self-government is due, failed to grasp the significance of the policy to which we had unconsciously committed ourselves in 1756. Lord Durham, like so many people to-day, was a political nationalist. He wanted to see a united self-governing Canada; and in order to secure Canadian unity he was prepared to let French-Canadian nationality be abolished, if not by a stroke of the pen, at any rate by the slow operation of political and social forces.

Lord Durham's attitude on this point was always a puzzle to me till I received a letter the other day from Western Louisiana, from a friend who is himself of French extraction, and lives close to the district where the Acadians (the French-Canadian refugees from Nova Scotia) settled after the events narrated in Longfellow's "Evangeline." He had been paying a flying visit to Canada in his summer holiday, and this is his naïve comment on the situation in Quebec. "I was much interested in the problem of the French Canadian; possibly I was affected by my own French blood and the fact of my being a Catholic, but it is clear to me that the matter must have been muddled at some stage, for here we have no trouble at all. *We took their language away without a ripple:* it is no longer required (even in New Orleans, where it survived many years after being abolished outside the city) to publish sheriff's sales in French."

That is the short and simple way, the Prussian way, the "melting-pot" way of dealing with Nationality. When the victim acquiesces it does indeed "settle" the question. "Stone dead hath no fellow," as Cromwell said of the execution of King Charles. But the victim does not always acquiesce. So far from submitting to this euthanasia, nationality is apt to become intensified under persecution, and, like religion, to take on morbid and unhealthy forms. Hence arise the political

nationalist movements which have made so much noise in the world.

The trouble about such movements—just as in the parallel case of political and religious movements—is that those who flock to their banner have no clear aim before their eyes. The political nationalist feels himself driven by an overpowering impulse, which he knows is genuine and springs from the depths of his nature, but he does not know whither it is leading him. It may, indeed, be said of him, as has been said of a kindred agitation, that "he does not know what he wants, and won't be happy till he gets it."

Meanwhile, the rest of the world, or at least those of us who are sympathetic to the cause of the oppressed, are equally bewildered. We all want to do our duty by him. But what *is* our duty? What is the right remedy for the wrongs which the Pole, the Ukrainian, the Slovak, the Sinn Feiner, the Herzogite, and the rest of the political nationalists proclaim?

The right remedy, I shall be told, is quite simple. It is to give them what they say they want. They claim to know exactly what they want. They want to set up independent republics. They want to turn Russia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the rest into a number of national states. They want to reproduce the mosaic of the religious map of the seventeenth century, only it will be a map coloured according to nationality, not according to religious allegiance.

This was the view of "national aspirations" on which most of us were brought up. You will find it in John Stuart Mill; and it still dominates the thinking of most of our political writers and public men. Thus, to quote but one example, Professor Ramsay Muir, who is a fairly faithful exponent of contemporary British political thought, speaking of the settlement which is to follow the present war, remarks: "If the whole of Europe could once be completely and satisfactorily divided on

national lines there might be a good hope of cessation of strife." [1]

Now it does not need many words to demonstrate that this mid-Victorian programme is both impossible to carry out and would be undesirable, even if it were possible.

First, it is impossible. How many nationalities are there in Europe? Professor Masaryk, a distinguished authority, in his pamphlet on "Small Nations in the European Crisis," reckons them at sixty-eight. How many states are there? Twenty-eight, of which only seven are homogeneous—that is, contain no substantial admixture of populations of other nationality. Thus it will be seen what a gigantic piece of tidying up Professor Muir's programme would require.

But his programme is not even ideally desirable; for it would not achieve its object; it would not satisfy the nationalist aspirations to which it is intended to minister. We can realise this best by considering the history of the last fifty years. Have the "national states," Professor Muir's "satisfied" states, been in fact elements making for international tranquillity? Compare the record of the typical national states, Germany, Italy, France under Napoleon III., the Balkan States, with that of the two great international states, the British and American Commonwealths. Comment is superfluous. Political nationalism does not make for tranquillity. It is too self-centred. It has too little sense of the community of nations. Whether in a family or in a larger community *sacro egoismo* is a watchword which is bound to lead to disturbance. Need I translate the Italian words into English? Or into Irish?

What, then, is the solution of the national problem? Before venturing to prescribe a remedy, let us diagnose the case more carefully. Let us examine the sentiment of nationality in the spirit of Graham Wallas or of William

[1] "Nationalism and Internationalism," p. 56.

James in his "Varieties of Religious Experience." Let me give you some "varieties of nationalist experience." First, let us take a case of what I may call morbid or exaggerated nationalist feeling. The most extreme instance I can recall is in a tale I once heard of a mythical Balkan potentate to whom the Almighty appeared in a dream and offered to bestow upon his people any gift which the Prince cared to name. One condition only was attached to the offer—that a double portion of the same boon would be bestowed upon the neighbouring nation. The Prince asked for a day to reflect. On the following night he was ready with his answer. "O God," he replied, "strike all my people blind of one eye"!

Such is nationalism *in excelsis*—a raging, tearing hatred of the alien, which would be laughable for its childishness did we not still see it manifested in the world around us. Turn now to the other end of the scale—to nationalism undeveloped and dying of inanition. I remember a conversation I once had in the market place at Argos—Agamemnon's Argos—with a Greek emigrant who was home on a holiday from the United States. He was a greengrocer by trade, like so many of his compatriots. In the course of the conversation I ventured to ask him, since he had told me he was a bachelor, whether he thought of marrying in the old country. "Not on your life," was his reply. "I mean to marry an American girl. Think of the custom I shall get from my wife's relations." Here is the working of the melting-pot. The nationalist is swallowed up in "the economic man."

If I were writing a treatise I could give you a score more instances intermediate between the two extremes. But I must not weary you. I hurry on, therefore, to ask: what is that of which the Balkan Prince had too much and the Argive greengrocer too little? For that, if we can define it, is the object of our search.

Let me give you a definition to pick to pieces at your leisure. Nationality is *a form of corporate consciousness of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country.* A nation is a body of people united by such a common consciousness.

If this is nationality, how can it be "satisfied"? What conditions are needed for the harmonious expression of this corporate consciousness? Two positive conditions, and two only, I believe, are needed.

The first condition is what I would call, in the largest sense of the words, *freedom of worship.* By this I mean freedom to do the things which your corporate freedom leads you to desire to do, whether it is to talk dialect, or to wear a kilt, or to keep Saturday instead of Sunday or to educate your children in a traditional way. The states of the modern world, if they are to live up to their professions as guardians of freedom, ought to allow the largest possible freedom of conduct and worship to their citizens in these and similar directions. National idiosyncrasies are, of course, troublesome things to the administrative mind. The Prussian way is an easy way. It is inconvenient to have two official languages, as in Belgium and South Africa, or even three, as in Switzerland; but such inconvenience is the price of toleration. It is a price the world must pay, and pay gladly and with understanding, for the richness and variety of a real international civilisation.

The second condition is a national home. A nation, like an individual, cannot lead a normal and happy life unless it has a home of its own, unless there is some place where there is an intimate national atmosphere, where the fire, which is its soul, is kept burning at a central shrine. The modern world is a world of superstates, of constant movement and migration. It is as impossible for all true Irishmen to live in Ireland as it is for all good Etonians to spend their lives at Eton. But so long as the members in exile know that the tradition

is being maintained, that somewhere Irish life is being lived under true Irish conditions, and that they can always refresh their spirit at the fountain-head, the soul of the true nationalist is satisfied.

Such is my interpretation of the sentiment of nationality. Let me now turn to face two objections which may spring to your minds from two opposite quarters.

The political nationalist will complain that I have made nationality a poor and colourless thing ; that I have stripped it of its flags and its fighting banners, of all its romance, so that he can hardly recognise the object of his devotion. I tell him, in reply, that the two nations who do understand nationalism in the purely non-political sense in which I have tried to set it forth are the two most romantic and least colourless nations in the world——the English and the Jews. You never hear speak of English Nationalism ; and England, as we all know, is not a self-governing country (how many Englishmen are there in the present War Cabinet of seven ?) ; yet is there any nationalism so intense, so intimate, so moving, so pure from all taint of politics or ascendancy, as that which breathes through English literature from Chaucer and Shakespeare to Rupert Brooke ?

Rupert Brooke's work in this vein is too familiar for quotation. Let me read you, therefore, a few lines from a yet younger poet which embody the true spirit and central tradition of English nationalism :—

"Now that I am ta'en away
And may not see another day,
What is it to my eyes appears ?
What sound rings in my stricken ears ?
Not even the voice of any friend,
Or eyes beloved world without end,
But scenes and sounds of the countryside
In far England across the tide. . . .

"The gorse upon the twilit down,
The English loam, so sunset-brown,
The bowed pines and the sheepbell's clamour,
The wet-lit lane and the yellow-hammer,

The orchard and the chaffinch song
Only to the brave belong.
And he shall lose their joy for aye,
If their price he cannot pay,
Who shall find them dearer far
Enriched by blood after long war."

Here, not on the platform or in the House of Commons, you have nationalism in achievement, nationalism satisfied.

The English are the great exponents of practical nationalism ; but just because it is always with them, a traditional possession, they have reflected little upon its nature and meaning. The best exponents of nationalist theory in modern times have been the Jews, who have, I believe, made in this region a contribution, if not comparable, at least worthy to be mentioned side by side with their contribution to the world's advance in the field of religion. I cannot speak of the work of the great Jewish philosopher of nationalism, Asher Ginzberg, known to his fellow-countrymen as Achad Ha'am, who is living here in our midst in London practically unknown to English readers and thinkers. I can only read you a document in which is enshrined the result of the sustained thought and devoted work of the Jewish nationalist movement.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Here we have, in one historic sentence, the complete association of Nationalism and Toleration. I believe this document will be epoch-making, not only for the Jews but for the world. It is the pioneer of a new era—an era which will see the world divided, for political purposes,

into supernational States or Commonwealths, and ultimately unified, but cherishing a large number of national individualities, centres of national tradition and inspiration, which will save the soul of mankind from the deadening influences of materialism and uniformity.

So much for the political nationalist. I turn now to a second criticism raised from the opposite quarter, by the cosmopolitan or, as I would prefer to call him, the agnostic. "Is not your whole idea," he says, "attractive though it may sound, a dream, a delusion, a romantic fiction? Are not Jews, as a matter of bare fact, a great deal more at home in Monte Carlo than in Jerusalem, and Irishmen in Tammany Hall than on the Hill of Tara? Is not this nationalism a foolish childlike phase which we are happily beginning to outlive?

Certainly, I reply, this is true of some Jews and some Irishmen. But is it true of the best Jews and the best Irishmen? Look closely into the various types and I think you will conclude that nationalism is not a mere fashion and foible; not, as Mr. Wallas calls it in his syllabus, "a fact alterable by human will," but springs from deep roots in man's inherited nature. You may cut these if you will, but you cut them at your peril. Whether for individuals or for nations, the Fifth Commandment holds. Those who break it, whether individuals or social groups, cannot do so with impunity.

If you doubt this, just look around you. Compare the nationalists and the cosmopolitans or Bolsheviks of your own acquaintance; and ask yourself why it is that the latter are so often so arid, so cantankerous, so thin-blooded, so mean-spirited, so unworthy of their cause (which, after all, includes many noble elements, little as one might conclude so from most of its exponents). Such people are like cut flowers: they draw no nourishment from their native soil. Or compare the achievement of communities which foster the national tradition with that of those who reject it. Why do Palestine,

which is the size of Wales, and Attica, which is smaller than Yorkshire, mean more to mankind than the whole of the New World? Why do the fruits of the human spirit, as a great Welshman has said, grow best on the little trees—not only Greece and Judea, but Tuscany, Holland, Flanders, Norway, England?

The answer is simple. Because it is contact with the past which equips men and communities for the tasks of the present; and the more bewildering the present, the greater the accumulation of material goods and material cares, the greater the need for inspiration and refreshment from the past. It is not the young nations which can best overcome these dragons. It is the old nations, who have learned to cherish internationalism without cutting their own roots and to purify their ambitions and purposes without surrendering their individuality.

Nationalism, thwarted, perverted, and unsatisfied, is one of the festering sores of our time. But nationalism rightly understood and cherished is a great uplifting and life-giving force, a bulwark alike against chauvinism and against materialism—against all the decivilising impersonal forces which harass and degrade the minds and souls of modern men.

Wise men have known and preached this in all ages, loving their home land as they loved their parents; and it was one of the wisest teachers among that oldest of the nations whose long exile is just ending who summed up his sense of what he owed to his country in the performance of the everyday work of the world, in words with which it is fitting that this long argument should conclude—

When I forget thee, O Jerusalem, then let my right hand forget its cunning.

EDUCATION, SOCIAL AND NATIONAL[1]

Again and again in discussing social or national or Imperial problems, when the question at issue has been plumbed to the depths, rival disputants find themselves driven back on to the inevitable conclusion: "It is all a matter of better education." Yet there, as a rule, the issue is allowed to rest; for the discussion of education opens up dangerous ground which few feel competent to tread. In the eyes of the plain man education, as a subject of public controversy, bears an unfortunate reputation. "Education Bills" and "Education Questions" have too often presented him with an ill-assorted combination of high-sounding generalities and complicated technical details which have effectually conspired together to destroy his interest in the subject.

Yet, in spite of the maulings which it has received at the hands of unworthy sponsors, the subject remains all-important for the English-speaking peoples. What can be more vital to a State than the education of its citizens? And what more necessary to it, in the performance of this task of civic training, than a clear conception, founded on the underlying facts of human nature and of the national character, of what education really means and is capable of achieving?

During the last ten years, undeterred by political controversies and almost unnoticed by the general public, an attempt has been made to approach the subject from a new angle, in a spirit worthy of its importance. The Workers' Educational Association, founded by a group of trade unionists and co-operators in 1903, has from the

[1] *The Round Table*, March, 1914.

very beginning aimed at nothing less than the restoration of education to its rightful place among the great spiritual forces of the community. If its experiments have been tried, and its successes achieved, among students of the working class, this is not because there is anything narrow or sectional in its message; but rather because, in the modern world, it is the working class which is in closest touch with the great realities which education seeks to interpret; and because the working people of this country, in particular, have a long and honourable tradition of true educational endeavour.[1]

This movement has now been at work for over ten years, and the principles which inspired it have been thoroughly tested in action. Within the last year it has set foot in Canada and Australia (where it has branches in every State of the Commonwealth) and has attracted widespread attention in Germany, France, and other continental countries. The time seems ripe, therefore, for an endeavour, both to describe the work that it is doing and to interpret its significance; for we seem to be face to face with nothing less than a new philosophy of education, full of potentialities unsuspected even by its English originators. In the following article, then, an attempt will be made, first, following out this line of thought, to suggest what education should be in a modern community; secondly, to describe what has been achieved by the Workers' Educational Association movement; and, lastly, to inquire what is the national and Imperial significance of the experiments which have been undertaken.

I

When people speak of education they are generally thinking of the instruction given to children by profes-

[1] On this point see Chapter I. of "Oxford and Working-Class Education;" the Report of a Joint Committee of University and working-class representatives on the education of workpeople (Oxford, 1908, 1s.); also Sadler's "Continuation Schools in England and Elsewhere."

sional teachers in schoolhouses provided for the purpose. This is, of course, the most obvious aspect of education, and the manner in which a modern community carries out its responsibilities in this respect is one of the best tests of its intrinsic health and prosperity. But for our present purpose the subject is best not approached direct. Those who have it in their keeping, politicians and officials, teachers and psychologists and the rest of the tribe of "educationists," have invested it with such an atmosphere of mystery and technicality as to obscure its broader relations. We propose, therefore, for the moment to leave the children and adolescents entirely aside, and to concentrate the reader's attention on a problem with which—if he is not frightened by the name—he is certain to be familiar: the education of the grown-up citizen.

Any one who has ever sat at the feet of a great teacher, either at school or in the wider life for which school is a preparation, knows what education *feels like.* But that does not make it easy to define. It is not the storing of the mind with information: it is not the love of knowledge and the search for truth: it is not the training of the judgment or the acquirement of a mental discipline: it is not the strengthening of the will or the building up of character: it is not even the forming of friendships based on that deepest of bonds, a common ideal and a common purpose in life. Education is something compounded of all these, but greater and deeper and more life-giving. One of the most striking definitions is perhaps that quoted by Dr. Parkin in his "Life of Thring," the famous headmaster of Uppingham School: "Education is the transmission of life." Yet even this is not quite satisfying. Education is, indeed, as high and broad and deep as life itself. Yet it is not life itself, but life with a difference. It is not simply experience, but experience *interpreted.* Wordsworth, in a wonderful phrase, defined poetry as "emotion remembered in tranquillity." Poetry, as he knew, is not

born amid the pomp and circumstance of experience, in crowded hours of glorious life; she is the still small voice of the soul, speaking in the quiet after the storm has passed. So it is with education. It is not experience itself, but the effort of the soul to find a true expression or interpretation of experience, and to find it, not alone, but with the help of others, fellow-students; for without common study—such as in a school or a University—there may, indeed, be reflection; there can be no true education. But where there is life and honest thinking and the free contact of mind with mind, where thought leaps out to answer thought and there is the sense of the presence of a common spirit, there, even if but two or three are gathered together, whether in a well-appointed building paid for out of rates and taxes, or in a squalid upper room, or in a primitive club house, or in a railway carriage going to work, or on the veldt under the stars, or at a street corner in an industrial town—there is a gathering of students and the nucleus of a university.

To those who complain that such a definition is too vague to be practically helpful one reminder must be sufficient. The Athenians of the fifth century before Christ are generally regarded as the most cultivated and the best educated community of whom history bears record. They originated or developed many of the most important activities of civilised life. They were, in fact, the great inventors and organisers of the things of the mind. Art and philosophy, democracy and the drama, we owe, not merely to their unwearying curiosity, their craving for vivid and many-sided experience, but to their supreme power of sifting, verifying, harmonising, in a word *interpreting*, the problems of the world in which they lived. It was no vain boast of Pericles that Athens was "the school of Greece," and not of Greece only but of all subsequent generations; the Athenian mind, as we find it in contemporary writings, seems to have been

carefully trained to live in the light of eternal realities, to be constantly testing theories by experience, and illuminating experience by study and discussion. Thus, for instance, Athens gives us not merely the spectacle of the first organised democracy, but also the first and perhaps still the most interesting series of speculations on the theory of democracy. As the Athenian went about his daily civic duties, as a judge or a councillor, a committeeman or a parliamentarian, or on training or active service in the army or navy, he would bring the experience of political life to bear, in discussions with his fellows, on the problems of government.

Yet, supremely educated as they were, the Athenians had no organised system of national education. During their period of active greatness, primary education was not a State concern, secondary education practically non-existent. In other words, they received their education, not in schools and academies or from professional teachers, but from the daily practice of civic duties in a democratic state and in the university of the camp, the galley, the gymnasium, the workshop and the market-place. This illustration may help, not merely to fill in the vague outline of the definition of education given above, but to explain how it is natural for a new educational philosophy to spring, not from the leisured class, but from the working class.

It is clear, then, from the example of Athens, as well as from the biographies of great men, that education can and should be continued all through men's active lives, right up to the decay of their physical powers. Education is, in fact, a sort of elixir against the ossifying disease called middle age; it is the necessary antidote against the routine of the modern world. By bringing in theory to illuminate practice, it corrects the deficiencies of both, and preserves the balance and proportion of mental life.

Every one engaged in active life is apt to think about his work, and every traveller who has armed himself with

introductions knows how interesting busy men are when they can be induced to talk. It is a natural and obvious step to give men opportunities to systematise this thinking for the common benefit. Education simply means drawing-out, and the first task of adult education is simply to afford the active citizen the opportunity of being "drawn out." Socrates used to go to men in their workshops or button-hole them in the market-place, and ask them leading questions. But modern experience has devised a more helpful method—that of the group or college.

For if there is one thing more than another that the history of schools and universities has taught us, it is that education is not an individual but a corporate matter. The individual by himself is powerless. That he is powerless for action has long been obvious; the history of all human institutions—of churches, of nations, of colonies, of trade unions—is merely a commentary on this text. But we are now beginning to realise that he is to a large extent powerless for effective thinking also. Solitude may breed the mystic, the philosopher, and even the scientist; but in all those great departments of knowledge which concern the thoughts and actions of mankind the thinker needs the stimulus and experience of his fellow-men. The cloister was a better educator than the cave. The university superseded the cloister; and the modern world, with its immense growth of knowledge and of the facilities for communication, is learning to supersede, or rather, to re-create the university. What a man needs, if he is to keep his mind alert, to be applying knowledge to experience and to contribute his quota of thinking to his country, is the stimulus of a group of like-minded students. When men study together in this spirit, they not merely help one another by the interchange of ideas; if their association is based on a common purpose, they become merged into something akin to a new personality. The psychologists are now beginning

to make clear to us, what is evident enough to the attentive reader of history, that a homogeneous group is greater and more powerful than the sum of the individuals composing it. A mediæval guild was more than a mere collection of craftsmen, as the early Church was more than a mere collection of disciples. Man is by nature a social animal, a member of a larger whole. It is one of the main problems of statesmanship to find the groupings in which the national qualities will be displayed to the best effect. It is one of the main problems of education to find similar groupings for students, whether young or old.

This is what is meant by the common assertion that education is a school of character. A school or a university is a place where the student *becomes something*, takes on a new personality. Sometimes he does so without "learning" anything at all—that is, without amassing any information from books. That is a pity. But it is a mistake to pit the two processes one against the other, or to assume, with some of the advocates of Latin and Greek, that the value of the schools which teach the dead languages, and send out into the world men of fine character who know and care nothing about them, is in any way bound up with the subjects supposed to be studied there. True education consists, neither in amassing knowledge, nor yet in rejecting it when it seems irrelevant at first sight, but in assimilating it until, by an effort not only of the mind but of the whole spirit, it becomes a part of one's very nature. Thus it is that some of the great educators of the past have had an almost morbid fear of book-learning. Plato in a famous outburst harangued against books because they could not answer an honest reader's questions; and St. Francis, in a beautiful story, rebuked a too-learned disciple who wished to add to his scanty belongings a copy of the Psalter. "You will be wanting a breviary next," was the Saint's argument. Religion, he felt, was too intimate

and living a thing to be learned from books. If he felt this about the Bible what would he have said to text-books or newspapers or magazines ?

Thus, education is evidently necessary for the mental and spiritual health of the individual grown-up person. It has always been necessary ; but never more than to-day, when the haste and hardness of life rub the bloom off men's thoughts and allow them all too little time for quiet and meditation and the deeper needs of the spirit. We have all of us nowadays more thoughts in our heads and more aspirations in our hearts than the rush of life allows us to be conscious of. Education and holidays are safety-valves of the sub-conscious mind. Take them away, and modern man can never be his best self. They are, in fact, as necessary to the true health and freedom of an industrialised population as the recognised necessaries of which modern governments provide it with a minimum standard. If any one doubts this, let him look into the faces of the workaday inhabitant of London ; or let him reflect on the appalling mental and emotional starvation revealed by the character of the popular entertainments and amusements of our large cities. The audience at a music hall or a picture show do not enjoy themselves ; they are far too indolent and superficial for that. They simply sit back and allow paid hypnotists to titivate the repressed instincts and emotions which they have not the vitality to bring into action themselves.

"All this is very true," the reader may say, "but such is twentieth-century life. We are living in an industrial age, not in ancient Athens or in mediæval Italy. Show me a body of modern working men who will abjure the public house, the picture theatre, and the political club in order to go to school, after their day's work, with a modern Socrates, and I will begin to take your abstractions seriously."

The sign demanded can be shown.

II

Few parts of industrial England can appear more depressing at first sight to the casual visitor than the string of overlapping villages now comprised in the new County Borough of Stoke-on-Trent and known as The Five Towns. Smoke and slag-heaps have done their best to mar the appearance of a once beautiful countryside; nor have the towns themselves yet been able to do much to remedy the confusion and ugliness inseparable from nineteenth-century industrialism.

Yet, a few weeks ago, addressing an audience of miners in a village schoolroom on one of the ridges overlooking this vale of smoke, a distinguished student of Sixteenth Century England spoke of what he termed the revival of humanism in the England of to-day. "Early in the sixteenth century," he said, "a great educational movement arose in Europe and penetrated to England. Men felt that new worlds were opening up before their eyes, that there were great kingdoms of the mind to be overrun and possessed. In those days there was a great Dutch scholar named Erasmus. He came to England to meet his fellow-scholars. He went to the seats of knowledge, to Oxford and to Cambridge, where the new learning was at home. If Erasmus were to come to England on such a mission to-day, do you know," he asked the miners, "where he would be directed to come? *He would be taken to the Potteries.*" The miners looked surprised. Some of them had been in the pit all day; others were going down on the night shift; but that so much importance should be attached to their natural human desire to meet at regular intervals for an evening's tussle at economics seemed strange to them. Their tutor, for whom the regular five miles missionary journey up the hill at the end of his own day's work was more of a strain than he let them know, was, however, glad to

feel that his work linked him with the great scholars of the past.

Let us follow Erasmus for a day or two as he takes stock of this new educational movement.

In one of the Five Towns there is a block of school buildings occupying a vacant plot by the side of a factory. Four great ovens, like giant champagne bottles, overlook the premises, and seem to leer wickedly into the playground. When Erasmus visits it at night, one of the rooms is still lighted. Some twenty-five men and women are gathered there, of various ages and trades, but predominantly of the working class. They have come together, he is told, for a university tutorial class in philosophy, which meets from 8 to 10. But they have come early : for it is not merely a class, but a club and a college ; several of them are anxious, too, to have a private word with the tutor. The tutor, he learns, is an Oxford graduate with a good honours degree in his subject, but, if he talks to him, he will find that he has learnt most of his philosophy in discussions with working people. For of the two hours of a tutorial class, the first only is used for exposition ; the second is sacred to discussion. So that a class consists, as has been said, not of twenty-five students and a tutor, but of twenty-six students who learn together. There is also a library in the room of some fifty or sixty volumes bearing on the subject: at least, the box is there, but the books are almost all in use, so that only the list of volumes is available for Erasmus's inspection. But the class, which is a democratic organism, has its own elected librarian and secretary, and from them he can learn all that he wishes to know. He will find that the books are not only diligently read, but form a basis for essays which are a regular part of the class work. He will discover how various and vexatious are the obstacles that industrial life sets in the way of this new type of university student —the ravages of overtime, the anxieties of unemploy-

ment, the suspicions of foremen and managers, the difficulties of obtaining quiet for reading and writing. He will hear of one student, nearly blind, who came regularly to class and made pathetic attempts to do his paperwork in large letters on a sheet of wallpaper ; of another who found it quietest to go early to bed and rise again after midnight for an hour or two of study ; of another who, joining a class at sixty-nine, attended regularly for six years until the very week of his death. And in the discussion, if he stays for it, he will hear the old problems of philosophy first raised in Plato (who is still used as a text-book) thrashed out anew from the living experience of grown men and women.

But he cannot stay, for he will be carried off to the parent class of the district, which is holding its 144th continuous winter meeting. Here he will find a new method. The tutor is standing aside : for the class has been turned for once into what university professors call a seminar. Two students are reading papers on special aspects of the year's subject, which is the French Revolution. Erasmus is in time for some of the second, a character study of Turgot contributed by a potter's engineer, who, as he afterwards confessed, had got up at 4 a.m. for a week to have it finished in time. The matter and the style are fully worthy of a university seminar ; the delivery would do credit to a teacher of elocution. For here is a student who has been in public life and knows the value of a spoken word. He has put his heart into the subject, and is not ashamed to show it.

Here Erasmus can learn about the inner life and organisation of this educational movement of which the Potteries form but a single centre.[1] The Workers' Educational Association was founded by a group of workpeople in 1903, with the object of stimulating the demand

[1] See "University Tutorial Classes : a Study in the Development of Higher Education among Working Men and Women," by Albert Mansbridge (General Secretary of the Workers' Educational Association). Longmans, 1913 (*2s. 6d.*).

for higher education among their fellows. Its astonishingly rapid growth has been due mainly to the fact that it provided an outlet for forces that had long been gathering underground, but also, in part, to the method of organisation adopted. The Association is not, like most societies, a collection of individual members ; it has several thousand individual members in its ranks, for it welcomes all without distinction of place, but it is in the main a collection of affiliated societies. Unlike the middle-class, the working-class is habituated to corporate modes of life. The trade union, the club, the chapel, the co-operative society have kept alive for working people the instinct and habit of association ; even the factory is sometimes a kind of college. Hence to approach workpeople for any purpose is very different from approaching the scattered denizens of villadom. They can be approached through their societies, which are represented on the Workers' Educational Association by delegates who act as links between the Association and a vast potential public of students. There are also numbers of educational bodies affiliated, representing an educational supply corresponding to the working-class demand. The Association, which is, for working purposes, divided into eight districts covering England and Wales, is democratically governed and, of course, holds itself aloof from all political parties or religious ties.

It was in 1907, after some four years' work in organising the demand among workpeople, that the Association first approached the universities for help. In the summer of that year a National Conference was held at Oxford at which a resolution was passed inviting the co-operation of the University ; and shortly afterwards a Joint Committee of seven University representatives, appointed by the Vice-Chancellor, and seven labour men, appointed by the Association, met to work out a definite scheme. The result of their deliberations was the issue

of the Report mentioned above (p. 102) and the establishment, on the lines laid down in it, of the University Tutorial Class system.

The first University tutorial classes were established in Rochdale and the Potteries in 1908. There are now 145 in England and Wales, all of the same character as that described : and only difficulties of finance have prevented a far more rapid spread. They are the outward and visible sign of an alliance, which by now seems as permanent as it has proved happy and natural, between the universities and the great organisations of the working class. Every university in England has its "Joint Committee" for tutorial class work, consisting of an equal number of university and working-class representatives. The Joint Committee, aided by grants from the State, is the controlling authority of the tutorial class ; but the strength of each class is in its local management. Each class is pledged to at least a three years' course, and every student is in honour bound to abide by the conditions of the class. The class is, in fact, a little college or entity of its own, and it is the class meeting which chooses the subject of study and approves the tutor sent down by the Joint Committee.

But the working-class students in the Potteries have done more than abide by the conditions which they pledged themselves to observe. They have set on foot an educational movement of their own.

The North Staffordshire coalfield not only embraces the Five Towns but also a number of villages which are scattered around it on every side, at distances of from two to ten or twelve miles. Here coal has been found, and here in rural surroundings an industrial population of miners has settled. These villages are for the most part difficult to reach, and are thus removed from all contact with the ordinary opportunities of civilisation. The university tutorial class students three years ago discerned in these semi-industrial villages a great field for missionary

work, and as this coincided in point of time with a demand for higher education which came from the miners themselves, the two parties were quickly brought together and a new educational movement set on foot. By personal effort, pit-head meetings, social evenings and every other means of tactful persuasion they communicated their enthusiasm to the villagers, till in the present session (1913–1914) there are not less than twenty-five class centres at work in connexion with what has been christened "The North Staffordshire Miners' Higher Education Movement." The tutors, who give their services unpaid, are in nearly every instance working men and women, members of tutorial classes in the Potteries, and the subjects studied are in most cases connected with the work in the tutorial class.

Let us return to Erasmus on the second day of his visit.

There are no classes during working hours, but his time will not be unoccupied. He may drop into the Labour Exchange to hear about the labour conditions of the district from a student who has work there : or into the Free Library to hear from the librarian about the new demand for serious books : or into the Local Education Office, where a wise official, who knows how not to interfere, is keeping friendly watch over developments. But most likely he will have time for none of these : for the miners and the potters among the students will be contending for every spare hour of his time in order that he may see at close quarters how their working day is spent. If he has not time for both, let him visit a pottery, Wedgwood's for preference. And if he has a student with him, he will discover how in one industry at least, philosophy can still animate craftsmanship. "The day I first read Bergson," said the potter who showed him round, "was an epoch in my life. *Creative Evolution*—the words were a revelation. *Every touch of the clay a new creation.* There is the whole philosophy of our work." Thus in friendly talk Erasmus and his new friend

wander through the rooms where the wheel is spinning, talking now of philosophy and now of Flaxman, who once worked here, until Erasmus, who has been in Lancashire, suddenly pauses to think why, in spite of the forbidding exterior, he has come to feel at home in this smoky and clannish world. Partly, he reflects, because life runs quietly here, because, even in the factories, there is no noise or sense of hurry or rushing, and the mind is free to follow her path undisturbed.

In the late afternoon, when the factories close down, Erasmus is fetched by another workman student, and carried out first by train and then in an antediluvian carriage (specially provided for this occasion) to an inaccessible village on the top of a hill. There in the schoolroom he finds an eager audience gathered together from this and the neighbouring villages. They have come to hear about the French Revolution, to be thrilled with the story of a great national drama. Erasmus, inured to lucubrations about scientific methods and documentary authorities, had almost forgotten that history is first and foremost a story. This evening reminded him. He saw the Bastille fall under his eyes, and felt the news of its capture reverberating through France. He lived for an hour in 1789, as the story rolled out from the lips of a trained public speaker. The miners and the field labourers and the village shopkeepers and the old village schoolmaster in the chair were in France too; question after question poured in till the primitive conveyance stood once more at the door. And so back to the wayside station and in the slow train to Stoke, with high converse on the way, of which Erasmus will bear an undying memory back to Holland.

III

The remarkable educational movement of which the Potteries form but one among many centres, suggests a

train of ideas which this is not the place to follow out at length. Time and experience are needed before their full significance can be revealed. But it is clear that the time has come for thinking out afresh, in the light of the changed conditions of modern life, the place and function of universities in the twentieth-century community. For the last four centuries universities have been regarded by English-speaking people mainly as training-grounds for public service, for the professions and for the life of a gentleman. They have, in a word, been finishing schools. The German graduate may be a man of learning, and the French the master of a polite and lucid literary style: but the "Oxford man" has been honoured primarily for what he is, not for anything he knows or does. Alma Mater has taken him to her bosom at an impressionable age and left an imperishable mark on his mind and his manners. But a new field of work is opening out before the English university of the future; to be the temporary home, not merely of the young who need to be prepared for life, but of students of riper years, who need the spirit of college and cloister in order to reflect on what life has taught them.

England has never stood in greater need of houses of quiet than to-day, places where men and women can repair for a few weeks or months to reduce their ideas to order, or to refresh their minds and spirits at the deepest springs of inspiration. Already that need is being in some degree satisfied. Oxford is filled summer by summer with tutorial class students, who come for a week or a fortnight or a month for common study and individual tuition. An old mediæval teacher, who gathered his wandering students from far and wide, would feel more at home in the Long Vacation Oxford of to-day than at any time since the foundation of the Colleges. And though the subjects studied are different, though history, literature and economics predominate over theology, medicine and law, he would be conscious

of the new vitality breathed into these human studies by contact with the living experience of thinking and feeling men and women. Oxford and Cambridge have it, in fact, in their power to become in a wholly new sense the intellectual and spiritual centres of England—and not of England only but of all the lands where their influence extends. Ideals can be better formed and policies thought out in the courts and gardens of a university than in the dusty purlieus of Whitehall or the crowded council rooms of industrial towns. If the great outstanding problems of the twentieth century are to be calmly and fearlessly met —if the old principles of British Government are to stand the test of new conditions, if justice and liberty are to prevail among the mingled races of mankind, if industrialism is to be made compatible with a civilised life for the working population, the university must arm the actors in these great causes with the knowledge and the power which come from the honest and fearless discussion of differences in an atmosphere of common study, and from the comradeship which is built up in the hours of insight and decision. *Idem sentire de republica*, to feel, not necessarily to think, alike about public affairs should be the privilege of university students, and their bond of union in the turmoil of life. In this, as in so many other of his great thoughts, Mr. Rhodes was both a prophet and a pioneer.

IV

It remains to pass on to another aspect of this new movement in education. The spirit and methods of the Workers' Educational Association will doubtless prove capable of adaptation to many fields of thought and activity. One such application, in particular, must be treated here, for it is closely relevant to the preceding discussion.

We have watched the new movement as it affects

associations of students inside the English community. We have seen its working on groups of individuals. We must now consider its power to draw out the secret powers, not of individuals, but of nations; for nations, too, like individuals, need the reinvigoration which comes from an attempt to understand and to interpret the manifold experience of their life and history.

If education may be defined as the transmission and interpretation of life, what shall we say of National Education? The answer is easy. National Education is the transmission and interpretation of national life: its constant reinterpretation as the experience of the nation becomes richer and more manifold in its onward career.

A glance at the history of nations will illustrate what is meant by this rather abstract statement.

The path of history is strewn with the débris of nations. Some, like Assyria and Babylon, Macedonia and Carthage, have written their names large on some pages of history; others have passed away without leaving so much as a memorial behind them. Others again have survived, maintaining unimpaired not merely a racial but a national existence. How is this to be explained? How is it, for instance, that the Jewish nationality is still a living factor in the world of to-day, whilst of the language and culture of the Carthaginians, a Semitic nation of kindred stock, not a trace remains? Why has Babylon been taken and Armenia left? Why have Burgundy and Lorraine perished except as provincial names, while Bohemia and Poland still preserve the living seed of nationality?

There is no simple answer to these questions; but one thing is clear. Somehow or other the surviving nations have succeeded in the face of conquest, loss of territory, dispersion, persecution and the temptations of assimilation, in transmitting the essence of nationality from generation to generation.

What is nationality?

It is not the tie of blood: for that bond is sacred to smaller units, to the family and the tribe. It is not the broader basis of race: for many great nations, such as England herself, have grown out of an amalgamation of races. It is not language, for a nation, such as Switzerland, may have as many as four languages, none of them peculiar to itself. It is not the possession of territory or of national independence: for nationality is sometimes most tenacious when these are absent. It is not religion in the ordinary sense: for many nations, such as Germany and Canada, have more than one Church which is a force in national life; whereas in the Middle Ages, when Christianity was a reality in the life of Europe, there was a single Church but many nations. It is not mere habit and the lapse of time: for the Jews have been in Europe for nearly two thousand years, yet their separate nationality has not been worn down. It is not merely common action and common suffering and a certain store of common memories: for the Irish have fought side by side with the English on a hundred fields and still remain Irishmen; and the Greeks and Serbs and Bulgars of Macedonia groaned and struggled for centuries under the Turks without being merged into a common nationhood. It is not the mere passionate attachment to scenes known and loved for centuries: else out of Lombardy and Tuscany and Sicily and the other fair provinces of the peninsula Italy could never have been born. All these are elements in nationality, but they are not its essence. No statesman or philosopher, speaking from outside knowledge or calculation, can lay his hand on the map and say, "Here is a nation." For nationality is not of the things which can be manufactured and set on a shelf. It needs to be made afresh every year and month and day by the life and thoughts and institutions of the people. In the life of nations there is no age nor youth as in the life of the individual. Nationality is immortal, like the fire in

Vesta's shrine, so long as men choose to tend it. Some nations, old in years, scarred with the wounds of centuries, are eager and buoyant, looking forward to a limitless future. Others, born but a generation since, are falling into visible decay because those that live within their borders have no care for deeper things. For nationality, like the more intimate affection between individuals, is a thing to be felt rather than to be defined; and in the last analysis, if we ask, "Is Servia or Bohemia or South Africa or Australia a nation?" the only true answer is through another question, "Will men die for her?"

"The man who has no nation," said the Greek philosopher long ago, "is either a god or a beast." Despite the forces of commercialism, which break men up into competing units, despite the tendencies of cosmopolitanism, fostered by the facilities for travel and for the easy interchange of ideas and standards, nationality remains an essential factor in the life of civilised peoples.

Yet it is slowly changing its character and becoming educated into self-consciousness; for in face of the denationalising influences of the day its whole existence is at stake, and it must either become explicit, responsible for its own continuance and the interpreter of its own experience, or, like so much that is "old-fashioned," it must pine and wither into a picturesque survival. In the days before railways and steamships and newspapers, before the spread of a few dominant languages over the greater part of the world, before the masterful irruption of Western Europeans into the quiet places of the planet, men needed no education in nationality, for it grew up in their hearts by habit and instinct out of the spirit of the community of which they formed a part. To-day all this is altered. All over the world, those who care for nationality may observe how nations, caught unguarded by the onrush of new ideas and influences, or by the temptation of new

opportunities, are being robbed of half their manhood in the names of progress and education.

You cannot, by teaching or by environment give a man a new nationality, any more than by watering you can give a cut flower new roots. Yet teachers and missionaries, statesmen and propagandists, idealists and philosophers are constantly attempting to do so—sinning at once against humanity and against the dictates of human science. Nationality is an element that springs from the deepest side of men's nature ; you can destroy it by severing men from their past and from the immemorial traditions, affections and restraints which bind them to their kin and country. But you cannot replace it ; for in the isolated shrunken individual, the cut flower of humanity with whom you have now to deal, *you have nothing left to work on.* Such education as you can give him will be the education of a slave : a training not of the whole man, but of certain aptitudes which may render him a useful workman, a pushing tout, or even a prosperous merchant, but never a good citizen. And he will revenge himself on you, in the subtlest and most exasperating of ways, by triumphantly developing into a bad imitation of yourself.

Herein lies the central difficulty of education in what is called a "new country." New countries there may be, but there is no such thing as a new man. For man, in the deepest side of his nature, is immemorially old ; and those make the best citizens of a new country who, like the French in Canada and Louisiana, or the Dutch in South Africa (to mention no specifically English examples), bear with them on their pilgrimage, and religiously treasure in their new homes, the best of the spiritual heritage bequeathed them by their fathers. New countries filled with new men are not new at all, but hoary with antiquity, older even than mankind, for the instinct of imitation, with its insatiable craving for the sensation of novelty (which is so often the

master-motive of their life) is as old as any of our inherited instincts.

But nationality strikes its roots deep, and is happily hard to kill. A single illustration may show its power. In the autumn of 1912 the English-speaking people of the United States, basking complacently in the thought that they were annexing new citizens from Southern Europe at the rate of a million a year, were startled to learn that thousands of newly made "Americans" were taking ship to the Balkan peninsula to offer their lives to the old countries. Tens of thousands more, who could not go themselves, sent money. The people of the United States awoke to the strange reality that, in spite of all the visible and invisible agencies of "assimilation," their country was not one nation but a congeries of nations such as the world has never seen before within the limits of a self-governing State. America had, in fact, become almost a school of nationality. Men who, in the scattered valleys of the Balkans or the isolated townships of Sicily and Syria, had never known what nationality meant, felt their sentiments expanding in the freer atmosphere of America. "We never knew we were Roumanians till we met our brothers over here," the writer was told by a Koutzo-Vlach from a remote village in the Pindus mountains, as he sat sipping Turkish coffee in an upper room in New York. It was no doubt disappointing to the older school of Americans to discover that the qualities and standards of George Washington cannot easily be grafted on to the descendants of Themistocles and the compatriots of General Savoff. But, even viewed from the standpoint of the American Republic, this outburst of nationality is reason for hope, not for despondency. For there is room in a great Republic or Commonwealth for many diverse nationalities, and here is evidence to show that the primary condition of successful government—civic devotion—is abundantly present. On a foundation of competing

individuals no political edifice can be built; but self-respecting groups, bodies of men who have merged their personality in a larger whole, are the stuff of which durable Commonwealths can be made. Just as England learnt to see Scotsmen, not as Dr. Johnson saw them, but as Sir Walter Scott saw them, so Americans need to open their eyes to all the human wealth which they have gathered in.

The problems of nationality which face the British Commonwealth are very different from those which face the United States, for nowhere in the world as in that great Republic have false theories of liberty and education persuaded statesmen on so large a scale (varying an old Roman phrase) to make a Babel and call it a nation. But just because the difficulties of the United States, spiritual, moral, intellectual, political, social and economic, are so acute, they are worth recalling: for the United States with its negroes, its Asiatics, its Slavs, its Italians, its Jews, its Dutch, Irish, and Scandinavians, its Huguenots, Cavaliers, and Puritans, inextricably intermixed and knit together by the bonds, not of nationality but of Statehood, forms, as it were, an epitome of the scattered problems of Britain.

What, then, is the moral to be drawn? What should be aimed at in the education of the different nations of the British Commonwealth.

The most essential element in the education of nations, as of individuals, is self-respect. You cannot educate a man until he *is* a man. Neither can a nation be fitted for the arts of progress and the lessons of civilization till it feels itself to be a nation. Education without self-respect is not the drawing-out of gifts and virtues. It is the smearing of a polish or the practice of a hideous mimicry. There is a clear and definite line, familiar to all who have travelled in "newly-developed" countries, between communities which are undergoing the process of education, enriching their national life

with what they are able to assimilate of the gifts of the age, and communities which are studying the arts and ingenuities of imitation, attempting feverishly to keep pace with the newest devices of industrialism or the latest fashions of the great world. That way lies decadence. It was trodden of old by the Roman provincials when, in the third and fourth centuries after Christ, at the height of apparent prosperity, a slow torpor crept over the vast bulk of the Roman Empire. It has been trodden since by many races whom it would be invidious to mention. Yet the path can be retraced; and the history of Italy, from the end of the eighteenth century onward, affords an example of how a nation can win back its soul by drawing inspiration from the true springs of national life.

There is another point to be noted. National Education is too often regarded as a mere training of each generation for the tasks of its own day. We are exhorted to turn out well-equipped workmen and commercial travellers—"economic men," in fact—in order successfully to compete with our rivals in prosperity. But true National Education is not so ephemeral in its aims. Its gaze is also on the past and future. Looking backward and forwards, it sees in each generation a group of torch-bearers who will hand on their light to the next. Thus, it will look far beyond the mere formal requirements of a modern school curriculum. It will seek aids for the work of national education wherever the genius of the nation has set its peculiar mark—in folklore, in songs, in the drama, in history, local and national, in poetry, in sport, in a knowledge of the countryside, and in every form of study or activity which tends to draw men together in a common purpose for the enrichment of the national life. National education is, in fact, as wide and various as the nation itself. *Nihil humani alienum a se putat.* A wise system of education, whether among the child-races of Africa or among the dominant nations who

control them, will seek to follow the national bent in all things wholesome and of good report, relying always, in its sympathetic direction, upon that sense of responsibility which is innate in all men who have not been robbed of their manhood.

And so the argument comes back, on a deeper level, to the idea of democracy ; for national education should always be, in the truest sense, democratic. Those who are learning must feel, not that something is being done to them, but that they are achieving it for themselves. The miners and potters of North Staffordshire make sacrifices in the cause of education, because they themselves bear the responsibility of management ; and the movement with which they are connected is democratic in the further sense that it is for the benefit of the group as a whole, not of isolated individuals. The miner who studies the French Revolution, the potter who reads Bergson, have no ulterior ambitions : they are proud of North Staffordshire, proud of the working class, and envy no man his birthright. What is true of groups and classes within a nation is true also of nations. Education affords a nation a means of working out its own destiny, of making clear to itself what is the nature of its mission—its distinctive contribution to the common stock of civilisation.

No nation can presume to prescribe its destiny to another. Imperialism, as we have learned to understand it of late, chastened and deepened by contact with other great forces of our time, has indeed a high and inspiring mission. There is a solemn responsibility on the part of the great organised States of the world, and especially of the British Commonwealth, towards communities which are still struggling with the elementary difficulties of political life. But those who believe most passionately that Britain, like Rome, has much to teach, must never forget, as Rome forgot, that she has much also to learn. If the British peoples are strong by virtue of their

national character and history, they can only hope to impart strength to those other peoples towards whom their duty lies, not merely by training them in the common lessons of Statehood, but by joining with them in a voyage of discovery, as a wise tutor with his students, towards the secret springs of their national life. For in Empire, as in education, giving and receiving go hand in hand ; and freedom, of which we often speak so lightly as though it were a boon to be bestowed, can never be *given* at all : it can only be *shared*.

There are many problems yet awaiting the united wisdom of the British nations ; yet the real hope that they will be nobly met lies in the generous and manly freedom of which England is the traditional repository. Not by rule or measure, not by any State-made enactments nor by imperial or international tribunals, but through the frank comradeship of free peoples, ever drawing fresh strength from the living experience of nationality, and enlightened and confirmed by education in their distinctive powers and destiny, can the problem of the world's government find an ultimate solution.

This essay has been left as it was written, early in 1914. It seemed fairer not to attempt to bring its practical details up to date or to force its statements of theory into verbal conformity on every point with later essays. During the war the work of the Workers' Educational Association has been extended and developed both at home and overseas. Moreover, its methods have been widely recognised and adopted by other agencies, not only by voluntary bodies like the Y.M.C.A., but even, with the necessary adaptations, by the military authorities. The offices of the Association are at 16, Harpur Street, W.C. 1.

THE UNIVERSITIES AND PUBLIC OPINION[1]

What is the place and function of Universities in a modern democratic community? What can a democracy reasonably expect from its great seats of learning, which, whatever their mode of government, are in effect, and are rightly regarded by the public, as national institutions? How can Universities best make their own special contribution to the life of a democratic Commonwealth?

The extension of the franchise lends point to such inquiries, for it confronts British Universities with new problems and opportunities which will at once test the wisdom and public spirit of their rulers and inmates and determine the nature and extent of their influence in the post-war generation.

Fifty years ago, when the franchise was first extended to the working class, Robert Lowe, in a memorable sentence, declared that "we must educate our masters." The words were spoken half in jest, but they bear a deeper meaning than their author realised. When he spoke of "our masters" he was thinking of the newly enfranchised working class. But the real masters of Britain, as of every community, are those who control the sources of knowledge. It was at least as important in 1867, if Robert Lowe had only known it, to educate the Universities in their civic and national responsibilities as to set up schools in every parish, for if the great storehouses of the nation's knowledge are divorced from the general life of the community the very foundations of

[1] From the "Educational Year Book," issued by the Workers' Educational Association, 1918.

popular government are undermined. Power, whether political or of any other kind, is simply applied knowledge. It can only be wielded effectively by men and women who *know*, instead of merely "thinking" or "believing" or "understanding" or "guessing" or taking on trust because they have heard it on a platform or "seen it in print." If the opinions in accordance with which the country is governed are based on ignorance and prejudice, and the knowledge upon which they should be based is stored up and jealously withheld in exclusive corporations, the last state of democracy will be worse than the first.

The power of the people must be based, in a word, not on opinion, but on knowledge, and on a recognition of the large and important mass of "hard facts" which it is beyond the power of organised opinion to alter. The tendency to forget this, the temptation to believe that parliamentary majorities and conference resolutions are trumpet-blasts at which the walls of Jericho will fall down, is the besetting sin of modern popular movements, and its wide prevalence is perhaps the main reason why, in spite of several generations of skilful and sustained agitation, democracy in Europe and overseas is not yet master in its own house. It must win the keys of knowledge before it can wield the sceptre of power.

Happily, in England at any rate, some of the "masters" took the hint in a way unintended by Robert Lowe. The last two generations bear witness to a gradual awakening of a sense of national responsibility on the part of the British Universities, and to their increasing desire to emerge from academic seclusion, and to extend the range of their activities and influence. The success of the W.E.A. in recent years has, perhaps, tended to throw somewhat unduly into the shadow the achievements of the pioneers of the various forms of "University Extension"—a work which was due, unlike the W.E.A., to the initiative of University men, and has

done, and is doing, much to sow seed which has borne fruit in numerous ways throughout the community.

Relatively small in bulk as such work has been, we may, nevertheless, regard it as having established the broad principle that the University in a modern community cannot remain a self-centred and exclusive corporation living for itself alone. Its knowledge, its opportunities, its equipment, its "atmosphere" are national possessions, held in trust by each passing generation of students and teachers for the benefit of the community as a whole. But the wider possibilities inherent in this recognition are still imperfectly realised. It is worth while trying to see whither it leads us.

The work of a modern University is, in the broadest sense, of two kinds—teaching and thinking. It is at once a school and an intelligence department ; or, to put it in army language, it is both an officers' training corps and the General Staff of the community. It exists both to prepare young people in body, mind, and character for the active work of life, and to help people of all ages to gain an understanding of the meaning of life in all its different phases. It is faced with a twofold task of *training* and of *interpretation*.

Of the work of the University as a training school little need be said here. Mr. Sidney Webb, with his love for enshrining romantic themes in committee-room phraseology, has described this side of University work as that of a "technical school for the brain-working classes." However much such a definition may grate upon all to whom college life calls up indelible memories of friendship and happiness in grey quadrangles and spacious gardens, it stresses the undeniable fact that for entry into certain kinds of employment a University education, that is, an education prolonged for three or four or even more years beyond the secondary school stage, will always remain, if not indispensable (as in Germany) at any rate extremely useful. Happily, it is

becoming increasingly recognised, both by psychologists and by practical men, that a prolonged general education is the best preparation for most occupations which require a high level of brain power and concentration, so that British Universities are not likely to fall into the German error of turning what should be a seat of education and of the liberal arts, of training for skilled service, into a battleground of competing and unrelated specialisms. The danger, however, does exist, and no one who has watched the reaction of British academic opinion to the war can be quite easy in his mind as to the future of the broader traditions of the British University course. Yet the response of the Universities to the call of the war should be sufficient to show that, with all their undeniable intellectual shortcomings, the Universities have not failed to give their inmates a sense of the paramount duty of national and social service, which is, or should be, the first element in a technical or professional equipment.

On this side of University work, apart from the maintenance of the liberal tradition, and its perpetual enrichment by contact with life and experience, the main problem is that of securing access for all those young people who are capable and desirous of receiving such a training. This is an immense task, but the main burden of it, in England at any rate, must fall for the next few years on the secondary schools. There is, unhappily, little ground for thinking that the University provision of the country, meagre though it is compared with what it might be, is not adequate to meet the needs of the young people who are capable of profiting by it. A University is not a glorified high school. It is not meant for boys and girls who are still in the text-book stage and unable to study without spoon feeding and direction. It is intended for students who, however scanty their knowledge, however vague and chaotic their ideas as to their future occupation, have some independent intellectual life of their own, who value ideas

and the contact of mind with mind, and who come to a seat of learning, not simply to scramble through some bread-winning test, but, whether consciously or not, to satisfy the needs of their growing spirit. It is not easy to devise tests which shall attract all those, however "wild," for whom the University has something to offer, and exclude all those, however bookish, for whom, at this stage, direct contact with life would be a better education; existing scholarship and matriculation arrangements, still more, existing scales of fees, are plainly not contrived for this end; but to suggest their amendment in detail goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say that, in exercising their function of selecting students for admission to their ordinary courses, Universities are performing a national service, and that if they do not, or cannot, exercise it in the best interests of the nation, it is the duty of the nation to interfere.

The other side of University work, what has been called the work of thinking or of interpretation, is too broad and various to be described in detail, but perhaps it can be summarised under three heads:—

First, it is the duty of a University to maintain a high standard in all studies and subjects which come within its range. Perhaps it would be simpler to say that its duty is to foster a love of truth; but truth in the ordinary sense of the word is too narrow and intellectual a term. A University should be a centre of taste, of the love of beauty, as well as of truth; its concern is with all the large and enduring interests of life, and those who are following the quest of the spirit in any field of endeavour, whether the world calls them artists or architects or musicians, philosophers or historians, biologists or chemists, social workers or statesmen in politics or industry, should feel equally at home within its walls. Modern life with its sick hurry and divided aims, its ruthless and mechanical "drive," is in ceaseless conflict with the healthy creative instincts of the artist, and with

the scholar's sensitive love of accuracy and balance and intellectual justice. It is the function of the University to maintain and diffuse respect for all sincere and fundamental achievement, to proclaim the cause of quality against quantity, of simplicity against showiness, of honesty against flattery, of precision against phrase-making; to cause men to feel shame at the hasty production and shallow judgment which pass muster in the crowded metropolis; to be a haven of refuge where men acquire or renew kinship with the spirit of truth which must preside over every fruitful undertaking or activity of mankind. If the Universities do no more for us in the next generation than reform the headlines of our newspapers and banish shop-window methods from our public life, they will have served democracy well.

Secondly, it is the duty of a University to undertake what is called "research," that is, to increase human knowledge, or, by interpreting existing knowledge, to increase our understanding of it. That is a task which has always been associated with Universities, but in recent times, when the teaching function of Universities has come more to the front, it has been apt to be neglected or relegated to the interstices of a busy teacher's time. It is often forgotten that teaching and research are different kinds of work, and often best undertaken by different persons. The "researcher" is primarily interested in his subject: the teacher is primarily interested in his students. The two interests, happily, are often combined; but all modern Universities should find room for a certain number of those rare and difficult minds who find their highest satisfaction in simply adding to the accumulated store of human knowledge.

Thirdly, the University exists to perform what can be called a function of *mediation;* to bring its knowledge and outlook to bear, as a helpful and reconciling influence, on the problems of the day. The true University spirit is not dry, thin, vacuous, pedantic, superior, or, as the

phrase goes, academic ; it is understanding, and sympathetic, health-giving and vitalising. A democracy in which the University played its proper part in public life would be equally free from pedantry in its professors, and from vulgarity and rant in its politicians. There would be constant action and inter-action between theory and practice, between book-learning and experience, between students of all ages and occupations. Political science would no longer be reserved for University lectures and remain conspicuous by its absence on party platforms or in election literature ; and our elder statesmen, men who had acquired ripe wisdom in the service of the State, would be chosen naturally, and as of right, to positions of influence and authority over young minds, which are too often reserved at present for teachers who have long since ceased to learn. Elections would still preserve the old-time fighting flavour so dear to the heart of the pugnacious Briton, but the issues to be decided in them would be thrashed out in fair-tempered, if vivacious, discussion between speakers and voters who had acquired intellectual seriousness and a due sense of civic responsibility. Candidates would learn to revise their traditional methods and would find it fatal to be convicted of ignorance of the tasks which they are asking authority to undertake. Men would learn to look constantly to the Universities for guidance and inspiration. Constitutional problems would be discussed at leisure, as in Ireland at this moment, within the four walls of a University, with a library within call. Nor would experiments be made upon the long-suffering body politic by practitioners imperfectly acquainted with social anatomy.

It is one of the ironies of the modern age that Democracy has become the dominant political creed at a time when the problems of society and government are more difficult and complex, less easy of understanding by the plain man, than ever before in human history. Simple solutions are preached on every hand, but every

fresh attempt to apply them breeds fresh disillusionment, till "the revolutionary tradition" has been worn threadbare and men are tempted to relapse into a cynical and contemptuous despair. For the problems of the modern time defy simple solutions, as Russia is learning to her cost; and it is Plato's philosopher-king rather than a many-headed multitude of tired toilers who is really required to solve them. If Democracy is to survive as an effective force, if government by the people is not to perish from the earth, the people itself must strive to acquire the spirit and temper of the philosopher; it must learn to recognise wisdom and sincerity when it sees them; it must fortify itself against the attempted tyranny of the expert and the assaults of reaction by making the University aware of its needs, and securing that its knowledge and equipment are made freely and constantly available for the service of Democracy.

What does such a policy involve in practice? Nothing less than a new system of education for adult citizens superimposed upon the system already provided for young people. Perhaps "system" is the wrong word for something that must of necessity be voluntary, elastic, spontaneous, and largely self-governing, as the experiments made by the W.E.A. in that direction have shown. But our statesmen and Universities have still to realise, in full measure, that it is farcical to call a community "democratic" unless its citizens have adequate leisure for attention to public affairs, and unless those who hold the keys of knowledge provide the opportunities for the wise and profitable use of such leisure. Democracy has still to win its spurs. It is living to-day upon the failures of alternative systems of government. Only through the fruits of adult education can it secure an intrinsic and lasting justification. When every town and village in Britain is a home of University study, in the widest sense of the word, then we can say with assurance that our country is made "safe for Democracy."

Have the British Universities realised the work that lies ready to their hands in this task of interpretation and mediation ? Can they do so until their personnel has been largely humanised and enriched, and their range of interest and study extended and broadened ? Is it likely that the necessary changes in University policy and government will be effected in time to meet the urgent needs of the enlarged democracy ? Will war, the greatest of educators for a nation like ours, which has always learnt best in the school of experience, send a freshening breeze through the cloisters and council rooms of our academies ? The optimist will not offer a direct answer to these questions. He will prefer to leave them with a question mark.

PROGRESS IN GOVERNMENT[1]

When I was asked to speak to you on the subject of Progress in Government I gladly accepted, for it is a subject on which I have reflected a good deal. But when I came to think over what I should say, I saw that you had asked me for the impossible. For what is Government? I do not know whether there are any here for whom Government means no more than a policeman, or a ballot-box, or a list of office-holders. The days of such shallow views are surely over. Government is the work of ordering the external affairs and relationships of men. It covers all the activities of men as members of a community—social, industrial, and religious as well as political in the narrower sense. It is concerned, as the ancients had it, with "that which is public or common," what the Greeks called *τὸ κοινόν* and the Romans *res publica*. The Old English translation of these classical terms is "The Commonwealth" or Common Weal; and I do not see that we can do better than adopt that word, with its richness of traditional meaning and its happy association of the two conceptions, too often separated in modern minds, of Wealth and Welfare.

Our subject, then, is the Progress of the Commonwealth, or, in other words, the record of the course of the common life of mankind in the world. It is a theme which really underlies all the other subjects of discussion at this week's meetings: for it is only the existence of the Commonwealth and its organised efforts to preserve

[1] This and the following lecture were delivered at the Woodbrooke Summer School, near Birmingham, in August, 1916, and reprinted in "Progress and History," Oxford, 1916.

and sustain the life of the individuals composing it, which have made possible the achievements of mankind in the various separate fields of effort which are claiming your attention. Lord Acton spent a lifetime collecting material for a History of Liberty. He never wrote it ; but, if he had, it would have been a History of Mankind. A History of Government or of the Commonwealth would be nothing less. Such is the nature of the invitation so kindly given to me and so cheerfully accepted. If you could wait a lifetime for the proper treatment of the subject I would gladly give the time ; for, in truth, it is worth it.

What is the nature of this common life of mankind and with what is it concerned ? The subjects of its concern are as wide as human nature itself. We cannot define them in a formula : for human nature overleaps all formulas. Whenever men have tried to rule regions of human activity and aspiration out of the common life of mankind, and to hedge them round as private or separate or sacred or by any other kind of taboo, human nature has always ended by breaking through the hedges and invading the retreat. Man is a social animal. If he retires to a monastery he finds he has carried problems of organisation with him, as the promoters of this gathering would confess you have brought with you here. If he shuts himself up in his home as a castle, or in a workshop or factory as the domain of his own private power, social problems go with him thither, and the long arm of the law will follow after. If he crosses the seas like the Pilgrim Fathers, to worship God unmolested in a new country, or, like the merchant-venturers, to fetch home treasure from the Indies, he will find himself unwittingly the pioneer of civilisation and the founder of an Empire or a Republic. In the life of our fellows, in the Common Weal, we live and move and have our being. Let us recall some wise words on this subject from the Master of Balliol's book on the Middle Ages.

"The words 'Church' and 'State,'" he writes, "represent what ought to be an alliance, but is, in modern times, at best a dualism and often an open warfare. . . . The opposition of Church and State expresses an opposition between two sides of human nature which we must not too easily label as good and evil, the heavenly and the earthly, the sacred and the profane. For the State, too, is divine as well as the Church, and may have its own ideals and sacramental duties and its own prophets, even its own martyrs. The opposition of Church and State is to be regarded rather as the pursuit of one great aim, pursued by contrasted means. The ultimate aim of all true human activity must be in the noble words of Francis Bacon 'the glory of God and the relief of man's estate.'"[1]

Bacon's words form a fitting starting-point for our reflections: for they bring vividly before us both the idealism which should inspire all who labour at the task of government and the vastness and variety of the field with which they are concerned. Looked at in this broad light, the history of man's common life in the world will, I think, show two great streams of progress—the progress of man over Nature, or, as we say to-day, in the control of his environment, and the progress of man in what is essentially a moral task, the art of living together with his fellows. These two aspects of human activity and effort are in constant contact and interaction. Studied together, they reveal an advance which, in spite of man's ever-present moral weakness, may be described as an advance from Chaos to Cosmos in the organisation of the world's common life, yet they are so distinct in method and spirit that they can best be described separately.

Let us first, then, consider the history of Government, as a record of the progress of man's power over Nature.

Human history, in this sphere, is the story of man making himself at home in the world. When human history begins we find men helpless, superstitious, ignorant, the plaything of blind powers in the natural and animal

[1] A. L. Smith, "Church and State in the Middle Ages," pp. 207–208.

world. Superstitious because he was helpless, helpless because he was ignorant, he eked out a bare existence rather by avoiding than by controlling the forces in the little world by which he found himself surrounded. Human life in its earliest stages is, as Hobbes described it, nasty, brutish, and short. Man was the slave of his environment. He has risen to become its master. The world, as the prophetic eye of Francis Bacon foretold, has become "The Kingdom of Man."

How complete this conquest is, can best be realised perhaps by considering man's relation to the lower animals. When history opens, the animals are in their element; it is man who is the interloper. Two thousand years ago it was not the Society of Friends but wolves and wild boars who felt themselves at home on the site of Bournville Garden Village. To-day we are surprised when we read that in remote East Africa lions and giraffes venture occasionally to interfere in the murderous warfare between man and man. Man has imposed himself on the animals, by dint of his gradual accumulation of knowledge and his consequent power of organisation and government. He has destroyed the conditions under which the animals prospered. He has, as we might say, destroyed their home life, exposing them to dangers of his own making against which they are now as powerless as he was once against them.

"It is a remarkable thing," writes Sir E. Ray Lankester, "which possibly may be less generally true than our present knowledge seems to suggest—that the adjustment of organisms to their surroundings is so severely complete in Nature apart from Man, that diseases are unknown as constant and normal phenomena under those conditions. It is no doubt difficult to investigate this matter, since the presence of Man as an observer itself implies human intervention. But it seems to be a legitimate view that every disease to which animals (and probably plants also) are liable, excepting as a transient and very exceptional occurrence, is due to Man's interference. The diseases of cattle, sheep, pigs, and horses are not known except in domesticated

herds and those wild creatures to which Man's domesticated productions have communicated them. The trypanosome lives in the blood of wild game and of rats without producing mischief. The hosts have become tolerant of the parasite. It is only when man brings his unselected, humanly-nurtured races of cattle and horses into contact with the parasite, that it is found to have deadly properties. The various cattle-diseases which in Africa have done so much harm to native cattle, and have in some regions exterminated big game, have *per contra* been introduced by man through his importation of diseased animals of his own breeding from Europe. Most, if not all, animals in extra-human conditions, including the minuter things such as insects, shellfish, and invisible aquatic organisms, have been brought into a condition of 'adjustment' to their parasites as well as to the other conditions in which they live: it is this most difficult and efficient balance of Nature which Man everywhere upsets.[1]

And Sir E. Ray Lankester goes on to point out the moral to be drawn from this development. He points out that

"civilised man has proceeded so far in his interference with extra-human nature, has produced for himself and the living organisms associated with him such a special state of things by his rebellion against natural selection and his defiance of Nature's pre-human dispositions, that he must either go on and acquire firmer control of the conditions, or perish miserably by the vengeance certain to fall on the half-hearted meddler in great affairs. We may indeed compare civilised man to a successful rebel against Nature, who, by every step forward, renders himself liable to greater and greater penalties, and so cannot afford to pause or fail in one single step. Or again we may think of him as the heir to a vast and magnificent kingdom, who has been finally educated so as to take possession of his property, and is at length left alone to do his best; he has wilfully abrogated, in many important respects, the laws of his mother Nature by which the kingdom was hitherto governed; he has gained some power and advantage by so doing, but is threatened on every hand by dangers and disasters hitherto restrained: no retreat is possible—his only hope is to control, as he knows that he can, the sources of these dangers and disasters."

[1] Lankester, "Nature and Man," Romanes Lecture, 1905, pp. 27–29.

The time will come, not too long hence, as I believe, when men have realised, with the scientists, that the world is one kingdom, not many, and these problems of man's relation to his non-human environment will be the first concern of statesmen and governors. In some of our tropical colonies they have, perforce, become so already. If you live on the Gold Coast, the war against malaria cannot help seeming more important to you than the war against German trade : and in parts of Central Africa the whole possibility of continued existence centres round the presence or absence of the tsetse fly which is the carrier of sleeping sickness. Some day, when means have been adopted for abating our fiercer international controversies, we shall discover that in these and kindred matters lies the real province of world-politics. When that day comes the chosen representatives of the human race will see their constituents, as only philosophers see them now, as the inheritors of a great tradition of service and achievement, and as trustees for their successors of the manifold sources of human happiness which the advance of knowledge has laid open to us.

If the first and most important of these sources is the discovery of the conditions of physical well-being, the second is the discovery of means of communication between the widely separate portions of man's kingdom. The record of the process of bringing the world under the control of the organised government of man is largely the record of the improvement of communications. Side by side with the unending struggle of human reason against cold and hunger and disease we can watch the contest against distance, against ocean and mountain and desert, against storms and seasons. There can be few subjects more fascinating for a historian to study than the record of the migrations of the tribes of men. He might begin, if he wished, with the migrations of animals and describe the westward progress of the many species whose course can be traced by experts along the natural highways of

Western Europe. Some of them, so the books tell us, reached the end of their journey while Britain was still joined to the continent. Others arrived too late and were cut off by the straits of Dover. I like to form an imaginary picture, which the austerity of the scientific conscience will, I know, repudiate with horror, of the unhappy congregation, mournfully assembled bag and baggage on the edge of the straits and gazing wistfully across at the white cliffs of England, which they were not privileged to reach—*tendentesque manus ripae ulterioris amore*, "stretching out their paws in longing for the further bank."

Our historian would then go on to describe the early "wanderings of peoples" (*Völkerwanderungen*), how whole tribes would move off in the spring-time in the search for fresh hunting-grounds or pasture. He would trace the course of that westward push which, starting from somewhere in Asia, brought its impact to bear on the northern provinces of the Roman Empire and eventually loosened its whole fabric. He would show how Europe, as we know it, was welded into unity by the attacks of migratory warriors on three flanks—the Huns and the Tartars, a host of horsemen riding light over the steppes of Russia and Hungary: the Arabs, bearing Islam with them on their camels as they moved westward along North Africa and then pushing across into Spain: and the Northmen of Scandinavia, those carvers of kingdoms and earliest conquerors of the open sea, who left their mark on England and northern France, on Sicily and southern Italy, on the Balkan Peninsula, on Russia, on Greenland, and as far as North America. Then passing to Africa and Asia, he would describe the life of the pack-saddle and the caravan, the long and mysterious inland routes from the Mediterranean to Nubia and Nigeria, or from Damascus with the pilgrims to Medina, and the still longer and more mysterious passage through the ancient oases of Turkestan, now

buried in sand, along which, as recent discoveries have shown us, Greece and China, Christianity and Buddhism, exchanged their arts and ideas and products. Then he would tell of the great age or maritime discovery, of the merchant-adventurers and buccaneers, of their gradual transformation into trading companies, in the East and in the West, from companies to settlements, from settlements to colonies. Then perhaps he would close by casting a glimpse at the latest human migration of all, that which takes place or took place up to 1914, at the rate of a million a year from the Old World into the United States. He would take the reader to Ellis Island in New York harbour, where the immigrants emerge from the steerage to face the ordeal of the Immigration Officer. He would show how the same causes, hunger, fear, persecution, restlessness, ambition, love of liberty, which set the great westward procession in motion in the early days of tribal migration, are still alive and at work to-day among the populations of Eastern Europe. He would look into their minds and read the story of the generations of their nameless forerunners; and he would ask himself whether rulers and statesmen have done all that they might to make the world a home for all its children, for the poor as for the rich, for the Jew as for the Gentile, for the yellow and dark skinned as for the white.

Let us dwell for a moment more closely on one phase of this record of the conquest of distance. The crucial feature in that struggle was the conquest of the sea. The sea-surface of the world is far greater than its land-surface, and the sea, once subdued, is a far easier and more natural means of transport and communication. For the sea, the uncultivable sea, as Homer calls it, is itself a road, whereas on earth, whether it be mountain or desert or field, roads have first painfully to be made. Man's definitive conquest of the sea dates from the middle of the fifteenth century when, by improvements in the art

of sailing and by the extended use of the mariner's compass, it first became possible to undertake long voyages with assurance. These discoveries are associated with the name of Prince Henry of Portugal, whose life-long ambition it was, to quote the words engraved on his monument at the southern extremity of Portugal, "to lay open the regions of West Africa across the sea, hitherto not traversed by man, that thence a passage might be made round Africa to the most distant parts of the East."

The opening of the high seas which resulted from Prince Henry's activities is one of the most momentous events in human history. Its effect was, sooner or later, to unite the scattered families of mankind, to make the problems of all the concern of all: to make the world one place. Prince Henry and his sailors were, in fact, the pioneers of internationalism, with all the many and varied problems that internationalism brings with it.

"In 1486," says the most recent history of this development, "Bartholomew Dias was carried by storm beyond the sight of land, round the southern point of Africa, and reached the Great Fish River, north of Algoa Bay. On his return journey he saw the promontory which divides the oceans, as the narrow waters of the Bosphorus divide the continents, of the East and West. As in the crowded streets of Constantinople, so here, if anywhere, at this awful and solitary headland the elements of two hemispheres meet and contend. As Dias saw it, so he named it, 'The Cape of Storms.' But his master, John II., seeing in the discovery a promise that India, the goal of the national ambition, would be reached, named it with happier augury, 'The Cape of Good Hope.' No fitter name could have been given to that turning-point in the history of mankind. Europe, in truth, was on the brink of achievements destined to breach barriers, which had enclosed and diversified the nations since the making of the World, and commit them to an intercourse never to be broken again so long as the World endures. That good rather than evil may spring therefrom is the greatest of all human responsibilities." [1]

[1] "The Commonwealth of Nations," edited by L. Curtis, Part I. p. 130.

The contrast between Constantinople and the Cape, so finely drawn in these lines, marks the end of the age when land-communications and land power were predominant over sea-power. The Roman Empire was, and could only be, a land-power. It is no accident that the British Commonwealth is, as the American Commonwealth is fast becoming, predominantly a sea-power.

How was "the greatest of all human responsibilities," arising from this new intercourse of races, met? Knowledge, alas! is as much the devil's heritage as the angels': it may be used for ill, as easily as for good. The first explorers, and the traders who followed them, were not idealists but rough adventurers. Breaking in, with the full tide of Western knowledge and adaptability, to the quiet backwaters of primitive conservatism, they brought with them the worse rather than the better elements of the civilisation, the control of environment, of which they were pioneers. To them Africa and the East represented storehouses of treasure, not societies of men; and they treated the helpless natives accordingly.

"England and Holland as well as the Latin monarchies treated the natives of Africa as chattels without rights and as instruments for their own ends, and revived slavery in a form and upon a scale more cruel than any practised by the ancients. The employment of slaves on her own soil has worked the permanent ruin of Portugal. The slave trade with America was an important source of English wealth, and the philosopher John Locke did not scruple to invest in it. There is no European race which can afford to remember its first contact with the subject peoples otherwise than with shame, and attempts to assess their relative degrees of guilt are as fruitless as they are invidious. The question of real importance is how far these various states were able to purge themselves of the poison, and rise to a higher realisation of their duty towards their races whom they were called by the claims of their own superior civilisation to protect. The fate of that civilisation itself hung upon the issue."[1]

The process by which the Western peoples have risen

[1] Ibid., p. 166.

to a sense of their duty towards their weaker and more ignorant fellow-citizens is indeed one of the chief stages in that progress of the common life of mankind with which we are concerned.

How is that duty to be exercised? The best way in which the strong can help the weak is by making them strong enough to help themselves. The white races are not strong because they are white, or virtuous because they are strong. They are strong because they have acquired, through a long course of thought and work, a mastery over Nature and hence over their weaker fellow-men. It is not virtue but knowledge to which they owe their strength. No doubt much virtue has gone to the making of that knowledge—virtues of patience, concentration, perseverance, unselfishness, without which the great body of knowledge of which we are the inheritors could never have been built up. But we late-born heirs of the ages have it in our power to take the knowledge of our fathers and cast away any goodness that went to its making. We have come into our fortune: it is ours to use it as we think best. We cannot pass it on wholesale, and at one step, to the more ignorant races, for they have not the institutions, the traditions, the habits of mind and character, to enable them to use it. Those too we must transmit or develop together with the treasure of our knowledge. For the moment we stand in the relation of trustees, teachers, guides, governors, but always in their own interest and not ours, or rather, in the interest of the commonwealth of which we and they, since the opening of the high seas, form an inseparable part.

It has often been thought that the relation of the advanced and backward races should be one purely of philanthropy and missionary enterprise rather than of law and government. It is easy to criticise this by pointing to the facts of the world as we know it—to the existing colonial empires of the Great Powers and to

the vast extension of the powers of civilised governments which they represent. But it may still be argued that the question is, not Have the civilised powers annexed large empires ? but Ought they to have done so ? Was such an extension of governmental authority justifiable or inevitable ? Englishmen in the nineteenth century, like Americans in the twentieth, were slow to admit that it was ; just as the exponents of *laissez-faire* were slow to admit the necessity for State interference with private industry at home. But in both cases they have been driven to accept it by the inexorable logic of facts. What other solution of the problem, indeed, is possible ?

"Every alternative solution," as a recent writer remarks,[1] "breaks down in practice. To stand aside and do nothing under the plea that every people must be left free to manage its own affairs, and that intervention is wicked, is to repeat the tragic mistake of the Manchester School in the economic world which protested against any interference by the State to protect workmen . . . from the oppression and rapacity of employers, on the ground that it was an unwarranted interference with the liberty of the subject and the freedom of trade and competition. To prevent adventurers from entering the territory is impossible, unless there is some civilised authority within it to stop them through its police. To shut off a backward people from all contact with the outside world by a kind of blockade is not only unpracticable, but is artificially to deny them the chances of education and progress. The establishment of a genuine government by a people strong enough and liberal enough to ensure freedom under the law and justice for all is the only solution. . . . They must undertake this duty, not from any pride of dominion, or because they wish to exploit their resources, but in order to protect them alike from oppression and corruption, by strict laws and strict administration, which shall bind the foreigner as well as the native, and then they must gradually develop, by education and example, the capacity in the natives to manage their own affairs."

Thus we see that the progress in knowledge and in

[1] P. H. Kerr in "An Introduction to the Study of International Relations," 1915, p. 149.

the control of their environment made by the civilised peoples has, in fact and inevitably, led to their leadership in government also, and given them the predominant voice in laying down the lines along which the common life of mankind is to develop. If we are to look for the mainspring of the world's activities, for the place where its new ideas are thought out, its policies framed, its aspirations cast into practical shape, we must not seek it in the forests of Africa or in the interior of China, but in those busy regions of the earth's surface where the knowledge, the industries, and all the various organisations of government and control find their home. Because organisation is embodied knowledge, and because knowledge is power, it is the Great Powers, as we truly name them,[1] who are predominantly responsible for the government of the world and for the future of the common life of mankind.

In the exercise of this control the world has already, in many respects, become a single organism. The conquest of distance in the fifteenth century was the beginning of a process which led, slowly but inevitably, to the widening of the boundaries of government. Two discoveries made about the same time accentuated the same tendency. By the invention of gunpowder the people of Europe were given an overwhelming military superiority over the dwellers in other continents. By the invention of printing, knowledge was internationalised for all who had the training to use it. Books are the tools of the brain-worker all the world over; but, unlike the file and the chisel, the needle and the hammer, books not only create, but suggest. A new idea is like an electric current set running throughout the world, and no man can say into what channels of activity it may not be directed.

But neither travel nor conquest nor books and the spread of ideas caused so immense a transformation in the

[1] A still better name would be the Great Responsibilities.

common life of mankind as the process beginning at the end of the eighteenth century which is known to historians as the Industrial Revolution. As we have spoken of the conquest of distance perhaps a better name for the Industrial Revolution would be the Conquest of Organisation. For it was not the discovery of the steam-engine or the spinning-jenny which constituted the revolution : it was the fact that men were now in a position to apply these discoveries to the organisation of industry. The ancient Greeks played with the idea of the steam-engine : it was reserved for eighteenth-century England to produce a generation of pioneers endowed with the knowledge, the power, the foresight, and the imagination to make use of the world-transforming potentialities of the idea. The Industrial Revolution, with its railways and steamships, telegraphs and telephones, and now its airships and submarines and wireless communication, completed the conquest of distance. Production became increasingly organised on international lines. Men became familiar with the idea of an international market. Prices and prospects, booms and depressions, banking and borrowing, became international phenomena. The organisation of production led to an immensely rapid increase of wealth in Western Europe. The application of that wealth to the development of the world's resources in and outside Europe led to a correspondingly huge advance in trade and intercourse. The breakfast-table in an ordinary English home to-day is a monument to the achievements of the Industrial Revolution and to the solid reality of the economic internationalism which resulted from it. There is still poverty in Western Europe, but it is preventible poverty. Before the Industrial Revolution, judged by a modern standard, there was nothing but poverty. The satisfying physical and economic condition which we describe by the name of comfort did not exist. The Italian historian Ferrero, in one of his essays, recommends those who have romantic yearnings after the

good old times to spend one night on what our forefathers called a bed. Mr. Coulton, in his books on the Middle Ages, has used some very plain language on the same text. And Professor Smart, in his recently published posthumous work, pointing a gentle finger of rebuke at certain common Socialist fantasies, remarks :

"There never was a golden age of equality of wealth : there was rather a leaden one of inequality of poverty. . . . We should speak more guardedly of the riches of the old world. A careful examination of any old book would show that the most splendid processions of pomp and luxury in the Middle Ages were poor things compared to the parade of a modern circus on its opening day."[1]

Such prosperity as we enjoy to-day, such a scene as we can observe on these smiling outskirts of Birmingham, is due to man's Conquest of Organisation and to the consequent development and linking-up, by mutual intercourse and exchange, of the economic side of the world's life.

So far we have been watching the progress of man in his efforts to "make himself at home" in the world. We have seen him becoming more skilful and more masterful century by century, till in these latter days the whole world is, as it were, at his service. He has planted his flag at the two poles : he has cut a pathway for his ships between Asia and Africa, and between the twin continents of America : he has harnessed torrents and cataracts to his service : he has conquered the air and the depths of the sea : he has tamed the animals : he has rooted out pestilence and laid bare its hidden causes : and he is penetrating farther and ever farther in the discovery of the causes of physical and mental disease. He has set his foot on the neck of Nature. But the last and greatest conquest is yet before him. He has yet to conquer himself. Victorious against Nature, men are still at war, nay, more than ever at war, amongst themselves. How is

[1] "Second Thoughts of an Economist," 1916, pp. 17–18, 22.

it that the last century and a half, which have witnessed so unparalleled an advance in the organisation of the common life of man on the material side, should have been an age of wars and rumours of wars, culminating in the vastest and most destructive conflict that this globe of ours has ever witnessed? What explanation could we give of this to a visitor from the moon or to those creatures of inferior species whom, as Sir E. Ray Lankester has told us, it is our function, thanks to our natural superiority, to command and control?

This brings us to the second great branch of our subject—the progress of mankind in the art of living together in the world.

Government, as we have seen, covers the whole social life of man: for the principles that regulate human association are inherent in the nature of man. But in what follows we shall perforce confine ourselves mainly to the sphere of what is ordinarily called politics, that is to the recognised and authoritative form of human association called the State, as opposed to the innumerable subordinate or voluntary bodies and relationships, which pervade every department of man's common life.

The progress of Government in this second sphere may be defined as the deepening and extension of man's duty towards his neighbour. It is to be reckoned, not in terms of knowledge and organisation, but of character. The ultimate goal of human government, in the narrower sense, as of all social activity—let us never forget it—is liberty, to set free the life of the spirit. "Liberty," said Lord Acton, who could survey the ages with a wealth of knowledge to which no other man, perhaps, ever attained, "Liberty is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end. It is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society and of private life."[1] Government

[1] "Freedom and other Essays," p. 22.

is needed in order to enable human life to become, not efficient or well-informed or well-ordered, but simply good ; and Lord Acton believed, as the Greeks and generations of Englishmen believed before him, that it is only in the soil of liberty that the human spirit can grow to its full stature, and that a political system based upon any other principle than that of responsible self-government acts as a bar at the outset to the pursuit of what he called "the highest objects of civil society or of private life." For though a slave, or a man living under a servile political system, may develop many fine qualities of character : yet such virtues will, in Milton's words, be but "fugitive and cloistered," "unexercised and unbreathed." For liberty, and the responsibilities that it involves, are the school of character and the appointed means by which men can best serve their neighbours. A man deprived of such opportunities, cut off from the quickening influence of responsibility, has, as Homer said long ago, "lost half his manhood." He may be a loyal subject, a brave soldier, a diligent and obedient workman : but he will not be a full-grown man. Government will have starved and stunted him in that which it is the supreme object of government to develop and set free.

It is idle, then, to talk in general terms about the extension of government as a good thing, whether in relation to the individual citizen or to the organisation of the world into an international State. We have always first to ask : What kind of Government ? On what principles will it be based ? What ideal will it set forth ? What kind of common life will it provide or allow to its citizens ? If the whole world were organised into one single State, and that State, supreme in its control over Nature, were armed with all the knowledge and organisation that the ablest and most far-seeing brains in the world could supply, yet mankind might be worse off under its sway, in the real essentials of human life, than if they

were painted savages. "Though I have the gift of prophecy and understand all mysteries and all knowledge: and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Government may be the organisation of goodness, or the organisation of evil. It may provide the conditions by which the common life of society can develop along the lines of man's spiritual nature: or it may take away the very possibility of such a development. Till we know what a Government stands for, do not let us judge it by its imposing externals of organisation. The Persian Empire was more imposing than the Republics of Greece: Assyria and Babylon than the little tribal divisions of Palestine: the Spanish Empire than the cities of the Netherlands. There is some danger that, in our new-found sense of the value of knowledge in promoting happiness, we should forget what a tyrant knowledge, like wealth, can become. No doubt, just as we saw that moral qualities, patience and the like, are needed for the advancement of knowledge, so knowledge is needed, and greatly needed, in the task of extending and deepening the moral and spiritual life of mankind. But we cannot measure that progress in terms of knowledge or organisation or efficiency or culture. We need some other standard by which to judge between Greece and Persia, between Israel and Babylon, between Spain and the Netherlands, between Napoleon and his adversaries, and between contending Powers in the modern world. What shall that standard be?

It must be a similar standard—let us boldly say it—to that by which we judge between individuals. It must be a standard based on our sense of right and wrong. But right and wrong in themselves will not carry us very far, any more than they will carry the magistrate on the bench or the merchant in his counting-house. Politics, like business, is not the whole of life—though some party politicians and some business men think otherwise

—but a department of life: both are means, not ends; and as such they have developed special rules and codes of their own, based on experience in their own special department. In so far as they are framed in accordance with man's spiritual nature and ideals these rules may be considered to hold good and to mark the stage of progress at which Politics and Business have respectively arrived in promoting the common weal in their own special sphere. With the rules of business, or what is called Political Economy, we have at the moment no concern. It is the rules of politics, or the working experience of rulers, crystallised in what is called Political Science or Political Philosophy, to which we must devote a few moments' attention.

We are all of us, of course, political philosophers. Whether we have votes or not, whether we are aware of it or not, we all have views on political philosophy and we are all constantly making free use of its own peculiar principles and conceptions. Law, the State, Liberty, Justice, Democracy are words that are constantly on our lips. Let us try to form a clear idea of the place which these great historic ideals occupy in the progress of mankind.

The great political thinkers of the world have always been clear in their own minds as to the ultimate goal of their own particular study. Political thought may be said to have originated with the Jewish prophets, who were the first to rebuke kings to their faces and to set forth the spiritual aims of politics—to preach Righteousness and Mercy as against Power and Ambition and Self-interest. Their soaring imagination, less systematic than the Greek intellect, was wider in its sweep and more far-seeing in its predictions. "As the earth bringeth forth her bud and as the garden causeth the things sown in it to spring forth," says Isaiah, in magnificent anticipation of the doctrine of Natural Law, "so the Lord God will cause righteousness and praise to spring forth before all

the nations." "Peace, peace, to him that is far off, and to him that is near, saith the Lord, and I will heal him: but the wicked are like the troubled sea when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace, saith my God, for the wicked." "Out of Zion shall go forth the Law and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And he shall judge between the nations and shall reprove many peoples; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." [1]

It was, however, Plato and Aristotle who first made politics a branch of separate study: and, unlike many of their modern successors, they pursued it throughout in close connexion with the kindred studies of ethics and psychology. Their scope was, of course, confined to the field of their own experience, the small self-contained City-States of Greece, and it did not fall within their province to foreshadow, like the Jewish Prophets, the end of warfare, or to speculate on the ultimate unity of mankind. Their task was to interpret the work of their own fellow-countrymen on the narrow stage of Greek life. Their lasting achievement is to have laid down for mankind what a State is, as compared with other forms of human association, and to have proclaimed, once and for all, in set terms, that its object is to promote the "good life" of its members. "Every State," says Aristotle in the opening words of his "Politics," "is a community of some kind." That is to say, States belong to the same *genus*, as it were, as political parties, trade unions, cricket clubs, business houses, or such gatherings as ours. What, then, is the difference between a State and a political party? "If all communities," he goes on, "aim at some good, the State or political community, which is the highest of all and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good."

[1] Isaiah lxvi. 2; lvii. 19, 21; ii. 3, 4.

Why is the State the highest of all forms of association? Why should our citizenship, for instance, take precedence of our trade unionism or our business obligations? Aristotle replies, and in spite of recent critics I think the reply still holds good: because, but for the existence of the State and the reign of law maintained by it, none of these associations could have been formed or be maintained. "He who first founded the State was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when protected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and righteousness, he is the worst of all." Or, to put it in the resounding Elizabethan English of Hooker: "The public power of all societies is above every soul contained in the same societies. And the principal use of that power is to give laws to all that are under it; which laws, in such case, we must obey, unless there be reason showed which may necessarily enforce that the law of Reason or of God doth enjoin the contrary. Because except our own private and probable resolutions be by the law of public determinations overruled, we take away all possibility of social life in the world."[1] The Greeks did not deny, as the example of Socrates shows, the right of private judgment on the question of obedience to law, or the duty of respect for what Hooker calls the Law of Reason or of God. Against the authentic voice of conscience no human authority can or should prevail. But Aristotle held, with Hooker, that obedience to law and faithful citizenship are themselves matters normally ordained by the law of Reason or of God and that, as against those of any other association (*κοινωνία*), the claims of the State are paramount. In other words, he would deny what is sometimes loosely called the *right* of rebellion, whilst not closing the door to that *duty* of rebellion which has so often advanced the cause of liberty. When Aristotle speaks of the State, moreover, he does not mean a sovereign authority exercising arbitrary power,

[1] "Ecclesiastical Polity," Book I. ch. xvi. 5.

as in Persia or Babylon : he means an authority administering Law and Justice according to recognised standards : and he is thinking of Law and Justice, not simply as part of the apparatus of government but as based upon moral principles. "Righteousness," he says, "is the bond of men in States and the administration of Justice, which is the determination of what is righteous, is the principle of order in political society." "Of Law," says Hooker,[1] here as elsewhere echoing the ancients, "there can be no less acknowledged than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world." The State takes precedence of the party or the trade union because, however idealistic in their policy these latter may be, the State covers all, not merely a section of the community, and is able not merely to proclaim but to enforce the rule of law and justice. Put in modern language, one might define the Greek idea of the State as the Organisation of Mutual Aid.

The Greek States did not remain true to this high ideal. Faced with the temptations of power they descended almost to the level of the Oriental monarchies with which they were contrasted. But even had they remained faithful to their philosophers' ideal of public service they would not have survived. Unable to transcend the limits of their own narrow State-boundaries and to merge their ideals with those of their neighbours, they were helpless in the face of the invader. First Macedonia and then Rome swept over them, and political idealism slumbered for many centuries. Rome gave the world, what it greatly needed, centuries of peace and order and material prosperity ; it built up an enduring fabric of law on principles of Reason and Humanity : it did much to give men, what is next to the political sense, the social sense. It made men members of one another from Scotland to Syria and from Portugal to Baghdad. But it did not give them "the good life" in

[1] End of Book I. of the "Ecclesiastical Polity."

its fullness : for it did not, perhaps it could not, give them liberty. Faced with the choice between efficiency and the diffusion of responsibility, the rulers of the Roman Empire unhesitatingly chose efficiency. But the atrophy of responsibility proved the canker at the heart of the Empire. Deprived of the stimulus that freedom and the habit of responsibility alone can give, the Roman world sank gradually into the morass of Routine. Life lost its savour and grew stale, flat and unprofitable, as in an old-style Government office. "The intolerable sadness inseparable from such a life," says Renan, "seemed worse than death." And when the barbarians came and overturned the whole fabric of bureaucracy, though it seemed to educated men at the time the end of civilisation, it was in reality the beginning of a new life.

Amid the wreckage of the Roman Empire, one governing institution alone remained upright—the Christian Church with its organisation for ministering to the spiritual needs of its members. With the conversion of the barbarians to Christianity the governing functions and influence of the Church became more and more important ; and it was upon the basis of Church government that political idealism, so long in abeyance was reawakened. The thinkers who took up the work of Plato and Aristotle on the larger stage of the Holy Roman Empire boldly looked forward to the time when mankind should be united under one government and that government should embody the highest ideals of mankind. Such an ideal seemed indeed to many one of the legacies of the Founder of Christianity. The familiar petition in the Lord's Prayer : *thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven* sounded, in the ears of Dante and Thomas Aquinas and innumerable theologians and canonists, as a prayer and a pledge for the ultimate political unity of mankind on the basis of Christian Law. Such a belief was indeed the bedrock of mediæval political thought. To devout Christians,

brought up in the œcumenical traditions of the Roman Empire,

"every ordering of a human community must appear as a component part of that ordering of the world which exists because God exists, and every earthly group must appear as an organic member of that *Civitas Dei*, that God-State, which comprehends the heavens and the earth.[1] . . . Thus the Theory of Human Society must accept the divinely created organisation of the Universe as a prototype of the first principles which govern the construction of human communities. . . . Therefore, in all centuries of the Middle Age, Christendom, which in destiny is identical with Mankind, is set before us as a single, universal Community, founded and governed by God Himself. Mankind is one 'mystical body'; it is one single and internally connected 'people' or 'folk'; it is an all-embracing corporation, which constitutes that Universal Realm, spiritual and temporal, which may be called the Universal Church, or, with equal propriety, the Commonwealth of the Human Race. Therefore, that it may attain its one purpose, it needs One Law and One Government."[1]

But the mediæval ideal, like the Greek, broke down in practice. "Where the Middle Ages failed," says the Master of Balliol, continuing a passage already quoted, "was in attempting . . . to make politics the handmaid of religion, to give the Church the organisation and form of a political State, that is, to turn religion from an indwelling spirit into an ecclesiastical machinery." In other words, the mediæval attempt broke down through neglecting the special conditions and problems of the political department of life, through declining, as it were, to specialise. While men were discussing the Theory of the Two Swords, whether the Emperor derived his power directly from God or indirectly through the Pope, or whether the sword should be used at all, the actual work of government in laying the foundations of the good life was neglected. Not only Liberty but Justice and Order were largely in abeyance and the range of State action which we to-day describe as "social legislation" was not

[1] Gierke, "Political Theories of the Middle Age," pp. 8 and 10.

even dreamed of. Absorbed in theory or wrapped in ignorance, men forget the practical meaning of Statehood and its responsibilities. Central Europe languished for centuries, under a sham Empire, in the unprogressive anarchy of feudalism. "The feudal system," it has been said,[1] "was nothing more nor less than the attempt of a society which had failed to organise itself as a State, to make contract do the work of patriotism." It is the bitter experience which Germany went through under the anarchy of feudalism and petty governments, lasting to well within living memory, which by a natural reaction has led the German people, under Prussian tutelage, to cling to the conception of the State as Power and nothing more.

The study of politics had to become secular before it could once more become practical, and, by being practical, ministering to practical ideals and enlisting practical devotion, become, as it were, sacred once more. Where the well-being of our fellow-men is concerned it is not enough to be well-meaning. Government is an art, not an aspiration: and those who are concerned with it, whether as rulers or voters, should have studied its problems, reflected on its possibilities and limitations, and fitted themselves to profit by its accumulated experience.

Since the close of the Middle Ages, when politics became secular, the art of government has advanced by giant strides. Invention has followed invention, and experiment experiment, till to-day skilled specialists in the Old World and the New are at hand to watch and to record the latest devices for dealing with a hundred difficult special problems—whether it be the administration of justice or patronage, the organisation of political parties, the fixing of Cabinet responsibility, the possibilities and limits of federalism, the prevention of war. There has, indeed, been as great an advance in the political art in the last four centuries and particularly in the

[1] "The Commonwealth of Nations," Part I. p. 73.

last century, as in the very kindred art of medicine. The wonderful concentration of energy which the various belligerent Powers have been able to throw into the present war is at once the best and the most tragic illustration of this truth. Man's common life in the State is more real, more charged with meaning and responsibility, more potent for good or for ill than it has ever been before—than our predecessors even in the time of Napoleon could have dreamed of.

The greatest inventors and most skilful practitioners of the political art in the modern world have been the English, for it is the English who, of all nations, have held closest to the ideal of freedom in its many and various manifestations. Superficially regarded, the English are a stupid people, and so their continental neighbours have often regarded them. But their racial heritage and their island situation seem to have given them just that combination of experience and natural endowment necessary to success in the task of government. Taken as a whole, the English are not brilliant, but they are clear-headed: they are not far-sighted, but they can see the fact before their eyes: they are ill equipped with theoretical knowledge, but they understand the working of institutions and have a good eye for judging character: they have little constructive imagination of the more grandiose sort, but they have an instinct for the "next step" which has often set them on paths which have led them far further than they dreamed; above all, they have a relatively high standard of individual character and public duty, without which no organisation involving the free co-operation of man and man can hope to be effective. It is this unique endowment of moral qualities and practica gifts, coupled with unrivalled opportunities, which has made the English the pioneers in modern times in the art of human association. Englishmen, accustomed to what eighteenth-century writers used to call "the peculiar felicity of British freedom," do not always remember

how far their own experience has carried them on the road of political progress. They do not realise how many problems they have solved and abolished, as the art of medicine has abolished diseases. When they hear speak of the eternal conflict between Nationality and Nationality, they often forget that a war between England and Scotland has long since become unthinkable and that the platitudes of St. Andrew's Day are still paradoxes in Central and Eastern Europe. When they are told of States where the spontaneous manifestations of group-life, non-conforming sects, workmen's associations, and ordinary social clubs, are driven underground and classed as dangerous secret societies, they should realise how precious a thing is that freedom of association which is one of the dearest attributes of English liberty. So too when they read of monarchical and military supremacy in a country like Germany, which is still politically speaking in the stage of England under the Tudors, or of Russian autocracy, or of the struggle over the King's prerogative which has been taking place in Greece. If we believe, as we must, in the cause of liberty, let us not be too modest to say that nations which have not yet achieved responsible self-government, whether within or without the British Commonwealth, are politically backward, and let us recall the long stages of political invention by which our own self-government has been achieved. Representation, trial by jury, an independent judiciary, equality before the law, habeas corpus, a limited monarchy, the practice of ministerial responsibility, religious toleration, the freedom of printing and association, colonial autonomy—all these are distinctly English inventions, but time has shown that most of them are definite additions to the universal art of government. We can survey the Balkans, for instance, and say with confidence that one thing, amongst others, that those nations are in need of is toleration, both in the sphere of nationality and of religion : or declare of the United States that their industrial future will be menaced

till they have freed Trade Unionism from the threat of the so-called law of Conspiracy : or ask of our own so-called self-governing Dominions whether they are content with a system that concedes them no responsible control over the issues of peace and war. This is not to say that our own governmental machinery is perfect. Far from it. It was never in greater need of overhauling. It is only to reaffirm the belief, which no temporary disillusionment can shake, that it is founded on enduring principles which are not political but moral. To compare a system which aims at freedom and seeks to attain that aim through the working of responsible self-government with systems, however logically perfect or temporarily effective, which set no value on either, is, as it were, to compare black with white. It is to go back on the lessons of centuries of experience and to deny the cause, not of liberty alone, but of that progress of the spirit of man which it is the highest object of liberty to promote.

We have no time here to discuss in detail the various English inventions in the art of politics, but we must pause to consider two of the most important, because they are typical of British methods. The first is the invention called the Principle of Representation. Representation is a device by which, and by which alone, the area of effective government can be extended without the sacrifice of liberty. It is a device by which the scattered many can make their will prevail over the few at the centre. Under any non-representative system, whether in a State or a Church or a Trade Union or any other association, men always find themselves set before the inexorable dilemma between freedom and weakness on the one hand and strength and tyranny on the other. Either the State or the association has to be kept small, so that the members themselves can meet and keep in touch with all that goes on. Or it is allowed to expand and grow strong, in which case power becomes concentrated at the centre and the great body of members loses all effective control.

The ancient world saw no way out of this dilemma. The great Oriental monarchies never contemplated even the pretence of popular control. The city-states of Greece, where democracy originated, set such store in consequence by the personal liberty of the individual citizen, that they preferred to remain small, and suffered the inevitable penalty of their weakness. Rome, growing till she overshadowed the world, sacrificed liberty in the process. Nor was the Christian Church, when it became a large-scale organisation, able to overcome the dilemma. It was not till thirteenth-century England that a way out was found. Edward I., in summoning two burgesses from each borough and two knights from each shire to his model Parliament in 1295, hit on a method of doing business which was destined to revolutionise the art of government. He stipulated that the men chosen by their fellows to confer with him must come, to quote the exact words of the summons, armed with "full and sufficient power for themselves and for the community of the aforesaid county, and the said citizens and burgesses for themselves and the communities of the aforesaid cities and boroughs separately, there and then, for doing what shall then be ordained according to the Common Council in the premises, so that the aforesaid business shall not remain unfinished in any way for defect of this power." In other words, the members were to come to confer with the king not as individuals speaking for themselves alone, but as representatives. Their words and acts were to bind those on whose behalf they came, and those who chose them were to do so in the full knowledge that they would be so bound. In choosing them the electors deliberately surrendered their own share of initiative and sovereignty and combined to bestow it on a fellow-citizen whom they trusted. In this way, and in this way alone, the people of Cornwall and of Northumberland could bring their wishes to bear and play their part, together with the people at the centre, in the government of a country

many times the size of a city-state of ancient Greece. There had been assemblies before in all ages of history: but this was something different. It was a Parliament.

Representation seems to us such an obvious device that we often forget how comparatively modern it is and what a degree of responsibility and self-control it demands both in the representative and in those whom he represents. It is very unpleasant to hear of things done or acquiesced in by our representatives of which we disapprove, and to have to remember that it is our own fault for not sending a wiser or braver man to Westminster in his place. It is still more unpleasant for a representative to feel, as he often must, that his own honest opinion and conscience draw him one way on a matter of business and the opinions of most of his constituents another. But these are difficulties inherent in the system, and for which there is no remedy but sincerity and patience. It is part of the bargain that a constituency should not be able to disavow a representative: and that a representative should feel bound to use his own best judgment on the issues put before him. To turn the representative, as there is a tendency to do in some quarters, into a mere mouthpiece with a mandate, is to ignore the very problem which made representation necessary, and to presume that a local mass-meeting can be as well informed or take as wide a view as those who have all the facts before them at the centre. The ancient Greeks, who had a strong sense of individuality, were loth to believe that any one human being could make a decision on behalf of another. In the deepest sense of course they were right. But government, as has been said, is at best a rough business. Representation is no more than a practical compromise: but it is a compromise which has been found to work. It has made possible the extension of free government to areas undreamed of. It has enabled the general sense of the inhabitants of the United States, an area nearly as large as Europe, to be concentrated at Washington, and

it may yet make it possible to collect the sense of self-governing Dominions in four continents in a Parliament at London. All this lay implicit in the practical instructions sent by the English king to his sheriffs ; but its development would only have been possible in a community where the general level of character was a high one and where men were, therefore, in the habit of placing implicit trust in one another. The relationship of confidence between a member of Parliament and his constituents, or a Trade Union leader and his rank and file, is a thing of which public men are rightly proud : for it reflects honour on both parties and testifies to an underlying community of purpose which no passing disagreement on details can break down.

Representation paved the way for the modern development of responsible self-government. But it is important to recognise that the two are not the same thing. Responsible self-government, in its modern form, is a separate and more complex English invention in the art of government. A community may be decked out with a complete apparatus of representative institutions and yet remain little better than an autocracy. Modern Germany is a case in point. The parliamentary suffrage for the German Reichstag is more representative than that for the British House of Commons. The German workman is better represented in his Parliament than the British workman is in ours. But the German workman has far less power to make his will effective in matters of policy than the British, because the German constitution does not embody the principle of responsible self-government. Sovereignty still rests with the Kaiser as it rested in the thirteenth century with Edward I. The Imperial Chancellor is not responsible to the Reichstag but to the Kaiser, by whom he is appointed and whose personal servant he remains. The Reichstag can discuss the actions of the Chancellor : it can advise him, or protest to him, or even pass votes of

censure against him ; but it cannot make its will effective. We can observe the working of similar representative institutions in different parts of the British Commonwealth. The provinces of India and many British Colonies have variously composed representative assemblies, but in all cases without the power to control their executives. The self-governing Dominions, on the other hand, do enjoy responsible self-government, but in an incomplete form, because the most vital of all issues of policy are outside their control. On questions of foreign policy, and the issues of war and peace, the Parliaments of the Dominions, and the citizens they represent, are, constitutionally speaking, as helpless as the most ignorant native in the humblest dependency. Representative institutions in themselves thus no more ensure real self-government than the setting up of a works committee of employees in a factory would ensure that the workmen ran the factory. The distinction between representation and effective responsibility is so simple that it seems a platitude to mention it. Yet it is constantly ignored, both in this country by those who speak of Colonial self-government as though the Dominions really enjoyed the same self-government as the people of these islands, and by the parties in Germany whose programme it is, not to make Germany a truly constitutional country, but to assimilate the retrograde Prussian franchise to the broader representation of the Reichstag.

Wherein does the transition from representation to full responsibility consist ? It came about in England when Parliament, instead of merely being consulted by the sovereign, felt itself strong enough to give orders to the sovereign. The sovereign naturally resisted, as the Kaiser and the Tsar will resist in their turn ; but in this country the battle was fought and won in the seventeenth century. Since that time, with a few vacillations, Parliament has been the sovereign power. But once this

transfer of sovereignty has taken place, a new problem arises. A Parliament of several hundred members, even though it meets regularly, is not competent to transact the multitudinous and complex and highly specialised business of a modern State. The original function of Parliament was to advise, to discuss, and to criticise. It is not an instrument fit for the work of execution and administration. Having become sovereign, its first business must be to create out of its own members an instrument which should carry out its own policy and be responsible to itself for its actions. Hence arose the Cabinet. The Cabinet is, as it were, a distillation of Parliament, just as Parliament itself is a distillation of the country. It consists of members of Parliament, and it is in constant touch with Parliament; but its methods are not the methods of Parliament but of the older, more direct, organs of government which Parliament superseded. It meets in secret: it holds all the strings of policy: it has almost complete control of political and legislative initiative: it decides what is to be done and when and how: it has its own staff of agents and confidential advisers in the Departments and elsewhere whose acts are largely withdrawn from the knowledge and criticism of Parliament. A modern Cabinet in fact is open to the charge of being autocracy in a new guise. Such a charge would, of course, be a gross overstatement. But there is no doubt that the increasing complexity in the tasks of government has led to a corresponding growth of power and organisation at the centre which has strengthened the Cabinet immeasurably of recent years at the expense of the direct representatives of the people. There are, however, powerful influences at work in the opposite direction, towards decentralisation and new forms of representation, which there is no space to touch on here. Suffice it to say that here, as elsewhere, the price of liberty is eternal vigilance.

England, then, and all who enjoy the full privileges of British citizenship have been placed by the progress of events in a position of peculiar responsibility. The twentieth century finds us the centre of the widest experiment of self-government which the world has ever seen; for the principles of liberty, first tested in this island, have approved themselves on the soil of North America, Australasia, and South Africa. It finds us also responsible for the government and for the training in responsibility of some 350,000,000 members of the more politically inexperienced and backward races of mankind, or about one-fifth of the human race. The growth of the British Commonwealth, about which so astonishingly little is known either by ourselves or by other peoples, is not a mere happy or unhappy accident. It is one of the inevitable and decisive developments in the history of mankind. It is the direct result of that widening of intercourse, that internationalising of the world, to which reference has already been made. It represents the control of law and organised government over the blind and selfish forces of exploitation. In the exercise of this control we have often ourselves been blind and sometimes selfish. But "the situation of man," as Burke finely said of our Indian Empire, "is the preceptor of his duty." The perseverance of the British character, its habit of concentration on the work that lies to hand, and the influence of our traditional social and political ideals, have slowly brought us to a deeper insight, till to-day the Commonwealth is becoming alive to the real nature of its task—the extension and consolidation of liberty. If it has thus taken up, in part, the work of the mediæval Empire and has had a measure of success where the other failed, it is because of the character of its individual citizens, because despite constant and heart-breaking failures in knowledge and imagination, we are a people who, in the words of a stern, if friendly, critic, "with great self-assertion and a

bulldog kind of courage, have yet a singular amount of gentleness and tenderness."[1]

We have come to the end of our long survey. Some of you may feel that I have fetched too wide a compass and given too wide an extension to the meaning of government. But if I have sinned I have sinned of set purpose. I refuse to confine government within the limits of what is ordinarily called politics, or to discuss the association called the State in isolation from other sides of man's community life. To do so, I feel, is to lay oneself open to one of two opposite errors: the error of those for whom the State is the Almighty, and who invest it with a superhuman morality and authority of its own: and the error of those who draw in their skirts in horror from the touch of what Nietzsche called this "cold monster" and take refuge in monastic detachment from the political responsibilities of their time. We must be able to see politics as a part of life before we can see it steadily and see it whole. We must be able to see it in relation to the general ordering of the world and to connect it once more, as in the Middle Ages, with religion and morality. No thinking man can live through such a time as this and preserve his faith unless he is sustained by the belief that the clash of States which is darkening our generation is not a mere blind collision of forces, but has spiritual bearings which affect each individual living soul born or to be born in the world. It is not for us to anticipate the verdict of history. But what we can do is to bear ourselves worthily, in thought and speech, like our soldiers in action, of the times in which we live—to testify, as it were, in our own lives, to that for which so many of our friends have laid down theirs. We are met at a culminating moment of human fate—when, so far as human judgment can discern, the political destinies of this

[1] "Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier," ii. 276.

planet are being settled for many generations to come—perhaps for good. If the task of leadership in the arts of government remains with us, let us face the responsibility conscious of the vast spiritual issues which it involves, and let us so plan and act that history, looking back on these years of blood, may date from them a new birth of freedom and progress, not for ourselves in this country alone, but throughout that kingdom of Man which must one day, as we believe, become in very truth the kingdom of God.

PROGRESS IN INDUSTRY

In our study of Government we traced the upward course of the common life of mankind in the world. We saw it in the increasing control of Man over his physical environment, and we saw it also in his clearer realisation of the ultimate ideal of government—the ordering of the world's affairs on the basis of liberty. We have now to turn aside from this main stream of social development to watch one particular branch of it—to survey man's record in the special department of economics. We shall no longer be studying human history, or the history of human society, as a whole, but what is known as economic or industrial history.

It is important to be clear at the outset that economic or industrial history *is* a tributary stream and not the main stream : for there are a number of people who are of the contrary opinion. There has been an increasing tendency of recent years to write human history in terms of economic or industrial progress. "Tell me what men ate or wore or manufactured," say historians of this school, "and we will tell you what stage of civilisation he had reached. We will place him in his proper pigeonhole in our arrangement of the record of human progress." Did he use flint instruments or fight with nothing but a bow and arrow ? Did he use a canoe with a primitive pole which he had not even the sense to flatten so as to make it into a serviceable paddle ? Then our sociologist will put him very low down on his list of the stages of human progress. For the modern sociologist is a confirmed plutocrat. He measures the character of men and races by their wealth. Just as old-fashioned people still think

of the society of our own country as a hierarchy, in which the various classes are graded according to their social prestige and the extent of their possessions : so students of primitive civilisation classify races according to their material equipment, and can hardly help yielding to the temptation of reckoning their stage of progress as a whole by the only available test. Thus it is common, especially in Germany and the United States, to find histories of what purports to be the progress of mankind which show man first as a hunter and a fisherman, then as a shepherd, then as a tiller of the soil, and then work upwards to the complicated industrial system of to-day. We are asked to accept the life of Abraham or David among the sheep-folds as the bottom of the ladder, and the life of a modern wage-earner under the smoky sky of a manufacturing area as the top ; and when we complain and say, as men like William Morris and Stephen Graham are always saying, that we would far prefer to live in David's world, in spite of all its discomforts, we are told that we have no right to quarrel with the sacred principle of Evolution.

To interpret human history in this way is, of course, to deny its spiritual meaning, to deny that it is a record of the progress of the human *spirit* at all. It is to read it as a tale of the improvement, or rather the increasing complication, of *things*, rather than of the advance of man. It is to view the world as a Domain of Matter, not as the Kingdom of Man—still less, as the Kingdom of God. It is to tie us helplessly to the chariot wheels of an industrial Juggernaut which knows nothing of moral values. Let the progress of industry make life noisy and ugly and anxious and unhappy : let it engross the great mass of mankind in tedious and uncongenial tasks and the remainder in the foolish and unsatisfying activities of luxurious living ; let it defile the green earth with pits and factories and slag-heaps and the mean streets of those who toil at them, and dim the daylight with exhalations of monstrous vapour. It is not for us to complain or to

resist: for we are in the grip of a Power which is greater than ourselves, a Power to which mankind in all five continents has learnt to yield—that Economic Process which is, in truth, the God, or the Devil, of the modern world.

No thinking man dare acquiesce in such a conclusion or consent to bow the head before such fancied necessities. The function of industry, he will reply, is to serve human life, not to master it: to beautify human life, not to degrade it: to set life free, not to enslave it. Economics is not the whole of life: and when it transgresses its bounds and exceeds its functions it must be controlled and thrust back into its place by the combined activities of men. The soul is higher than the body, and life is more than housekeeping. Liberty is higher than Riches, and the welfare of the community more important than its economic and material progress. These great processes, which the increase of man's knowledge has set in motion, are not impersonal inhuman forces: men originated them: men administer them: and men must control them. Against economic necessity let us set political necessity: and let the watchword of that political necessity, here as always, be the freedom and the well-being of mankind.

With this caution in mind, then, let us approach our subject.

What is Economics? Economics is simply the Greek for "house-keeping." If writers and thinkers on the subject had only kept this simple fact in mind, or used the English word instead of the Greek, the world would have been saved much misery and confusion. Political economy is not, what Mill and other writers define it to be, "the Science of Wealth." It is the art of community-housekeeping, and community-housekeeping, as every woman knows, is a very important if subsidiary branch of the art of community-management or government.

Housekeeping, of course, is not a selfish but a social function. Housewives do not lay in bread and cheese simply to gratify their own desire to be possessors of a large store, but for the sake of their household. The true housekeeper or economic man is the man who is consciously ministering to the real needs of the community. Like the ruler or minister in the political sphere, he is a man who is performing a public service.

This is equally true whether the housekeeper has a monopoly of the purchase of bread and cheese for the household, or whether he or she has to compete with others as to which is to be allowed to serve the public in that particular transaction. Just as, under the party system, which seems to be inseparable from the working of democratic institutions, men stand for Parliament and compete for the honour of representing their neighbours, so in most systems of industry men compete for the honour of supplying the public. Competition in industry is practically as old as industry. In the earliest picture that has come down to us of Greek village life we read of the competition between potter and potter and between minstrel and minstrel—a competition as keen and as fierce, we may be sure, as that between rival shopkeepers to-day. For the opposite of competition, as has been truly said, is not co-operation but monopoly or bureaucracy : and there is no short and easy means of deciding between the rival systems. Sometimes the community is better served by entrusting one department wholly to one purveyor or one system of management—as in the Postal Service, or the Army and Navy. Sometimes it is clearly better to leave the matter open to competition. Nobody, for instance, would propose to do with only one minstrel, and seal the lips of all poets but the Poet Laureate. Sometimes, as in the case of the organised professions and the liquor trade, a strictly regulated system of competition has been considered best. No doubt the tendency at the present time is setting strongly against

competition and towards more unified and more closely organised systems of doing business. But it is important to make quite clear that there is nothing immoral or anti-social about the fact of competition itself, and nothing inconsistent with the idea of service and co-operation which should underlie all social and economic activity. It is not competition itself, as people often wrongly think, which is the evil, but the shallow and selfish motives and the ruthless trampling down of the weak that are too often associated with it. When we condemn the maxim, "the Devil take the hindmost," it is not because we think we ought to treat the hindmost as though he were the foremost—to buy cracked jars or patronise incapable minstrels. It is because we feel that there is a wrong standard of reward among those who have pushed to the front, and that the community as a whole cannot ignore its responsibility towards its less fortunate and capable members.

It is, indeed, quite impossible to abolish competition for the patronage of the household without subjecting its members to tyranny or tying them down to an intolerable uniformity—forcing them to suppress their own temporary likes or dislikes and to go on taking in the same stuff in the same quantities world without end. For the most serious and permanent competition is not that between rival purveyors of the same goods, between potter and potter and minstrel and minstrel, but between one set of goods and another : between the potter and the blacksmith, the minstrel and the painter. If we abolished competition permanently between the British railways we could not make sure that the public would always use them as it does now. People would still be at liberty to walk, or to drive, or to bicycle, or to fly, or at the very worst to stay at home. Competition, as every business man knows, sometimes arises from the most unexpected quarters. The picture-house and the bicycle have damaged the brewer and the publican. Similarly

the motor-car and the golf links have spoilt the trade in the fine china ornaments such as used to be common in expensively furnished drawing-rooms. People sit less in their rooms, so spend less on decorating them. The members of the household always retain ultimate control over their economic life, if they care to exercise it. "Whoso has sixpence," as Carlyle said, "is sovereign (to the length of sixpence) over all men ; commands Cooks to feed him, Philosophers to teach him, Kings to mount guard over him,"—to the length of sixpence. Passive resistance and the boycott are always open to the public in the last resort against any of their servants who has abused the powers of his position. A good instance of this occurred in the events which led to the so-called Tobacco riots in Milan in 1848. The Austrians thought they could force the Italians in their Lombard provinces to pay for a government they hated by putting a heavy tax on tobacco. But the Italians, with more self-control than we have shown in the present war, with one accord gave up smoking. Here was a plain competition between a monopoly and the consumer, between tobacco and patriotism : between a united household and an unpopular servant : and the household won, as it always can unless its members are incapable of combined action or have been deprived by governmental tyranny of all power to associate and to organise.

We are faced then with a community or household which has certain wants that need to be supplied. The individual members of the community are justified, within the limits of general well-being,[1] in deciding what are their own wants and how to satisfy them. They claim the right to *demand*, as the economists put it, the goods and services they require, bread and cheese, poetry, tobacco, motor-bicycles, china ornaments. In order to meet those demands, which are stable in essentials but

[1] Including the well-being of the producers—a point which is too often overlooked.

subject to constant modification in detail, there is ceaseless activity, rivalry, competition, on the part of the purveyors—on the side of what economists call *supply*. The business of housekeeping, or what is called the economic process, is that of bringing this demand and this supply into relation with one another. If the members of the household said they wanted to eat the moon instead of sugar, their demand would not be an economic demand: for no housekeeper could satisfy it. Similarly on the supply side: if the baker insisted on bringing round bad epics instead of bread and the grocer bad sonatas instead of sugar, the supply, however good it might seem to the baker and the grocer, and however much satisfaction they might personally have derived from their work, would not be an economic supply: for the housekeeper, acting on behalf of the household, would not take it in. But if the demand was for something not yet available, but less impossibly remote than the moon, the housekeeper might persuade the purveyors to cudgel their brains till they had met the need. For, as we know, Necessity, which is another word for Demand, is the mother of invention. Similarly, if a purveyor supplied something undreamed of by the household, but otherwise good of its kind, he might succeed in persuading the household to like it—in other words, in creating a demand. The late Sir Alfred Jones, by putting bananas cheap on the market, persuaded us that we liked them. Similarly Mr. Marvin, who deals in something better than bananas, has persuaded us all to come here, though most of us would never have thought of it unless he had created the demand in us.

Economic progress, then, is progress both on the side of demand and on the side of supply. It is a progress in wants as well as in their means of satisfaction: a progress in the aspirations of the household as well as in the contrivances of its purveyors: a progress in the sense of what life might be, as well as in the skill and genius

and organising powers of those to whom the community looks for help in the realisation of its hopes. It is important that this double aspect of our subject should be realised, for in what follows we shall have no opportunity to dwell further upon it. Space compels us to leave the household and its wants and aspirations out of account and to direct our attention solely to the side of supply; although it must always be remembered that no real and permanent progress in the organisation of production is possible without improvements in the quality and reduction in the number of the requirements of what is called civilisation.[1] What we have to watch, in our study of progress in industry, is the history of man as a purveyor of the household: in other words, as a producer of goods and services: from the days of the primitive savage with his bark canoe to the gigantic industrial enterprises of our own time.

We can best do so by dividing our subject into two on somewhat similar lines to the division in our study of government. Let us consider industry, first as an activity involving a relationship between man and Nature; secondly, as involving what may be called a problem of industrial government, a problem arising out of the co-operation between man and man in industrial work. In the first of these aspects we shall see man as a maker, an inventor, an artist; in the second as a subject or a citizen, a slave or a free man, in the Industrial Commonwealth.

Man as a maker or producer carries us back to the dawn of history. Man is a tool-using animal, and the early stages of human history are a record of the elaboration of tools. The flint axes in our museums are the earliest monuments of the activity of the human spirit. We do not know what the cave men of the Old Stone Age said or thought, or indeed whether they did

[1] On this point see "Poverty and Waste," by Hartley Withers, 1914, written before the war, which has driven its lessons home.

anything that we should call speaking or thinking at all ; but we know what they made. Centuries and millenniums elapsed between them and the first peoples of whom we have any more intimate record—centuries during which the foundations of our existing industrial knowledge and practice were being steadily laid.

"One may say in general," says Mr. Marvin,[1] "that most of the fruitful practical devices of mankind had their origin in prehistoric times, many of them existing then with little essential difference. Any one of them affords a lesson in the gradual elaboration of the simple. A step minute in itself leads on and on, and so all the practical arts are built up, a readier and more observant mind imitating and adapting the work of predecessors, as we imagined the first man making his first flint axe. The history of the plough goes back to the elongation of a bent stick. The wheel would arise from cutting out the middle of a trunk used as a roller. House architecture is the imitation with logs and mud of the natural shelters of the rocks, and begins its great development when men have learnt to make square corners instead of a rough circle. And so on with all the arts of life or pleasure, including clothing, cooking, tilling, sailing, and fighting."

How did this gradual process come about? Mr. Marvin himself supplies the answer. Through the action of the "readier and more observant minds"—in other words, through specialisation and the division of labour. As far back as we can go in history we find a recognition that men are not all alike, that some have one gift and some another, and that it is to the advantage of society to let each use his own gift in the public service. Among primitive peoples there has indeed often been a belief that men are compensated for physical weakness and disability by peculiar excellence in some sphere of their own. Hephaestos among the Greek gods was lame: so he becomes a blacksmith and uses his arms. Homer is blind: so instead of fighting he sings of war. They would not go so far as to maintain that all lame men must be good blacksmiths or all blind men good poets:

[1] "The Living Past," pp. 20, 21.

but at least they recognised that there was room in the community for special types and that the blacksmith and the poet were as useful as the ordinary run of cultivators and fighting men. The Greek word for craftsman—δημιουργός—"worker for the people," shows how the Greeks felt on this point. To them poetry and craftsmanship were as much honourable occupations or, as we should say, professional activities as fighting and tilling. Whether Homer took to poetry because he could not fight or because he had an overwhelming poetic gift, he had justified his place in the community.

Specialisation is the foundation of all craftsmanship and therefore the source of all industrial progress. We recognise this, of course, in common speech. "Practice makes perfect," "Genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains," are only different ways of saying that it is not enough to be "ready" and "observant," but that continued activity and concentration are necessary. A perfect industrial community would not be a community where everybody was doing the same thing: nor would it be a community where every one was doing just what he liked at the moment: it would be a community where every one was putting all his strength into the work which he was by nature best qualified to do—where, in the words of Kipling:

> "No one shall work for money, and no one shall work for fame,
> But each for the joy of the working, and each, in his separate star,
> Shall draw the thing as he sees it for the God of Things as They Are."

Progress in industry, then, on this side, consists in increasing specialisation and in the perfection of the relationship between the workman and his work. Man in this world is destined to labour, and labour is often described as the curse of Adam. But in reality, as every one knows who has tried it, or observed the habits of those who have, idleness is far more of a curse than labour. Few men—at any rate in the temperate zone—

can be consistently idle and remain happy. The born idler is almost as rare as the born poet. Most men, and, it must be added, most women, are happier working. If holidays were the rule and work the exception the world would be a much less cheerful place than it is even to-day. Purposeful activity is as natural to man as playing is to a kitten. From a purely natural point of view, no one has ever given a better definition of happiness than Aristotle when he defined it as *an activity of the soul in the direction of excellence in an unhampered life*. By excellence, of course, in this famous definition, Aristotle does not mean simply virtue : he means excellence in work. It is impossible, as we all know, to be good in the abstract. We must be good in some particular directions, *at* some particular thing. And the particular thing that we are good at is *our* work, our craft, our art—or, to use our less aesthetic English word, for which there is no equivalent in Greek, our duty. If happiness is to be found in doing one's duty, it does not result from doing that duty badly, but from doing it well—turning out, as we say, a thoroughly good piece of work, whether a day's work or a life's work. There is a lingering idea, still held in some quarters, that the more unpleasant an activity is the more virtuous it is. This is a mere barbarous survival from the days of what Nietzsche called slave-morality. We are each of us born with special individual gifts and capacities. There is, if we only knew it, some particular kind or piece of work which we are pre-eminently fitted to do—some particular activity or profession, be it held in high or in low repute in the world of to-day, in which we can win the steady happiness of purposeful labour. Shall we then say that it ministers to human progress and to the glory of God deliberately to bury our talent out of sight and to seek rather work which, because it is irksome and unpleasant to us, we can never succeed in doing either easily or really well ? No one who knows anything of education or of the training of the young, no

one, indeed, who has any love for children, would dare to say that we should. Our State educational system, miserably defective though it is in this regard, is based upon the idea of ministering to the special gifts of its pupils—of trying by scholarships, by Care Committees, by the institution of schools with a special "bias," to meet the needs of different kinds of young people and to set them in the path on which they are best fitted to travel.

In doing this the modern State is only trying to carry out the principle laid down in the greatest book ever written on education—Plato's "Republic." Plato's object was to train every citizen to fill the one position where he could lead the best life for the good of the State. His aim was not to make his citizens happy but to promote goodness; but he had enough faith in human nature—and who can be an educational thinker without having faith in human nature?—to be convinced that to enable men to "do their bit," as we say to-day, was to assure them of the truest happiness. We of this generation know how abundantly that faith has been confirmed. And indeed we can appeal in this matter not only to the common sense of Education Authorities or to the philosophy of the ancients, but to the principles of the Christian religion. The late Professor Smart, who was not only a good economist but a good man, has some very pertinent words on this subject.

"If for some reason that we know not of," he remarks,[1] "this present is merely the first stage in being; if we are all at school, and not merely pitched into the world by chance to pick up our living as best we can . . . it seems to me that we have reason enough to complain of the existing economic system. . . . I imagine that many of our churchgoing people, if they ever get to the heaven they sing about, will find themselves most uncomfortable, if it be a place for which they have made no preparation but in the 'business' in which they have earned their living. . . .

[1] "Second Thoughts of an Economist," p. 89.

A man's daily work is a far greater thing towards the development of the God that is in him than is his wealth. And, however revolutionary the idea is, I must say that all our accumulations of wealth are little to the purpose of life if they do not tend towards the giving to all men the opportunity of such work as will have its reward *in the doing*."

And of his own particular life-work, teaching, he remarks, in words that testify to his own inner peace and happiness, that "some of us have got into occupations which almost seem to guarantee immortality."

Let us, then, boldly lay it down that the best test of progress in industry and the best measure of success in any industrial system is the degree to which it enables men to "do their bit" and so to find happiness in their daily work, or if you prefer more distinctively religious language, the degree to which it enables men to develop the God that is in them. Let us have the courage to say that in the great battle which Ruskin and William Morris fought almost single-handed against all the Philistines of the nineteenth century, Ruskin and Morris, however wrong they may have been on points of practical detail, were right in principle. Let us make up our minds that a world in which men have surrendered the best hours of the day to unsatisfying drudgery, and banished happiness to their brief periods of tired leisure, is so far from civilised that it has not even made clear to itself wherein civilisation consists. And when we read such a passage as the following from a leading modern economist, let us not yield to the promptings of our lower nature and acquiesce in its apparent common sense, but remember that economists, like all workmen, are bounded by the limits of their own particular craft or study.

"The greater part of the world's work," says Professor Taussig,[1] the leading exponent of Economics at Harvard, "is not

[1] "Principles of Economics," vol. i. p. 11. It is interesting to note that in his latest book, "Inventors and Money-making, Lectures on some Relations between Economics and Psychology" (1915), Professor Taussig to some extent goes back upon the point of view of the extract given above.

in itself felt to be pleasurable. Some reformers have hoped to reach a social system under which all work would be in itself a source of satisfaction. It is probable that such persons are made optimistic by the nature of their own doings. They are writers, schemers, reformers; they are usually of strongly altruistic character, and the performance of any duty or set task brings to them the approval of an exacting conscience; and they believe that all mankind can be brought to labour in their own spirit. The world would be a much happier place if this state of mind could be made universal. But the great mass of men are of a humdrum sort, not born with any marked bent or any loftiness of character. Moreover, most of the world's work for the satisfaction of our primary wants must be of a humdrum sort, and often of a rough and coarse sort. There must be ditching and delving, sowing and reaping, hammering and sawing, and all the severe physical exertion which, however lightened by tools and machinery, yet can never be other than labour in the ordinary sense of the word."

When Professor Taussig assures us that "the great mass of men are of a humdrum sort, not born with any marked bent or loftiness of character" he is simply denying the Christian religion. To argue the point with him would carry us too far. We will do no more here than remind him that the people to whom the Founder of Christianity preached, and even those who were chosen to be its first disciples, were, like this audience, distinctly humdrum, and that assuredly the American Professor would not have discerned in them promising material for a world-transforming religious movement. What people see in others is often a mirror of themselves. Perhaps Professor Taussig, in spite of his excellent book, is rather a humdrum person himself.

When, however, Professor Taussig declares that "the greater part of the world's work is not in itself felt to be pleasurable" he is saying what, under existing conditions, we must all recognise to be true. A year or two ago Mr. Graham Wallas made an investigation into this very question, the results of which confirmed the general impression that modern workmen find little happiness in

their work.[1] But two of the conclusions which he reached conflict in a rather curious way with the statement of Professor Taussig. Mr. Wallas's evidence, which was largely drawn from students of Ruskin College, led him to the conclusion "that there is less pleasantness or happiness in work the nearer it approaches the fully organised Great Industry." The only workman who spoke enthusiastically of his work was an agricultural labourer who "was very emphatic with regard to the pleasure to be obtained from agricultural work." Professor Taussig, on the other hand, selects four agricultural occupations, ditching, delving, sowing, and reaping, as characteristically unpleasant and looks to machinery and the apparatus of the Industrial Revolution to counteract this unpleasantness. But the most interesting evidence gathered by Mr. Wallas was that relating to women workers. He had an opportunity of collecting the views of girls employed in the laundries and poorer kinds of factories in Boston.

"The answers," he says,[2] "surprised me greatly. I expected to hear those complaints about bad wages, hard conditions and arbitrary discipline which a body of men working at the same grade of labour would certainly have put forward. But it was obvious that the question, 'Are you happy?' meant to the girls, 'Are you happier than you would have been if you had stayed at home instead of going to work?' And almost every one of them answered 'Yes.'"

Why were they unhappy at home? Let Professor Taussig reflect on the answer. Not because they had "rough" or "coarse" or "humdrum" work to do, as in a factory or laundry, but because they had nothing to do, and they had found idleness unbearable. "One said that work 'took up her mind,' she had been awfully discon-

[1] A similar inquiry on a much larger scale was made by Adolf Levinstein in his book "Die Arbeiterfrage" (Munich, 1910). He examined four thousand workpeople, consisting of coal-miners, cotton-operatives, and engineers. With the exception of a few turners and fitters almost all replied that they found little or no pleasure in their work.

[2] "The Great Society," p. 363.

tented." Another that "you were of some use." Another thought "it was because the hours went so much faster. At home one could read, but only for a short time; there was the awful lonesome afternoon ahead of you." "Asked a little girl with dyed hair but a good little heart. She enjoyed her work. It made her feel she was worth something." And Mr. Wallas concludes that it is just because "everything that is interesting, even though it is laborious, in the women's arts of the old village is gone:" because "clothes are bought ready-made, food is bought either ready-cooked, like bread and jam and fish, or only requiring the simplest kind of cooking:" in fact just because physical exertion has been lightened by books and machinery, that "there results a mass of inarticulate unhappiness whose existence has hardly been indicated by our present method of sociological inquiry."

It would seem, then, that the task of associating modern industrial work with happiness is not impossible, if we would only set ourselves to the task. And the task is a twofold one. It is, first, to make it possible for people to follow the employment for which they are by nature best fitted; and secondly, to study much more closely than heretofore, from the point of view of happiness, the conditions under which work is done. The first task involves a very considerable reversal of current educational and social values. It does not simply mean paving the way for the son of an engine-driver to become a doctor or a lawyer or a cavalryman. It means paving the way for the son of a duke to become, without any sense of social failure, an engine-driver or a merchant seaman or a worker on the land—and to do so not, as to-day, in the decent seclusion of British Columbia or Australia, but in our own country and without losing touch, if he desires it, with his own natural circle of friends. The ladder is an old and outworn metaphor in this connection. Yet it is still worth remembering that

the Angels whom Jacob observed upon it were both ascending and descending. It is one of the fallacies of our social system to believe that a ladder should only be used in one direction—and that the direction which tends to remove men from contact and sympathy with their fellows. But in truth we need to discard the metaphor of the ladder altogether, with its implied suggestion that some tasks of community-service are more honourable and involve more of what the world calls "success" than others. We do not desire a system of education which picks out for promotion minds gifted with certain kinds of capacity and stimulates them with the offer of material rewards, while the so-called humdrum remainder are left, with their latent talents undiscovered and undeveloped.

Recent educational experiments,[1] and not least that most testing of all school examinations, the war, have shown us that we must revise all our old notions as to cleverness and stupidity. We know now that, short of real mental deficiency, there is or ought to be no such personage as the dunce. Just as the criminal is generally a man of unusual energy and mental power directed into wrong channels, so the dunce is a pupil whose special powers and aptitudes have not revealed themselves in the routine of school life. And just as the criminal points to serious defects in our social system, so the dunce points to serious defects in our educational system. The striking record of our industrial schools and reformatories in the war shows what young criminals and dunces can do when they are given a fair field for their special gifts. One of the chief lessons to be drawn from the war is the need for a new spirit and outlook in our national education from the elementary school to the University. We need a system which treats every child, rich or poor, as a living and developing personality, which enables every English boy and girl to stay at school at least up to the time when

[1] Especially the wonderful results obtained from the young criminals at the Little Commonwealth in Dorsetshire.

his or her natural bent begins to disclose itself, which provides for all classes of the community skilled guidance in the choice of employment based upon psychological study of individual gifts and aptitude,[1] which sets up methods of training and apprenticeship in the different trades—or, as I would prefer to call them, the different professions—such as to counteract the deadening influence of premature specialisation, and which ensures good conditions and a sense of self-respect and community-service to all in their self-chosen line of life, whether their bent be manual or mechanical or commercial or administrative, or for working on the land or for going to sea, or towards the more special vocations of teaching or scholarship or the law or medicine or the cure of souls. No one can estimate how large a share of the unhappiness associated with our existing social system is due to the fact that, owing to defects in our education and our arrangements for the choice of employment, there are myriads of square pegs in round holes. This applies with especial force to women, to whom many of the square holes are still inaccessible, not simply owing to the lack of opportunities for individuals, but owing to the inhibitions of custom and, in some cases, to narrow and retrograde professional enactments. The war has brought women their chance, not only in the office and the workshop, but in higher administrative and organising positions, and not the least of its results is the revelation of undreamt-of capacities in these directions.

In the second task, that of perfecting the adaptation between men and their tools, we have much to learn from the industrial history of the past. It is natural for men to enjoy "talking shop," and this esoteric bond of union has existed between workmen in all ages. We may be sure that there were discussions amongst connoisseurs in the Stone Age as to the respective merits of their

[1] See "Readings in Vocational Guidance," by Meyer Bloomfield (Boston, 1915).

flint axes, just as there are to-day between golfers about niblicks and putters, and between surgeons as to the technique of the extraction of an appendix. A good workman loves his tools. He is indeed inseparable from them, as our law acknowledges by forbidding a bankrupt's tools to be sold up. Give a good workman, in town or country, a sympathetic listener and he is only too ready to expatiate on his daily work. This sense of kinship between men and their tools and material is so little understood by some of our modern expert organisers of industry that it is worth while illustrating it at some length. I make no apology, therefore, for quoting a striking passage from an essay by Mr. George Bourne, who is not a trade unionist or a student of Labour politics but an observer of English village life, who has taken the trouble to penetrate the mind of what is commonly regarded as the stupidest and most backward—as it is certainly the least articulate—class of workmen in this country, the agricultural labourer in the southern counties.

"The men," he writes, "are commonly too modest about their work, and too unconscious that it can interest an outsider, to dream of discussing it. What they have to say would not therefore by itself go far in demonstration of their acquirements in technique. Fortunately, for proof of that we are not dependent on talk. Besides talk there exists another kind of evidence open to every one's examination, and the technical skill exercised in country labours may be purely deduced from the aptness and singular beauty of sundry country tools.

"The beauty of tools is not accidental, but inherent and essential. The contours of a ship's sail bellying in the wind are not more inevitable, nor more graceful, than the curves of an adze-head or of a plough-share. Cast in iron or steel, the gracefulness of a plough-share is more indestructible than the metal, yet pliant (in the limits of its type) as a line of English blank verse. It changes for different soils: it is widened out or narrowed; it is deep-grooved or shallow; not because of caprice at the foundry or to satisfy an artistic fad, but to meet the technical demands of the expert ploughman. The most familiar example

of beauty indicating subtle technique is supplied by the admired shape of boats, which, however, is so variable (the statement is made on the authority of an old coast-guardsman) that the boat best adapted for one stretch of shore may be dangerous, if not entirely useless, at another stretch ten miles away. And as technique determines the design of a boat, or of a waggon, or of a ploughshare, so it controls absolutely the fashioning of tools, and is responsible for any beauty of form they may possess. Of all tools none, of course, is more exquisite than a fiddle-bow. But the fiddle-bow never could have been perfected, because there would have been no call for its tapering delicacy, its calculated balance of lightness and strength, had not the violinist's technique reached such marvellous fineness of power. For it is the accomplished artist who is fastidious as to his tools; the bungling beginner can bungle with anything. The fiddle-bow, however, affords only one example of a rule which is equally well exemplified by many humbler tools. Quarryman's peck, coachman's whip, cricket-bat, fishing-rod, trowel, all have their intimate relation to the skill of those who use them; and like animals and plants, adapting themselves each to its own place in the universal order, they attain to beauty by force of being fit. That law of adaptation which shapes the wings of a swallow and prescribes the poise and elegance of the branches of trees is the same that demands symmetry in the corn-rick and convexity in the beer-barrel; the same that, exerting itself with matchless precision through the trained senses of haymakers and woodmen, gives the final curve to the handles of their scythes and the shafts of their axes. Hence the beauty of a tool is an unfailing sign that in the proper handling of it technique is present. . . .

"It is not the well-informed and those eager to teach," he says in another passage, "who know the primitive necessary lore of civilisation; it is the illiterate. In California, Louis Stevenson found men studying the quality of vines grown on different pockets of earth, just as the peasants of Burgundy and the Rhine have done for ages. And even so the English generations have watched the produce of their varying soils. When or how was it learnt—was it at Oxford or at Cambridge?—that the apples of Devonshire are so specially fit for cider? Or how is it that hops are growing—some of them planted before living memory—all along the strip of greensand which encircles the Weald—that curious strip to which text-books at last point triumphantly as being singularly adapted for hops? Until it got into the books, this piece of knowledge was not thought of as learning; it had merely been

acted upon during some centuries. But such knowledge exists, boundless, in whatever direction one follows it: the knowledge of fitting means to ends; excellent rule-of-thumb knowledge, as good as the chemist uses for analysing water. When the peculiar values of a plot of land have been established—as, for instance, that it is a clay 'too strong' for bricks—then further forms of localised knowledge are brought to supplement this, until at last the bricks are made. Next, they must be removed from the field; and immediately new problems arise. The old farm-cart, designed for roots or manure, has not the most suitable shape for brick-carting. Probably, too, its wide wheels, which were intended for the softness of ploughed land, are needlessly clumsy for the hard road. Soon, therefore, the local wheelwright begins to lighten his spokes and felloes, and to make the wheels a trifle less 'dished'; while his blacksmith binds them in a narrower but thicker tyre, to which he gives a shade more tightness. For the wheelwright learns from the carter—that ignorant fellow—the answer to the new problems set by a load of bricks. A good carter, for his part, is able to adjust his labour to his locality. A part of his duty consists in knowing what constitutes a fair load for his horse in the district where he is working. So many hundred stock bricks, so many more fewer of the red or wire-cut, such and such a quantity of sand, or timber, or straw, or coal, or drain-pipes, or slates, according to their kinds and sizes, will make as much as an average horse can draw in this neighbourhood; but in London the loads are bigger and the vehicles heavier; while in more hilly parts (as you may see any day in the West Country) two horses are put before a cart and load which the London carter would deem hardly too much for a costermonger's donkey.

"So it goes throughout civilisation: there is not an industry but produces its own special knowledge relating to unclassified details of adjustment."[1]

It is this craft-knowledge and common professional feeling which is at the basis of all associations of work-people, from the semi-religious societies of ancient times, which met in secret to worship their patron-god—Hephaestos, the god of the metal-workers, or Asclepios, the god of the doctors—through the great guilds of the Middle Ages to the trade unions and professional organisations of to-day. Trade unions do not exist simply to raise

[1] "Lucy Bettesworth," pp. 178–180 and 214–216.

wages or to fight the capitalist, any more than the British Medical Association exists simply to raise fees and to bargain with the Government. They exist to serve a professional need : to unite men who are doing the same work and to promote the welfare and dignity of that work. It is this which renders so difficult the problems of adjustment which arise owing to the introduction of new and unfamiliar processes. Professional associations are, and are bound to be, conservative : their conservatism is honourable and to their credit : for they are the transmitters of a great tradition. The problem in every case is to ensure the progress necessary to the community without injury to that sense of "fellowship in the mystery" on which the social spirit of the particular class of workmen depends. It is from this point of view that recent American proposals in the direction of "scientific management" are most open to criticism : for they involve the break-up of the craft-spirit without setting anything comparable in its place. In fact, Mr. F. W. Taylor, one of the inventors of what is called the "system" of scientific management, frankly ignores or despises the craft-spirit and proposes to treat the workman as a being incapable of understanding the principles underlying the practice of his art. He goes so far as to lay it down as a general principle that "in almost all the mechanic arts the science which underlies each act of each workman is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited to actually doing the work is incapable of fully understanding this science, without the guidance and help of those who are working with him or over him, either through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity."[1] Along the lines of this philosophy no permanent industrial advance is possible. It may improve the product for a time, but only at the cost of degrading the producer. If we are to make happiness

[1] This sentence is practically an unconscious paraphrase of a passage from Aristotle's defence of slavery.

our test, and to stand by our definition of happiness as involving free activity, such a system, destructive as it is of any real or intense relationship between the workman and his work, stands self-condemned. If we are looking for *real* industrial progress it is elsewhere that we must turn.

This leads us naturally on to the second great division of our subject: progress in the methods of co-operation between man and man in doing industrial work. For if man is a social animal his power to do his bit and his consequent happiness must be derived, in part at least, from his social environment. The lonely craftsman perfecting his art in the solitude of a one-man workshop does not correspond with our industrial ideal any more than the hermit or the monk corresponds with our general religious ideal. It was the great apostle of craftsmanship, William Morris, who best set forth the social ideal of industry in his immortal sentence: "Fellowship is Life and lack of Fellowship is Death." Our study of the workman, then, is not complete when we have seen him with his tools: we must see him also among his workmates. We must see industry not simply as a process of production but as a form of association; and we must realise that the association of human beings for the purpose of industrial work involves what is just as much a problem of government as their association in the great political community which we call the State.

It is difficult to see the record of the progress of industrial government in clear perspective for the simple reason that the world is still so backward as regards the organisation of this side of its common life. The theory and practice of industrial government is generations, even centuries, behind the theory and practice of politics. We are still accustomed in industry to attitudes of mind and methods of management which the political thought of the Western World has long since discarded as incompatible with its ideals. Two instances must suffice to illustrate

this. It is constantly being said, both by employers and by politicians, and even by writers in sympathy with working-class aspirations, that all that the workman needs in his life is security. Give him work under decent conditions, runs the argument, with reasonable security of tenure and adequate guarantees against sickness, disablement and unemployment, and all will be well. This theory of what constitutes industrial welfare is, of course, when one thinks it out, some six centuries out of date. It embodies the ideal of the old feudal system, but without the personal tie between master and man which humanised the feudal relationship. Feudalism, as we saw in our study of political government, was a system of contract between the lord and the labourer by which the lord and master ran the risks, set on foot the enterprises (chiefly military), and enjoyed the spoils, incidental to mediæval life, while the labourer stuck to his work and received security and protection in exchange. Feudalism broke down because it involved too irksome a dependence, because it was found to be incompatible with the personal independence which is the birthright of a modern man. So it is idle to expect that the ideal of security will carry us very far by itself towards the perfect industrial commonwealth.

Take a second example of the wide gulf that still subsists between men's ideas of politics and men's ideas of industry. It is quite common, even in these latter days, and among those who have freely sacrificed their nearest and dearest to the claims of the State, to hear manufacturers and merchants say that they have a "right to a good profit." The President of the Board of Trade remarked openly in the House of Commons after many months of war that it was more than one could expect of human nature for coal-owners not to get the highest price they could. Such a standpoint is not merely indecent: it is hopelessly out-of-date. Looked at from the political point of view it is a pure anachronism.

There used to be times when men made large fortunes out of the service of government, as men still make them out of the service of the community in trade and industry to-day. In the days of St. Matthew, when tax-gathering was let out by contract, the apostle's partners would probably have declared, as Mr. Runciman does to-day, that it was more than one could expect of human nature that a publican who had a government contract for the collection of the taxes should not get all he could out of the tax-payer. It is, indeed, little more than a century ago since it was a matter of course in this country to look upon oversea colonies merely as plantations—that is, as business investments rather than as communities of human beings. The existence of Chartered Company government marks a survival of this habit of mind. The old colonial system, which embodied this point of view, proved demoralising not only to the home government but to the colonists, as a similar view is to the working class, and it led to the loss of the American colonies as surely as a similar attitude on the part of employers leads to unrest and rebellion among work-people to-day.

We have thus a long way to travel before the ideals of politics have been assimilated into the industrial life of the community and have found fitting embodiment in its kindred and more complex problems. But at least we have reached a point where we can see what the problem of industrial government is. We can say with assurance that a system which treats human beings purely as instruments or as passive servants, and atrophies their self-determination and their sense of individual and corporate responsibility, is as far from perfection in industry as the Roman Empire was in politics. Renan's words about "the intolerable sadness" incidental to such a method of organisation apply with redoubled force to occupations which take up the best part of the day of the mass of the working population. The bleak and

loveless buildings, with their belching chimneys, which arrest the eye of the thoughtful traveller in the industrial districts of England are not prisons or workhouses. But they often look as if they were, and they resemble them in this—that they too often stand for similarly authoritarian ideas of government and direction. Industry is still an autocracy, as politics was in the days before the supremacy of Parliament. Power still descends from above instead of springing from below. It is a power limited no doubt by trade union action and parliamentary and administrative control: but it is in essence as autocratic as the government of England used to be before the transference of sovereignty from the monarch to the representatives of his subjects. It was recently announced in the Press that Lord Rhondda had bought a group of Welsh collieries for 2 millions, and that as a result "Lord Rhondda now controls over $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions of capital, pays $2\frac{1}{2}$ millions in wages every year, and is virtually the dictator of the economic destiny of a quarter of a million miners. Rumours are also current," the extract continues, "that Lord Rhondda is extending his control over the Press of Wales."[1] The existence of such power in this twentieth century in the hands of single individuals, not selected from the mass for their special wisdom or humanity, is a stupendous fact which must give pause to any one who is inclined to feel complacent about modern industrial progress. In days gone by political power was as irresponsible as the economic power wielded to-day by Lord Rhondda; and it descended from father to son by hereditary right in the same way as the control over the lives of countless American workers descends to-day as a matter of course from John D. Rockefeller senior to John D. Rockefeller junior. If there is any reality at all in our political faith we must believe that a similiar development towards self-government can and must take place in industry. It may be that generations will elapse

[1] *The Welsh Outlook*, August, 1916, p. 272.

before the problems of industrial government find a final and satisfactory constitutional solution. But at least we can say that there is only one basis for that solution which is compatible with a sound ideal of government, or indeed with any reasoned view of morality or religion—the basis of individual and corporate freedom with its corresponding obligations of responsibility and self-respect. No nation, as Abraham Lincoln said, can remain half-slave and half-free: and it was a greater than Lincoln who warned us that we cannot serve both God and Mammon. It is this underlying conflict of ideals in the organisation of our existing economic system which is the real cause of the "Labour unrest" of which we have heard so much in recent years.

With this warning in our minds as to the imperfections of our modern industrial organisation, let us briefly survey the record of the forms of economic association which preceded it.

The earliest form of industrial grouping is, of course, the family; and the family, as we all know, still retains its primitive character in some occupations as a convenient form of productive association. This is particularly the case in agriculture in communities where peasant holdings prevail. But the family is so much more than an industrial group that it hardly falls to us to consider it further here.

Outside the family proper, industrial work among primitive peoples is often carried on by slaves. It was a step forward in human progress when primitive man found that it was more advantageous to capture his enemies than to kill or eat them; and it was a still greater step forward when he found that there was more to be got out of slaves by kind treatment than by compulsion. This is not the place in which to go into the vexed questions connected with various forms of slavery. Suffice it to say that it is a profound mistake to dismiss the whole system in one indiscriminating condemnation. Slavery

involves the denial of freedom, and as such it can never be good. But other systems besides slavery implicitly involve the denial of freedom. Some of the finest artistic work in the world has been done by slaves—and by slaves not working under compulsion but in the company of free men and on terms of industrial equality with them. This should serve to remind us that, in judging of systems of industry, we must look behind the letter of the law to the spirit of the times and of social institutions. Slavery at its best merges insensibly into wage-labour at its lower end. Many of the skilled slaves of ancient Greece and Rome are hardly distinguishable in status from a modern workman bound by an unusually long and strict indenture and paid for his work not only in money but partly in truck. In order to stimulate their productive capacity it was found necessary in Greece and Rome to allow skilled slaves to earn and retain money—although in the eye of the law they were not entitled to do so ; and they were thus frequently in a position to purchase their own freedom and become independent craftsmen. Slavery in the household and in small workshops is open to many and serious dangers, which need not be particularised here ; but the worst abuses of slavery have always taken place where slaves have been easily recruited, as in the early days of European contact with Africa, and when there were large openings for their employment in gangs on work of a rough and unskilled character. The problem of slavery in its worse forms is thus at bottom a cheap-labour problem analogous to that which confronts North America and South Africa to-day ; and there is an essential difference which is often ignored between the educated slave in a Roman Government office who did the work of a First Division Civil Servant for his imperial master and his compeer working in the fields of South Italy ; and between the household servants of a Virginian family and the plantation-slaves of the farther South. Let us remember, in passing judgment on what is admittedly

an indefensible system, that during the war which resulted in the freeing of the American slaves the slaveholders of the South trusted their household slaves to protect the women and children during their absence from home, and that that trust was nowhere betrayed. There is another side to "Uncle Tom's Cabin" as surely as there is another side to Mr. Carnegie's pæan of modern industrialism in his "Triumphant Democracy."

Systems of serfdom or caste which bind the workman to his work without permitting him to be sold like a slave may be regarded as one step higher than slavery proper. Such systems are common in stable and custom-bound countries, and persisted throughout the European Middle Ages. We need not describe how the rising tide of change gradually broke up the system in this country and left the old-time villein a free but often a landless and property-less man. The transition from serfdom to the system of wage-labour which succeeded it was a transition from legal dependence to legal freedom, and as such it marked an advance. But it was also a transition from a fixed and, as it were, a professional position of service to the community to a blind and precarious individualism. It was a transition, as Sir Henry Maine put it, from status to contract. This famous nineteenth-century aphorism is eloquent of the limitations of that too purely commercial age. Every thinking man would admit to-day that status at its best is a better thing than contract at its best—that the soldier is a nobler figure than the army contractor, and that corporate feeling and professional honour are a better stimulus to right action than business competition and a laudable keenness to give satisfaction to a valuable customer. We have always suffered from the temptation in this country of adapting business methods and ideals to politics rather than political ideals and methods to business. Our eighteenth-century thinkers explained citizenship itself, not as a duty to our neighbours, but as the fulfilment of an unwritten contract.

Our nineteenth-century legal writers elevated the idea of free contract almost to an industrial ideal; while, in somewhat the same spirit, the gutter journalists of to-day, when they are at a loss for a popular watchword, call for a business government. Such theories and battle-cries may serve for a "nation of shopkeepers"; but that opprobrious phrase has never been true of the great mass of the English people, and it was never less true than to-day.

The idea of industrial work as the fulfilment of a contract, whether freely or forcibly made, is thus essentially at variance with the ideal of community service. It is difficult for a man who makes his livelihood by hiring himself out as an individual for what he can get out of one piece of work after another to feel the same sense of community service or professional pride as the man who is serving a vocation and has dedicated his talents to some continuous and recognised form of work. It is this which makes the system of wage-labour so unsatisfactory in principle compared with the guilds of the town workmen in the Middle Ages and with the organised professions of to-day; and it is this which explains why trade unions of recent years have come to concern themselves more and more with questions of status rather than of wages, and to regard the occupation which they represent more and more as a profession rather than a trade. No one has laid bare the deficiencies of the wage-system more clearly than Adam Smith in the famous chapter in which he foreshadows the principle of collective bargaining.

"What are the common wages of labour," he there remarks,[1] "depends everywhere upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little, as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower, the wages of labour. . . . We rarely

[1] "Wealth of Nations," Book I. ch. viii.

hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely combine is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit but constant and uniform combination not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost secrecy till the moment of execution ; and, when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen, who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of labour. Their usual pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great profit which the masters make by their work."

These words were written 140 years ago, but, as we all know, they are still true of the working of the system too-day. Indeed, the war has served to emphasise their truth by showing us how deeply entrenched are the habits of bargaining and of latent antagonism which the working of the wage-system has engendered. It is the defect of the wage-system, as Adam Smith makes clear to us, that it lays stress on just those points in the industrial process where the interests of employers and workpeople run contrary to one another, whilst obscuring those far more important aspects in which they are partners and fellow-workers in the service of the community. This defect cannot be overcome by strengthening one party to the contract at the expense of the other, by crushing trade unions or dissolving employers' combinations, or even by establishing the principle of collective bargaining. It can only be overcome by the recognition on both sides

that industry is in essence not a matter of contract and bargaining at all, but of mutual interdependence and community service: and by the growth of a new ideal of status, a new sense of professional pride and corporate duty and self-respect among all who are engaged in the same function. No one can say how long it may take to bring about such a fundamental change of attitude, especially among those who have most to lose, in the material sense, by an alteration in the existing distribution of economic power. But the war has cleared away so much of prejudice and set so much of our life in a new light that the dim ideals of to-day may well be the realities of to-morrow. This at least we can say: that no country in the world is in a better position than we are to redeem modern industry from the reproach of materialism and to set it firmly upon a spiritual basis, and that the country which shall first have had the wisdom and the courage to do so will be the pioneer in a vast extension of human liberty and happiness and will have shown that along this road and no other lies the industrial progress of mankind.

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY[1]

Among the many far-reaching questions which the war has brought into fresh prominence none is more important in its relation to the future welfare of Great Britain than that of the organisation of industry. The war has laid bare serious defects in our existing arrangements, and, as a result, large changes in methods and policy are being put forward in many quarters. The object of the following pages is to examine the situation in the industrial world more particularly as it affects the working class, and to discuss it with special reference to the character and aspirations of the British Labour movement. Labour is the factor most vitally and intimately concerned in questions of industrial organisation, and no broad changes in policy can hope to be effective unless they are made with Labour's assent and co-operation. The day is past—as the events of the war have proved—when reforms, however desirable, could be imposed from above over the head of the representatives of the working class. On the other hand, no Labour policy, however idealistic, can hope to achieve its object unless it is based on an understanding of the facts of the world as it is to-day. Labour has to face not merely a national but an international economic situation and to realise its bearing upon its own domestic problems. The example of the Germans compels employers and work-people alike to view industrial methods and policies in a new light, and to take stock of their survival-value. Whatever our ideals and prepossessions, we cannot afford to sit

[1] From *The Round Table*, June, 1916.

down helplessly before the competition of better educated brains or to ignore the latest improvements—if improvements they turn out to be—in industrial training and organisation.

I. Labour during the War

Before discussing what we have to learn from Germany it will be well to cast our eyes back over the industrial record of this country during the last two years of war; for it is only by seeing the whole record in perspective that we can appreciate the bearing of the different forces and factors involved.

At the end of July, 1914, the situation as between Capital and Labour was more disquieting than it had been at any time since the great strikes of 1911. Both sides had drawn their lesson from that conflict, and were preparing their forces for another. In particular the railwaymen were looking forward to the expiration of their Conciliation Boards' agreement in the early winter, and plans were being concerted which have since been carried through—though in a different spirit—for a Triple Alliance, primarily devised for defensive purposes, providing for joint action in cases of common interest, between the miners, the transport workers, and the railwaymen, amounting to a million and a quarter workers in all.

At the outbreak of war the situation changed as by magic. It was some weeks and even months before the mass of the people realised, mainly through the arrival of the Belgian refugees, what was actually at stake in the war; but the national instinct asserted itself at once, and the settlement of all outstanding disputes and the proclamation of an industrial truce were matters of days rather than of weeks. The Trade Union leaders instantly undertook to postpone or to forego their demands and called upon their members to put country before class,

and to do their utmost to see the war through. A joint Parliamentary Recruiting Committee was formed, and Labour members, with few exceptions, made strenuous efforts in response to the Government's appeal to secure volunteers, many of whom, as was afterwards found out, would have been far better left at their own trades.

During the first few months of fighting nobody thought out the reaction of the war upon industry. The Government's War Book had been drawn up on the supposition that only a small Expeditionary Force would be employed, and it does not seem to have dealt with the industrial aspects of the problem of military supply. The first obvious effect of the war on industry was to create instability and unemployment, and the prevalent idea during those months was that there would be serious and widespread distress among the poorer classes. It was under this impression that the Prince of Wales's Fund was raised and that prominent economists urged the undertaking of public works and improvements by municipalities in order to provide employment. There was, in fact, for a time very considerable distress, especially among women workers, and unemployment undoubtedly was a contributing factor in the enlistments. There was reduction of wages in some quarters and a considerable amount of short time in most industries. The Factory Inspectors' Report for 1914 records the efforts that were made in many cases by employers, themselves hard hit and uncertain of their future, to keep their staffs together and to secure them from destitution.

Towards the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 two tendencies began increasingly to make themselves felt. Prices began to rise; and skilled labour began to run short, owing to the demand for munitions and the success of the recruiting campaign. These two causes together operated to disturb the harmonious atmosphere that had been brought about at the beginning of the war;

but they need not have done so had the Government understood what was happening, and taken steps to deal with it in time. When prices began to rise so as to make serious inroads on the household budget, there was a confident expectation in Labour circles that the Government would somehow intervene to keep them down—in the same way as it had intervened in the autumn on behalf of the banks and the accepting houses. The matter was raised in the House of Commons in February, and the Prime Minister replied in what has become known as the "Wait till June" speech, which created a most unfortunate impression, and greatly strengthened the force behind the wages demands which were then beginning to be made. These demands were aimed at the maintenance of the pre-war condition of real wages, and much recrimination would have been avoided if this point had been stipulated for when the industrial truce was proclaimed or, at least, when the Government's Arbitration Committee was appointed. Meanwhile the shortage of labour, combined with the wide and unregulated extension of Government contracts, was leading to an ever-fiercer competition among employers to secure the services of the available skilled men. For some time great confusion reigned. Every device was used to attract men from one situation to another—with demoralising effects on the general progress of the work. The effect on output of the restrictive Trade Union regulations in the engineering trades also began to be seriously felt about this time, and the shortage of skilled workers in various crafts led to constant minor troubles on questions of demarcation. It was in these circumstances that, on February 8, the Under-Secretary of State for War, for the first time awaking to the problem, made a somewhat naïve appeal to the Trade Union leaders in Parliament to abandon their restrictive rules and to "organise the forces of labour." Soon after this, when the situation began to look serious, the Government appointed the Committee on Production,

consisting of Sir George Askwith, Sir George Gibb, and Sir Francis Hopwood, to arbitrate in the disputes that might arise, but without laying down any principle on which to base their awards. It was a little later, at the end of February, that the first strike took place on the Clyde ; it only lasted a few days, but it drew the notice of the country to the widespread existence of industrial unrest. About the same time Mr. Lloyd George made his first speech about the importance of munitions and described the war as " an engineers' war."

Attention now began to be directed increasingly to the question of Trade Union rules, especially as regards the training of the new workers who were seen to be necessary. The Government at last realised that something more was needed than a mere appeal to Members of Parliament without any corresponding agreement or guarantee. The result was a series of conferences in March, 1915, between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Runciman, as representing the Government, and the representatives of the engineering Trade Unions. The Trade Union representatives undertook to recommend to their members to agree to compulsory arbitration for the period of the war and to waive all rules in restriction of output or of the training of new workers. In return they demanded and secured through the Government from the employers promises of (1) the limitation of war-profits and (2) restoration of pre-war Trade Union conditions and reinstatement of men with the Colours. These conditions were formally accepted by the members, who did not, however, realise what they implied or how widespread were the changes that were to take place in the industry. Soon afterwards the Ministry of Munitions was created, and immense new plans began to be developed for the building of shell factories and the extension of orders, necessitating the tapping of fresh sources of labour.

Meanwhile it was found that the March agreement,

although embodying the views of the vast majority of Trade Unionists, provided no means of controlling the minority. This difficulty could only be met by embodying the agreement in statutory form. Legislation was also felt to be needed to curtail the bargaining power of the workman and to restrict the rise of wages. The result of this was the Munitions Act, which created a class of "controlled establishments," the workers in which were exempted from recruiting and guaranteed security of employment, but could receive no rise in wages or salary except after permission from Whitehall. The Act also put an end to the "pilfering" of labour by competing employers, which was still causing serious confusion. This was done by including a clause that tied workmen engaged on munitions work to their job by making it illegal for an employer to take them on within six weeks without a certificate of discharge from their previous employer. The bearings of this clause were not understood either by Parliament or by the workers when the Bill was passed, and it has proved a fruitful cause of friction in the working. Workmen who, for domestic or other reasons, desired to change their employment found that they had to come before a court before they could do so, and resented what they considered a vexatious interference with personal freedom. Various minor possibilities of abuse were revealed in the course of the Act's working and were remedied in an amending Act of last January. But the Act is still resented, not only because of its restrictive character in general, but also because it sets up what the workers regard as inequitable distinctions between different classes of labour. For instance, the engineering trade has had its mobility, and thereby its bargaining power, restricted, whereas seamen, dockers, coal trimmers, and others are not affected by it and can bring what pressure they like to improve their position. The working of the Act did much to rouse the suspicions of the workers, and to

confirm their rooted objection to "industrial conscription" —that is to say, the subjection of civilian workers to military law with the consequent limitation of their freedom of association. It should be added that a similar discrimination under the Act exists in the case of employers, ship-owners, for instance, being free to make much larger profits than armament makers.

The labour events of the last twelve months can be briefly dismissed. The most notorious was the short-lived strike of 120,000 Welsh miners in June, 1915, in successful defiance of the compulsory arbitration clause of the Munitions Act, which was adopted by Proclamation to include their case. Sporadic further trouble due to the non-Unionist question has been met by a remarkable agreement signed in March, 1916, establishing compulsory Trade Unionism in the South Wales coalfield for the period of the war. The only other serious industrial trouble has taken place in the Clyde area, where local causes have combined to maintain an undercurrent of intense bitterness and suspicion. A small strike of some 1500 highly skilled men broke out at the end of March on a question of workshop management. It was vigorously opposed by the local officials of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and six of the leading men involved were deported from the district, but otherwise left free. The strike did not last more than a few days.

Much more serious in its effects on the war than these two disputes has been the difficulty about enforcing the agreement as to the abandonment of Trade Union regulations regarding the training of new workers. The workers concerned proved intensely conservative, and in many shops months elapsed before the promised arrangements for dilution, that is, for the training of the new workers, could be proceeded with—although, as always happens with the working class, when the need was really borne in upon them they fell in willingly. Still more serious has been the problem of Trade Union rules in

restriction of output. Progress here has not been easy. Mr. Lloyd George paid visits to the Trade Union Congress at Bristol in September and to Glasgow at Christmas in an endeavour to improve matters, but was very unfortunate in his methods on both occasions. A conference with Mr. Asquith just after Christmas led to more satisfactory results, and incidentally revealed to the public the nature of the psychological obstacles that had to be overcome. But the force of circumstances is gradually proving too strong, and the engineering industry has, in fact, been transformed, both in material and in *personnel*, during the last twelve months. The Ministers and the responsible Trade Union leaders concerned have, however, not yet publicly acknowledged that in pledging themselves to restore pre-war conditions they pledged themselves to the impossible, and that a new policy must be devised to meet the new conditions.

Several conclusions emerge from this brief review. Judgments on it will vary according to the standard adopted. Let us first judge it, as Ministers and Government officials tend to do, by what we may call a "pre-war standard"—that is, by what we have been in the habit of expecting from ourselves, both in respect of organisation and public spirit.

Looked at in this light the record, so far as employers and workpeople are concerned, is not only not discreditable but very much the reverse. On the one hand, employers, by repute a conservative class, have carried through, practically on their own initiative, immense changes and improvements in plant, organisation, and the training of labour, and, while doing so, have been content to sacrifice the major proportion of their excess profits. No doubt the limitation of profits leaves open many loopholes, but employers, as a whole, can fairly claim to have adhered to their bargain with the Government; and any one who thinks the limitation of profits a small change should consider what an alteration in

traditional standards and motives its enactment implies, and ask himself how it would be likely to be received, say, in the United States.[1] On the other hand, labour, as a whole, has done its share far more effectively than the public—who hear only of isolated disputes—has been able to realise, and has maintained the productive capacity of the country, in spite of the withdrawal of some 4,000,000 workers, in a manner that is truly surprising. Sir George Paish lately estimated that the national income, which before the war stood at £2,400,000,000, had been increased for the year 1915 to £3,000,000,000. This estimate makes no allowance for the rise in prices; but even with this deduction it is a remarkable tribute to the work of the civilian population. Moreover, of the extra values thus created, considerably the lesser proportion has found its way into working-class pockets. The Board of Trade returns record an addition of £45,000,000 to the wages bill in 1915; independent authorities, calculating for additional sources of increase not covered by the official figures, raise the sum to between £150,000,000 and £200,000,000, or even higher; but even this leaves some two-thirds of the extra value to the other factors in production. In other words, the working class, faced with a situation in which its bargaining power was greater than at any time since the Black Death, has not only had its own monopoly value curtailed by legal enactment, in the Compulsory Arbitration and leaving certificate clauses of the Munitions Act, but has acquiesced in a serious reduction of the rate of wages in comparison with prices. These concessions could only have been secured by consent; and the fact, in consequence, that Labour has, as it were, been taken into partnership by being officially consulted on questions of industrial policy has created a precedent which may lead to far-reaching results. The

[1] 1918. I leave this sentence as it was written in 1916. The reader will not think that I have overlooked the developments that have since occurred in the United States.

opposition of principle between the two parties remains, however, unaltered ; in some respects it has even been intensified ; and nothing that has happened so far is sufficient to prevent a speedy resumption of conflict on the old lines as soon as the war is over.

So much for the point of view of the disillusioned official, who has learnt to depreciate sanguine expectations and is agreeably surprised to discover that human nature can respond to ideal motives at all. Let us now take higher ground and survey the record from the point of view of that large section of the nation, drawn from every class and occupation, which has put all thought of self aside. How does this record read in the trenches ?

The first and most natural reflection is the comparison with the French. France has not, indeed, as is sometimes imagined, been exempt during the war from selfishness and even corruption amongst her employing class, or from labour criticism and discontent. In the prostration at the beginning of the war, says an official British summary[1] of a French report, "more than half the industrial and commercial establishments of France closed their doors, and most of those who kept open did so with reduced staffs working short time." Of the 5,000,000 persons employed in private industry, 2,000,000 were thrown out of work, and the remaining 3,000,000 "did not by any means receive their normal wages." Both wages and employment seem to have improved more slowly after the shock than in this country. By the end of 1915 wages had "recovered to an appreciable extent." "They tend more and more to become normal, and, for certain group of workers"—the carpenters, masons, bricklayers, and builders' labourers, engaged in the Calais district on making barracks for the British troops, are given as an example—"they exceed the normal rates." The reference in the report is apparently to money wages. It appears, therefore, that,

[1] *Board of Trade Labour Gazette*, April, 1916.

though, in France as in this country, "the increase in the cost of living has instigated the workers to demand corresponding advances in their daily wages," they have only to a very partial extent been successful. "Men," says the report, "have been more successful than women, and industrial workers than commercial or domestic employees." Strikes have been rare, only ninety-seven being recorded between August 1, 1914, and December 1, 1915.

But it is not in the sphere of general industrial organisation but in that of the productions of munitions that France rightly deserves to be held up as a model. There, thanks to the sense of overwhelming need and to the clearsightedness of the authorities and the patriotism of the workers, the long-drawn negotiations and the recurring friction which occurred in this country have been successfully avoided. No difficulty whatever seems to have been experienced either as regards Trade Union regulations or the introduction of unskilled male and female labour. No strikes have taken place ; and, in view of the military situation, they would have been unthinkable. "Time-keeping," says the British deputation report, "is remarkably good, the time lost owing to avoidable causes not exceeding on the average 1 per cent.," and the arrangement for training new workers and the avoidance of fatigue seem to be markedly superior to our own. It is undoubtedly largely because we have been so slow to deal with these problems of health in this country that our output of munitions has fallen far short of what it might have been. The result is that France, with her best industrial regions torn from her and a very large proportion of her adult male population in the field, has undoubtedly handled her munitions problem more successfully than we in this country. This is not a pleasing reflection for the premier industrial country in the world, to whom our Allies naturally look as an arsenal and a storehouse. Nor does this greater

efficiency of the French munitions supply spring out of the system of compulsory military service : men can be compelled to work, but they cannot be compelled to do good work ; the evidence as to the increasing intensity of production in France shows indisputably that the driving force was not military law but patriotic zeal.[1]

The war has also served to throw a fierce light upon the inefficiency of our pre-war industrial arrangements. Quite apart from the class struggle, British industry was slowly losing ground owing to the superior skill of our rivals. Both employers and workpeople were too old-fashioned and too easy-going. Restriction of output has been rife in every direction. The upper ranks of industry have largely been manned through social or hereditary influence, with the result that businesses have often been overstaffed and underworked. The connection between research and industry, between exact knowledge and business enterprise, has been neglected, and while "the University doctor" in Germany and the "College man" in the United States have been applying their brains to production and the development of new markets, our own University output—relatively far too small in numbers owing to the long-standing defects of our secondary education—has remained almost wholly out of touch with the industrial and commercial life of the country, and our technical institutions have languished owing to the lack of good openings for their students. Meanwhile, the same vicious tendency has affected labour. "Ca' canny" has gained ground in many quarters, both among skilled and unskilled, with the result that the whole community is taxed for their relative inefficiency of particular groups of workers. The war has brought the problem conspicuously before

[1] See the report of the mission sent to investigate labour conditions in the French munitions factories, printed in the *Board of Trade Labour Gazette* for January, 1916. Compare the Health of Munition Workers Committee Report on Industrial Fatigue. (Cd. 8213. 1½*d.*)

the public in the case of the engineering trade, but the difficulty is one which is not confined to any one trade or group of trades. It is bound up with the whole Trade Union tradition of collective bargaining and the standard rate. As Mr. and Mrs. Webb remarked in their classical treatment of this subject twenty years ago, "It is a necessary incident of the collective bargain that one man should not underbid another, and this underbidding can as easily take place by the offer of more work for the same hour's wage as by the offer of a normal amount of work for a lower hourly wage." The solution of the problem is not incompatible with Trade Unionism, but it raises difficult questions of Trade Union policy and workshop organisation and control which require broad and careful reconsideration in the light of the war.[1]

German Industrial Organisation and its Ideals

Let us set side by side with this review of industrial conditions in our own country a brief account of what has been going on in Germany in face of similar difficulties. Fortunately, we possess in a book published last autumn a vivid and enlightening sketch of the reaction of the war both upon German industrial conditions and upon German economic ideas. "Mittel-Europa," by the ex-pastor Friedrich Naumann, a well-known German writer and thinker, and the founder of the German "Christian Social" movement, is a book worthy of the close attention of British readers;[2] for it is written in a moderate and at times even in a subdued

[1] The chapter on the standard rate in Sidney and Beatrice Webb's "Industrial Democracy" is still the best treatment of this vexed question. On the question of our failure to keep up to date in scientific and mechanical improvements, see a remarkable table of comparisons between the United Kingdom and the United States, drawn up by Mr. Charles Booth and printed in his "Industrial Unrest and Trade Union Policy," p. 27. (Macmillan, 1913. 2*d.*)

[2] Published by Reimer, Berlin. For details about the author and his position in the political and religious life of Germany, see "The German Soul," by Baron von Hügel. (Dent, 1916.)

tone, and is comparatively free from the rhodomontade characteristic of so much recent German professional and journalistic writing. The book has had a very wide circulation, and the economic facts and tendencies which it brings out are, it may be added, confirmed from more recent sources. Its pages are worth extensive quotation as an illustration of the intellectual world in which German "advanced" thinkers are living to-day, and of the way in which the various elements in the German system, parts of which, taken in isolation, appeal to the most diverse schools of thought in this country, dovetail into one another to form a complete and consistent whole.

The purpose of the book is to promote the closer union of Germany and Austria-Hungary, or rather—to use the author's own word—to plead the cause of a new territorial entity, "Central Europe." Just as Chamberlain called upon us to "think imperially," so Naumann calls upon his readers to "think in terms of Central Europe." It is characteristic of German methods that he begs historians and teachers of the young to teach history henceforward in this sense, and that he should give a brilliant if wilfully one-sided account of German history to show how the thing can be done.

But "Central Europe" is not to be a single sovereign State, like the British Empire, nor is it to be based on any principle of justice or liberty or, indeed, on any ideal at all. Although he is, or has been, a clergyman, Naumann is not an idealist; he does not appear even to have asked himself what the object of a State is or what it is that Governments exist to promote; he thinks purely in terms of wealth and power; swelling statistics (of which his appendix is full) are his tests of excellence. It is natural, therefore, that what he should aim at is not the political union of the Central European States, but their economic union. He does not even suggest a federation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The

sentimental objections, as he knows, would be insuperable. Nor does he suggest a Customs union or *Zollverein*, for the conflict of interests renders it impossible ; the Prussian Junkers, for instance, would bar the free import of Hungarian grain. What he suggests instead is a common economic policy ; and that policy, which he sets out with great charm of style, is simply the development, out of the existing war-time control of foodstuffs, munitions, and other commodities, of a system of chartered trusts or monopolies operating over the whole area of Central Europe. He looks forward to the creation of a Central European Economic Commission manned by "experts," which shall supervise the economic organisation of the territory, adjust the claims of the various monopolies, and receive deputations from the representatives of the workmen and other employees. He is, in fact, proposing to form a State somewhat on Syndicalist lines, based on the economic rather than on the political side of community life—but with this all-important difference, that the controlling power will be in the hands not of guilds of workers, but of corporations working for private profit. It will be a government not unlike what critics of America sometimes declare to be the *de facto* government of the United States.

The following is an extract from his account of how the German Government met the situation caused by the British blockade and the unexpectedly large requirements of the army :

"Since military law prevailed, a few months sufficed for a step which would otherwise have required a generation of negotiation —the declaring of all necessary commodities to be State property and the replacing of private trade by public departments and State administrative commissions. *State Socialism moved forward overnight by gigantic strides.* Before the war a man had the right to say : 'I can do what I like with my own potatoes.' Now the State says : 'Your potatoes are my potatoes.' . . . All this in-

volved an immense task of organisation; for the adjustment between the men called out on military service and the increasing unemployment at home is by no means automatic, and the taking over of raw materials and foodstuffs by the War Supply Commission and the Corn or Potato Commission was and is no small trouble. The Government Departments would have been very shy to undertake either task in time of peace; but now they had to face it with a diminished staff of officials to do the work, and they succeeded. In peace time things would have gone much worse; for every one would have insisted on his customary right; but the war brought with it undreamed-of strength: you must, you shall, you will, you can! A willing people with a voluntarily accepted economic dictatorship can achieve anything. The dictatorship was incomplete, for the preliminary inventory had not been undertaken; but this defect was gradually repaired. The condition we see before us to-day is certainly not quite what is known, in Karl Marx's phrase, as the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat,' yet one cannot help, in some aspects, being reminded of that expression. It is a step towards Socialism under Government leadership. It is an Economic Dictatorship of the Government Departments most closely concerned."

So much for what has actually taken place—for the German analogue to our controversies about munitions and prices. No doubt there have been serious lapses in the organising process there described;[1] but, broadly speaking, the successful industrial dictatorship of the German War Office and of the various Food Commissions is a well-established fact. Let us now turn to the reaction of these developments upon German economic thinking; for it is here that Naumann's book is most suggestive for us in this country.

"That we Germans have glided into this State Socialism, or, to use the strict term, this 'public,' as opposed to private, 'economic activity' as if it had always been our mode of life—that is our great discovery of ourselves in the war. When we emerge from the war, we shall no longer be the same economic men as before. The period of absolute individualism, the period

[1] Some of them are described in an article by Mr. John Hilton, written from a close study of the German sources, in *The Nineteenth Century and After* for January, 1916.

of the imitation of the English economic system, which was already in decline, will then be over—so too will be all thoughts of an internationalism that boldly transcends the limits of the State of to-day. On the basis of our experiences in the war, we demand a regulated economy: *the regulation of production from the point of view of State necessity*. . . . This involves a certain reconciliation between middle-class and Socialistic economic conceptions. Before the war one realised already that the sharp opposition was being toned down; for our manufacturers were organising and the workers were developing a strong and realistic Trade Union policy on the basis of the existing order. . . . Now that the war has for a time freed us from all doctrinaire thinking and forced us to face the practical task of organisation, it has become apparent that State Departments, Employers' Associations and Trade Unions are merely members of a common organism—of the community viewed from the point of view of livelihood or economy."

There is nothing inherently new in this idea of government by chartered companies. What is new is the German author's and his enthusiastic public's confident belief in the virtues of large-scale official organisation, as against the free enterprise of groups of individuals and voluntary associations; and, above all, their belief that such an organisation will commend itself to the German and Austro-Hungarian working class. For the author sets out to be a liberal advocate of the claims of Labour and, more especially, of Trade Unionism, and he proposes to conciliate Labour by weaving Trade Unionism into the texture of this new monopolistic system. "Monopolies," he declares, "without a statutory limitation of their autocracy over the workers would involve what would be regarded by present-day public opinion as an intolerable infringement on personal freedom." But to meet this difficulty he does not propose to establish responsible political government, or a measure of Trade Union control, or representation, or even recognition, on questions of workshop conditions, or anything that is to be found in British labour programmes either political or industrial; but simply a vague

and undefined plan of unemployment insurance. Just as Central Europe itself is to be based not on Liberty but on "Organisation," so he offers its workers not Responsibility but Security. It is true that he repeatedly describes his scheme as Socialistic; but if this is what Socialism really means to a German advanced thinker, Socialism and Prussianism must be much nearer akin than they have hitherto been considered to be in this country.

Before asking ourselves what we have to learn from these far-reaching ideas and proposals, it is important that we should realise the nature of the human material with which they are to be carried out. We are often told, in connection with Socialism and other proposals, that they assume a "change in human nature." Naumann accepts this view, and his argument for these radical transformations in industrial organisation and ideals is precisely that the Germans have evolved a new type of man, who is capable of efforts and subordinations unacceptable to any other people. The pages in which he develops this thesis are so interesting and so true to life that they must be given at some length:

"The distinguishing peculiarity of the German is not his possession of some new quality not otherwise to be found in the world, but the methodical and disciplined heightening of a capacity which did and does exist amongst the peoples who used to lead the world, but was never deliberately and carefully developed. No doubt we feel that we are far, very far, from having reached the end of our organisability, but in the eyes of our neighbours we have already departed widely from their mode of life. To them we are a people of slaves, because we have learnt better than they how to do our work according to a common plan and a common rhythm. This is true of work of every kind. It is not as if industrialism were the special German characteristic, for in industry, machinery, and craftsmanship the English were and are our superiors, and the special German spirit to which I refer is just as much in evidence in our agriculture as in our industry.

"In the last twenty years our German industries have assumed

a wholly new appearance. Whilst growing, they have grown into one another. Through employers' associations, buying arrangements, agreements as to prices and selling areas, a complex system of mutual attachments and dependences has come into being. A stranger no doubt would find all this too intricate to unravel, but it has grown up bit by bit to meet one need after another, and has quietly, in the course of one generation, carried over the old-fashioned individual employer, even if he originally set his face against it, into an ordered industrial community-life. . . . From personal motives he becomes a member of impersonal institutions and works for them as for himself. This dovetailing of the individual self into the community-self is what we are pre-eminently able to achieve. . . . What forty years ago seemed a remote and idealistic project of Socialist and State Socialist dreamers has firmly and visibly taken shape in our existing economic institutions. Germany is not simply becoming an Industrial State; she is becoming an Organised State in the full sense of the term.

"Corresponding with this is the development we are witnessing amongst the wage-earners and, after their model, among all the groups of higher employees. The old ideal of the individual worker who sells his labour-power when, where, and how he wishes, has almost disappeared before the social ideal of association for common wages and work. The non-Unionist does indeed still survive in considerable numbers, but he has wholly lost the leadership. And what distinguishes the German Trade Unionists, so far as we can see, from the older English movement is their greater sense of solidarity and discipline, which they have won for themselves against the wishes of the Government and the employing class, in spite of anti-Socialist laws and police persecution. The German masses are determined to be organised; that is their principle of life. It is not a sufficient explanation to say that they have organised to increase their power to bargain for higher wages. Any one who is in touch with Trade Unionists knows that a reasonable private selfishness is only one element in their policy, and in the case of the leading men not the dominant element. They have worked out for themselves their Trade Union ideal of life—an ideal narrow and stiff, no doubt, as was only to be expected from small men with a small scope and horizon, but firm and consistent and clear in itself. The idea of the impersonal industrial guidance of the masses as regards the sale and utilisation of labour is winning its way through and becoming self-evident. In this respect the German worker

differs from his Latin neighbours: for what is called Socialism in France and Italy, although nominally and theoretically related to the German Trade Union movement, lacks the hard core of inner firmness attained by our Socialist and other Trade Union corporations.

"And not only the wage-earner but the middle class is treading the same path; the scientists, the teachers of various grades, the scholars, the doctors, even the artists. The old craftsmen's guilds are breaking out into new life and adapting themselves to the changed conditions of the time. With all the strife of our conflicting interests and associations we are a homogeneous people—magnificently homogeneous in this mode of practical organisation of our work and life, the joint product of the elementary school, universal military service, the police system, organised knowledge and Socialist propaganda. We hardly knew that at bottom we all had the same ideal—that of the regulation of labour, the mark of the second phase of capitalism, which can be described as the transition from private capitalism to Socialism, provided the word Socialism is interpreted, not as a proletarian phenomenon merely, but in a wide and free sense as the ordering of the people with a view to the increase of the common production of all for all.

"It is this new German man who is so unintelligible to the individualist peoples. He seems to them partly a relapse into old unfree mediæval days and partly an artificial creation which denies and does violence to humanity. In the educated circles of Paris and London men regard this German type with mingled feelings of pity, awe, respect, and repulsion. Even if they were capable of achieving the same there, they would not wish to do so, for they have not this discipline of soul, nor do they desire it, for it would mean the surrender of their own soul. No one can understand this fully unless he has on occasion tried to see Germany from outside through the eyes of strangers. From the German who only knows Germany the inner strength of this contrast must remain hidden; he does not feel how strange he has become to just the best men among the Western peoples, not through any single thing that he does, but simply through what he is."

The joint product of the elementary school, universal military service, the police system, organised knowledge, and Socialist propaganda—there we get the scheme of

modern German life in its totality. It is only by studying the new German type of man in the light of this commentary that we can understand the inner connection between the various elements in German life which, seen from the outside, seem so discordant, but yet have combined to produce this "homogeneous" result. Patriotism and Socialism, Syndicalism and Militarism, philosophy and Bureaucracy and Trade Unionism have all contributed their part towards the construction of the modern German ideal : and the name of that ideal is Organisation :

"In these days," says our author, "every Government office, every party and every society is pulling out its notebook and putting down ideas for improvements after the war. I would wager that three-quarters of these notebooks contain the words, Better Organisation ! . . . Fichte and Hegel nod approval from the walls. The German after the war will be a servant of the State as never before in his daily work. His ideal is and remains Organisation, not random impulse : Reason, not a blind struggle for existence. This is our freedom, our self-development. It is with this that we shall have our great period in history, like other victorious peoples in other times with other arts and excellences. It is our period that is dawning, now that English Capitalism has reached and passed its zenith, and for this our period we have been prepared by the joint work of Frederick the Great, Kant, Scharnhorst, Siemens, Krupp, Bismarck, Bebel, Legien, Kirdorf, and Ballin."

How do we in Britain stand in relation to this phenomenon, and what have we to learn from it, and in particular, how does it stand in relation to the traditions and ideals of our own Labour Movement ?

III. Principles and Ideals of the British Labour Movement

England is the oldest of the industrial countries. Her inventors and manufacturers were the pioneers of modern industrial development and her idealists and

reformers were the pioneers of the modern Labour Movement. She has the oldest industrial tradition and the oldest, most highly skilled, and most firmly rooted working class. To the dweller in a Cathedral city or a county town in the south of England, cities like Manchester and Birmingham, and still more Huddersfield and Rochdale and Stoke-on-Trent may seem crude and raw and modern ; but compared with Essen and Elberfeld and Chemnitz, as with Kansas City and Pittsburg, they are stable and venerable communities. They have long since passed through their industrial revolution and settled down. Changes in machinery and organisation there must always be, but the tingling excitement that thrills through our German author's pages, springing from a sense of new worlds just discovered, with immeasurable reactions upon human life and association, has long since passed away. The mental experience that England passed through between 1780 and 1840 and France, in a lesser degree, under Louis Philippe and Napoleon III., Germany is passing through under William II., and is inviting Austria-Hungary and the Balkans to enjoy under her ægis in the coming generation. British readers may be excused, therefore, for detecting, beneath all the pomp of German verbiage and all the undeniable record of German achievement, something a little naïve and mediæval and almost childlike in their general outlook. The British workmen, too, once worshipped Reason with a capital "R" in the pages of Tom Paine, and set all his hopes, with Robert Owen, on the Principle of Association. But he has learnt much and suffered much since that first schoolboy flush of idealism, and more especially he has learnt, in his social ideas and projects of organisation, to keep his feet firmly fixed upon the ground of experience and common sense. He does not, like the German, worship Organisation as an ideal, but prefers to refer new ideas to a rough standard of human values which he has worked out for himself, and to ask what effect they would have on life as he

knows it at present and as, in his moments of insight and inspiration, he thinks it may yet become.

The modern British Labour Movement originated in 1792 with the foundation of the London Corresponding Society by Thomas Hardy, a shoemaker's assistant from Stirling. During the five generations that have since elapsed it can claim to have led the way for the world both in ideas and achievements. "The working class," the writer once heard a Russian exile declare to an audience of American working men, "the working class, comrades, has four legs, and unless it has all four at once it cannot stand upright. These four are the Trade Union, the Co-operative Movement, the Political Movement, and Education. We in Russia have had the last without any of the others, and what good has it done us?[1] Here, in America, where the working class is free, there is no Co-operative Movement, and the Political Movement is slow to come to birth. England has had the first two for many generations, she has the third in the Political Labour Party, and now she is growing the fourth in the Workers' Educational Association." In truth, the outstanding events in working-class development throughout the world during the last century were all due to British initiative. Trade Unionism, Co-operation, Mutual Insurance, Socialism, Factory legislation, working-class political organisation, all originated in this country. Just as our scientists and manufacturers and merchants and bankers invented the steam-engine, the spinning jenny, the limited company, and the cheque-book, so our workmen both at home and in the Dominions have been feeling their way through many failures, as all inventors do, towards stable and satisfactory ways of harmonising modern industrial life, in all its ruthlessness, with individual security, political freedom, and social well-being.

Yet, though the British Labour Movement, in the

[1] The reference was to the revolutionary educational movement of the mid-nineteenth century, which was carried on largely by university students.

widest sense of the words, has been a model for the world, it has retained certain characteristics of its own which mark it out from parallel movements in other countries. "Economic conditions," says one of the profoundest of our living historians,[1] "will not of themselves produce a Trade Union nor religious convictions a church. . . . There is nothing in which the different races of mankind and the separate branches of these races differ so much as in their aptitude for free association, and in the forms which that aptitude takes. It is a divergence not so much of religious convictions as of social characteristics which makes the Christian Church such a different institution in Germany and in England, in Scotland and in South Africa." The Socialist Movement in the various forms of its appeals and propaganda, as adapted to different countries in which it works, would have been an equally apt illustration. "Social character of this kind," Professor Unwin continues, "must not be thought of as innate and as springing up spontaneously in each fresh generation. To a large extent it is transmitted through conscious imitation of the older generation by the younger, of the class which has achieved organisation by that which has not." There are few countries in which this process of social imitation works more strongly than in England, or in which, as a result, a sense of social continuity and the force of tradition are more marked. Two characteristics of that tradition must be mentioned here: for they are essential to an understanding of the inner spirit of the Labour Movement.

In the first place, the Labour Movement in this country has always set before itself a moral and social ideal. It has never conceived of itself as engaged simply in a struggle for ascendancy, and for the material fruits which ascendancy would bring with it. It has never preached the doctrine of the class-struggle in the way in

[1] "Industrial Organisation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," by George Unwin, p. 8.

which many Continental Socialists have preached it, and as the struggle between nations and "cultures" is being preached in Germany to-day. The thinkers and writers and speakers who have been influential in the British movement have almost all been moralists—that is, men interested in human nature and in the betterment of human life rather than in the promotion of outward forms of equality or the working out of tidy and logical methods of organisation. Tom Payne and Cobbett and Robert Owen, the early Chartists and Co-operators, Carlyle and Ruskin, Arnold Toynbee, and William Morris, Keir Hardie and Robert Blatchford of the *Clarion*, they have all, like their earliest predecessor John Ball in the fourteenth century, and the Levellers in the seventeenth, been prophets and preachers rather than economists or devotees of "organisation." Even when, like Robert Owen, they set their whole hope in "a New View of Society," they did so with a clear and definite moral end, and the opening page of Owen's collected writings, not unlike Naumann in its naïveté, may serve to mark the contrast between the spirit of the two men and their countries. "*These writings*," he says, in a statement printed in capital letters, "*are intended to effect an entire Revolution in the spirit, mind, manners, habits, and conduct of the human race; . . . a Revolution which will destroy every ignorant selfish feeling, will unite man to man and will then harmonise all to Nature and God, making the Globe an ever improving earthly Paradise, which is now evidently the intention of our Creator.*"

This characteristic of the British movement is due partly to the close connection which has always existed—even in the time of Tom Paine and Shelley—between the Labour Movement and the religious spirit, and especially to its contact with Nonconformity. This is, perhaps, the greatest point of difference between the British and Continental movements, for if there is one thing more difficult than another to explain to an intelligent foreigner it is Nonconformity. No one who only knew the British

Labour Movement from outside and from its journals could realise how many and intimate are its connections with religion and to how large an extent it is the legitimate descendant, adapted to altered circumstances, of the old Puritan spirit. "You jeer at the name Leveller," wrote Winstanley in 1649. "I tell you Jesus is the head Leveller." "To none in my peculiar mental make-up," wrote Blatchford in his burning chapter in "Merrie England" on "the self-made man," "am I more indebted than to Jesus Christ. . . . His will expressly bids me treat all men as brothers. And to the extent of my indebtedness to Christ am I bound to pay all men his heirs." In its hatred of oppression and injustice; in its unexpected outbursts of sentiment (as in its spasmodic interest in the problems of native races or foreign affairs); in its tenacity and grit and patience; in its power of self-deception which its enemies like to call cant; above all in its native manliness and its healthy and never-failing idealism, the spirit of the seventeenth century is still alive amongst us. It was Cromwell who used the power of England to intervene on behalf of the oppressed mountaineers of Savoy. It was his spiritual descendants who understood in a flash the meaning of the invasion of Belgium.

This leads us on to the second great distinguishing mark of the British movement—the stress it has always laid on the importance of personal independence. "Yorkshire people," remarks Charlotte Brontë,[1] who knew them well, "are as yielding to persuasion as they are stubborn against compulsion," adding, in Victorian idiom, that "taken as they ought to be," they are "ladies and gentlemen every inch of them." The remark applies far beyond the bounds of her own West Riding. It is, indeed, one of the keynotes of English working-class history from the days of John Ball and the Peasants' Revolt onward. To the British workman freedom has never meant "perfect

[1] "Shirley," chap. xx.

service" or "self-realisation" or "organisation" or anything else so metaphysical. It has always meant the sense of being personally and individually free, or, as a recent psychological writer has put it, a sense of "the continuous possibility of initiative." The British workman would rather "feel free" than be a part of the most efficient "organism" in the world. This does not mean that he prefers anarchy to obedience or licence to government. Our political and industrial record is the best answer on that point. But it does mean that the British workman has a rooted objection, which no amount of argument will remove, to institutions and forms of organisation which in Naumann's phrase, "deny and do violence to humanity." He dislikes the feeling of being a cog in a machine: he rebels against "impersonal economic guidance": he objects to becoming a standardised human unit; and where he suspects standardisation and mechanical uniformity and the pressure of a soul-destroying discipline or organisation his soul is instinctively in revolt. One need not search far for illustrations of this deep-lying truth. It accounts for a number of phenomena which must be a puzzle to Continental observers—for the traditional abhorrence of the workhouse and the equally deep-rooted dislike of the benevolent feudalism of "model employers" and "model landlords," for the essentially voluntary character of British Trade Unionism, in spite of the obvious advantages of using the law to make them "black-leg" proof, for the reluctance to submit to compulsory arbitration and compulsory military service, for the distrust of Government interference even when accompanied (as in the Insurance Act) by the best intentions, for the chaotic growth and easy-going methods of Trade Union organisation, the dislike of centralisation with its consequent loss of personal touch and the slowness in adopting schemes of amalgamation,[1] above all,

[1] There are about 4,000,000 Trade Unionists in the United Kingdom, divided between 1,135 separate Unions, whereas the main division of the

for the steady increase in the feeling that the real problem before the working class is that of counteracting the dehumanising tendencies of modern large-scale production by securing for the workers a greater share in the control of the conditions under which they labour.

All this amounts to little more than saying that the British Labour Movement is not French or German or American, but British. It has grown out of the British character, like the British Commonwealth, and reflects that character both in its strength and in its weakness. It is as different from the German movement as a British Colony from a German Colony. It is, in fact, intensely national. The rich are often national in their sentiments but cosmopolitan in their mode of life: the poor, by necessity, are national in both.

But the British Labour Movement is far more national than either the German or the American, for, unlike them, it has its roots in a historic past. There is little of the traditional Germany to be seen in the organised "Central European" of to-day. "Entry into the Central European economy," says Naumann, "is a soul-transforming decision," just as, for the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who pass the Statute of Liberty every year, entry into the United States means an irrevocable break with their Old World past. The German workman, like the American, is first and foremost an "economic man." It is not nationality but the economic machine, which knows nothing of nations and persons, that has set the distinctive mark, which we know so well, on their souls and faces. The true national quality is underneath, submerged and forgotten, "hustled" or "organised" out of consciousness. Just as behind the cold, set, expressionless features of the German under his helmet there lurks a reminiscence at moments of the good-natured sentimental

German Labour Movement—that affiliated to the Social Democratic Party—numbered in 1913 about 2,500,000 members, divided between only forty-eight separate unions.

"dear, stupid Germans" of the days of Queen Victoria, so the face of the typical American "hustler" is as a mask behind which one can detect Puritan England or Ireland or Bohemia or Italy or Jewry or whatever his spiritual heritage may happen to be.

It is because Germany and the United States have cut themselves off from the past in their industrial development that their efficiency seems to us so sinister and impersonal in its manifestations. They have a *tabula rasa* to work on, and we feel as if they could make of it what they will; they have sloughed off the old world with its limitations and deficiencies and weaknesses. But we may easily forget they have sloughed off with it great elements of strength and idealism also. Their choice of efficiency against tradition is not pure gain, nor is ours pure weakness. Be that as it may, we have made our choice. It is made for us by our national history, which has given us the character we have to-day. We cannot standardise or Prussianise our workers. We cannot submit them to the industrial conscription (*Arbeitsmilitarismus*) of Germany or the "scientific management" of America. Our employers and government officials are too tolerant and our workmen are too independent. The masters are not cold-blooded enough and the men too little submissive. All parties, in short, are too British. "Scientific managers," says a recent American investigator, "by the very nature of their occupations and experiences, cannot approach any real comprehension of the peculiar conditions and relations that create the aims, attitudes, problems, standards, and ideals of the workers."[1] Our captains of industry cannot so ignore human nature, nor would the British workman put up with it if they did.

What, then, are we to do in view of our admitted deficiencies? How are we to meet the world after the war—the ruthless, efficient, organised, large-scale world in

[1] "Scientific Management and Labour," by R. F. Hoxie. New York, 1915. Page 120.

which the Germans have set the pace? Our duty is clear. It is frankly to set up our industrial ideal and our system of life against theirs. Not to bow down in blind adoration before the demigods of efficiency and the latest exponents of Divine right, but to use our own talents, and to bring forth out of our national treasurehouse things both old and new. To repair, to correct, to improve, to build up, but always in the light of our own tradition, which has made us what we are. To maintain and deepen and justify our faith in the unity of the spirit of man. To preserve and extend that inner flow and connection between the soul and the intellect, between knowledge and virtue, which, by sweetening the mind and purifying the purpose of the brain worker and blessing the manual worker with a deep wisdom of his own, enables each to supplement the other and draws both within the circle of a common humanity. To believe that since men are men and not gods or machines, an organisation so ordered and so manned as the German must ultimately fail through the human limitations of its directors and the moral atrophy of the slaves who man it. Not to concentrate power and initiative into the heads of a few experts, but to diffuse responsibility as widely as possible amongst a community of free men. "Heroes and great men," wrote a great Russian writer recently,[1] "are to be found everywhere, in Germany as well as in England, but no other country can boast so extraordinarily good a type of average man as England. . . . No other literature has given us such an attractive, lovable and, above all, familiar type of the average person. I look at the Englishman of Kipling and of Dickens with the greatest reverence and affection, and I shake them by their strong reluctant hands." Let us take courage by seeing ourselves as our best friends see us. The stuff of which our writers made their heroes is still with us. We are still, what Andreieff calls us,

[1] "God Save England," by Leonard Andreieff: *Times* Literary Supplement. March 2, 1916.

before all else "a nation of men," and not in machinery nor in experts but in character of the average man lies our salvation.

IV. Industrial Policy after the War

In what direction, if not to Germany, are we to look for the changes that, as is generally admitted, are necessary in our social economy?

This is not the place to outline a programme in detail, but a few suggestions must be added in order to indicate the bearings of the foregoing remarks. Only strictly labour problems will be touched on: nothing can be said about other matters, such as education and housing, which, though of predominant interest to the working class, are not industrial problems in the strict sense of the term.

The British working class is divided, and somewhat sharply divided, into two sections. Out of some 15,000,000 manual workers, male and female, 4,000,000 are organised into Trade Unions, and the remaining 11,000,000 are unorganised. It is this latter class which has the most pressing claim on the attention of Parliament: for it consists of men and women who are, for the most part, not in a position to overcome their difficulties without the aid of the State.

It is this miscellaneous, unorganised working-class population, in town and country, both in the army and at home, which has been most affected in its ideas and demands by the war. These are the men and women who form the material of Mr. Rowntree's and Professor Bowley's appalling statistics of "primary poverty"; these are the "12,000,000 always on the verge of starvation," of whom Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman used to remind us. The lower stratum of this section of the population presents, or presented before the war, a spectacle of helplessness and wretchedness unique

in the industrial life of the modern world. They are the wreckage of five generations of the modern industrial system. "It is hardly disputable," says a recent writer,[1] in words which observers from the Continent and America have often endorsed, "that millions of electors in the greater British cities have reached a point of personal decadence—physical, mental, and moral—to which no Continental country furnishes a parallel on any comparable scale." This is the other side of the medal—the converse to the self-help and personal independence of the organised Labour Movement. Just as our best is the best in the world, so our worst is among the worst. Those who wish to live in imagination through the daily round of the unorganised worker and the casual labourer, to share its racking anxieties, its bitter humiliations, its joyless excitements, should turn from statistics and sociological generalisations to the poignant self-revelation of one of their own members. "The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists,"[2] by Robert Tressall, house-painter and sign writer, is not only a precise and careful record, written with a realism and a firmness of touch that are almost French, of a certain section of working-class life, but it also enables the thinking reader to form some conception of the immense revolution which the war must have caused in thousands of working-class minds and households.

For to this section of the population the war is the beginning of a new life. It has broken the crust of immemorial custom. It has given them what they lacked before : a horizon. It has brought comparative plenty in many cases where before there was perpetual want. It has brought health where before there was perpetual lassitude. It has brought hope where before there was dull despair. For such as these there can be no relapse into the old morass. It remains for the State by deliberate action to fortify this new sense of hopefulness and self-respect.

[1] Ensor, R. C. K. "Modern Socialism," p. xlvii.
[2] Grant Richards, 1913.

A bold extension of the Trade Boards Act to large new classes of workers both in town and country, coupled with the assertion, on Australian lines, of the principle of the living wage, would seem to be one natural way of coping with this inevitably pressing problem.[1]

Passing from the unorganised to the organised workers, perhaps the clearest need is for internal changes in the Trade Union movement as a whole and in the separate Unions, which shall make the industrial democracy and responsible Government of the working class more of a reality. Constitutional reorganisation and a closer touch between the leaders and the rank and file is urgently required. The Trade Union Movement is built up on the same principles as political democracy. It aims at introducing, so far as possible, into industrial life the principles of free and responsible government. Yet it has not yet succeeded in securing full acceptance for those principles even among the ranks of its own members, among whom there has been an increasing tendency in recent years to substitute Prussian for British models of policy and action. An article, signed Rob Roy, in the editorial page of the Glasgow *Forward* of April 8 puts the case with great clearness:

"The members of a Trade Union frame a constitution, enact rules, elect officials to administer their affairs and enforce their rules. When the strain comes, they throw their rules and their

1 What constitutes a minimum living wage was laid down in connection with the Federal Act by Mr. Justice Higgins in the Federal Arbitration Court of Australia on November 8, 1907, in the following terms, quoted in the British report on the Australian system, Cd. 4167, p. 217: "If 'A' lets 'B' have the use of his horses, on the terms that he gives them fair and reasonable treatment, I have no doubt that it is 'B's' duty to give them proper food and water and such shelter and rest as they need; and, as wages are the means of obtaining commodities, surely the State, in stipulating for fair and reasonable remuneration for the employees, means that the wages shall be sufficient to provide these things, and clothing, and a condition of frugal comfort estimated by current human needs." The British Trade Boards are not at present guided in their determinations of minimum rates by the principle of the living wage.

leaders overboard. If this sort of strain comes often, Trade Unionism may order its coffin. That is anarchy, not organisation. 'Our only hope lay in drastic action *by ourselves.*' I regret to say it, but the last words seem to me to bear their own condemnation. If every group is to take drastic action when its grievance is not remedied at once, and according to its wishes, then Trade Union brothers may write 'Ichabod' on their offices. If a group has a good case it can surely rely on convincing its own officials of the justice of the case. Should that process fail, the appeal to all fellow-members is still open to it. If the common sense of all refuses to be convinced, then the group must put its case better, or acknowledge that that case is so weak as to be unconvincing. Industrial Democracy can't justify itself on Anarchist principles. An instinctive appeal to violence, *à la Sorel*, is a denial of Democracy—industrial and otherwise.

"But I am told the men distrust their official leaders. Who elected the leaders? To take the measure of a man's ability and character, after years of observation, is a comparatively easy task for the human mind. On the whole the Trade Unions choose well. They may miss a genius, but they keep out rank incompetents. Prestige of birth and connection or inherited privilege doesn't count with them, and by so much they are better in their methods than, let us say, a good many established European institutions, which shall be nameless. Trade Union officials may be all that impatient and insurgent minorities call them. Will those minorities devise better methods of getting the right man into the right place? If they can't—and they have never shown how—will they accept the disagreeable and slow compulsion of the appeal to reason? They have a free field and no favour. They can bring the majority round to their way of thinking, or they can adopt the Prussian method of imposing their will on the plea of necessity and force. Prussianism crops up in queer ways and queer quarters—not least among our pacifist friends, who would assume all the privileges of Junkerdom right off the reel if only they could."

This spirit will, however, not be exorcised by the mere preaching of obedience. It has partly arisen from inelastic constitutional methods which throw too little responsibility and initiative upon the local officials, and partly from the inevitable disabilities under which they suffer. Under the existing system of Trade Union

organisation, by which the local officials attend to their work in their spare time, it is impossible that they should have an adequate sense of the relation between central and local problems. To preserve unity and continuity of policy without atrophying responsibility among the local leaders and the rank and file is the problem in democratic government which Trade Unionism has to solve.

So far as to the internal organisation of the Trade Union movement. But for what is that organisation to be used? The war may well prove a turning-point in Trade Union policy and history. When Mr. Tennant, on February 8, 1915, called upon the Labour leaders to help the Government and employers out of a difficulty by "organising the forces of labour," he was creating a far-reaching precedent, which the successive subsequent consultations of representative labour bodies have confirmed. Difficulties had arisen in the workshops all over the country. Whose business was it to deal with them? On the old theory of what may be called industrial autocracy it was solely the business of the "master" to deal with "his men." On the new theory, now acknowledged almost as a matter of course, it is also the business of the leaders of the industrial democracy to which the men belong. The various consultations and conferences that have taken place mark the devolving of a share of the responsibility for the carrying on of the industrial work of the country on to the Trade Unions and their leaders. How far this new development will ultimately go no one can yet say. What is certain, however, is that this acceptance of responsibility by Labour is in the straight line of the British political and industrial tradition.

The next step in advance seems clearly marked out. It is the extension and development of the system of Joint Committees which the war has brought into the foreground. Joint Committees, both local and central, of employers and Trade Union leaders have existed for

some years in most of the leading industries; but their functions have been confined to the discussion and, where possible, the settlement of disputes. Even before the war, Mr. Charles Booth, in an interesting pamphlet, had suggested their extension into a more permanent form of organisation with enlarged functions. He advocated a scheme of "reciprocal recognition" of Trade Unions by employers and of employers by Trade Unions, and the establishment in this connection of "permanent Joint Committees, representing masters and men, for consultative purposes." These Joint Committees should, in his view, be at liberty to discuss "all matters of mutual concern," amongst which he especially mentions questions of apprenticeship and juvenile labour.[1]

Mr. Booth's suggestion of "reciprocal recognition" raises a point which must not be ignored. When matters affecting a trade or industry as a whole are under discussion it is as important to secure the collective consent of the employers as that of the men. The non-federated master is just as much a problem as the non-Unionist or "rebel" group of workmen. "As the difficulties in the Docks of London made clear only two years ago," writes Professor Ashley, "the great obstacles in the way of industrial peace are not only the extremists on the Labour side, but also the employers (often comparatively small employers) who refuse to be bound by an employers' agreement to which they were not individually parties."[2]

Such an extension of the functions of Joint Committees as Mr. Booth suggests would not prevent disputes or even strikes; but it would lead to a state of feeling which would make disputes less likely to occur, and easier to settle when they did occur. Such Joint Boards would have the great advantage of keeping the

[1] "Industrial Unrest and Trade Union Policy," pp. 24–25.

[2] "The Economic Organisation of England: an Outline History." 1914. Page 190.

two sides in constant touch. If set up not only nationally but locally they might be of very great help in questions of workshop discipline and supervision, where there are far larger economies to be made than is generally realised in the avoidance of friction and the improvement of relations between the two parties. Friction is not only unpleasant : it is expensive : it reduces output and costs money in supervision.

There is another more important duty which would fall to the share of such Joint Boards. They would have to deal with the difficult questions opened up by the Government's pledge for the restoration of Trade Union rules. Trade Union regulations are, in effect, an endeavour on the part of the workers to control the conditions of their industrial life. They deal with such questions as wages, hours of labour, overtime and Sunday work, apprenticeship and method of entry into an occupation, the kind of work to be done by different classes of workers, method of negotiation with employers, and other similar matters. In other words, they attempt to substitute for the supreme and autocratic control of the employer over the working lives of his employees (which before the days of Trade Unionism and the awakening of the public conscience on the matter led to grave injury to the community) a greater and greater degree of self-direction by the organised workers themselves through their representatives. But, hitherto, the Trade Unions have had no place in the administration of the industrial society, and such control as they have in the past obtained has been exerted from without and not from within. This is not the place to discuss the character and scope of Trade Union rules. It is, however, not unlikely that the changes brought about by the war will render some of the more important of them inapplicable ; in which case the nation will be able to fulfil its promise only by offering an alternative solution.

The conditions of such a solution would naturally

form the subject of discussion in the joint bodies already suggested. No doubt they would first be discussed separately both by employers and by labour: and they will also have formed a subject of careful study, conducted, industry by industry, on the part of the Government. But the final adjustment of the problem, and the settlement of the conditions under which the nation is to be launched on its work of industrial reconstruction, can only be reached at a series of national conferences at which both sides are represented. It will be for the Government to convoke such conferences and to have its own schemes; but only through an agreement of the representatives of the two parties can they be carried into execution and the nation be saved from drifting back into the precarious condition of "armed peace" which characterised British industrial life before the war.

There is no space here to develop these suggestions further: to indicate them is enough to show that there is a British alternative to Prussian methods of industrial regulation: that the adaptation to industrial life of the spirit and principles of our political institutions is judged by cool heads to be practicable: and that it is likely to develop, as British inventions do, through being tested by piecemeal experiments adapted to the peculiar conditions in each particular case. "Society is feeling the way," to quote Professor Ashley again, "with painful steps towards a corporate organisation of industry on the side alike of employer and employed: to be then more harmoniously, let us hope, associated together—with the State alert and intelligent in the background to protect the interests of the community." It should be the privilege of Britain to base that new corporate association on those principles which, as embodied in political institutions, we and our Allies are pledged to uphold. For, in the industrial field, as in the political, there is a clear conflict of spirit and principles between Prussianism and the Commonwealth:

and we shall be false to ourselves and to posterity did we not strive, without haste yet without rest, to apply to our own domestic problems those very ideals, home-grown and familiar, yet sufficing, which our dead have entrusted to our keeping.

RECONSTRUCTION[1]

During the last two months a change has come over the people of this country so noteworthy, and yet so silent and indefinable, as to deserve attention in these pages; for no outside observer could discover it for himself from our newspapers, nor could he easily interpret it from the external demeanour of the population in street or train or office. It is a change of which most men and women are aware within themselves and of which, if they are observant and sensitive, they are conscious also in those around them, but which few care to acknowledge, still less to analyse, for to do so would stir the depths, and that the Englishman dislikes. This silent revolution is the reaction upon Britain of the great advance.

The greatest revolutions in this country have always been silent revolutions. We have always realised that outward changes are of no avail unless men's minds have been prepared beforehand to profit by them. We know that new social classes cannot be created in a moment to undertake the new tasks which may be ready for them. We have always believed in progress as a broadening down from precedent to precedent, and attempted to make ready the workmen before summoning them out to the harvest-field. English history is a record of startling achievements ushered in by silent revolutions. Without Wiclif and the Lollards there would have been no Reformation; without the Puritans no Revolution; without Wesley and the Evangelicals no abolition of the slave trade and no Factory Acts; without the philosophic

[1] From *The Round Table*, September, 1916.

Radicals no colonial self-government; without Thomas Arnold and the public school system no Indian Civil Service; without the forty years' devoted labour of the elementary teacher no Kitchener's Army. It is the quiet work of the mind that makes revolutions possible. Without a change of outlook all external change is meaningless. But if the inner change has taken place, everything is possible, even the moving of mountains. And it is this silent inner change which is preparing the way for the new world after the war.

It is a change which is strangely compounded of the spirit of hope and the spirit of sacrifice—of the sense of coming victory and the ache of personal loss. We know now that the Empire and what it stands for are saved, that the old country will "carry on" for generations to come. But we know, too, that for tens of thousands life has henceforth lost much of its personal meaning, that there are gaps in the home circle which will never be filled, and that life will be a lonely pilgrimage to the end. Personal affections and ambitions have made way for a bigger cause. Life seems wider and more impersonal. Our fellow-countrymen seem nearer to us. Rank and class seem to count for less. All have suffered alike and all have served alike, and all have the same world to live in and to repair—a world that seems lonely at times beyond all bearing, yet is lit up with the flame of sacrifice and the undying memory of those who are gone.

How can we best bear our testimony to the spirit in which they died? That is the question which underlies the activity which has sprung up during the last few months round the idea of reconstruction after the war. When reconstruction was first publicly mentioned in a House of Lords debate last December the idea that was in most men's minds was the difficulty of the sudden transition from a war to a peace footing. The Government was urged to prepare a "Peace-book" on the analogy of the "War-book" prepared by the Committee

of Imperial Defence. But in the months that have since intervened reconstruction has taken on a wider scope. People have come to realise that what is needed is not a mere transitory programme to enable life to resume its normal pre-war channel, but some larger and more permanent policy, conceived in the spirit which the war has revealed. Less and less do we feel inclined to go back to "Business as usual," with all the narrow habits of thought and action that it implies. It cannot, we feel, ever really be "business as usual" with so many gone. There is a sense that an effort must be made to lift our whole public life, both on its political and economic sides, above the petty and disastrous contentiousness which disfigured it before the war. Men who have breathed the larger air of common sacrifice are reluctant to return to the stuffy air of self-seeking.

There is another respect in which a change is to be felt. We have become more acutely conscious than ever before that there have been two Englands—one the England of tradition, of the public, of the Army, of Parliament, in later years of industry and finance, the other the England of individuals who have maintained their personal independence, but have had but a dependent share in the great historic past. Many have discovered for the first time, what every foreigner sees, and what every Briton from across the oceans knows, that the British are not a nation as the French are a nation, because the revolution of social equality has never yet been made. The great mass of the nation are fighting even now not for an England which is themselves, but for an England which inherits noble traditions and fine qualities, but which is separated from them by the impalpable barrier of caste. This separation which has added bitterness to every political and economic dispute, has been wonderfully bridged in the trenches. There is a growing sense that it must be bridged at home. Social superiority and privilege must give way to common humanity and

common sacrifice. In future we must be a more united and a more equal people than we have been in the past.

The effects of these tendencies are still obscure, but they are already to be seen in the programme of the work allotted by the Government to the Reconstruction Committee presided over by the Prime Minister. The subjects that are being inquired into by that body, working through a number of carefully manned sub-committees, cover a wide range of social and economic interest. Its investigations are not confined merely to problems of demobilisation, but cover "the entire range of subjects which will call for immediate treatment at the close of the war." The two most important of these are certainly education and the organisation of industry. It has already been announced that a Committee, presided over by Lord Crewe, the new President of the Board of Education, has been appointed to review the whole question of national education in the light of the war. The industrial inquiry, it may be imagined, will be on a similarly comprehensive scale, designed to probe into the causes of the contrast between the spirit of public service which the war has so strikingly revealed in all classes of the community and the habits and traditions of self-interest and class-antagonism which have become endemic in our commercial and industrial life.

Such inquiries go down to the very roots of our national life. If the recommendations put forward are wise and far-reaching, and the country is in a mood to adopt them, we may see the beginning of a new epoch of regenerative activity. For the most critical points in our national defences are, and have been for some time, the school, the workshop, and the slum. The war, as a whole, has been a triumphant vindication of the spirit of the country. But it has brought to light grave shortcomings, which it will need a generation of active work to repair. And it is work that needs most of all to be set on foot in the homes in which our children are reared,

both in town and country, in the classroom and the teachers' training college whence their education proceeds, and in the office and workshop where they spend the greater part of their lives.

With the question of housing we do not propose to deal. It is a large and complex problem for itself. What was wrong with our pre-war organisation of industry can be stated in one word. It was inhuman. The coming of the joint-stock company and the growth of large-scale undertakings had destroyed the old personal tie between masters and men and the sense of common service to the community that was associated with it. It has been replaced by mechanical profit-making organisations, which have not yet either been humanised or related to public service. Trade Unions and Employers' Associations are necessary parts of the organisation of a modern State, and collective bargaining is clearly an advance on the old unequal system of individual wage-contracts. But collective bargaining between large-scale organisations of employers and workmen involves a piling up of armaments on both sides not unlike that of the rival European groups before the war. At its best it preserves the peace by establishing a precarious balance of power: at its worst it precipitates a disastrous conflict: and, in either case, whether it works well or ill for the moment, it is non-moral and inhuman, for it has no basis in a sense of common service or public duty. Hence it creates a feeling of divided interest and permanent estrangement which has been all too visible to the rest of the community during the recurring industrial crises of the last ten years.

In this vicious situation a great national responsibility rests upon the leaders of both groups of combatants. "The future of the community depends on them working with and into one another." "The issues are too tremendous to be left to tests of strength." These words are quoted from the last book written by one who was

both an employer and a teacher of economics, the late Professor Smart of Glasgow :[1] and he goes on to give his own remedy for improving the relations between Capital and Labour. "If they are not to be regulated," he says, "by a kind of martial law from above" (and Professor Smart, who was no Socialist, had no love for State intervention), "*they must be regulated by conscience.*" It is a very simple remedy—but how much more effective, if men would adopt it, than Compulsory Arbitration or the Munitions Act ! And Professor Smart goes on, out of his own experience, to make a special appeal to employers.

"Personally," he says, "I count it (the employers' function) the noblest profession of all, though, as a rule, it is taken up from anything but the noblest motives : and what I ask is—just this and no more—that the traditions of the professions be transferred to it—the *noblesse oblige* of living for their work and, if necessary, dying for it. If an employer has any faith in the well-worn analogy of an 'army of industry' he must believe in the necessity of Captains of Industry, who think first of their country and their men, and only second of their pay. . . . He must take the sins of his order upon himself and win back the confidence that meanwhile has disappeared. His task to-day, in fact, is very much that of a philosopher-king who comes to his throne after many days of misrule by his predecessors. He has no right to his honourable position but that he governs divinely. And, if I am not mistaken, the first thing that will test his worthiness for high office is the attitude he takes up to Trade Unionism."

Partnership and a sense of common duty, in other words, can only spring up out of mutual knowledge and understanding ; and these cannot arise except as a result of ordinary unrestrained human intercourse—of frank and open conference by the leaders of both sides in the questions of common interest to them both. The first step to put into action the aspirations towards good will which the sacred memories of the war are stirring on both sides is the establishment of joint representative Committees in the various industries to meet and discuss the

[1] "Second Thoughts of an Economist," 1916, pp. 152–3.

problems of their common work. While we are thinking of reconstruction and of re-establishing the Public Law of Europe let us not forget the work of constructive organisation on similar lines that awaits us at home.

The work that lies before us in the field of national education is of a somewhat different kind. Here it is not so much a change of spirit and system that are required, but encouragement, consolidation, invigoration. The war has indeed revealed grave shortcomings of detail in English education, especially in its higher branches ; but on the whole it has been a vindication of its essential soundness. It has proved us a nation not only sound and strong in character but far more adaptable, both in soldiering and in industry, than either we or our enemies suspected. The number of our volunteers and the success of the New Army in France are a historic tribute not only to our homes but to our schools. Whatever may be said in criticism of British education, let this outstanding fact always be remembered.

But the grave defect of our national education is that there is not enough of it. There are not enough children in our elementary schools. There are not enough teachers to teach them. There is not enough provision for educating the teachers, either before or after they have begun teaching. There are not enough classrooms to make good teaching in small classes possible. There are not enough playing-fields to enable the elementary schools to develop the corporate spirit by which battles are won. There are not enough secondary schools available for the children of the great mass of the population or sufficient facilities for the children of poor parents to reach those that exist. There is not enough access to the Universities, either from the schools or for adult students. There is not enough support for voluntary agencies, such as the Workers' Educational Association and the Adult Schools, which are trying to make democracy a reality by creating an educated public opinion on current problems. There

is not enough contact between the great organised professions, including commerce and industry, and the national centres of knowledge. In a word, we have a system of education which, excellent in many of its parts, and filled with devoted workers, is lacking in unity and coherence, and testifies to a want of thought or of faith on the part of the nation as a whole.

Such a condition of affairs cannot continue into a time when men's minds will be concentrated on making up in the next generation what they have lost in their own. Great and far-reaching developments and extensions will be demanded. Three only can be mentioned here. The status of the teaching profession will need to be raised so as to attract more teachers. Already before the war and its wastage began the prospects for the profession were not bright. Of the 14,000 elementary teachers annually required to fill up vacancies, only about 5000 were forthcoming, leaving an annual deficiency of 9000. Moreover, of the total of 160,000 only some 60,000 were fully trained. These deficiencies can only be redressed by very largely increasing the present rates of pay and pension—especially for assistant teachers. Teachers should be paid enough to have money for books and a good holiday and ordinary social intercourse. It is the monotony and loneliness of so many teachers' lives, especially in the country, which deters so many from the profession. Secondly, no class should contain more than 30 pupils except in subjects where practically no individual teaching is required. This would transform the whole conditions of elementary school life and would attract to the profession thousands of "born teachers" who dare not face it at present. Thirdly, all exemptions under 14 should be abolished and provision should be made for part-time continuation education up to the age of 17 or 18. The years between 14 and 18 are perhaps the most important in life, and our social and industrial problems will never be solved so long as we continue to

waste the fruits of the elementary school and to throw our young people out into the competitive struggle just at the age when they most want shielding. We have only to think of the children of the poor as though they were our own to realise what this means. The New Army has shown us how what is called "the public school spirit" can develop in new soil when it gets the chance. The Boy Scout Movement points the same moral. A Continuation School system not devoted to purely technical ends but laying stress on corporate life and on character will mean giving everybody the opportunity of passing through the stage of "public school life."

These changes will cost much money and we shall all be poorer after the war. They may more than double our education estimates. But even if the richer classes have to live much more wholesomely than they have hitherto, we must secure the health of the coming generation so that they can hand on the torch which the dead have so nobly borne.

THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY AFTER THE WAR[1]

The title which the Ruskin College Executive selected some six months ago for my paper, "The Control of Industry After the War," is well adapted to these troublous and uncertain times, for it is capable of at least two quite different interpretations. It may be taken to refer to the probable extension of the control by the State over privately owned industry after the war, or to the increase of the control by the workers themselves over the conduct of the industry in which they are employed. I propose to interpret it according to the second of these meanings—the control by the workers. As regards the extension of the control by the State I shall have nothing to say, and that for two very good reasons. Firstly, because Mr. Sidney Webb has already dealt with that subject. Secondly, because, in my opinion, the problem of the workers' control, though less familiar to the general public, is beyond all doubt the more important of the two. Indeed, it is not only important, it is urgent, and it is just because I am convinced of its urgency that I shall make no apology for attempting to deal with it in an absolutely practical manner, even at the risk of wearying you with the discussion of details of organisation.

Before coming to details, however, it seems necessary to make clear wherein the importance of the problem consists. The best way of doing so, I think, is to show how intimately it is related to the objects and ideals

[1] A Paper read at a Conference of working-class organisations convened at Oxford, under the auspices of Ruskin College, on July 21–23, 1916.

towards which Ruskin College and the Labour Movement as a whole are directed.

What is the object of the Labour Movement—I mean its object in the widest sense, as opposed to the particular programme on which it may have agreed at the moment as the next step towards the attainment of that object? Its object is surely to provide the conditions of a good life for the working class. The object of all government is, or ought to be, to provide the conditions of a good life for mankind. The object of the Labour Movement is to do the same for those on whose behalf it is more specially working.

But then the question arises, What do we mean by the conditions of a good life? What sort of a life do the workers want? What is it that the workers regard as a good life?

These are not at all easy questions to answer. There are a good many people, however, who are prepared to answer them offhand; generally, I notice, people who do not belong to the working class themselves. I came across two perfectly definite answers lately which are worth quoting, as they are both by well-known writers on industrial subjects. Mr. F. W. Taylor, the inventor of the system of scientific management, remarks in advocacy of his plan, that it "has for its foundation the firm conviction . . . that it is possible to give the workman what he most wants—high wages— and the employer what he most wants—a lower labour cost for his manufactures." Mr. Taylor is quite clear in his mind as to what it is that the workman most wants—it is high wages. And if he is right there is a good deal to be said for his system, for it has undoubtedly led to higher wages, at any rate for certain individual workers. The other writer whose definition I shall quote is Mr. Harold Cox, the editor of the *Edinburgh Review*. Writing recently in that periodical on the subject of industry after the war he lays it down that what every workman wants for his

life is security. He goes on to argue that in these times, under the existing system of industry, a skilled workman can always be sure of employment, and that for such a man the existing system, though it may sometimes impatiently be described as "wage-slavery," "offers the highest attainable form of liberty."

Now if Mr. Taylor and Mr. Cox were right, if the workman's ideal of life was summed up in high wages or security, or a combination of the two, there would be no object in composing this paper, for that ideal would be sufficiently met by the extension of the methods of State ownership and control described by Mr. Sidney Webb. Make all the workers Government servants, and so provide them with security; guarantee them high rates of wages, adjusted to the state of prices, and there, so far as Mr. Taylor and Mr. Cox are concerned, you have the workers' millennium. Being secure of their job and of a pension at the end of it, they will have nothing to worry about; their souls will be at peace; and, as for the material side, they will be able to satisfy their simple aspirations in the way of furniture and trips to the seaside, and even rise to the possession of the much criticised cottage piano. What more could man desire? What more, indeed! One feels inclined to echo the question Browning asked long ago in his "Rabbi Ben Ezra"—

"Irks care the crop-full bird? Frets doubt the maw-crammed beast?"

Yet we all know very well from our own experience that Mr. Cox and Mr. Taylor are wrong. Their answers do not give a complete account of the workman's psychology. Indeed, they do not give a complete account of any one's psychology. It is not the case that security and a competence necessarily lead to a happy life. Some people are so constituted as to prefer insecurity to security, as, for instance, those who deliberately choose to spend their life at sea or go on Arctic expeditions. Some

rich people are very unhappy and would undoubtedly be happier poor, however much some of us may feel inclined to exchange places with them. Care, in fact, does irk the crop-full bird. Doubts do fret the maw-crammed beast. The Bible told us this long ago, but we have had a curious confirmation of it lately in the remarkable decline in nervous and mental diseases among the well-to-do as a result of the war. Having something outside themselves to think about, they have less time to brood over their own ailments. It is as though our physical nature itself protested against ease and security and echoed the words of Browning—

> "Then welcome each rebuff
> That turns earth's smoothness rough,
> Each sting that bids nor sit nor stand but go.
> Be our joy three parts pain!
> Strive and hold cheap the strain;
> Learn nor account the pang; dare, never grudge the throe."

No doubt if the workman were a mere animal he would be satisfied with the solutions offered him by such men as Mr. Cox and Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor, in fact, gives the whole case away on a later page of his book, where he says that certain work for which, under his system, he offers the sure inducement of higher wages is so crude and elementary that he firmly believes that it would be possible to train an intelligent gorilla to do it. If the object of the Labour Movement is to create the conditions of a good human life, not a good animal life, such a statement carries with it its own condemnation. We all know that it is what we do that makes us what we are; and if a man spends the best part of his day doing what could be equally well done by a gorilla, no amount of wages or of security can make up for the continuous degradation to which he must thereby be exposed.

It is clear, then, that any one who thinks that what is called "the Labour problem" can be "solved" simply

by "feeding the beast," by higher wages and increased security of employment, is ignoring some of the deepest factors in the situation. He is thinking of the workman as though he were an animal and not a man. If I did not know that Mr. Cox and the late Mr. Taylor (whom I once had the pleasure of meeting in the United States) were high-minded and public-spirited men, I should be tempted to say that they had constructed an imaginary workman in the image of their own materially minded selves. As it is, I can only suppose that they are the victims of that common English malady—want of imagination; that they have conveniently forgotten that the workman is a man with similar passions to themselves, and that he is not likely to acquiesce in systems and solutions which they and their friends would not dream of putting up with. In discussing these questions with people who are not in actual contact with working-class feeling I often feel inclined to adapt the famous outburst which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of Shylock when he is being mocked by a Christian: "Hath not a workman eyes? Hath not a workman hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as an employer is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?" To those, if any there be, who would answer these questions in the negative I have no more to say. To them the problem with which this paper deals can be of no concern. They will still continue to believe that the Trade Union movement is out for higher wages and nothing more. But to those who are prepared to regard the workman as a human being, with human feelings and desires and aspirations, it will be clear that it is idle to talk of a good life for the workman if the conditions under which he works,

however princely his pay, are degrading to his self-respect and injurious to his moral and spiritual health.

A good life for the workman, then, does not mean simply the provision of facilities for his leisure hours. It means that there must be something good, something worth while, about the work itself. To those of us who are not members of the working class but know something of its conditions, nothing is more saddening, or indeed, I would say, more maddening, than the thought that millions of our fellow-countrymen are cut off from one of the chief sources of joy—the joy that it is natural for men to feel in their work. "What he wished most for men in this world," writes Mr. Thomas Jones in his recently published memoir of Professor Smart, of Glasgow, "was that they should find their deepest happiness in their daily work." Professor Smart was only echoing what William Morris and John Ruskin had thought and felt before him. It is indeed one of the chief contributions that this country has made to the international Labour Movement that its thinkers and leaders have always laid stress on the effect of economic conditions upon human character, and have never despaired of the task, however difficult it might seem, of counteracting the dehumanising tendencies of modern large-scale production and restoring to the workman something of the dignity, the independence, and the happiness which he enjoyed in the days before the division of labour.

The first step in that direction is clear before us. It is to create conditions which will enable the workman to feel that his work is fulfilling a social purpose. So long as work is looked upon as a charity which the employing classes provide for the workers in order to save them from destitution it is idle to talk of the dignity of labour. Nor is the situation much improved when the structure of industry is set upon a purely commercial foundation and employers and workpeople both agree to look upon it merely as a means of profit or livelihood. There is a

cynical phrase which has lately become prevalent amongst us, though it originates, I believe, like many other business expressions, in the United States. Employers, we are told, are "not in business for their health." The people who use the expression do not usually go on to tell us what employers are in business for if it is not for their health, but they generally let it be inferred what they mean. They mean they are in business for what they can get out of it for themselves. Under those circumstances it is not unnatural that the workers, who often have very good reasons for knowing that they are not in business for *their* health, should act on similar principles. "If you prick us do we not bleed? And if you wrong us do we not revenge?" But, in truth, there is a deeper meaning than those who use it are aware of behind the slang American phrase. Neither employers nor workmen are in business for their own health, it is true, but they are, or ought to be, in business for the health of the community. Every trade and every industry is, or ought to be, serving a public need. That indeed is the only justification for their existence. If people did not want boots there would be no boot industry. If people did not want to travel or to send goods there would be no railway service. If people did not want to write letters there would be no postal service. If people did not go to law there would be no lawyers. If people kept in perfect health and never got old there would be no doctors. There is not the slightest difference in this respect between what are called trades and what are called professions. A postman is as necessary as a doctor; a miner as a lawyer; an engine driver as a clergyman; a printer as a schoolmaster. It is only because of the way we have become used to regarding their work, and more especially because of the conditions under which it is performed, that people regard the services of the working class as in any way less dignified, or self-respecting, or socially useful than those

of the members of what are sometimes called the learned professions.

There is, then, no reason in the nature of things why printers, miners, railwaymen, and postal workers should not find as much satisfaction in their daily work as doctors, lawyers, clergymen, and schoolmasters. No work that is worth doing is easy or can be done without toilsome effort. It may, perhaps, seem easier to write a sermon than to set up a newspaper, or to bamboozle a jury than to drive the Plymouth express; but not all so-called professional activity is comfortable or even clean. Chopping off arms or legs is no more pleasant than hewing coal, and managing a large class of unruly boys may be as irksome as sorting letters or trying to decipher the addresses on the envelopes of University dons. The distinction between the trades and the professions is not one between manual work and brain work, for all manual work (except under the Taylor system) involves brain work, and all brain work involves more or less of manual work, even if it is no more than driving a pen or wielding a cane; nor is it one between work involving education and work involving none, for in the skilled trades, as in agriculture, a good general education is more and more being found to be necessary, while there are professions, at least backwaters of professions, in which extraordinary tracts of ignorance may be found to prevail. The distinction is more and more being seen to be one of idea rather than of fact. It arises out of the part which those concerned feel that they are playing rather than out of their real social function. And this self-respect, or absence of self-respect, is bound up with the question of professional organisation and the control of the conditions under which the work is done.

The idea that industry exists to perform a social function is still so strange to some people that it is worth while trying to make it clearer by an illustration. Many people still think it no shame to assert that the primary

object in the conduct of any trade or industry is to get rich. When we speak of a "successful" business man or manufacturer we do not, I fear, mean in ordinary speech a man who has successfully served the public and supplied its wants, but a man who has grown rich out of the public. The late Sir Alfred Jones is regarded as a successful shipowner because he left a large fortune, not because he guessed that the public would like bananas and succeeded in putting them cheap upon the market. Yet we should be somewhat ashamed of applying the same test to doctors and schoolmasters and clergymen. We do not look up in a reference book to find out what the salary of the Master of Balliol is before venturing to call the good friend of Ruskin College, who has so lately been chosen to that office—what we all know him to be—one of the most successful teachers of our time. Nor do we judge of the success of the Bishop of Oxford as a clergyman by the size of the stipend by which he is burdened. Still less do we apply this scale of measurement to the field of politics and government. We should all regard Mr. Gladstone as a successful statesman. Whatever judgment history may pass upon his policies, he retained the confidence of his fellow-countrymen, and was able to serve them longer and more continuously than any public man of his time. Yet how many people know what he got out of it? No doubt he was not in politics for his health, though he lived to be a very old man. But nobody is interested to know how much money he left, or whether he was the richer or the poorer for having been four times Prime Minister. And who is going to apply the miserable commercial yard rule of success to a great public servant like Lord Kitchener?

If any one doubts that the day will come when the same high standard of public service will be applied to industry let him consider how often the low standard, which we have happily superseded, has been regarded as

inevitable in the service of government. In his fascinating book on Turkey, Sir Charles Eliot has an illuminating chapter on the provincial government of the Turkish Empire. Turkish governors, we learn, are like business men, they are not in office for their health. As in the instability of Turkish affairs they are apt not to be in office long, they have to make haste to feather their nest while they are there, which Turkish methods of levying and transmitting taxation render it an easy thing to do. So recognised a practice is this extortion, and so resigned have the people become to it, that their one desire, when a new appointment is made, is not to have an honest governor—for none such exist—but one, as they put it, "whose eye is full"—that is to say, who has already made his pile and is not likely to be so extortionate. This view of the profits to be derived from the public service is not confined to the East. I have no personal experience of English municipal government, but I once had the privilege of spending an evening with a leading Tammany official in New York. He was what is known as a professional politician—surely if we understood the words rightly the noblest of all professions. I remember asking him why he had gone into politics. He told me it was because he was left an orphan with a large family of young brothers and sisters to look after, and it seemed to him the quickest way of making enough money to give them a decent start in life. I wonder how many of those present took office in the Trade Union movement with any such object. Like many other people whose principles are not above suspicion, he was, personally, a most agreeable and sympathetic personality. Like so many employers and workmen in this country, he was the victim of a bad system. Brought up in a selfish school, he never had a chance of realising what public service means.

Industry and politics are two very closely related functions. The object of politics or government is to

carry on the public business of the community; to pass the laws and make the administrative arrangements which are needed in the interests of the community as a whole. The object of trade and industry is very similar. It is to serve the needs of the community; to provide the goods and services which are necessary to its existence and well-being. It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the same standard should tend to be adopted in both, and that that standard should conform to the general view of life in vogue in the country. In a community where life is organised on a commercial basis and men's thoughts run in a money-making channel it is natural that politics should tend to become commercialised. In a community where higher ideals prevail and men's thoughts are directed rather towards public service, it is equally natural that trade and industry should tend to become, as it were, professionalised; that those whose life is spent in them should think first of the service they are rendering to the community rather than of the material reward to be derived from performing it. We should all agree that the labourer, whether in politics or industry, is worthy of his hire. The question is whether he does the work for the work's sake or only because of the hire.

But industry and politics do not resemble one another only in their objects. They resemble one another also in their methods. Both have certain work to get done for the community, and in both cases the question arises how that work shall be organised. Both industry and politics are faced by what in politics is called the constitutional problem and in industry the problem of management—that is, the question of who is to be ultimately responsible for the conduct of the work and how that responsibility is to be exercised. In politics, so far as this and most Western countries are concerned, this problem of management has been decided in favour of democracy. The people as a whole have taken into their hands the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of public business,

and entrust its direction to Ministers or servants, who are responsible to the people for their acts and policy. In industry, however, the problem of management is still unsolved, or rather it has hitherto been decided in a direction adverse to democracy. The manager in industry is not like the Minister in politics : he is not chosen by or responsible to the workers in the industry, but chosen by and responsible to partners or directors or some other autocratic authority. Instead of the manager being the Minister or servant and the men the ultimate masters, the men are the servants and the manager and the external power behind him the master. Thus, while our governmental organisation is democratic in theory, and by the extension of education is continually becoming more so in practice, our industrial organisation is built upon a different basis. It is an autocracy, but not an untempered autocracy. It may perhaps be described as autocracy modified by Trade Union criticism and interference and by Parliamentary and administrative control.

To say that industry is carried on by methods of autocracy is not necessarily to impute the blame to those who are responsible for the system. It has yet to be proved that it can be carried on in any other way. Nay, more ; it has yet to be shown that those who live under the system desire that it should be carried on differently. But the contrast between political democracy and industrial autocracy—between the workman as a free citizen and the workman as a wage-earner—is so glaring that it has become obvious that it cannot indefinitely continue in its present form. Men who have tasted what freedom and responsibility mean in one department of life are not likely to acquiesce in remaining mere irresponsible instruments of production in the industrial sphere. The problem of management, what I would call the constitutional problem in industry, the question as to how the industrial process shall be controlled, is already, and is likely to continue, the burning issue in

industrial policy. Thus after our long excursion in the philosophy of politics we are brought back to the practical subject of this paper.

The problem of management is certain to become increasingly acute in the near future as a direct result of the war. Every one is agreed that the only way in which we can make good the losses of the war and meet the heavy charges incurred is by increasing our industrial efficiency. That involves not only working harder but improving the methods of organising our work. This at once brings us up against the question of management. Broadly speaking, there are two schools of opinion, or two tendencies, on the subject of management. There is the tendency of those who would improve efficiency by concentrating knowledge and responsibility for workmanship in the hands of expert directors, and the policy of those who believe rather in the diffusion of responsibility among the workers. The first tendency is represented by the advocates of scientific management, who propose, in Mr. Taylor's words, that "the management must take over and perform much of the work which is now left to the men," and desire "that there shall be a far more equal division of the responsibility between the management and the workman than exists under any of the ordinary types of management." If you read Mr. Taylor's book you will find that what he means by "a more equal division of the responsibility" is that the management is to do all the thinking and the workman all the toiling; that the scientific manager is to use his head and the workmen merely their arms and legs. This is autocratic rule with a vengeance; it takes one back to the days of slavery and of the Pyramids, or of those Assyrian reliefs in the British Museum where you may see scores of labourers harnessed like animals toiling for the Great King. To use the workman's arms and legs and to ignore that he has a brain is to ruin him as a craftsman and to degrade him as a man. The American official

investigators into the working of the system leave no doubt on this point.

"Scientific management, fully and properly applied," they write, "inevitably tends to the constant breakdown of the established crafts and craftsmanship and the constant elimination of skill in the sense of narrowing craft knowledge and workmanship, except for the lower orders of workmen. . . . Some scientific management employers have asserted their belief in their ability to get on a paying basis within three months should they lose their whole working force, except the managerial staff and enough others to maintain the organisation, if they had to begin all over again with green hands. . . . It enables the employer constantly to lop off portions of the work from a certain class, and thus constantly to create new classifications of workers with new conditions of work and pay. Add to this the advantage gained by the employers in the progressive gathering up and systemisation of craft knowledge for their own uses, and the destruction of apprenticeship, which cuts the workers off from the perpetuation among them of craftsmanship, and the destructive tendencies of scientific management, so far as present-day unionism and collective bargaining are concerned, seem inevitable."

Scientific management breaks down, then, not because of the labour-saving devices of its inventors—many of which may be worthy of adoption—but because of the system of management with which it is associated. Mr. Taylor and his associates may be perfectly right when they are talking of improved tools ; it is when they are discussing the government of men that they are at fault. We in this country, if we believe in democracy, are compelled to look for the solution of the problem of management in the opposite direction—not in the management encroaching on the brainwork of the men, but in the men being more closely associated with the management, understanding its difficulties, discussing its problems, and sharing its responsibilities. Our policy must be, not to make output mechanically perfect by turning the workman himself into a mere machine, but to make our organisation scientific in the widest sense by the

voluntary and harmonious co-operation of all the human factors concerned. It is along this road, and no other, that we shall reach the industrial democracy of the future, towards which the English industrial idealists of the nineteenth century—Ruskin, William Morris, and John Stuart Mill—were bold enough to point the way.

Industrial democracy is a big word. Let us try to bring it down from the clouds. What sort of organisation does it mean in actual practice? First, let us make clear what it does not mean. It does not mean handing over the control of matters requiring expert knowledge to a mass of people who are not equipped with that knowledge. Under any system of management there must be division of labour; there must be those who know all about one subject and are best fitted to deal with it. Democracy can be just as successful as any other form of government in employing experts. Nor does democratic control, in the present stage at any rate, involve a demand for control over what may be called the commercial side of management—the buying of the raw material, the selling of the finished article, and all the exercise of trained judgment and experience that are brought to bear by business men on these questions. I do not mean to say that workpeople are constitutionally incapable, as some employers seem to believe, of running a business. The existence of the co-operative movement is a sufficient answer on that point. Some day the Trade Union movement may follow the example of the co-operative movement and go into business—possibly on rather different lines from what is considered business to-day—but at present at any rate the workers' demand for democratic control is not a demand for a voice in the business, but for control over the conditions under which their own daily work is done. It is a demand for control over one side, but that the most important side because it is the human side, of the industrial process.

Having thus cleared the ground, I propose to devote

the remainder of this paper to showing that the time is ripe for an experiment in one of the principal businesses of the country, and to a detailed examination of the changes which such an experiment will involve.

English people are in the habit of believing that ideas are "all very well in theory," but will never work in practice. The reason why ideas which are theoretically sound do not work out in practice is generally because they are applied without sufficient consideration of the conditions of the particular case, or because those who are entrusted with the task of carrying them out are not in sympathy with them. It is clear that not all the British industries are ripe for changes in the direction of democratic control. There are a number of previous conditions which it would be well to satisfy if an experiment is to have a good chance of success. I think we may broadly lay down seven conditions which the business or industry we are looking for should satisfy :—

1. It should be a nationalised industry—that is to say, an industry which is recognised to be a public service and a permanent part of the national life. Such an industry is at once more removed from the atmosphere of commercialism and immune from the dangers, if also from the stimulus, of competition and to liability from sudden changes on the side of demand. It would be possible, of course, to choose a municipalised industry, but a nationalised industry is more likely to yield the broad outlook required on both sides.

2. It should be an industry where the amount of labour employed is relatively large compared with the fixed capital invested, and where prosperity, therefore, depends principally upon the efficiency of the workers. Such an industry obviously affords a better ground for experiments in labour management.

On the labour side it should be an industry where the workers are—

3. Highly skilled.

4. Have a relatively high standard of general education and intelligence.

5. Have a high general level of personal character.

6. Where Trade Unionism is well organised both as regards numbers and spirit and has been afforded recognition by the employing authority.

7. Where there are no serious demarcation difficulties between the various Trade Unions concerned.

In the case which I propose to submit for experiment, the case of the Post Office, all these conditions would seem to be fulfilled.

1. It is a nationalised service.

2. The labour force—253,750 in all, or 230,000 on the manipulative side—is relatively large compared with the fixed capital.

3. The work is for the most part highly skilled, as is indicated by the fact that—

4. The great majority of postal workers have to pass a general examination at the age of 16 or over.

5. The *morale* of the service is uncommonly good. In spite of obvious temptations, the number of dismissals from the service is negligible. The average annual percentage of dismissals in the manipulative branch of the service is 0·25 per cent.

6. Trade Unionism is powerful and well organised in spite of the large number of girls employed. Practically all the men are organised.

7. The unions concerned are on good terms with one another and are organised for common action in a National Joint Committee.

How is the work of the Post Office at present organised? There is, as already mentioned, a broad division of the employees between what is called the clerical staff and the manipulative staff. With the clerical staff, which has organisations of its own, I do not propose to deal in what follows. I shall confine myself to the manipulative staff, consisting principally of postmen,

sorters, telegraphists, telephonists, and engineering grades, who are represented on the National Joint Committee of Post Office Associations. That Committee consists of the following organisations :—

Name of Association.	Class or Classes represented.	Official Establishment of Classes.	Membership of Association.
Postmen's Federation	Postmen, assistant and auxiliary postmen.	68,000	51,500
Postal and Telegraph Clerks' Association.	Telegraphists, counter clerks and telegraphists, sorting clerks and telegraphists, telephonists, and learners.	35,000	22,000
Fawcett Association	Sorters, London Postal Service.	7,021	6,430
Engineering and Stores Association (Postal, Telegraph, and Telephone).	Skilled and unskilled workmen, etc., in Engineering and Stores Department.	13,000	7,000
National Federation of Sub-Postmasters.	Scale payment sub-postmasters.	22,658	9,400

Let us now turn to the organisation of the management side. The control of the Post Office is vested, subject to the supremacy of the Cabinet and of Parliament, in the Postmaster-General and his permanent Secretary, known as the Secretary of the Post Office. The control of the service thus centres in the Secretary's office at St. Martin's-le-Grand. The work of the Secretary's office is carried on under his supervision in five departments, dealing respectively with questions of establishment, staff, buildings and equipment, organisation (*i.e.* mails, train services, collection of letters, etc.), and engineering. There are also Secretaries for Scotland and Ireland, who exercise a general control over the staff in those countries, subject, however, to the control of the Secretary's department in London. All dismissals, for instance, must be referred to London.

As regards local administration, the country is divided into 14 districts, each of which is in charge of an official

called the Surveyor. Surveyors are allowed fairly wide powers of organisation and control, subject, however, in the case of the staff to the right of appeal to the Secretary in London in all cases affecting either an individual or a group of individuals.

Below the Surveyors are the Postmasters. In every Surveyor's district there are a number of Postmasters responsible for the business of the head office and certain sub-offices. Postmasters are given a fairly free hand in matters of organisation, but in the more important matters affecting their subordinates they are required to obtain the Surveyor's sanction.

Let us now turn to the question of the relation between the governing authorities and the staff, so far as staff conditions are concerned. Those conditions are laid down in a series of regulations which may be summarised as follows: The associations of postal employees have been accorded recognition by the Post Office authorities; that is, they are recognised as having the right to represent the interests of individual workers or groups of workers. The conditions under which this right may be exercised are carefully defined by the authorities. The general procedure is for the central office of the association concerned to submit a memorial on the point at issue to the Secretary or to the Postmaster-General. Such memorials are invariably acknowledged, and it is possible for the representatives of the association to meet the authorities at periodical intervals to discuss matters already submitted in writing. The matters on which the associations are free to submit memorials are defined as "general questions relating to the conditions at work, *i.e.* wages, hours of duty, leave, meal reliefs, etc." Memorials on local questions and on individual questions other than those affecting discipline or the conduct of supervising officers have to be submitted in the first instance by the local branch of the association concerned to the local responsible official

(*i.e.* the Postmaster or Surveyor). The local official first deals with representations, and, failing satisfaction, the association is at liberty to carry the matter further to headquarters and obtain a reply. No memorials are allowed to be submitted on questions relative to promotion. The liberty of action of the associations is also limited in the case of questions of discipline. The provision in this connection is sufficiently important to be quoted in full :—

"Memorials respecting disciplinary measures that have been taken against individual officers may be submitted to the Secretary or the Postmaster-General by the central body of the association in serious cases, where appeals by the individuals, made first to the local authorities and then to the Secretary or Postmaster-General, have not been successful, and where the central body have satisfied themselves by a full investigation of the circumstances that they can present new facts or considerations which render further review desirable."

It will thus be seen that the Trade Unions are put in the position of a sort of permanent and official opposition. Their function is not to co-operate with the management, but to criticise, not to prevent complaints, but to endeavour to remedy them ; and in certain cases, such as discipline, where feeling is likely to run highest, they are precluded from interfering till the matter has already been declared upon by the Secretary and has become the subject of serious and probably bitter controversy.

How can this system of management be modified in the direction outlined ? An attempt will be made in the following remarks to suggest how this might be done. The object of the reforms suggested is not to revolutionise the organisation of the postal service or to turn the Department upside down ; it is to take the existing organisation as it stands and to make the least possible change compatible with granting to the staff that measure of responsibility which is increasingly felt to be necessary

in order to secure the efficiency and harmony of the service. I am indebted in what follows to my friend Mr. J. G. Newlove, a distinguished ex-student of Ruskin College and now General Secretary of the Postal and Telegraph Clerks' Association, who has given much time and thought to the improvement of the service with which he is connected, and is willing to accept full responsibility for the constructive side of this paper.

The first suggested change is that machinery shall be set up which will give the central bodies of the associations representation on a committee of each branch of the Secretary's office. Where the interests of each grade are peculiar, as in the establishment branch, there should be a representative of each grade; where their interests are identical, as on building questions, less would suffice.

Similar machinery should be set up in each Surveyor's district. Advisory Committees should be formed to discuss with the Surveyor questions of policy affecting his district, and these committees should contain a representative of each grade to co-operate with the Surveyor's staff.

Passing down to the individual office—what corresponds in other industries to the "workshop"—it should be one of the duties of the Postmaster to consult with representatives of the staff on all questions affecting the particular office. This should extend to all questions without exception which affect the office as a whole, for all such questions must in some way reflect on the organisation of the office. Even a matter like complaints from the public can be traced back to office organisation.

A difficulty arises at this point as to the procedure in very small offices. The associations find by experience that is is often difficult in such offices to find a local secretary who is sufficiently well trained to deal with questions of policy. Yet it is just in such small offices that precedents distasteful to the staff are apt to be created. Such offices, therefore, require special treatment,

and it is suggested that a representative of the Executive of the associations should be able, if necessary, to act as a medium of advice for the smaller offices. It might prove desirable in this connection to rearrange the boundaries of the associations' districts so as to harmonise them with the Surveyors' districts.

This procedure is in itself no great innovation. Many Postmasters do already adopt means of consultation with their staff, and are indeed definitely encouraged to do so by the rules of the Department. The new arrangement will merely serve to regularise this and to level up the procedure in the various offices. It is not suggested that the new committees shall have a deciding voice. Where no agreement can be reached in them the decision must continue to rest, as now, with the supervising authorities. If on matters of importance a policy were to be adopted contrary to the wishes of the associations it would always be possible to them to reopen the matter through their annual conference and to approach the Postmaster-General as at present. But the criticism which they would then bring to bear would be bred of inside knowledge, and it would of necessity be constructive rather than critical in tone.

This change of spirit would be likely to apply in special degree to questions of financial policy. One of the chief functions of the new central machinery would be to discuss questions involving expenditure, and in particular questions of wages or salaries. The procedure at present in this connection is not satisfactory. No scheme involving fresh expenditure can be adopted until it has been approved by the Treasury. The present method of dealing with such schemes is to refer them to a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. The members of such Committees are necessarily not conversant with the whole inner working of a huge organisation like the Post Office, and are, therefore, unable to form a judgment at first hand on the problems submitted to them for

decision. They must inevitably rely for their special knowledge upon the high officials of the Department. This, it will be seen, naturally tends to place those at present responsible for the policy of the Department in a preferential position as compared with the representatives of the staff. As under existing conditions the Department is bound to consider the interests of the taxpayer, its natural rôle is that of opposition to increases in pay. This is intensified by the fact that the Post Office is run at a considerable profit, amounting to no less than £6,000,000 in the last year before the war, and that there is a tendency to adopt purely commercial standards of successful administration. If the procedure by Parliamentary Committee were abandoned and questions of wages and conditions were threshed out on the proposed central committees before being submitted to a Parliamentary body for ratification, or final decision in cases of disagreement, the arrangement would work more fairly for all parties concerned, including the Treasury. The elimination of friction and the consequent increase of *esprit de corps* should go further towards true efficiency and economy than the existing methods, lending themselves, as unequal contests always do, to undesirable and often unpleasant methods of influence and agitation. If it were found possible not to pay the profits of the Post Office into the ordinary revenue, but to earmark them for special purposes of social usefulness, in the choice of which the associations might have a voice, this would remove any feeling on the part of the staff that they were being "exploited" in a commercial spirit, and would act as a strong incentive to them to use every effort to improve the service.

This brings us to the functions of the central and local committees. The most important and difficult of these would be the discussion of questions of discipline. Discipline is really the crux of the whole change of method and spirit proposed. The existing rule, which

forbids the associations to interfere except after judgment has already been passed both locally and at the centre, is based on the root principle of the old system, that power is exercised from above and that the prestige of the ruling authority must not be infringed. It is also based upon reasons of practical convenience in that most men extremely dislike the responsibility of sitting in judgment on their companions and workmates. If the associations are to receive the right of co-operating with the supervisory staff in dealing with cases of discipline they will be assuming responsibility for giving what must sometimes be very unpleasant decisions against their members. But because a thing is unpleasant there is no reason for not facing it. Democracy involves the extension of responsibility in things pleasant and unpleasant alike. If the associations were ready to deal with pay, but shirked dealing with punishment, they would be false to their principles. Fortunately, the number of serious cases which arise in the service is extremely small, but these are just the cases which the associations ought to deal with. The best arrangement would seem to be to leave minor breaches of discipline to be dealt with as at present by the individual Postmaster, but that serious cases referred by him to the Surveyor should be dealt with by the Surveyor's committee, where the representatives of the association would be less subject than on the local committee to the bias of personal feeling. Matters dealt with by the Postmaster would be brought before the association through the local committee if it were found necessary.

Questions of recommendation for promotion should also be dealt with by the Surveyor's committee. Promotion and discipline really hang closely together ; both involve difficult decisions and the danger of heart-burning. But there seems no way out except through the extension of the principle of responsibility.

As regards the rest of the committee's work, it can

be summed up under the general heading of "conditions" —hours, leave, meal reliefs, improvements in office equipment, etc. Most questions of this kind would be settled locally. Only questions of principle would be referred to the central committee for decision.

Such, in brief outline, is the way in which the principle of democratic control might be introduced into the largest single business in the country. The changes suggested may seem modest in scope, but they would be far-reaching in effect. The Postmaster-General who had imagination enough to adopt a scheme of this nature would be conferring a benefit alike on the postal workers, the Labour Movement, and the whole nation. To the postal workers the change would bring a new sense of dignity and self-respect and satisfaction in their work, and, more important perhaps even than these, it would leave them free to exercise their citizen rights as pure citizens without the constant temptation to use political influence as a means for remedying grievances arising out of their employment under Government. It would thus be a charter not only of economic, but of political emancipation. To the Labour Movement it would be an example and an inspiration to apply the same principle of responsible democracy to the far more difficult problems of private employment which still lie unsolved before it. To the community it would mean a transformation in the spirit of one of the chief of those public services on the efficiency of which we shall be so much dependent in the work of national reconstruction after the war. A keen, willing, and enterprising Post Office can be of far more service to us than we realise at present. But most of all the community will benefit from the knowledge that the qualities of mind and character necessary to the working of self-governing institutions are not confined to any one class or section, that democracy is a plant which, properly tended and safeguarded, can grow and prosper in other than its familiar

soil, and that our country, which has led the world in the institutions of politics and government, is ready and eager to apply the same enduring principles to wider and wider fields of public business.

NOTE.—Since this paper was written its main position has been adopted in the report of the Whitley Committee, and accepted by the Government. Curious to relate, however, the Government, whilst recommending joint control to private employers throughout the well-organised industries, has as yet taken no steps to apply its own precepts to the Post Office.

CAPITALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]

SOME months ago, before the United States entered the war, a distinguished and benevolent Jewish-American millionaire, Mr. Jacob Schiff, was invited to give his opinion on the project of a League of Nations to prevent future wars. His reply was short and to the point, as befits a successful business man. "*Your league does not meet the difficulty: the root of the trouble is economic.*" As every sermon must have a text, this utterance by Dives may serve as an introduction to the subject which I want to bring before you.

How far are economic causes at the root of the present war? What is the connection, if any, between the existing economic system and the international antagonisms out of which the war has sprung? What exactly is meant by the phrase which is not uncommonly heard that the war is a "capitalist" war, or, as the Russian Extremists put it, a war waged by bourgeois governments in which the working class as such has no concern? And, if we can answer these questions, what bearing has our answer on the problem of the better organisation of international relations after the war?

These are thorny subjects, which cannot be disposed of in a short paper; but so much confusion of thought and perplexity of spirit prevail about them that an attempt to clear the issue may be worth the attention of

[1] A paper read at a Conference of working-class organisations convened at Birmingham, under the auspices of Ruskin College, on September 21 and 22, 1917.

a conference concerned with the problem of reconstruction. For we cannot apply remedies till we have ascertained the disease; and if Mr. Schiff's words are strictly true, some of the remedies which are just now being most confidently proposed do not "meet the difficulty" at all.

Let us begin by defining our terms. I think we had better drop the term "bourgeois." It is a Continental expression which defies exact definition, but I fear that if one looked into it too closely, a fair proportion of those present might have to plead guilty to the soft impeachment. Do not some of us live in villas, and do not most of us wear dark coats and stiff collars? But what is meant by a "capitalist"? I suppose it means some one who has resources, in money or its equivalent, in addition to his natural labour-power, whether of hand or brain. A penniless artist is not a capitalist; nor is a landless agricultural labourer; but the capitalist class, in this sense, would include the whole body of people from the millionaire to the workman with a few pounds in war loan or in the "Co-op." who have something "put by," whether in securities or in land, or in a little business, or in bricks and mortar.

I do not think any one can honestly pretend that this body of people, in this or any other country, either provoked the war or stand to derive any benefit from its continuance. To begin with, they are not organised in such a way as to have any common will or policy, or any means of enforcing it; and, in the second place, if they had, they would certainly be in favour of peace, retrenchment, and prosperity, with low prices and low taxes, just as, when they organise municipally, they are invariably in favour of low rates.

An able American Socialist writer, Mr. L. B. Boudin, in his "Socialism and War," [1] puts this point very clearly:

[1] New York: New Review Publishing Association, 1916, p. 32. The lectures reprinted in it were delivered in the first winter of the war.

"I know it is the fashion among Socialists," he writes, "to assume and assert that the burdens and miseries of war are borne wholly by the working class, and that for the capitalist class it is a sort of picnic, abounding in fun and excitement, besides being a good business. . . . As to the present war, I must say the idea is utterly baseless. This war is certainly no picnic for any social class. Certainly not to the capitalist class, either in the Alliance or in the Entente countries. It is even doubtful whether it is good business—the destruction of property is altogether too great for that. As to the destruction of life, it is so appalling and so indiscriminate as to class as to make the sacrifices of the capitalist class very real and very substantial."

These words were written early in the war, but its prolongation has only confirmed them. In another American publication I find a definite estimate as to the effect of the war upon the capital values of the possessing class. The *New Republic*, of June 2, 1917, quotes the *British Bankers' Magazine* as saying that the average value of 387 representative securities has declined 20 per cent. since the outbreak of war. In other words, the capitalists who hold these securities are, on the average, 20 per cent. poorer with respect to them than on the outbreak of war. This is not nearly such a disastrous slump, after three years of war, as Mr. Norman Angell taught us to expect, but it fully bears out his general contention that "war is bad business."

This war, then, is certainly not in the interests of the capitalist class in general; and I think the same can be said of any war or scare of war which either causes a slump in capital values or involves Governments in large expenditure on armaments and mobilisation.

But, it will be said, there are sections of the capitalist class which have benefited, and benefited greatly, by the war. Undoubtedly this is true: the figures of the Excess Profits Tax returns reveal it for all to see. Large numbers of traders and manufacturers have taken advantage of the temporary scarcity of something which they had to sell, whether it be cargo-space or wooden huts, or

potatoes, or various kinds of munitions and equipment, and have exacted their pound of flesh from the purchaser according to the recognised rules of the commercial game. The war has undoubtedly brought about a great transference of wealth among the property-owning and investing class, not only in this country, but in all countries, belligerent and neutral alike. Most capitalists are considerably poorer, some are much richer, and some people who were not capitalists at all have recently become so. A correspondent in Italy writes to me, in words which have a familiar ring: "Here, too, there is a great deal of profiteering, and all sorts of common people are getting rich, and even say, 'Long live the war'"; whilst a very well-informed neutral with whom I recently had a talk declared that if the war led to social upheavals, as he considered very likely, they would most likely break out first in the neutral countries, where the intense class-bitterness aroused by the working of the capitalist system under the present abnormal conditions is not held in check by any of the influences which may make for national unity in the belligerent countries.

That any one at all should become richer or more comfortable at a time when hundreds of thousands of his fellow-men are making the supreme sacrifice has struck public opinion in all countries as incongruous, and indeed deplorable. It illustrates in a flash the measure of the difference between the appeal of duty and the appeal of self-interest—a difference of which we were all dimly aware in pre-war days, but which it has taken the experience of the war to burn in upon our minds. But it would, nevertheless, be very difficult to prove that all or any section of those who have improved their material position as a result of the war either helped to bring the war about, or even desired it. Many of them have suffered personal losses which they would have given their new-gotten wealth many times over to escape; and of the great majority I think it may be said with truth

that they made money because they could hardly avoid it. Merchants and manufacturers, like most Englishmen, are very conservative in their habits, especially when they are getting on in years. When such a man has been accustomed all his life to working along certain lines, he cannot easily adapt himself to new standards. Mr. Runciman, for instance, is reputed to be a man of unusual ability, yet he saw nothing to be ashamed at in saying from his place in the House of Commons, when he was President of the Board of Trade, that it was more than one could expect of human nature for a coalowner not to exact the highest possible price for his coal.[1] Mr. Runciman has not even the saving grace of being elderly, and he has had an experience of public life which might have made him familiar with other standards. If a Liberal Cabinet Minister speaks and thinks in this way, it may be presumed that thousands of ordinary people who live according to habit, without trying to put their policy into words, are acting along the lines he indicated. Their actions may set a deplorable and demoralising example ; but they are not necessarily bad people. They are only the victims of habit—the followers of a vicious tradition. It is true that they might have risen superior to the tradition, as many of them have done ; but if we look at the matter in the broadest light and judge them as we should desire to be judged ourselves, we must conclude that it is not they who are at fault, but the system in which they are working—the system which has made it second nature for them to make the highest possible profit on a commercial transaction.

But, I shall be told, to say that the individual capitalist is the victim of a bad system does not prove

[1] Mr. Runciman's words were : "The coalowners are pretty shrewd business men, and if they find offers coming along week by week at increased prices, it is more than one can expect of human nature that they should refuse these offers made to them." In reply to an interruption he added : "All business men are anxious to get the largest amount they can for what they have to sell."—House of Commons debates, July 19, 1915.

that the war is not a "capitalist war." In fact, it is rather an argument the other way. This or that capitalist, or group of capitalists, may not have brought about or desired the war. The American Socialist editor who, in August, 1914, explained what was going on in Europe as "a frame-up by Rothschild" may have been somewhat out of his depth; we may grant that the shipowners, provision merchants, and others, who are alleged to have made money out of the war, had nothing whatever to do with the "ten years of secret diplomacy" which preceded the outbreak of hostilities; but was not the capitalist system itself the canker at the root of our civilisation which is responsible for its sudden collapse? Is it not, to say the least, profoundly disquieting that a crisis in the nation's history should reveal so profound a discrepancy between the spirit of national service which animates its soldiers and sailors and the motive of profit by which its merchants and manufacturers are expected, almost as a matter of course, to be actuated? If war brings out so much unselfish heroism among the fighting men, and so much selfish greed among the business men, is not the spirit of business—the spirit which animates the existing economic order—an even greater enemy to human progress than the menace of German domination against which we are contending? Is not the real enemy, perhaps, not the spirit of militarism, as embodied in the Kaiser's armies, but the spirit of profiteering as embodied in the normal life of all the contending parties? If we want to secure a truly just and stable peace, had we not better take Mr. Schiff's hint and look beyond the League of Nations, with its machinery—so familiar to workmen from its operation in other spheres—for the upholding of public right and the enforcement of international agreements? Will it not be quicker, in the long run, to touch the evil at its source, and abolish an economic system which is admittedly on a lower plane than the majority of those who are enmeshed in its toils?

Three years ago I should have answered these questions with an emphatic "No!"—not because I did not desire to see extensive changes in the existing economic system, but because I believed in doing one job at a time and doing it thoroughly. War may or may not be the most dangerous and deep-rooted disease of modern civilisation, but it is certainly the most absorbing in its claim on the attention and the energies of peoples. It demands stern, continuous, and undivided concentration. And as I believed, and believe still, that the decisive defeat of German militarism is indispensable to the future progress and happiness of the peoples of Europe, I was inclined to lay aside speculations as to the reform of our industrial system till "after the war." There were many who thought with me on the same lines, who, as one soldier put it, went out to France to finish the work of the French Revolution in Europe, meaning to come back to help on the social revolution at home.

But in thinking we could thus separate the two great problems which rack the peoples of Europe, we were wrong. Students and statesmen cannot choose the order in which great and long-standing issues will allow themselves to be dealt with, and to expect the problems created by the Industrial Revolution to be frozen into immobility while Europe devoted itself with a single mind to solving those created by the French Revolution was to demand a second miracle of Joshua—to ask the sun, which rises afresh every morning above the smoke-cloud of our industrial centres, to stand still in its course. Capitalism did not cause the war, it is true; it was the Kaiser, not Rothschild, who pulled the trigger; but capitalism and the philosophy of self-interest on which it reposes were intimately connected with the atmosphere of selfishness and domination which made the war possible. The two sets of causes, political and economic, lay smouldering together beneath the crust of European society. When one erupted, it should have been possible

to foresee that it would bring the other with it to the surface.

But perhaps not even the most clear-sighted observer of the problems of modern society could have predicted the closeness of the relationship which the course of the military operations would establish between political and economic issues and forces. Blinded by precedent, statesmen and economists alike thought of war in terms of armies; or, if they saw a little further, of finance. A few months of war, waged on a modern scale, showed that victory depended neither on courage in the field nor on gold and credit, but on industrial power. The struggle was transferred, or rather extended, from the trenches to the workshop and the shipyard; and the clash of the fighting men became a mere section of a vaster conflict between the entire working force of the contending peoples. Thus the problems connected with the working of the economic system, instead of lying dormant "for the duration of the war," were everywhere discussed and considered afresh, not only by the workers but by Governments, and all over Europe able administrative brains began to consider them from a standpoint which had never before, in this country at any rate, been adopted in public policy—the standpoint not of profit but of use—how best to enable our industries to supply the immediate and pressing needs of the community.

After three years of destruction the interrelation of the two sets of problems—the political and the economic—has become more intimate than ever. The British and German blockades which threaten to denude both countries—happily not in equal degree—of their stock of raw material and imported foodstuffs, together with the withdrawal of labour from peace-time activities over a large part of the world, are bringing statesmen face to face with a situation in which all the old landmarks of capitalist economics and fiscal controversy are submerged. The end of the war will find Europe—especially Central

Europe—poor, exhausted, and largely deprived of its means of support and supply. As a recent writer puts it, in an article bearing the ominous title "A World Famine": "Unless some very drastic and very far-reaching measures are taken in time, and taken on a sufficiently large scale, there will be many millions of families in parts of Europe and South-Eastern Asia without employment and without means to buy the scanty supplies of extremely dear food that will be locally accessible to them. . . . It is not too much to say that there will be places within a day's journey of European capitals where society, with an extremity of want not paralleled in Europe since the Thirty Years' War, may be near dissolution."[1] Already we can see that among the questions with which the Peace Congress will have to deal will not only be the establishment of public right and the redrawing of the map of Europe, but the more urgent problem of how to provide food, clothing, and other necessaries to the distressed peoples of Europe, a task which the existing economic system has not performed with conspicuous success in peace time, and is certainly not qualified to cope with in the unprecedented conditions of the immediate post-war period.

So far from setting back industrial change, then, the war has brought it in its stride; and the discussion of economic problems is not only not irrelevant to the problems of the war and the settlement, but is vitally bound up with them. The war has shown that modern life is all of one piece: that its separate problems cannot be isolated and taken one at a time for special treatment; and that when statesmen inscribe liberty and justice on their banners and bid their fellow-citizens die for them, they are stirring up feelings and drawing attention to contrasts for which, sooner or later, they are certain to be called to account.

Now perhaps we are in a position to sum up this

[1] *New Statesman*, August 25, 1917.

rather abstract discussion as to the relation between capitalism and the war. To those who say: "Leave the economic issue aside and concentrate all on winning the war," the answer is: The war itself will not allow us to leave the economic issue aside; and, that being so, winning the war necessarily takes on a wider significance. It means the triumph of liberty and justice, not only on the battlefield but at home: the extension to the economic sphere of the principles which the Allies have proclaimed in the political. It means accepting Mr. Schiff's challenge, and grappling with the deep-seated industrial problem which, if not, as Mr. Schiff declares, *the* root of the trouble, is certainly one of its twin roots. To the smaller group on the other hand who say: "Leave the war to take its own course and concentrate all on abolishing the existing economic order," the answer is: You are no more free than the politicians to select one problem for treatment and ignore the rest. You may ignore the war, but the war will not ignore you. Moreover, the existing economic order which you are out to "abolish," is in process of transformation before your eyes. Much better watch what is happening and try to learn from it, rather than stand aside and denounce profiteering whilst you allow militarism to take its course.

How can the ideals of the Allies be applied to our industrial system at home? To attempt an answer to this question lies beyond the scope of this paper. I will only say this: that the war has effectually disposed of the idea that a simple and sufficient remedy for our industrial ills is to be found in abolishing the system of privately owned enterprise and replacing it by a system of State ownership. The war has certainly dealt a heavy blow at the capitalist system: the system which relied on the self-interest of competing producers and middlemen to supply the needs of the community. But the State, which has been enthroned in their stead, has not proved itself able unaided to organise our industrial life

on a better basis. State officials are not actuated, it is true, by motives of pecuniary gain ; but humanity has other failings besides those which used to be attributed as virtues to "the economic man," and some of these can put grit into the machine quite as effectually as the greed of the most thoroughgoing capitalist. The war has, in fact, modified, if not transformed, the attitude of British Socialists towards bureaucracy ; and I suspect that, when the curtain is lifted, we shall find the same to be the case on the Continent. The result of the intervention of the State has been not altogether unlike what happens when a bystander interferes in a street brawl between a drunken couple. Workmen and employers have discovered that their familiarity with their own trade and their long association together, even on cat and dog lines, have given them a certain common stock of sympathy as against an intruder from outside. The intruder, on the other hand, is beginning to wonder whether he has not shown a certain want of tact in his interference. The resulting situation may be judged from the nature of the proposals put forward with official sanction in the Whitley Report, and from the favourable reception accorded to them. Between State Socialism and private capitalism we have discovered that there is an intermediate region : industrial self-government. The association of the two parties who understand their own business, in an equal partnership in a common service, will itself go far to redeem the organised industries from the domination of pecuniary motives. There is no space to pursue this line of thought further. Moreover, many of those present, who know the working of some of the Boards of Control already set up for certain industries, can speak with more knowledge than an outsider. But if, when war-time pressure is removed and the State has once more retired to a discreet distance, the self-governing institutions—national, local, and in the workshop—which are now being officially advocated become a living reality,

it will be true to say that one of the results of the war has been to promote our declared national aims of justice and liberty among important sections of our own people.

But the most urgent economic task which the settlement will impose will not be domestic, but international: it will be concerned, as we have already suggested, with the securing of supplies upon which the recuperation of the peoples, and, more especially, of the industrial peoples, depends. How can this problem best be dealt with? It is worth while trying to answer this question; for upon its successful solution in the months following the signing of peace the international "atmosphere" of the post-war period will very largely depend.

Private capitalism, as we have seen, must prove unequal to the task. Nor will "industrial self-government" help us; for we are dealing with what is essentially a problem of foreign trade and foreign policy. The responsibility for supplying the needs of their exhausted populations must, in one form or another, be borne by the various Governments.

What form should this action take? The natural course might seem to be for the various Governments concerned to deal with the matter themselves; and, in point of fact, enough is known for the conjecture to be hazarded that every Government in Europe, belligerents and neutrals alike, is already setting on foot an official organisation to deal with the problem of post-war supplies. Self-preservation alone demands it. No belligerent Government dare demobilise its armies till it can provide employment for its workers; and employment depends in its turn upon industrial raw material, and raw material upon shipping. There is therefore urgent need for all the Governments to organise what resources they can lay their hands on with at least the same thoroughness as they have devoted to the business of mobilisation or making war. In spite of the perilous uncertainty of many of the factors involved, dependent as they are on the

terms of peace, Government "Reconstruction Departments" are probably everywhere at work on the twin problems of demobilisation and supplies.

But, here again, can we rely upon the replacement of private capitalism by State action to solve the problem satisfactorily? The individual officials acting on behalf of the various Governments may not be "profiteers," but what assurance is there that the Governments for whom they will be acting will not be actuated by motives at least as unworthy as those of the capitalist? Is competition between Government and Government, whether for wealth or for territory or for power, any less dangerous to the world's welfare than the competition between trader and trader or syndicate and syndicate? Is it not, in fact, far *more* dangerous, owing to the far greater concentration of power in the hands of the Governments that are competing and owing to the whole armoury of weapons, military and diplomatic as well as commercial, which they can bring to bear on the attainment of their purposes? Is not, indeed, the association between Governments and economic enterprises one of the most sinister features of the diplomatic history of the years before the war? In so far as the war was the product of the capitalist spirit, was it not the economic projects and ambitions of Governments rather than of individual capitalists which brought it about? In Morocco, for instance, though the private firm of Mannesmann Brothers had something to do with the international troubles that arose, could Mannesmann Brothers by themselves have created an international crisis or brought about a European war? It is said that certain American interests in Mexico have tried on numerous occasions to involve the United States in war with Mexico. They have hitherto failed, owing to the attitude of the United States Government. Similarly neither in Morocco nor in Persia nor in Turkey nor in China would the penetration of European capitalists have

been a contributory cause of the present war had not the Governments taken up their stand behind the private trading interests and associated themselves and their prestige with their enterprises. Left to themselves, capitalists may be selfish and grasping ; but they cannot bring about war, for they do not wield the power of the State.

It is for this reason that private capitalism, so far from being recognised as a war-making force, was for many years regarded, and is still regarded in many quarters, as pre-eminently pacific in its influence on international relations. Cobden, for instance, was a capitalist to the backbone ; no man in his day held a firmer belief in the virtues of the existing economic order. But he was also a staunch and lifelong advocate of peace at a time when pacifism was a far less popular creed than now. And he was an advocate of peace *because* he was a man of business : his pacifism and his internationalism sprang directly out of his belief in the harmonious and satisfactory working of the capitalist system. Just as he believed in unrestricted private enterprise at home and resented the interference of the State with the natural working of economic laws, so he believed in the mission of the private trader, unassisted and unhampered by his own or other Governments, to spread prosperity and harmony throughout the world. Hands off, Governments ! was his perpetual cry ; leave international politics to the private trader, and he will keep you clear of war. What he dreaded above all else, and surely, as the event has shown, not without reason, was the concentration of political and economic power in the same hands—the hands, moreover, which hold in their keeping the keys of war and peace. As the motto of his earliest political writing he adopted a famous sentence from Washington's farewell address to the American people : " The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our

commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible." To the spirit of that motto Cobden remained true all his life. Like Mr. Schiff, he doubted the value of international political machinery. He did not wish to see any sanction provided for international agreements or to see his own country involved in the quarrels of other nations. "Non-intervention" was his motto. Let each country keep to itself and keep its own peace. In case of quarrel, he favoured settlement by arbitration ; but far better avoid a quarrel, if possible, by maintaining a placid and dignified isolation. Much the same view is held—or was held up to the eve of the war—by his latter-day successors, Mr. Norman Angell and his group. They sought to divert men's minds from thoughts of war by taking the businesslike attitude that war does not pay. They appealed to reason against passion, to self-interest against patriotism, to solid considerations of profit against romantic dreams of national greatness.

Alas ! it is proved to demonstration that war does not pay ; but the deduction which Cobden and Norman Angell drew from that fact—namely, that Governments should go on governing and leave trading to the traders, has been falsified once and for all. The war has shown that you cannot draw a sharp line between "government" and "politics" on the one hand, and "trade" on the other. That indeed might seem to be the moral, not simply of the war, but of the history of the commercial and colonial policy of the Great Powers during the half-century between Cobden's French Treaty and to-day. Considerations arising out of foreign trade, questions of fiscal policy at home and in overseas dependencies, cannot be kept out of the political arena. They do not simply concern the livelihood of traders. They vitally affect the life of nations. The same is true of the many commercial questions which the war has shown us to be bound up with the problem of national defence.

The true moral to be drawn from the fact that war is bad business is not that Governments should eschew business for fear of burning their fingers at it, but that Governments should go into business in a spirit calculated to maintain the world's peace. This is equally true whether the "business" in question consists in devising a tariff or negotiating a commercial treaty, or subsidising a "key industry," or in actual commercial transactions in the world's markets.

What is the bearing of all this on the immediate question at issue—that of post-war supplies? It is that the war will have been fought in vain if it finds the various Governments, in their mutual business relations, actuated by the same grasping and anti-social spirit as too often characterised their pre-war commercial activities. If the problem is left to be solved on competitive lines, with the Governments outbidding one another, there will be a scrambling and pushing and threatening and bullying such as the world has never seen before, and the League of Nations will perish in its cradle amid the wrangles of the rival disputants. The problem is one that can only be handled successfully on co-operative lines, both in the interests of the world as a whole and of the populations concerned. And once it is realised that co-operation between the various Governments is the only policy compatible with a tolerable state of international relations after the war, it will not take long to draw the further conclusion that the wisest course would be to set the whole matter on an international basis; in other words, for the various Governments to delegate powers to purchase, allocate, and convey supplies on their behalf to an international Commission. Such a Commission would then, in effect, become a Relief Commission for the world as a whole, similar to the Commission which looked after the needs of Belgium, under American guidance, during the earlier period of the war.

This suggestion has already found a place in the

Labour Party draft peace terms submitted to the Inter-Ally Socialist Conference.[1] I will not therefore waste words on advocating it. On abstract grounds it is sure to commend itself to many. It seemed better to emphasise the nature of the alternative policy with which Europe would be faced if it were not adopted ; to draw attention to the effects of an orgy of competitive bargaining by Governments, some of them, including the smaller neutrals, in desperate case, upon the prospects of the incipient League of Nations. However impracticable the proposal seems, it is worth while trying to make it practicable, for the sake of what it will avoid.

But the proposal is not inherently impracticable. If the machinery had to be created *de novo* within a few weeks or months, its world-wide scope might well prove beyond the powers of human organisation. But in fact the machinery is already there ready to hand : it exists in the shape of the blockade, and the Inter-Ally economic control which has been established in connection with it. The blockade, which was first established to keep goods out of Central Europe, slowly developed, through the pressure of events, into an organisation for allocating shipping and supplies to the different countries and services. The rationing of imports will not need to begin after the war. The Allies and neutrals are already living under a regime of rationing. All that

[1] For convenience of reference the recommendation in question is subjoined : "That in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardship, and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries in proportion, not to their purchasing powers but to their several pressing needs ; and that, within each country, the Government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities, in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market mainly to the richer classes in proportion to their means, but systematically, to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community on the principle of 'no cake for any one till all have bread.'"

will be required will be to adjust the form and scope of the organisation to meet the needs of the post-war situation. It is impossible to predict what changes will be needed in this direction till we know the conditions at the end of the war; nor is it profitable to speculate on the treatment to be meted out, under such an arrangement, to the Central Powers. But the embargo recently proclaimed by President Wilson on American exports to neutral countries and the extensive powers granted to Mr. Hoover as Controller of American food supplies indicate that the United States Government has a clear vision of the part which the supply question must play both during the closing phase of the war and in the period of reconstruction. President Wilson is not only the controlling mind in one of the largest producing areas in the world, but he is also the leading exponent of the idea of the League of Nations. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that the initiative in the matter of the international control of post-war supplies will come from Washington.

There is no space to carry the suggestion further. One other observation may, however, be made. One of the chief tasks of the Relief Commission, on which the Labour Party Memorandum lays stress, would be to determine the order in which commodities should be imported. It would have to decide which were the more and which the less important imports. On what principle would this be decided? In ordinary times, under the regime of private enterprise, it is decided by "demand." If more people are prepared to pay for pianos than for boots, more pianos will be imported than boots, though a piano is a luxury and there may be many thousands of people who badly need boots. But the Relief Commission would make its decision not according to individual demand, but according to social need—to each nation "according to its needs." That is the purpose or which it would be appointed. For some time after

the war, at any rate, necessaries will take precedence over luxuries; and it is to be hoped that even after the control of imports has been relaxed, the object lesson in social economics provided by the working of the Commission's "priority scheme" may diffuse saner and healthier views about spending among the consuming public than prevailed before the war. "No cake until all have bread" is a sound maxim of social policy against which the existing economic system constantly offends. The remedy lies partly with Governments, but partly also, as the war has revealed to us, with the conscience of the consuming public.

One more suggestion in conclusion: The organisation proposed above could not, from the nature of the case, last very long. Under the best of conditions it would not be popular, and it will need all the support of educated opinion in the countries affected if it is to carry through its task without discredit to the prestige of international organisation. There are, however, other more permanent pieces of work waiting to be done if the connection between international organisation and economic policy is to be maintained and the world saved from relapsing either into the laissez-faire capitalism advocated by Cobden or the anti-social inter-state competition which characterised the generation preceding the war. If the League of Nations comes into being it would be wise to bear Mr. Schiff's criticism in mind and extend its purview to the economic questions which have been the cause of so much international friction. The most practicable line of advance would seem to be through the setting up of permanent Standing Commissions to investigate and watch particular problems and make recommendations about them to the conference of the League to form the subject of resolutions which would then be carried down to the separate sovereign Parliaments. There is no space to go into these problems in detail; but the mention of such

questions as Labour legislation, migration and conflicts of standard of life, conservation of the world's resources, the export of capital and foreign loans and concessions, the control and improvement of world-communications, is sufficient to show how inextricably economic problems are now bound up with foreign affairs and public policy all the world over, and how valuable a dispassionate and authoritative statement about them might be in influencing opinion and moulding the policy of Governments. The days when economic internationalism spelled the negation of official action are gone past recall. If the world wishes to organise its life on a peaceful basis, it must habituate itself to the idea of international governmental organisation. It must learn to think of itself as a single society and to disentangle those of its social problems which are common to all its members and can only be dealt with by the common action of the Governments concerned, from the larger body of questions, such as taxation and fiscal policy, which are primarily matters of local and national concern. Above all, mankind must have the courage to judge both economic and national issues from an ethical standpoint and to adjust its policies and institutions, whether in government or in business, to that wider point of view. In this great task of changing the *motives* which have hitherto been dominant in our economic policy and relationships, and of bringing them into harmony with the Golden Rule, the working-class movement which, whatever its other failures, has never bowed the knee to commercialism, may well find one of the mainsprings of its activity in the generation after the peace. If the great European working-class leaders rise to the height of the opportunity they will interpret the mind and conscience, not of their class only but of a world which is learning through suffering the true meaning of civilisation.

THE NEW GERMAN EMPIRE[1]

I. The Spirit of German Policy

What sort of a peace does Germany still hope to secure? The question can be answered in a sentence: a peace which will enable her to fulfil in the next war the aims she has failed to fulfil in this. This can best be illustrated by a brief survey of the policies and war aims pursued by Germany's rulers since 1914. Those aims and policies are perfectly definite and can be set forth and analysed with precision. They have been too little studied in this country, where there has been a disposition to regard Germany as though she were simply a "mad dog" and her rulers as though they were suffering from a megalomania which obscured their powers of reasoning and reflection. It is true that Germany's rulers have been blind, but only to forces and considerations which they regard as irrelevant or are unconstitutionally incapable of understanding—to the claims of moral feeling, of international right, of human decency and chivalry. But within the narrow and non-moral limits which they have prescribed for their study their thinking has not been confused or neglectful, but as clear-cut, as well-informed and as conscientious as that of their masters, Bismarck and Macchiavelli. The Germans of to-day pride themselves on not being romanticists like their ancestors, on having abandoned "the kingdom of the clouds" which Voltaire assigned to them, and having acquired in its stead sobriety of thought and judgment, backed up by a wealth of technical and scientific knowledge. It is in

[1] From *The Round Table*, March, 1917.

this spirit that they approach the study of political questions.

The Chancellor's speech to the Main Committee of the Reichstag outlining the course of the submarine controversy and proclaiming the decision to embark upon unrestricted warfare was a perfect example of the German scientific method in politics. So is the discussion of German foreign policy in Prince Bülow's book. Both treat politics as though it were a vast game of chess. Force is marshalled against force; estimates are made of the various chances and probabilities involved; and the issue is decided purely on considerations of power. This is what is called *Realpolitik* or *Machtpolitik*. It is a phenomenon that is strange and confusing to the British public, unaccustomed as it is to this cold, clear, intellectual analysis of facts and forces with every element of feeling and moral value left out. But once it is understood that this *is* the method which is being followed, it is not difficult to detect the different steps by which it proceeds: for the very fact that it is so strictly logical and methodical betrays it. Once grasp the essentials of the problem as the German statesman sees them, and it is comparatively simple to follow out the argument to its conclusion, especially as German writers and speakers in their naïve boastfulness and over-confidence are constantly giving us the opportunity of verifying our hypotheses as to the drift of their ideas. The German method, in fact, by leaving out all the great essential human interests which lend nobility to the study and art of government, has reduced problems of State policy to a naked and transparent simplicity. Just as Macchiavelli's "Prince" is an easier text-book to follow and to understand to the depths than Plato's "Republic" or the New Testament, so the policies of Bismarck and Bethmann-Hollweg are more easily defined and analysed than those of Lincoln and Mazzini or of President Wilson and Viscount Grey.

Let us try, then, to see the history of the war through

German eyes. It will be necessary to make large use of German sources and to accustom the reader to the language of militarism : for without extensive quotation, not from extremists but from moderate and representative spokesmen, it is impossible to give British readers an adequate sense of the abyss which still separates the thought and feeling of the general public in the two countries. Only one thing can bridge that abyss—the re-discovery of moral values by the great mass of the German people, so that they may once more enter into intelligible intercourse with the civilised world. How is that to be brought about ? There are not many present-day Germans endowed at once with sufficient insight to see their own countrymen as others see them and with courage enough to proclaim what they see. One such man, Eduard Bernstein, the well-known member of the Socialist minority in the Reichstag, has lately answered that very question in the pages of an American review, and his answer is the same as that of our own Prime Minister.

"The war (he says) is in a high degree the trial of German militarism. Shall it be maintained with its present features or not ? For the parties of the middle-class the question is almost settled already. Unless the war ends for Germany in a downright defeat they will maintain it by hook or by crook."[1]

This estimate is borne out by Professor Hans Delbrück, Treitschke's successor in the Chair of History in Berlin University, who, writing early in 1914, says, in words that cannot be too often quoted : "Any one who has any familiarity at all with our officers and generals knows that it would take another Sedan, inflicted on us instead of by us, before they would acquiesce in the control of the Army by the German Parliament."[2]

Thus for the sake of the Germans themselves, whom it has terrorised, no less than for that of the world,

[1] Article in the *New Republic*, September 23, 1916.
[2] "Regierung und Volkswille," 1914, p. 136.

Prussian militarism, with its strutting arrogance, its cold brutality, its immense and not undeserved prestige for evil, must be "wholly and finally destroyed" as a political and social force in the life of the German people. Then and then only can we hope to see "in Germany as well as in Europe one great emancipated land from the Urals to the Atlantic shores." If there are any other means under heaven to the same end, save victory in the field over the military rulers of Prussia, those means have still to be revealed to us.

II. Germany's War Aims

What has been the general aim of the Kaiser's policy since he expelled Bismarck from the seat of power in 1889 and seized the reins himself? It can be summed up in a few words. Bismarck was unprincipled, but he was prudent. He left Germany the most important single Power on the Continent of Europe. She had won three wars: she had attached to herself in a network of alliances, open and secret, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia and Roumania. Her one inveterate enemy, France, she had driven into isolation. With Britain, who did not cross her path and had many points of friction with France, she was on terms of friendship, almost of alliance.[1] She was, in his own words, a "satiated Power."[2] Under the Kaiser she became a hungry Power. His object was to make her a "world-Power"—to transform her from the dominant State in Europe into the dominant State throughout the globe. This sounds like a dream or a

[1] On January 26, 1889, shortly before his retirement, Bismarck said in the Reichstag: "I regard England as our old traditional ally, with whom we have no conflicts of interest. When I say 'ally' I do not use the word in its diplomatic sense; we have no treaty with England; but I wish to preserve the close relationship with England which we have had now for over 150 years, even in colonial questions. And if I was satisfied that we were in danger of losing it, I should be careful to try and prevent that happening."

[2] Speech on February 6, 1888.

vague aspiration. But its practical implications were worked out by his advisers with German care and thoroughness, in full appreciation of the almost inevitable contingency of war. It is true that there was before the war a school of "moderate" opinion in Germany, dominant among the Social Democrats (whose political power by no means corresponded with their numerical strength) and represented even in high governing circles, which did not desire a war with Britain, and, indeed, hoped to avoid the arbitrament of war altogether. But no one who reads Prince Bülow's book or the present Imperial Chancellor's review of his policy in his speeches can doubt that both these "moderate" men looked forward to a time when Germany, with or without war, would have elbowed her way to the front. Since the outbreak of war the party of relative moderation has ceased to exist, the majority of the Socialists have accepted the official programme, and the Imperialists reign supreme. Leaving out of account the Socialist minority, which, so far as numbers go, is insignificant in its public representation, controversy has raged, not between "moderates" and extremists, but between different schools of Imperialism. This was inevitable as soon as the military machine assumed uncontrolled command, and will continue until it has been discredited by defeat.

German imperialists have had two separate and distinct aims in view—one in the West, the other in the East. No doubt their distinctness is more apparent now, both to us and the Germans, than it was before the war, for it has been brought out into sharp relief by the unexpected course of the campaign. But, looked at closely, the two aims always were distinct both in the policy which they involved and in the appeal they made to different sections of the German population. They are distinct, but they are not mutually incompatible. Rather they are complementary. Yet the attainment of either without the other would involve a great advance on the Bismarckian

position and the achievement of a very substantial measure of "world-dominion."

Let us examine each of them in turn.

Germany's Western aims, as German imperialists conceived them before the war, can be summed up as follows: To decoy or to intimidate Great Britain or (if needs must) to defeat her; to crush France once and for all; to overawe Holland, Belgium, and Portugal; to extend her power, in one form or another, over Rotterdam, Antwerp, Calais, and the mineral deposits of French Lorraine; to break up the extra-European dominions of her victims, including, in the end, the British Commonwealth, and to build up on their ruins a greater Germany beyond the seas.

There is no space here to go into these various points in detail. So far as the proposed European annexations are concerned, it is only necessary to refer to the speech by the second personage in the Empire, the King of Bavaria, on Germany's need to control the mouth of the Rhine; to the Imperial Chancellor's remarks bearing on the same subject during the negotiations; to the economic aspects of the General Staff's carefully designed plan of campaign in France and Belgium; and to the manifesto of the Six Economic Associations,[1] representing every class in the Empire, peasants included, with the exception of the town workmen. It is in its extra-European aspects that the programme chiefly concerns us.

There it found itself faced at the outset with one insuperable obstacle—the British Navy. "With regard to extra-European politics," says Prince Bülow, in his frank and revealing book, "England is the only country with which Germany has outstanding issues to settle." The same theme runs through speech after speech by the Kaiser and his representatives in their campaign for the growth of the German Navy, from the Kruger telegram onwards. Germany, already predominant in Europe as

[1] Reprinted in "The Issue," by J. W. Headlam, Appendix I.

the first military Power, was to become an extra-European or a "World-Power," with a "place in the sun" beyond the ocean, enjoying "the freedom of the seas" which has been defined on different occasions as "the Empire of the Atlantic," the command of the Suez Canal, or a balance of naval power with Great Britain, but which, closely examined, really means, or meant, a substitution of German for British supremacy. It was in this spirit that Seeley's "Expansion of England" was studied and (thanks to its misleading Prussian title) misinterpreted in German schools. It was in this spirit that Germany looked forward to the inevitable Day.

What sort of a Colonial Empire did Germany hope to attain after winning the freedom of the seas? The ordinary middle-class and working-class voter who supported the Government on the Colonial issue in the Herrero election of 1907 (when the Socialist representation was cut down from 81 to 43) had probably only a very hazy answer to this question. He would most likely have said that he wanted something big and rich and full of good fighting material: generally speaking, in fact, an Empire after what was considered the English style. But the statesmen and the professors had their projects worked out in detail. It is worth while quoting one statement of Germany's colonial demands, not only because it conforms so closely to the childish popular canons, but because it is from the pen of a man who has more than once endangered his academic position by the moderation of his views.

"The first and most important of all the national demands [says Professor Delbrück [1]] which we shall have to make when the time comes for the signing of peace must be a demand for a very large Colonial Empire, a German India. The Empire must be so big that it is capable of conducting its own defence in case of war. A very large territory cannot be completely occupied by any enemy. A very large territory will maintain its own army

[1] "Bismarck's Erbe," 1915, p. 202.

and provide numerous reservists and second-line troops. If its main centres are connected by rail its different districts will be in a position to support one another in case of need. A very large territory can have its own munition and arms factories. A very large territory will also have harbours and coaling stations."

And he adds in a footnote, "in order to prevent misunderstandings," and to explain what he means by "very large," that

"the Belgian and French Congo by themselves cannot suffice for the German India which we must try to secure and have a right to demand after our victories. This equatorial territory may provide us with unsuspected treasures in the future, but so far as the next generation is concerned its extraordinarily thin population will prevent it from being profitable to us: indeed, it would cost money. Only when the rich districts lying around it, which are now in English hands, are added on shall we have in sufficient measure the practical pre-requisities for a German India."

These are not the daydreams of peace. These words were written in April, 1915, after the big check in the West and before the Eastern drive. The views expressed in them are even now not abandoned. Writing in the February issue of a Berlin monthly review,[1] an ex-governor of East Africa crosses the "t's" and dots the "i's" of Delbrück's statement.

"If Belgium," he says, "as we hope and as the Belgians hope, is to be divided after the war between Germany and France, vast portions of the Belgian and French Congo will have to be included in Germany's colonial Empire, which we would then complete by the acquisition of British East Africa and Uganda, in exchange for Kiau Chau, New Guinea, and Australasian islands. Such an Empire could easily be defended from the sea, and it would have to be considered whether we could not exchange Togoland, which is isolated, for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Germany would then have a Colonial Empire worthy of her enterprising spirit, and it would yield us all the raw material we need."

[1] Baron Albrecht von Rechenberg, in *Nord und Sud*, summarised in the *Westminster Gazette*, January 27, 1917.

Similarly, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a conspicuously moderate paper, was still two months ago demanding "a compact Colonial Empire in place of our present haphazard acquisitions."[1]

Nor is this attitude confined to the official and bourgeois classes. The Socialist majority, though shy about annexations in Western Europe, have from the beginning associated themselves with "imperialist" projects overseas. In an article dated January 17, 1917, one of their members, writing on terms of peace, demands for Germany "an extensive Colonial territory which will enable her to import from within her own sphere of government the tropical products which cannot be grown on her own soil."[2]

It remains to be seen whether these expectations will be realised. They can now only be fulfilled on one hypothesis—the checkmating of British sea power. This is the logic of the introduction of what the Germans call their "sharpest weapon," unrestricted submarine warfare. For it is certain that the great German Colonial Empire is not attainable *by military victories in the present war*. German public opinion in general is, it appears, still far from recognising this. But the German Government knows better. It knows that whether or not it recovers its lost colonies, it has, if things remain as they are, no hope of establishing the great self-sufficient German Empire of its dreams, for such an Empire, even if it could be won through exchanges of territory in a negotiated peace, would be useless for its purpose as a fighting organism without "the freedom of the seas"; and the British Navy still stands undefeated in the way. Moreover, if the territorial arrangements at the peace are settled, as we may hope, on the principle of government by

[1] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in an article criticising the immoderate demands of the German Colonial League. Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, January 10, 1917.

[2] Article by August Müller in the leading Socialist monthly, *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, January 17, 1917.

consent of the governed, it is not likely that Germany will recover even the "haphazard acquisitions" she has lost, still less that peoples living in the tropical zone will be handed about "as if they were property" to meet the needs of a self-sufficient German Empire. That being so, short of a naval victory or a successful submarine blockade, Germany is thrown back upon thinking out an alternative overseas policy until she is ready to resume the struggle against British sea-power, armed by the experience of the present war and under more favourable conditions. We shall see what that policy is.

It is worth while dwelling for a moment on the reason for the failure of Germany's original Western design, for it throws an interesting light on her future plans. She failed because when "the Day" came, after all her talk it caught her napping. In July, 1914, Germany did not intend to raise the Western issue in its full scope. Her Western plans, carefully cherished as they were, and loudly proclaimed as they had to be in order to secure popular support for the Navy, were to be reserved for a future war, which was to be the sequel of 1914, as 1870 succeeded 1866. It was not anticipated that the violation of Belgian neutrality would bring Great Britain into the war. This was unmistakably confessed by the demeanour of the Kaiser and the Imperial Chancellor on August 4 and 5, 1914. Still less was it anticipated that the victorious resistance of France would give Britain time to bring her full naval and military power into play. This has become abundantly clear in the course of the controversy in Germany about the effects of the British blockade. We know now from the statements of responsible persons[1] that the German War Staff had not reckoned out the economic implications of a long-drawn war with Great Britain, and that, if we had disregarded

[1] *E.g.*, Dr. Walter Rathenau, the originator of the Raw Materials Department of the German War Office, in a lecture delivered in December, 1915, and since published.

international law and neutral opinion, as the Germans, judging us, as always, by themselves, naturally expected us to do,[1] and instituted the blockade from the first in its present rigour, Germany would before now have been completely denuded of essential raw materials.

It is for this reason that one of the subjects most discussed in the German Press since the blockade became acute is the best method of economic mobilisation for the next war—that "Second Punic War" against Great Britain which, if Prussian militarism retains its hold over the peoples of Central Europe, will follow inevitably from the present conflict. That this design is cherished—and not unnaturally cherished—in responsible quarters could easily be proved at length. It is best illustrated by the practical arrangements for the storage of raw material and the conscription of industrial workers in the next war suggested by Dr. Rathenau in the lecture already referred to as a result of his administrative experience at the German War Office and by the following extract from the official Government paper, the *Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zeitung* for October 15, 1916:

"The Reichstag Committee for Trade and Industry discussed on Saturday, as already briefly reported, the questions connected with the Economic Transition from War to Peace. The proceedings were confidential. . . . A representative of the Centre (the Roman Catholic party) summarised the main problems to be dealt with as follows: (1) The transition from war to peace; (2) The organisation of economic life on a peace basis; (3) *The setting up and carrying through of a plan for placing economic life on a war-basis.* The two latter subjects (adds the journal), are of course matters for the future."

The bearing of plans of this kind on Germany's

[1] A composite book under the title "German Food Supply and the English Starvation Plan," was published in Germany early in 1915. Its preface bears the date December 12, 1914. The entry of foodstuffs into Germany was, of course, not stopped until early in 1915, after the German Government had assumed control of the whole food supply and proclaimed its intention of starving out Great Britain by submarine blockade.

present policy may be left aside for the moment. They provide, however, an interesting testimony both to Germany's relative unpreparedness for the full tide of the Western war and to her anxiety to face the logic of the situation which will arise when, as Germany's rulers still hope, the dominant military Power of the world, having emerged from the war with its prestige enormously enhanced and its military strength substantially increased by its Eastern conquests, stands face to face in the East as in the West, in the Persian Gulf as in the North Sea, with the dominant sea Power.

III. The Eastern Plan

For though Germany has failed or partially failed up to the present in the West she has succeeded in the East; and it must never be forgotten that it was with Eastern not with Western plans immediately in view that she sped the Serbian ultimatum on its way and backed it up by declaring war on Russia.

In this Eastern adventure Germany's aims can be simply stated. They are as usual twofold—partly military and partly economic. Her military object was, and is, to secure a military preponderance in the Old World by establishing the supremacy of her arms over Central and Eastern Europe and Nearer Asia. Her economic object is clearly stated in the following sentences from the opening essay in an authoritative work recently issued on "The Economic Rapprochement between Germany and her Allies." [1]

"The establishment of a sphere of economic influence from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf has been for nearly two decades

[1] "Die wirtschaftliche Annäherung zwischen dem deutschen Reiche und seinen Verbündeten," issued at the request of the Verein für Sozial-politik, edited by Professor Herkner, of Berlin, 2 vols., 1916. The quotation is taken from the opening essay, by Dr. Spiethoff, Professor of Political Economy at the German University at Prague, vol. i. p. 24.

the silent unspoken aim of German foreign policy. Our diplomacy in recent years, which has seemed to the great mass of all[1] Germans vacillating and little conscious of its aim, only becomes intelligible when regarded as part of a consistent Eastern design. It is to the credit of Rohrbach to have shown in his writings how the single incidents fit into the general scheme of our policy. It is indeed in this region, and in this region alone, that Germany can break out of her isolation in the centre of Europe into the fresh air beyond and win a compact sphere of economic activity which will remain open to her independently of the favour and the jealousy of the Great Powers. Apart from the defence of hearth and home, no other success could compensate Germany for the enormous sacrifices of the war if she did not secure a really free hand, politically speaking, to pursue this economic goal. It is true that critical observers who have gone carefully into the details of the plan profess themselves sceptical of great economic results and emphasise the fact that the improvement of our relations with these regions cannot compensate us for the loss of our vitally important connections with the Great Powers and other States. They may very well be right. Nevertheless it remains true that a secure future for Germany is to be reached along this road and no other, and that Germany would be missing the greatest opportunity ever offered or likely to be offered her in the history of her foreign relations if she were not now to go forward with vigour and decision to its realisation."

Here it is clearly shown that the Eastern aims in themselves will not at present meet Germany's economic needs. If she is no longer to be "dependent on the favour and the jealousy of the World-Powers" she requires a Colonial Empire in the tropics as well. Nevertheless, the Eastern prize was well worth following up, and with good fortune it might even yield "Western" results. After Great Britain and Turkey had entered the lists and the Moslem Holy War had been proclaimed, sanguine spirits dreamed dreams of an African Empire to be won and kept without command of the sea, and influential scholars and writers spoke openly of the conquest of Egypt and the Soudan, and a Berlin-Cairo-Central African railway. Here, again, expectation has

[1] *I.e.*, including the Germans of Austria, of whom the writer is one.

so far outrun performance. Nevertheless, Germany's main object has been achieved with amazing success. She has overrun Poland, Courland, Lithuania, Serbia, and Montenegro, most of Roumania and part of Volhynia, and she has won more signal conquests still over her own allies and the adjoining neutrals. Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are no longer free agents. They could not if they would cut themselves loose from the German control, which first pushed them into the war and then saved them from disaster; and the longer the war continues the tighter must that control become. Turkey, in particular, has become in fact, if not in name, a German annexe. Meanwhile, the smaller European neutrals have been impressed and intimidated by the display of German efficiency and "frightfulness." Thus Germany, cut off from the sea and from the New World, robbed of the overseas Empire of her dreams, has established a new Empire in its stead in the very heart of the Old World. Stretching from Strassburg to Riga, from Schleswig to the Persian Gulf and to Arabia, it has been driven like a wedge through the continent, pushing Russia away from the warm sea into the northern ice and gloom, and leaving the Western Powers isolated in the peninsula of Europe, cut off from land communication with Russia, India, and the rest of Asia.

IV. The New German Empire

What is the character of this new Empire? What does it portend? And, in particular, what is its bearing on the future of the British Commonwealth, and of the causes for which it is trustee?

It may be well to take the last question first, for it can be simply answered. This new German Empire, if it survives, would be regarded as a disaster by all its neighbours, by Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Italy, Greece, and Russia; but it would be

most disastrous of all to Great Britain, at whom it would be chiefly aimed. If Germany succeeds, at the Peace, in retaining possession of her Eastern conquests, then Britain will have lost the war. The point need not be argued at length, for it is regarded by German writers as a self-evident proposition. It will be sufficient to give two representative German statements of the position of Britain in the event of the permanent establishment of the New Empire. In the course of the book already quoted written in April, 1915, Professor Delbrück remarks :

"Whether this war drives the English out of Egypt or not, what becomes of the English supremacy in Egypt if Turkey now maintains her existence, rejuvenates and reorganises herself militarily and economically, and establishes a railway system which will permit her to put great armies and all that pertains to them right on to the Egyptian frontier? Hitherto England has been able, in time of peace, to maintain her hold on Egypt with a garrison of 6000 Europeans. Whatever the conditions of peace at the end of the war, this idyll of British supremacy has passed away beyond recall."[1]

The same argument is still more clearly put by Paul Rohrbach, the semi-official writer who has done so much to further Germany's Eastern designs. Writing in his own paper, *Deutshe Politik*, on November 24, 1916, he remarks :

"There was a period of war between the great miscarriage at the Dardanelles and the successful Russian summer offensive, when here and there, in the English Press, the phrase cropped up that there were 'two victors' in the war—England and Germany. Behind this lay the idea that English policy might rest content, in case of need, with a 'drawn' war. From the English point of view, however, this was a piece of lazy and confused thinking. They know better to-day : and they are perfectly right when they

[1] Delbrück, "Bismarck's Erbe," Berlin, 1915, pp. 211–212, written in April, 1915. The point here made in print about the defences of Egypt is no new one for the Professor. It was made in his university lectures at least a early as 1902. The Kaiser's visit to Palestine was in 1898.

say that if the game between them and us ends in an apparent 'draw' it is we who will be the victors and they the vanquished. . . . In point of fact, if the Central Powers, with Bulgaria and the Turkish East, form a solid political block across the Balkans, then, for obvious political and geographical reasons, it is no longer possible for England in the future to conduct her world-policy on its traditional lines. English foreign policy, in contrast to that of all other European Powers, has hitherto rested on the fact that not only England, but also every vital part of her Empire, was unassailable. This was a very pronounced advantage possessed by England as against all other Powers, although the English have for over a century been accustomed to treat it as a self-evident necessity and as a matter of course. . . . But if the English wish Egypt and India to remain unassailable in the future, and if they wish to secure themselves against the German submarine danger, they must defeat us to such an extent so as to sever our connection with the East, to render us powerless to prevent the break-up of Turkey in favour of England and her Allies, and to force us to submit to permanent restrictions as regards the construction and use of submarines. When England has achieved all this, and not one moment sooner, she has won the war. If she has not attained these aims when peace is concluded, then she has, according to her own confession, lost the war. Here, and nowhere else, lies the root of the English fighting spirit. It took an astonishingly long time before the whole of or, at least, the greater part of the English people realised this situation. But now it is realised, and, hence, we may be sure that England will not stop the war, however great her own sacrifices may be, until she admits defeat."

It is characteristic of the German writer that he should attribute the obstinacy of the British fighting spirit to intellectual calculation rather than to intensity of moral purpose. But his reasoning is perfectly sound. The establishment of the Berlin-Bagdad Empire as a spearhead against Egypt and India would strike a fatal blow at British security and would involve a complete transformation in our military and defensive system, with the consequent reactions upon domestic and social policy. So far as purely British interests are concerned the case is unanswerable, as the neutral world is well aware. And if Britain were Germany, and British ideals were Prussian

ideals, there would be no more to be said. It is natural that a Great Power, especially a great Naval Power, should have a traditional bent towards the policy of *Divide et Impera* and should prefer to have small or weak States as its neighbours rather than a first-class highly organised military Power. That is the light in which the German writer, accustomed to weighing strength and weakness rather than right and wrong in the balances, regards the issue. All that he sees are two great non-moral World-Powers ranged against one another for mastery, and all the "right" that he expects to emerge from the contest is the "right" of the stronger. But there is, of course, a higher point of view than that of purely British interests—the point of view set forth in the Allied Notes and in President Wilson's Message. We have no right to condemn the new German Empire till we have examined the principle on which it is based, the policy which its rulers mean to pursue, and the bearing which its definitive establishment and consolidation in the treaty of peace would have on the future history of the Old Continent and of the world.

What, then, is the character of this new Empire? On what principle of government is it based? Is it a benevolent autocracy based on the desire of the dominant German rulers to promote the welfare of their subjects? Or is it a Commonwealth based upon the exercise of political responsibility by all who are fitted to bear it? Is it based upon the rule of law, or upon the assent of the governed? Will it contribute to the comity of nations and form a corner-stone in the new League of Peace? Judged by the touchstone of President Wilson's Message, how does it stand the test? Men of liberal tendencies in neutral countries, ignorant of the local circumstances and safe in the detachment of the New World, have been tempted to welcome it as a large-scale international experiment and to discern in it an element of stability and order—or at least to demand for it a fair

trial. "The Allies," says a writer in an American weekly paper, well known for its progressive tendencies,[1]

"are resolved not to accept a Germanised Central Europe, even though it rests on the acquiescence of the minor Slav peoples; but inasmuch as they may be forced to consent, it is worth while to consider possible compensations. Germany would have acquired more or less political control over a large region whose economic resources are undeveloped and whose inhabitants possess an inefficient political and social organisation. German control would not rest on military conquest. . . . The Germans could not treat such peoples as they have in the past treated the Prussian Poles or the Alsatians. The different groups of non-Germans in the Central European system would insist on a substantial measure of self-control. Some kind of federal system would have to be forged, and the making of it would be a slow, delicate and dangerous operation. . . . These non-German peoples will never be politically content unless they can be wrought into an international commonwealth, analogous to that which is needed for British Imperial federation.

"In any event the Germans would cease for the time being to threaten British and French sea power."

And the article closes with the suggestion that the establishment of the New Empire and the consequent increase of Germany's prestige "might place fewer impediments in the way of the ultimate creation of a system of supernational law" than would a decisive victory for either side.

Can speculations of this kind be brought to the test of fact? Is there any likelihood or even possibility that the new German Empire can develop, through the free union of its constituent peoples, into a commonwealth analogous to that of Britain?

It would be easy to suggest an answer to this question from the past history of the four partners in the Alliance which has crystallised into the new Empire, or from the past record of the alliances and conflicts between them. Prussian ruthlessness in Alsace-Lorraine, in Schleswig

[1] *The New Republic*, December 16, 1916. See an article on the same subject in the issue for January 27, 1917.

and in Poland, the relentless persecution and matchless hypocrisy of the Magyars in the government of their "national" State,[1] the suppression of every symbol and vestige of Serbian nationality in their occupied territory by the Bulgars, the simple, cold-blooded Turkish expedient of wholesale massacre, are not promising foundations for a stable edifice of empire. Nor does the alliance between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, which was first manifested to the world by the open breach of the Treaty of Berlin, supported by Germany in "shining armour" and then confirmed at the treacherous outbreak of the Second Balkan War, nor the alliance between Germany and Turkey, cemented by the blood of the Armenians, suggest that the new dominion will stand forth as a champion of international right. But these things, after all, are in the past, important and suggestive as they are. It will be fairer, in the space at our disposal, to test the new Empire rather by the future programme set before it by its promoters and sponsors. Let us judge it, not by what it is, but by what those who have brought it into being hope and believe it may become.

So much has been written in Germany on the subject of "Berlin-Bagdad," and there is such unanimity and, indeed, monotony about the views expressed, that it is not difficult to summarise them. This will best be done, not by isolated quotations, which could be multiplied indefinitely, but by reproducing a few connected statements from representative sources. These may make it clear how widely the new German Empire diverges from the ideals and practice of the British Commonwealth as regards both its external relations and its internal policy and organisation.

To take first the question of external relations. "In

[1] "The whole of public opinion in Hungary holds the principle of nationalities in honour," was Count Tisza's comment on President Wilson's message. Far more respectable was the German comment which advised President Wilson never to mention the subject of Prussian Poland again.

every discussion on the peace that must follow this war," says President Wilson, "it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by a definite concert of the Powers. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depend is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new Balance of Power?" How is this question answered by the prophets of the new German Empire? There is only room for one statement of their creed: but it must be given at some length:

"The great lesson which the German people has had to learn is to think in terms of power (*machtpolitisch denken*); and the present war has taught us more in this regard than all the four centuries of European diplomacy and development that preceded it. For all who have eyes to see and a mind alive to the world around them the Great War has made clear our true situation. We must insist on being a World-Power, or we cease to be a Great Power at all. There is no other alternative. . . . Let no one here say that small States, too, can have a national life of their own. True, so long as the great States around them allow them to exist. But any day may see the end of their existence, in spite of all treaties to the contrary, and every day brings us fresh evidence how little assured is the existence of small States. For *neither alliances nor treaties provide the least security* for the existence of the Great Powers, still less of small States. Any one who still retains belief in such things is past all argument. A man who has not learnt wisdom from the events of the last two years is incapable of learning anything. Of course every Great Power will always do its best to form alliances with other Powers, great and small, in order to assure its existence against hostile coalitions. But no one of them can feel any security that these alliances will be observed, Germany least of all. . . . We cannot do without alliances, but we can only reckon upon them as promoting our own security so long as they are cemented by the greatest possible sense of common interest. Alliances by themselves are worthless. . . .

"Let us sum up the argument. Germany needs, quite independently of her Allies, to be large, strong and powerfully organised; in order to secure herself against the possibility of *being deserted by the small Powers and being treacherously attacked by the Great.*

"What does she need as a guarantee of this? The answer is: an extensive Empire, with highly developed agriculture and industry, the best possible strategic frontiers against sudden attacks and the best possible allies—alliances based not upon scraps of paper (*papierene Verträge*) but upon the elementary and vital needs of the allies as regards both defence and economic development. It is unnecessary, nay, harmful, to rely upon the affection and loyalty of *any* ally unless the material basis of the alliance has been soundly laid. If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream—that is, out of its reliance on the goodwill and honest dealing of peoples and States—it will have done us a great service. *There are no ethical friendships between States in our day. There are only friendships of convenience.* And friendships of convenience last just so long as the convenience itself.

"*That is the sheet-anchor of all foreign policy.* What we desire for our future therefore is a strong, self-dependent Germany, strong enough to secure that Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey shall find their greatest safety and prosperity through the German connection—and *only* through Germany."

There is nothing new in sentiments such as these. The temper, the argument, even the very turns of phrase, are as old as history. Macchiavelli, in his lore for princes, preached upon the self-same text; and two thousand years before him the greatest of Greek historians noted how war, "the most compelling of teachers," upset all the established conventions of morality and taught men a new code of mutual dealing. "What an intending ally trusts to is not the goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power for action." "The strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must."[1] So ran the writ of blood and iron, in the ancient world, as it runs to-day. What is new, and what must give us pause, even after all we have witnessed of German methods, is the source from which this monstrous doctrine is proclaimed. This new prophet of ascendancy, who lisps in the accents of Macchiavelli and pours scorn on the ideals which, as we are told on high authority,

[1] Thucydides, Book iii., ch. 82, Book v., chs. 89 and 109.

"every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take for granted," is no politician or diplomatist, no Prussian soldier, like Bernhardi, familiar from the traditions of his service with the philosophy of the jungle, no hired scribbler paid to dip his pen in poison, but a man known through two hemispheres as a moral educator of the young. Few German writers, indeed, are better known and more esteemed in this country than Dr. Kerschensteiner, of Munich, whose name is inseparably associated with the Day Continuation School system in that city and elsewhere in Germany, and it is with a sense of cruel irony that his English admirers will find his name associated with this solemn and deliberate denial of the very possibility of international right and of a comity of nations. There is no need for further witnesses as to the part the new German Empire is likely to play in the "creation of a system of international law." *Ex hoc uno disce omnes*—and their name is legion.[1]

Let us now turn to the internal policy and organisation of the new Empire. No subject has been more discussed in Germany and among her Allies in recent months; but a brief summary of the general upshot of the debate must suffice. Germany's objects with regard

[1] "Die Zukunft Deutschlands," by Oberstudienrat Dr. Georg Kerschensteiner, Member of the Reichstag, Munich, in the "Europäische Staats und Wirtschafts-zeitung," December 16, 1916. Italics as in the original. Dr. Kerschensteiner is the author of "Education for Citizenship," English translation, Chicago 1912 and 1915, and "The Schools and the Nation," English translation, 1914. As regards other literature, the German learned periodicals are filled with articles and reviews of books and pamphlets on current social and political questions, among which Mitteleuropa predominates. Diligent search of the available literature has revealed one single pamphlet which departs from the prevalent materialist philosophy and imports moral considerations into the argument. And of this the expert reviewer sternly remarks: "The author seems to be quite unaware that he is being guilty of an unpardonable confusion of thought. All ethical considerations are completely alien to the State and the State must therefore resolutely keep them at arm's length," adding that it is to be hoped that such "pointless ethical reasonings" will not find imitators. ("Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik," July, 1916, p. 317. Review by Professor Eulenberg, of Leipzig, of "The War in the Light of Social Theory," by William Jerusalem. Stuttgart, 1915.)

to her new Eastern Empire are twofold: military and economic. It was the Military General Staff who made the present war. Circumstances, and not least the British blockade, have set at their side, as no less important for the carrying out of Prussian designs, an Economic General Staff. Together they have worked out the possibilities of the new Empire in terms of men and things—of cannon-fodder and material products.

The military question is always regarded as a mere matter of arithmetic. Having waged one war with perhaps a majority of unwilling soldiers in their ranks—Poles, Alsatians, Schleswickers, Czechs, Italians, Roumanians, and Jugoslavs among the regiments of the Central Powers, not to speak of the composite Turkish army—the General Staff is justified in laying its plans on the hypothesis that the same thing can be done again on a larger scale. Moreover, the effect of a uniform system of military training upon the populations concerned must not be overlooked. The unity of modern Germany, as Germans are never tired of telling us, is largely the result of compulsory military service. As Germany was unified in the generation after 1871, so Mitteleuropa, they hope, in spite of its composite and refractory material, will be welded into a military, if not an intellectual, unity in the generation after 1914. The process has already been carried far in the present war. The German military system is dominant throughout the armies of the allies and Germans are almost everywhere in command, in fact if not in name. The very protestations of military independence issued at intervals by the various allied Governments testify to the helplessness of their position. This unified military control is convenient in many ways to the German Government. It enables it to dispose of doubtful units by sending them to fronts where they will be out of harm's way, and to employ them to keep the civil population in order by the use of foreign troops. Turks, we learn, have already been employed to quell

a civil disturbance at Munich.[1] This is indeed a new use for "colonial" troops, but under the militarist regime it is too convenient not to be resorted to.

There is another element in the German military system which must be remembered. Its foundations are laid, as every one knows, in the national school. It is inevitable, therefore, that Germany should seek to control the educational system of her allies—more especially of Turkey and Bulgaria, who are more amenable to such treatment. The influence of German universities and university professors in this direction of recent years has been very great, not only in Europe but in America, and it will, of course, be extended wherever possible after the war. Already a university has been established in Constantinople, and although it has made itself ridiculous by proposing the Kaiser for the Nobel Peace Prize it is likely to be more successful in its main object—the spread of German ideas in Turkey. This policy is already put forward under the specious plea of promoting Turkish independence. Every one who knows Turkey is familiar with the work of the mission schools, a very large number of them American, which have carried on their civilising labours without attempting to use their influence for political purposes. These "alien schools," we are now told,[2]

"must be turned into true Turkish institutions. This will be a favourable moment . . . to see that German methods are appreciated. . . . The foundations of our power will be stronger and broader if—in harmony with Turkish wishes—we secure our influence, not by the establishment of new schools of our own, but by gradually introducing the German language as the most important second language in the Turkish schools, and thus by the

[1] Statement from a well-informed—seemingly official—source in the daily papers on February 5.

[2] "The Economic Rapprochement between Germany and Her Allies," vol. ii., p. 450, article on German-Turkish Economic relations. It is the standard book on the subject, and in its general cautious treatment marks a reaction against Naumann's "Mitteleuropa."

active and increasing collaboration of German teachers implanting a deep respect for the achievements of German culture."

But the economic side of Germany's programme is no less important than the military, and it is round this that controversy chiefly centres. It is best set forth in a series of quotations.

The following extract is taken from the chapter on Turkey in the large, composite and obviously semi-official book on "Germany and the World War" to which most of the best-known "political" professors have contributed.[1]

"The great problem of German-Turkish relations is commonly summed up in the watchword 'Berlin-Bagdad.' Enemy statesmen have discerned in this the idea of a German political domination. They have spoken of Turkey as a German province, or at least contemplated a German 'Protectorate' over the Turks. And yet the problem is not one of politics at all, but of economics. . . . Berlin and Bagdad are linked together as the termini of a mighty railroad that is now nearly completed—a line that will link up lands of widely different economic conditions and render possible an exchange between them which will make them independent of hostile competition, hostile attacks and, above all, the command of the sea. What we have to deal with, then, is *a great closed economic territory as the basis of political friendship.* All the States astride the line—the German industrial States in the North, the great Turkish agrarian State in the South-East, the Balkan States in the centre—will remain free to carry on their own national affairs, but they all have the same interest in exchanging their goods along this artery of communication. Granted that in peace time heavy goods will be mainly transported by sea to save expense, yet the existing crisis has shown us the immeasurable value of a secure line of communication by land, a line which is comparable with the great overland railways of the United States."

There speaks the voice of the bourgeoisie and the official classes. Let us add some representative testimonies from the working class. In the article already

[1] "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," Berlin, 1916, p. 305, chapter by Professor Dr. Carl H. Becker of Bonn. The preface to the second edition states that "the book has been received at home and abroad as an unprejudiced scientific treatment of the events brought about by the war." Italics, as in all subsequent quotations, are reproduced from the original.

quoted from the leading Socialist monthly paper the writer remarks—

"The peace which seems possible to us to-day will leave Germany and her allies in the eyes of Europe as a group of Powers whose sphere of economic control extends from the marshes of the Elbe to the waters of the Persian Gulf. Thus Germany, in close union with her allies, will have won by her arms the kernel of a great sphere of economic control worthy to be set as a closed economic system (*geschlossenes Wirtschaftsgebiet*) by the side of those of the other world-Empires."

In 1915, before the entry of Bulgaria, a number of leading German trade unionists representing the chief industries of the country published a book entitled "Working Class Interests and the Issue of the War." It was a naked appeal to sectional self-interest, in harmony with the dominant philosophy of the country. Trade by trade the German workman is told that defeat means ruin and victory more work and higher wages. But whenever the question of peace terms crops up the familiar exposition of Eastern policy reappears:

"A German commercial policy which met the needs of the Balkan States and, above all, of Turkey would bring with it invaluable consequences. It would bind those peoples more closely to Germany, because it would offer them mutual advantages and the possibility of cultural progress. It would suit the interests of the German consumer, because it would assure him of the import of foodstuffs independently of the sea and of England. . . . It would also be of advantage to our industries. The procuring of *industrial raw materials* is extremely important for the trade unionist as for the manufacturer. Already to-day we are importing *wool* from those regions. With the improvement of methods of communication cotton-production would assume a greater importance for Turkey, to the great advantage of the Central Powers. There is no reason to rely for ever on the American supply or to be dependent on the development of Africa. Both these sources can be cut off from the sea. The straight road to Asia is, however, open if only these peoples can be *interested in the prosperity of Germany*." [1]

[1] "Arbeiterinteressen und Kriegsergebniss:" a Trade Union war book,

The same point of view is dominant in the most interesting Socialist document which has as yet come to hand on the subject, the published report of the proceedings at a meeting between the official representatives of the German and Austrian Socialist and Trade Union movements, held at Berlin early in 1916. From the purely intellectual point of view the discussion was on an extraordinarily high level, and the various conflicting factors and interests in the complicated economic situation were analysed with a wealth of practical and theoretical knowledge seldom found at political gatherings in this country. But the whole discussion is dominated by the materialist philosophy of Marx, which has proved so sinister a bond of union between Prussian militarism and German and Austrian socialism. The moral standpoint is simply non-existent. "Central Europe" is judged, not from the point of view of justice or moral values, but by whether it is the predestined next step in the economic evolution of the world; and from this standpoint there has been no difficulty in bringing round the great majority of Socialists to the policy of co-operating with the Governments and the bourgeois parties in promoting the closer economic union of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Near East. The general attitude of those present on the question of the rights of small nations may be judged by the following extract from the report of the remarks of the one courageous minority speaker (Ernest Meyer), who ventured to touch on the subject of the wishes of the non-German nationalities concerned : [1]

"From the Socialist point of view, we ought not only to ask

edited by William Jansson (editor of the official organ of the German Trade Union movement), p. 159, from the closing essay of the editor.

[1] Verbatim report of proceedings on January 9, 1916, issued by the Executive of the German Social-Democratic Party, Berlin, *Vorwarts* Publishing Office, 1916, p. 49. The words translated "Parish Pump politics" above are "Montenegrische Kirchturmspolitik"—*i.e.* "Montenegrin church steeple politics."

what are the interests of the German working-class; we ought also to take into account the interests of the workers in the Balkan countries. . . . Very likely our comrades in the Balkans have other wishes in preference to the *rapprochement* with the Central Powers. . . . We cannot demand that without further ado the wishes of the German workers should ride roughshod over theirs. (Interruption: 'Absurd!') Regard for the working-class interests of other countries has not hitherto been regarded by us as absurd. (Interruption: 'Parish Pump politics!')"

Let us complete the picture by an extract from the most widely read, as it is also by far the best written, of all the books that have appeared in Germany on this subject—a very oasis in a desert of sand—Naumann's "Central Europe." Attention has already been drawn, in a previous article, to the significance of Naumann's book in connection with German domestic policy; his exposition of the underlying meaning and philosophy of Germany's Eastern policy is equally striking:

"We have reached the heart of the constitutional problem of Central Europe.[1] It consists *in the marking off of National Government from Economic Government and Military Government.* The distinction is fundamental. We started, it will be remembered, with the idea of large-scale economic areas (*Weltwirtschaftsgebiete*). The large-scale economic area of Central Europe must be larger than the existing States of Germany and Austria-Hungary. We have refrained, for obvious reasons, from mentioning the names of neighbouring States to be brought in, merely stating in general terms that further accessions are necessary. But into what sort of a union shall they be brought in? The answer is: a military union and an economic union. Anything over and above this would be superfluous and positively harmful. In all other matters there must be no derogation of political independence. It is therefore vital to delimit the military and economic functions as so to work them into a new central government. Let us take first the latter side of this new union, or, if the expression be preferred, the new Economic State. . . . This Economic State will have its own customs frontiers just as the

[1] Central Europe is habitually now used by German writers to include the Turkish Empire, though Naumann is more directly concerned with Austria-Hungary.

military State will have its trench defences. Within these frontiers it will promote a wide and active interchange of commodities. For this a central Economic Government will be required, which will be directly responsible for part of the economic arrangements concerned and will advise the national Governments as to the remainder. Customs, the control of syndicates or trusts, organisations for promoting exports, patents, trade marks, etc., will be under central control. Commercial law, traffic policy, social policy and similar matters will only be indirectly within its purview. But the super-national Economic State, once established, will steadily increase its powers and will gradually evolve an administrative and representative system of its own."[1]

Here, then, we have the programme. The new German Empire, we now see, is not, and is not intended to be, a political unit in the ordinary sense of the term. It is ostensibly an alliance—an association of militarised partners, each pursuing objects of their own, but bent on preserving a closed system against the jealousy of the outer world, and submitting to the general direction of the most powerful member of the group. The guiding motive is self-interest, and the terms of alliance are a business contract.[2] The four Powers are in league for what they can get out of it: and Germany, who holds the others to her by a characteristic blending of cajolery and terrorism, maintains the alliance, with the definite material object of eventually rendering herself independent of British sea-power as regards the import of foodstuffs

[1] "Mitteleuropa," by Friedrich Naumann. Berlin, 1915: p. 249. The passage quoted will be found on p. 272 of the English translation (P. S. King & Co., 1916).

[2] This is brought out most clearly of all in the manifesto, unique in its combination of peasant cunning and *naïveté*, which was issued by the Bulgarian Government previous to its entry into the war. It is reprinted in Herkner, vol. ii. It is perhaps the first time in history that a call to arms has been backed up by statistics. The following extract is typical of the whole: "Germany and Austria-Hungary are cut off from American and Russian imports of corn. If, therefore, we can get our corn to their markets we can sell it free of duty and at the price of 60 to 80 francs per 100 kilogrammes. Bulgaria would be guilty of the greatest of crimes if she did not make arrangements (*i.e.* by attacking Serbia) to enable our corn to be sold at these high prices" (p. 470).

and essential raw materials, such as cotton and wool. She conceives the world as divided up among a few great World Powers with mutually exclusive economic spheres, and she is determined to carve out her own area of exploitation.

It is hardly worth while to point out to British readers how this conception conflicts at every point with the principles and practice of our own "free, tolerant and unaggressive" Commonwealth, which has kept clear the seas for the trade of the whole world and maintained throughout its dependencies the principle of the open door for all comers. That a system which is based merely on self-interest and repudiates the very suspicion of any deeper unity is built upon unsure foundations is a proposition which need not be argued in the pages of *The Round Table*. Yet it is interesting to recall that this strange, new ambitious German scheme is in its general conception not a novelty but an anachronism. There was a time in British history when we, too, pursued the phantom of the "self-sufficient Empire" and regarded every neighbouring State as an intending highwayman. "Berlin-Bagdad," for all its parade of modern science, is little more than an adaptation to modern conditions of the ideas and policy of the "Old Colonial System," which led to such friction between the Colonies and the Mother Country and ultimately to the disruption of the Commonwealth.[1]

[1] "Anxiety to make England independent of continental Europe in respect of shipping and of certain raw materials . . . was the motive which prompted English statesmen to favour projects of American colonisation. . . .

"The policy of British statesmen towards the colonies was moulded by the conceptions of their commercial systems. They left the colonists to concentrate their attention on the local affairs of their several communities, in the belief that Britain could bind them to herself by undertaking to defend them against foreign aggression, and by offering a preference to their raw products, in return for which she was to confine the market for those products to herself. . . .

"The inherent defect of the system lay in the fact that it was one which could not exist without control, and that control lay in the hands of only one of the parties to the bargain. Each side was so situated as to think mainly or

That friction is inevitable, and is already plentifully in evidence. Germany's allies do not relish the prospect of being treated as the colonial plantations of a modern industrial State. The Turkish Government, for instance, has recently announced a complete revision of the Turkish tariff, and German authorities are already complaining of the "industrial fanaticism" by which it is inspired. The Hungarians, whose country is described by Naumann in glowing periods as the "granary" of Germany, protest that their manufacturers only need an influx of German capital to develop on prosperous lines. Austrian industrial interests have been so much alarmed at the prospect of Austria becoming the dumping ground of German goods [1] that the idea of a Customs Union has already been abandoned for the milder formula of an "economic rapprochement." The disputes which always break out in a partnership where self-interest is the only tie are already in full swing.

But we need not conclude too hastily that these conflicts of interest will undermine the foundations of the new project of Empire. That can be done, and must be done, by the Allies alone. For there are two great outstanding differences between the old Colonial system of Britain and the new Colonial system of Germany, which ensure to the latter, if secure from without, at least a temporary stability. In the first place, Germany has and will retain the undisputed military control over her allies, so that of the two alternatives, tyranny or disruption, the former is the more likely. Secondly, each of her allies

exclusively of its own interests, which was but a part of the whole. There was no common control in which all shared, such as might compel them to think of the interests of all—of the interests, that is to say, of the Commonwealth as a whole."

"The Commonwealth of Nations," edited by L. Curtis, pp. 245, 307, 309.

[1] Not all Austrian manufacturers share this view. At a conference of the Lower Austrian Union of Trades, on May 14, 1915, a glove manufacturer remarked in all innocence: "In trades like ours taste is the most important factor involved, and we shall all readily admit that we have nothing to fear from German competition in this respect." Herkner, vol. ii. p. 161.

is itself a tyrant, practising ascendancy over lesser peoples, so that a sense of common interest and common guilt is always at hand, in case of need, to hold the system together. Berlin-Bagdad represents the ascendancy of Germans, Magyars, Bulgarians and Turks over Alsatians, Poles, Danes, Czechs, Jugoslavs, Roumanians, Italians, Slovaks, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, and other races. In the last analysis, as they know already to their cost, the lesser partners have little voice in the higher direction of the system, just as the German people themselves have little voice in the decisions of their own Government. But they realise that the alternative before them is not the transference of their allegiance to another camp, but in the case of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, at any rate, a drastic alteration both in the boundaries and in the character of their Governments. So they acquiesce perforce in the control of Berlin, a control over the lives of some 150 million people—one-tenth of the population of the world—exercised, directly or indirectly, by the same methods—the combination of prestige and terrorism—by which the old Empires of the East retained their temporary dominion over some of the same unhappy lands; at the best, organisation, discipline, efficiency, science, material well-being; at the worst, forced labour, deportation, slavery, massacre.

Such an Empire is not a commonwealth or community of citizens. It is not even an autocracy of the familiar type. It is something different and more sinister: a military and economic unit, a barracks and a plantation, an area in which the normal concerns and functions of government and social life are subordinated to the demands and requirements of an economic and military General Staff. In peace its inhabitants are no more than a "labour-force"; in war they are simply "man-power." If it survives the present war and is allowed to be consolidated in the future peace, it will rivet tyranny for yet another generation upon the peoples of Central Europe

and Nearer Asia, and make ready, slowly perhaps but inevitably, as its resources develop and a new crop of soldiers grows to manhood, for yet another trial of strength between militarism and the forces of liberty and justice.

THREE DOCTRINES IN CONFLICT[1]

In the climax of the conflict in which the world is involved men's minds have become susceptible as never before to the power of ideas. The guns are still speaking as in 1914, and they will go on speaking, ever more forcibly, till victory is achieved ; since, in the great argument which Prussia provoked, no other form of decision avails. But side by side with the guns, and mixing its music with theirs, goes a running undercurrent of discussion, of questioning, of philosophising. Men who never reasoned before are turning their minds to consider the cause for which their continued endurance is demanded. Women too, newly enfranchised or hoping for enfranchisement, newly bereaved or in daily anxiety of bereavement, are joining in the silent debate. As the whole framework of society has been violently wrenched and reshaped to meet the necessities of a war which affects every department of social existence, so men's minds too, under the stress of change, are being torn from the moorings of custom and carried forward to unknown destinations. New ideas are blowing round us in the storm-laden sky. Old ideas, forgotten since 1848 and earlier, are astir in their company. Europe is in a ferment, and in the universal uncertainty, in the increasing misery and suffering, no man can predict what forces, what leaders, what forms of society and government will emerge for her peoples.

At such a time it is necessary, not only to meet force with force on the battlefield, but to meet argument with

[1] From *The Round Table*, March, 1918.

argument. It was for that reason, no doubt, that the Prime Minister, on behalf of the British Commonwealth, and President Wilson, on behalf of the United States, recently restated the war-aims of their peoples. But a restatement of war-aims does not meet the whole need of which men are conscious. It does not cut down to the roots of the debate. What questioning and critical spirits, in Britain and elsewhere, are demanding is something deeper and more searching than a statement of just terms of peace between the contending Governments. They are asking for the title-deeds of the Governments themselves. They are raising the fundamental questions of political and social philosophy. They desire to know by what right, kings, ministers, and generals command and soldiers and subjects obey, why the few are rich and the many poor, why some peoples bear rule and others are dependent, why, in the distribution of wealth and power both amongst individuals and nations, so much leaps to the eye which seems unequal, arbitrary, and to be justified only by the logic of force.

The following article embodies an attempt not to answer but to provide guidance towards the answer of such and similar questionings. To restate the outline of a political faith, and to contrast it with contending creeds, must necessarily involve an element of platitude. Yet nothing is more common, in times of crisis, than to find that, while the world's opinion is being swayed hither and thither by winds of strange doctrine, familiar and fundamental truths are overlooked.

Three doctrines of society and government are fighting for mastery in the world of to-day. Two of them are contending for victory on the battlefield. All three are contending for victory over men's minds. The first is the principle of Prussianism ; the second is the principle of Revolution ; the third is the principle of the Commonwealth.

In the battle which has been joined between these

three antagonists compromise will be difficult, if not impossible : for the adherents of each are struggling for a victory complete, universal, and decisive. Each aspires to win success not in one country but in all—to achieve the recognition of its unquestioned predominance throughout the civilised world : for the adherents of each, and indeed the hopes of mankind, are bent upon the attainment of a settlement founded, not on the shifting sands of compromise, but on the general acceptance, as the basis of the new world order, of certain agreed principles regarding the organisation of society, the nature of government, and the conduct of international relations. It is this world-wide character of the debate and the urgency of the issues that hang upon it which justify the attempt to isolate the doctrines involved from the entanglements of surrounding circumstance and to examine them in the clear light of historical experience and ethical principle.

I

Prussianism, as we see it embodied in Central Europe to-day, is not a new phenomenon in history. In its cruder aspects it is as old as Egypt and Assyria. But it has never before been worked out with so much skill, persistence, and courage, or attracted to its banner such a host of able, heroic, and disinterested servants. If we are to understand its full purport or the true force of its appeal, we must make an effort to see it through the eyes of those from whom, as the history of the last three and a half years proves, it has the power to call forth such an abundant reserve of sacrifice and endurance. We must learn to view it, not as a mere policy of military conquest and economic aggrandisement, inspired and directed by a caste of professional soldiers and their hereditary chief, but as a logical and consistent body of political, philosophical and religious doctrine.

Prussianism is a doctrine of authority. It is founded on a sense of the weakness and helplessness of man in his natural state. Man is not born free. He is born a slave —a slave to impulse and caprice, to bodily need, to the buffetings of an imperious environment. Isolated, ignorant, undisciplined, man, the latest-born heir of creation, is no radiant young prince, as some idealists see him, ready and fitted to enter into the rich inheritance of the ages, but a reed shivering in the wind of inward and outward circumstances.

Thus far Prussianism moves in agreement with all those, whether in ancient Greece or modern Britain and America, who have preached the need for a rule, a standard, a guiding authority, as the base of the whole social scheme. Where Prussianism diverges from the doctrine of the framers of the American Constitution and from the principles expressed in the institutions of the British Commonwealth is in the task which it sets before that authority to perform and in the nature and credentials of the authority itself.

What is that task? What, in the Prussian view, is the object of political and social organisation? Is it to secure that this shivering reed, this weak and trembling being called man, this plaything of nature, shall attain, through wise guidance, to the self-control without which freedom is a snare, and then through freedom to the powers and responsibilities which make up the full stature of manhood? That is not the Prussian answer. Prussianism has at once too little faith in the potentialities of human nature and too keen a sense of the practical urgencies of present-day life. "Freedom," it answers, "may indeed be the hall-mark of complete being. It may indeed be desirable, in the abstract, for the children of men in all their relationships. As to that we will not be dogmatic. If the conditions of social existence were other than what they are, the experiment of training the race to the exercise of uncontrolled freedom might well

be tried. But within the limits of human life as it is, and of the possibilities open to rulers and lawgivers, we dare not contemplate the opening of the dykes which hold in the dark waters of popular will and passion. The true objects of government and social organisation are to be sought in another sphere. We do not aim at training the natural man to be free. We aim at training him for the use of an authority higher and wiser than himself. We aim at creating material and spiritual conditions which shall turn his ignorance into knowledge, his weakness into serviceable strength, and his want of discipline into firm and confident obedience. We aim at making out of lonely and capricious units, each with its own private fancies and inclinations, with its infinitely various dispositions and capacities, of which in its own narrow field it is powerless to make good use, an army, steady, self-controlled, homogeneous, invincible, a fit instrument to achieve the highest purposes of the Creator. Thus we give to each man, not what the West calls freedom—for such freedom, as all history proves, only breeds weakness and anarchy—but something which we think worthier of that great word, the freedom that the angels know, the freedom which consists, not in individual initiative or decision or assent, not in the achievement of self-chosen purposes, but in the perfect service of a righteous and revered authority."

What is that authority? It is the authority of a Christian King, of a ruler who holds his power by Divine Right.

The Divine Right of Kings is a phrase that has so long been unfamiliar to English lips that it is hard for us to realise that the belief is still in full vigour.[1] We who

[1] Prussian Conservatives hold that his divine election empowers the King to intercede between God and his people. On the occasion of William II.'s birthday on January 27 last, the *Kreuz Zeitung*, alluding to his prayers for his people, said: "Among the heathen and Jews the office of Priest was often associated with their King. Happy the Christian nation whose King voluntarily assumes the priestly office for his people."

know Prussianism by its fruits in Belgium and elsewhere are accustomed to think of it as essentially irreligious. That such is too often its effect upon its agents the war has unhappily afforded testimony enough. But this is neither the whole truth nor indeed that part of it which it most behoves us to understand. It is a law of the world that no strong organisation, be it a nation or a band of robbers, can be purely evil ; for evil through its own nature spreads weakness, suspicion, and disunion. Were Prussianism purely evil it would have collapsed long ago. It could not have drawn on the reserves of strength which have enabled it to maintain an heroic unequal contest against hunger, hardship, and superior numbers. Prussianism stands for more than the use of howitzers and cannon fodder. It is a creed held, with intense conviction, by men who have had the courage to apply it, logically and consistently, to every relationship of life. Its prophets and leaders, of whom Bismarck is the shining exemplar, have not only been unfeignedly devout in their personal lives, but have seen no disharmony, but rather a close association between their religious beliefs and their political and social philosophy.

"No State," said Bismarck, "has a secure existence unless it has a religious foundation. For me the words, 'By the Grace of God,' which Christian rulers add to their name, is no empty phrase ; I see in them a confession that the princes desire to wield the sceptre which God has given them according to the will of God on earth. If we withdraw this foundation we retain in a State nothing but an accidental aggregate of rights, a kind of bulwark against the war of all against all."

And again, speaking in 1848, when the dykes had for the moment broken down and Europe seemed about to be inundated with the waves of popular passion, he reminded his hearers, in words which have become historic as the lodestar of two generations of policy, that the Prussian cause rested "on authority created by God, an authority by the Grace of God," and had been "developed

in organic connection with the existing and constitutional legal status."

These famous words not only reveal the nature of the Prussian authority—the King by the grace of God—but tell us something as to how that authority is in practice exercised and made effective. The King of Prussia is no arbitrary Oriental Sultan, no Temporal Pope, whose personal power is unlimited and personal opinion infallible: he acts, in accordance at once with the dictates of conscience and the "existing and constitutional legal status."

What is that status? It is a constitution granted by the King, and subject to revocation by him at pleasure, by which he limits his power and accords certain rights and responsibilities to chosen classes and individuals among his subjects.

This is not the place in which to describe the constitutional development of Prussia or to sketch the intricacies of the present system of legislation and administration. But their effect has been, in brief, to surround the monarch with a body of able, fearless and unbending retainers from among the landed gentry or *Junker* (squires) of the old Prussian provinces—a class at once fanatically loyal to their "all-highest War-lord" and fanatically jealous for their own military traditions and constitutional privileges. It is upon the basis of their allegiance that the structure of the Prussian power has been raised. Had not the Great Elector, according to the true Prussian doctrine, crushed, tamed and subjected them, converting their wilful and fissiparous feudalism into the willing instrument of his royal purpose, the Prussian nobility would have languished in petty power and disunion like their compeers in Hanover, Mecklenburg, and South Germany, the victims of their own useless and impotent freedom. "The intimate union of Crown and people," wrote the King of Prussia a few weeks since, in reply to the birthday greetings of the Prussian Upper House,

"which I received as a sacred heritage from my fathers, dates from the hard times by which Prussia was trained for its world-historical mission."

For the last two centuries the Prussian King and his people—a military bodyguard of country squires—have pursued this mission together, and the relationship, at first military and personal, has been crystallised into legal and constitutional forms. Together they have added province upon province to the original Prussian domain—Silesia, Posen, Westphalia, the Lower Rhine, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel have been directly incorporated. Alsace-Lorraine, conquered mainly by Prussian arms, was added to the German Empire when, in 1871, it was inaugurated under Prussian auspices. And now they have gone forward once more. Belgium, Poland, Courland, and Lithuania lie within that unrelaxing grasp. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey are dependent, as South Germany has been dependent since 1871.

But the distinguishing feature of Prussianism is not its successful career of military conquest. Military conquest, after all, is a matter of technical training, equipment and skill, of local superiority, sometimes of accident. The world has seen many examples of resounding military success, of seemingly invincible armies. Alexander and Napoleon both grew from smaller beginnings and stretched their arm farther over the known world than Prussia. What distinguishes the career of Prussia from that of Alexander and Napoleon is its capacity for absorbing its victims and converting them, within a generation, into agents for the further extension of its power. No military State in history has shown this capacity in so high a degree since the days of Rome. The Prussians are the Romans of the modern world. They are moving to world-mastery from similar small beginnings, by similar gradual stages, by a similar combination of force and civilising achievement, of legions and lawgiving, of skilful

education and ruthless suppression. To give to the modern world, so restless and divided, so anxious for unhindered security, a Roman peace, guaranteed by the iron majesty of Roman laws and Roman arms, is the dream of Prussian idealism.

How has this great work of subjection and absorption been accomplished? By the power of fear and by the power of knowledge.

It has lately been remarked by an acute psychologist[1] that social philosophers are apt to judge of mankind according to the nature of the system which they desire to provide for it and to see little in human nature save what accords with their initial design. Thus Hobbes, for instance, played on the single motive of fear, Burke relied on the force of use and wont, and Bentham read self-interest into every act of man. Prussianism, like Hobbes, sees chiefly in man a being responsive to fear.

To the true-born Prussian, living as he does in a perpetual minority, like the Spartan among his Helots, reliance on terrorism and the cultivation of a sense of arrogant contempt towards other peoples and classes has become a fixed habit. "*Vox populi*," said a Junker deputy, in a recent outburst, "*Vox populi, vox cattle.*"

"The population here," wrote Bismarck from Frankfurt in 1848, in the days when that city was almost as great a hotbed of revolutionary feeling as Petrograd is to-day, "would be a political volcano if revolutions were made with the mouth; so long as it requires blood and strength they will obey any one who has the courage to command and, if necessary, to draw the sword; they would be dangerous only under cowardly Governments."

According to the spirit of these words Bismarck acted towards South Germany all his life, and so his successors have dealt with their present allies. "Frightfulness" is the spearhead of the Prussian attack. They have studied the motions of fear in all their manifestations, from the first faint symptoms of weakening, the first flickering of

[1] Graham Wallas, "The Great Society," p. 147.

the eyelid, to the wild-eyed panic which sweeps away regiments and populations in ignominous rout.

Fear is the cement of the Prussian dominion. Her young people know it in the classroom, when the shadow of the State examination, on which their whole social status depends, darkens their adolescent years. Their soldiers know it in the barracks and on the drill ground. The civilian knows it in his contact with the soldier and the public official ; the South German in his contact with the Prussian, the ally in his contact with the German. The natives of the German colonies know it well. So do the inhabitants of the occupied territories, and the neutral Governments and peoples, and voyagers by sea, and dwellers in cities within reach of Prussia's strong arm. It is her recurring tactic in military and naval operations, in diplomacy, in internal policy, even in business, where she has taught her agents to conceal temporary weakness and embarrassment by spreading legends of inexhaustible reserves of money-power and invincible skill in salesmanship and manufacture. Prestige, discipline, demoralisation—prestige for herself, discipline for her servants, demoralisation for the rest. These in the Prussian conception are the harvest of fear.

But with the inculcation of fear has gone the inculcation of knowledge. "Culture" and terrorism have ranged the world together. First of all European States Prussia realised that knowledge is power : that to exercise dominion in the modern world a Government must not only train its whole manhood to arms, but set its whole people to school and mould their minds to its bent. "Culture" existed before Prussia made the conception her own ; it meant, and still means, familiarity with the best products of human thought and feeling, refinement of taste, a wide outlook, an acquaintance with men and things. But culture in the Prussian sense is something less pleasing in its appeal and less universal in its range. Prussian culture is a State product : it is

knowledge, State-organised and State-edited, employed to found or perpetuate a State tradition or to forward a State purpose. It is the armoury whence Prussia draws the weapons of knowledge or opinion with which to promote her designs.

Upon knowledge, thus cultivated and canalised, the strength of Prussia has depended and still depends to-day —upon the faithful and tireless docility of her servants and victims. It was not simply the skill of her diplomats and generals which enabled her to reap the fruits of her victory over the other German States in 1866, but the science, the swift efficiency, the monumental solidity of the system thereby revealed. She drew South Germany to her in that seven weeks' campaign and in the years that followed by the magic of intellectual achievement. She awed its statesmen ; her glamour dazzled the middle class ; she hypnotised the rising generation at school and in the army ; she whetted the ambition and stimulated the desires of her merchants and manufacturers. So again it was not simply the physical courage of her soldiers, but the trained intelligence of Moltke and Roon, fertilised by the teachings of Clausewitz and a great school of thinkers upon the art of war, which won the victories of 1870. Nor is it any pre-eminence in natural capacity, any striking gifts of taste or insight or sensibility, which have given German scholarship its worldwide reputation. It is its patient, plodding, conscientious, systematic use of specialised knowledge, the well-devised alliance of Prussian organisation with the old South German spirit of research. By knowledge she won her position in the arts of production and in the markets of the world. And by knowledge her power has been maintained during three years of unexampled warfare and blockade—by the intelligent and well-directed industry of her workmen, by the technical skill of her chemists and engineers, her manufacturers and financiers, by the organising ability and deeply pondered experience of her General Staff, by the

concentrated and disciplined labours of countless servants of the Prussian power who form the rank and file of her fighting forces at the front and in the rear.

Thus Prussia, having linked knowledge to power, and founded both in a disciplined loyalty to an authority which has been tested in action and so far not been found wanting, supported by allies, her equals in name but already half absorbed into her system, bestrides Europe and the Near East and looks forward, tired but confident, straitened and suffering, but to all outward seeming victorious, towards a peace which will give her breathing space to plan the next step in her "world-historical mission."

II

In December, 1917, the German army lay far out in Russian territory. During over three years of campaigning it had won a series of resounding victories—Tannenberg, Gorlice, Warsaw, Tarnopol, Riga. It had overrun vast provinces, centres of industry and wealth, protected by important fortresses. It had broken up the whole defensive system of European Russia, inflicting immense losses on her armies. The German navy had just successfully attacked and occupied the key of the Eastern Baltic. Before the German generals the way to Petrograd lay open. Russia was powerless to resist. Her army was demoralised and in process of disorderly disbandment. Her railways, the arterial system on which her vast bulk depends for the elements of warmth and subsistence, for the possibility of life itself, were almost as disorganised as her army. The workmen in her towns were crying out for bread and peace. Her peasants were too busy pegging out claims of fresh land, and too distrustful of the paper roubles with which the enemy had helped to flood the country, either to attend to the work of production or to make available what produce they had.

Famine and civil war, disease and licence stalked through the land with giant strides. In March there had been one Russia from Poland to the Pacific ; now, whether there were six or sixty no man could tell. Republics sprang up in a night. Cities and districts proclaimed their independence. The realm of the Romanoffs, of Catherine, of Peter the Great, was no more. Russia had reeled back into the dark ages. She lay prostrate, sick of a malady that had long been in her blood, which deprived her even of the power to minister to her own relief.

A turn of the wheel had put the reins of such organised power as still existed in her capital into the hands of a knot of resolute men, exiles lately returned to their native land. The populace asked for peace. They had joined in the demand themselves, and now they responded. They informed the enemy of their willingness, first to conclude an armistice and then to treat for peace. The armistice was concluded, and then, on a given day, the delegates of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, the temporary masters of Petrograd, were conveyed on a German train, despatched to fetch them, to the head-quarters of the German Eastern Army at Brest-Litovsk.

The fate of Russia was entrusted, in these negotiations, to a strangely assorted company. A peasant and a workman, a private soldier and a sailor came to take part in the discussions, shepherded by three or four revolutionary politicians. Staff officers accompanied them as technical experts, to advise their plebeian masters. One of these, General Skalon, overcome by the occasion of his mission, put an end to his life during the course of the discussions. Thus, in every circumstance of tragedy and discouragement, the representatives of the Russian Revolution entered the hall of session to open negotiations with the delegates of victorious Prussian power.

Then followed the strangest debate, surely, of which history bears record. It was not a debate, indeed, but a

dialogue—a philosophical dialogue held, not, as of old, in porch or cloister, but in the open forum, with all mankind for audience. While the Prussian generals sat by waiting for the negotiations between victor and vanquished to pursue its orthodox traditional course, they saw their civilian colleague, who with an imprudent show of generosity had wandered beyond his beat, drawn into paths of metaphysical argument by men who, brooding in long years of exile, had trodden these tracks till they had become more familiar than solid earth. Thus the spokesmen of the Revolution, with desolation behind them, but an audacity outsoaring Prussia's to sustain their spirit, were able, from this singular point of vantage, to make a listening world familiar with their whole thought and purpose.

Bolshevism, as the leaders of the Soviet preach and practise it, is not a new doctrine. In its emotional appeal it is as old as slavery, in its speculations and projects as old as industrialism. Nor is it the first time that it has seized power and essayed the task of government. Paris has seen and remembers not all but something of what Petrograd now endures. The preachings of Lenin and Trotsky are but a crude and contorted version of ideas which have been discussed, in part adopted and in part discarded, by students and statesmen in happier countries than Russia during the last three generations. Closely examined, what they have to set before us is not a system of life and government, well compacted, logical and consistent, as the metallic and uncompromising ring of their language might seem to imply, but a patchwork composition in which victims of all the oppressions of which the modern world is full can find food for their own particular dream of liberation or revenge, for their elemental anger, their unthinking and childlike fanaticism. Democracy and militarism, socialism and syndicalism, pacifism and the class-war, nationalism and internationalism —these are disconnected and discordant ideals, yet all are

equally proclaimed or implied in the Bolshevik programme. Government by the whole people, owning and controlling the machinery of production; government by a section of the people organised in councils composed of privileged groups of workers: peace with the foreign enemy, since the power of propaganda is greater than power of the sword; war against the domestic exploiter, since only through civil war can the working class come into its own: "self-determination," the right of secession and independent sovereignty for every national group, whatever the character of its policy and allegiance; the knitting together of the peoples into a single society controlled by an international council. Here is no single ordered doctrine, like Prussianism, no clean-cut programme for the future of humanity, but a shrill reiterated clamour of irrational contradiction.

Yet Bolshevism, riddled though it is with inconsistency, has a unity of its own, and the inner force that comes from unity; and with that force it may yet make much history in Europe. Its unity is not intellectual—it is emotional. Its devotees do not think alike—they feel alike. It is the emotion expressed in the simple battle-cry which to-day, as when Marx penned it seventy years ago, can set the waves of passion surging, at moments of crisis and suffering, in any crowded concourse of wage-earners:

Workers of the world, unite; you have a world to win and nothing to lose but your chains.

It is the emotion which springs from a consciousness of wrongs daily and hourly endured, of a human birthright withheld, of gifts wasted and perverted in soulless drudgery, of the existence of a great world of power and beauty and happiness beyond the utmost reach of the individual, but just not beyond his ken. It is the revolution of the soul of man against the outcome of a century of industrialism.

No man can understand the appeal of the revolutionary

movement till he has experienced or realised in imagination the degradation which the modern industrial system, with its false standard of values, its concentration on wealth and material production, its naïve detachment from ethical principle or civic obligation, has brought upon the masses who have served as the cannon fodder for its operations. "The worker in our modern world," says a writer whose lot is to live in the one country in Europe which is at once unspoiled by industrialism and relatively immune from the privations and compulsions of war,

"The worker in our modern world is the subject of innumerable unapplied doctrines. The lordliest things are predicated for him, which do not affect in the least the relationship with him of those who employ his labour. The ancient wisdom, as it is recounted to him on God's day, assures him of his immortality: that the divine signature is over all his being, that in some way he is co-related with the Eternal, that he is fashioned in a likeness to It. . . . So proud a tale is told of him, and when he wakens on the morrow after the day of God, he finds that none will pay him reverence. He, the destined comrade of Seraphim and Cherubim, is herded with other children of the King in fetid slum and murky alleys, where the devil hath his many mansions, where light and air, the great purifiers, are already dimmed and corrupted before they do him service. . . . So great a disparity exists between spiritual theory and the realities of the social order that it might almost be said that spiritual theory has no effect at all on our civilisation, and its inhuman contours seem softened at no point where we could say 'Here the Spirit has mastery. Here God possesses the world.'

"The imagination, following the worker in our industrial system, sees him labouring without security in his work, in despair, locked out, on strike, living in slums, rarely with enough food for health, bringing children into the world who suffer from malnutrition from their earliest years, a pauper when his days of strength are passed. He dies in charitable institutions. Though his labours are necessary, he is yet not integrated into the national economy. He has no share of his own in the wealth of the nation. He cannot claim work as a right from the holders of economic power, and this absolute dependence upon the autocrats

of industry for a livelihood is the greatest evil of any, for it puts a spiritual curse on him and makes him in effect a slave. Instinctively he adopts a servile attitude to those who can sentence him and his children to poverty and hunger without trial or judgment by his peers. A hasty word, and he may be told to draw his pay and begone. The spiritual wrong done him by the social order is greater than the material ill, and that spiritual wrong is no less a wrong because generation after generation of workers have grown up and are habituated to it, and do not realise the oppression ; because in childhood circumstance and the black art of education alike conspire to make the worker humble in heart and to take the crown and sceptre from his spirit, and his elders are already tamed and obsequious."[1]

Who will say that this description is exaggerated, as applied to the countries and classes where the ideals and temper of the Revolution make their strongest appeal ? And who can forbear to wonder that, confined as they are within such narrow and squalid limits, the workers, as a class, have preserved or developed such a boundless capacity for faith and hope and generous idealism ? For the victims of a system so deadening in its daily incidence the very power to feel indignation is itself an achievement. The message of the Revolution, bearing with it the glow of passion, the sense of union and organisation, the vague expectation of decisive action and perpetual release, comes as a tonic and lifegiving force. To the historian, the economist and the party leader and organiser the successive revolutionary programmes which have marked its European course, from the days of St. Simon through Marx and Bakunin to the latest Maximalist inspiration—socialism, anarchism, communism, syndicalism, in their changes and variations—are serious criticisms and philosophies of society and government. Not so to their followers. By the vast majority they are accepted, not as doctrines consciously adopted, the fruit of intelligence and reflection, but as a religion, a revelation, a

[1] "The National Being," by A. E., Dublin, 1916, pp. 66–68.

vision of the Kingdom. The Revolution, which substitutes economics for theology, and gilds the repellent theorems of the dismal science with an apocalyptic glow, is the workman's substitute for a Christianity which has seemed so powerless to supply him with sustenance either for body or spirit.

The emergence of the smouldering fires of the Revolution into activity in Europe is a natural result of three years of conflict in which the populations of the Continent have suffered as in the history of modern warfare only the peoples of the Confederacy have been called upon to endure. For the subjects of the Central Empires, locked in the prison-house of a slave State, revolution is, if they dare to take it, the shortest road to safety, comfort, and freedom. But forest fires know nothing of frontiers ; and to the peoples of the Alliance, some of them, France, Italy, and the smaller nations, bearing an almost equal or even greater strain, the propaganda of the Revolution at this crisis of the war against Prussianism is an unwelcome distraction and may even be a disaster: for it darkens counsel and divides and confuses the forces of freedom.

"Let us try never to forget," wrote a wise French Liberal[1] lately, "that Socialism is for Liberalism an ever doubtful ally. It has not the passion for liberty, it has not the passion for nationality, it has no passion, no instinct, save for the struggle against the bourgeois class. It has, at this moment, the instinct that whoever may be the victor, this war is preparing for it a very great future. It is impatient for the moment which will allow it to begin to gather its harvest, to store away at last the fruit of so much suffering. It is almost prepared to neglect, as a fact of secondary importance, whether it must do its harvesting under German guidance or under some other. Its thought is elsewhere. It is, moreover, made up of masses who have the habit of being dominated, and one domination more leaves it unamazed."

The same warning, never more necessary than to-day,

[1] M. Daniel Halévy in the *New Republic*, January 5, 1918.

runs like a refrain through the writings of the most prophetic of all nineteenth-century idealists. "By dividing into fractions that which is in reality but one thing," wrote Mazzini in 1852, "by separating the social from the political question, a numerous section of French Socialists has powerfully contributed to bring about the present shameful position of affairs in France." And speaking of the revolutionary propaganda of that day and its distracting influence on idealistic endeavour, he wrote :

"Man is not changed by whitewashing or gilding his habitation ; a people cannot be regenerated by teaching them the worship of enjoyment ; they cannot be taught a spirit of sacrifice by speaking to them of material rewards. . . . The Utopist may see afar from a hill the distant land which will give to society a virgin soul, a purer air ; his duty is to point it out with a gesture and a word to his brothers ; but he cannot take humanity in his arms and carry it there in a single bound ; even if this were in his power, humanity would not therefore have progressed."

And again, in words that strikingly recall recent history in Russia, he says of the French movement :

"Anarchy entered its ranks. A man, gifted with a power of logic, disastrous because applied to the service of a false principle, and able to dominate weak minds by his incredible audacity and his clear and cutting rhetoric, came to throw the light of his torch upon this anarchy. . . . He refuted one system by another ; he contradicted himself ten times over. He enthroned irony as queen of the world, and proclaimed the Void. It is through this Void that Louis Napoleon has entered." [1]

What Mazzini said of the effect of the influence of Proudhon on the career of Napoleonism in France may yet prove true of the influence of Trotsky on the career of Prussianism in Europe.

For the revolutionary idea does more than break up the unity of the forces of freedom : it tends to realign

[1] "Europe : Its Condition and Prospects. Collected Works VI.," pp. 239, 250–1, 253.

them against one another, leaving the front unguarded against the common enemy. In the name of liberty and under the guise of friendship, it instinctively seeks out the failings to which liberalism in a crisis is ever prone, its distaste for authority, its repudiation of discipline, its tendency to mistake argument for action, its capacity for illusion and for ignoring unpleasant realities. True, it presses its attack also against the legions of Prussia and her allies. But fear may well prove a firmer master than idealism, and Prussianism, with its supreme and perfected military administration, is better versed in the art of repression than the free and responsible Governments of the West. While such equivocal forces are afield let the army of freedom beware!

The votaries of revolution, overleaping the present, claim the future for their own. Ignoring or discounting the war, they have already annexed the coming age. But the future is not with them. Masters alone in the arts of enthusiasm and destruction, the world will not turn to them to repair its ruin and desolation. Not through such ministers of wrath will salvation come. To steadier hands and wiser heads will fall the healing tasks of the new order.

III

Prussianism and the Revolution are near akin. Both were cradled in violence and brought up on tales of conflict. Both have learned in the school of experience to regard all life as a war, now open, now concealed. Both aim at world-ascendancy and pursue that aim by terrorism. Both are unscrupulous in negotiation, daring and resolute in action, impenetrably self-centred in thought and purpose. Both acknowledge no authority, no principle of humanity or goodwill beyond the blind and driving law of their own being. Both are members of that tribe of devouring fanaticisms whose dreary and

blood-stained doings fill so large and tragic a place in the recorded annals of mankind.

It was this psychological kinship, so real and perceptible beneath the striking contrast of their external credentials and appearance, which gave dramatic interest and unity to the dialogue at Brest. Here were the two great destructive agencies of our time met face to face in the persons of their chosen representatives: the one gross, solid, material, equipped with the full panoply of martial grandeur; the other with no visible legions to support it, but strong in the consciousness of a power, elusive, all-pervading, impalpable, an infection in the air, a fever in the blood, a terror lurking in the dark.

The spokesmen of the Revolution, for their part, did not fail to acknowledge the relationship. "When General Hoffmann pointed out," said M. Trotsky, on January 14, "that the Russian Government based its position on power, and that it makes use of force against all those whose opinions differ from its own, and that it stigmatises them as counter-revolutionaries and bourgeois, it should be observed that the Russian Government is based upon power. Throughout the whole of history no other government has been known. So long as society consists of contending classes, the power of Governments will be based on strength, and these Governments will maintain their dominion by force. . . . What the Governments of other countries object to in the actions of the Russian Government is the way in which it makes use of its power, and from this policy it does not allow itself to be deterred."

Here is the inner link between Prussianism and the Revolution. Here is the hidden root from which so much bitter fruit has sprung. Here, in a few sentences, is the complete philosophy of militarism. If this is the whole truth about society and government, then force is the only arbiter between contending parties and principles, and the big battalions, as so often, will

engage philosophers after the event to justify the necessary, the inevitable, the "progressive" character of their achievement. Or can we find some more universal and more harmonious ideal? Can we build the house of our faith, of our political and social allegiance upon some firmer and sounder foundation? Is there some standard, some guiding principle, which we can set up with assurance against the crude and corrupting doctrine of force?

Such a principle exists. It is working in us and around us. It is transforming human life and its institutions. To understand its nature, to realise the gulf which divides it from the contending militarisms, to grasp the true force and quality of its achievement, we must stand aside for a moment from the heat and conflict of the present age and survey, as from a mountain top, the situation and record of man as a whole.

IV

Man is a spiritual being. Seventy years, or little more, is the span of his physical life. This planet, which, save when he looks upward, bounds his vision, is the place where those years are spent. To enable him to live the best life it can afford him is the object of political and social organisation.

For unnumbered ages man has lived on the planet. They were ages of darkness and ignorance, and only dim traces of their record survive. Men and women were born, lived and died, endured cold and hunger, pain and danger, hunting and being hunted, dwelling almost as beasts among the beasts, knowing nothing of the planet save a few miles of hill or jungle, and nothing of man's being save what the passing occasion might call forth—now a stab of anger or curiosity, now a call to lead or to follow, some motion of fear or jealousy or revenge, a gleam of wonder, a glow of passion, a glory of friendship

or motherhood. Man was the slave of nature, the plaything of circumstance. Life was compacted of custom and instinct. Knowledge was not yet, and Reason, for lack of material for her use, was sluggish and undeveloped.

Slowly man mastered the outer and the inner knowledge. He learnt to control his environment—to make fire, to grow food, to sail, to spin, to weave, to use metals. He learnt to control his inherited nature—to subdue fear and lust, greed and ambition, jealousy and revenge, to trust and to keep trust, to command with justice and obey with honour, to enlarge his circle of loyalty from family to kin, from kin to tribe, to spare, even to conciliate his enemy, to reverence the old and respect the young, to sweeten his intercourse with lasting affections, to dignify it by contact with the sanctities of memory and aspiration. Life was no longer a struggle of all against all. It had become, on its narrow but expanding stage, a sphere of common endeavour, of mutual service. Thus civilisation began. Thus slowly and painfully, through the labours of an uncounted succession of humble men and women, was amassed the nucleus of that which is now in jeopardy, the social inheritance of mankind.

To preserve and increase this inheritance two things were needed, knowledge and institutions—knowledge as the instrument of future progress and conquests, institutions to embody in a living tradition the conquests of the present. The cultivation of knowledge and the establishment of social institutions mark the development of civilisation.

As the pressure of material need relaxed, knowledge, the child of wonder and reflection, grew. Wisdom and the arts were handed down and perfected from generation to generation, entrusted to poet and prophet and priest, to caste and guild, to schools of craftmanship and medicine, law and science, to the cloister and the

university, to the republics of science and letters, to the company of teachers and students throughout the world. With truth for task-mistress they have laboured in honourable rivalry, not simply for hire or reward, but for the service of mankind. Thus knowledge could replace instinct, reason could dethrone passion, in the ordering of human affairs.

But if instinct and passion are the blind weapons of the Revolution, knowledge, as we have seen, is the chief ally of Prussianism. Knowledge is not mistress in the house of life. She is but a handmaid, powerful of arm but unfitted for initiative. She is bound in humble service to fulfil the desires and purposes of others. What use men make of her depends in part upon their own individual and temporary desires, but in greater degree upon the character of the institutions which embody, at any time, the living tradition and lasting purposes of civilisation.

What are the common needs and concerns of men for which institutions have been devised? Two stand out above the rest—one economic, the other political. For his physical existence man needs material goods, food, clothing, shelter and domestic comfort. As a spiritual being man needs justice and liberty.

The history of social and political thought and endeavour is the record of man's attempt to create institutions appropriate for the fulfilling of these needs, to embody in a lasting and progressive tradition the dream of the perfect state and the perfect economic system. Far indeed has the fulfilment lagged behind the quest of the ideal in either sphere. Exploitation and the class-struggle, slavery and serfdom, profit-seeking and inequality stain the one record; tyranny and warfare, the ambition of the strong, the submission and spoliation of the weak, mar the other; and the end is not yet. But steadily through the ages, in Greece and Palestine, in Rome, ancient and mediæval, in England, France and

the New World, the purpose and ideal, first of politics, and then of industry also, have become clearer to the vision.

What is the nature of that ideal? If the close-knit institutions of Prussianism, as we have seen, leave men's souls starved and stunted, if the Revolution dissolves all institutions and plunges society back into barbarism, what doctrine, what principle of organisation can assure man order, harmony, and freedom, can satisfy at once the needs of body and spirit?

The inspiration of all sound and enduring political and social construction is what has been called the principle of the Commonwealth. The name is convenient because it serves to distinguish, as habitual usage does not, institutions which promote the cause of human welfare and those, such as have been described in Prussia, which have a more sectional and sinister purpose. What, it will be asked, is a Commonwealth? A Commonwealth is a community, designed to meet the common needs of men, founded on the principle of the service of each for all. Is the Commonwealth to be identified with any particular type of government? Is it necessarily a democracy? Does the service of all necessarily imply the rule of all? "Easier a great deal it is," wrote a wise Elizabethan, "for men by law to be taught what they ought to do than instructed to judge as they should do of law: the one being a thing which belongeth generally unto all, the other such as none but the wiser and more judicious sort can perform."[1] Yet since, despite the contempt of Prussia and the cynicism of the Revolution, the spirit of man was framed for wisdom and judgment, for responsibility, initiative and self-control, since a man without liberty is a being bereft, as the poet has said, of half his manhood, the perfect Commonwealth, the ideal towards which all political and social endeavour moves forward, is a society of free men and women, each at

[1] Hooker, "Ecclesiastical Polity," i, xvi, 2.

once ruling and being ruled, each consciously giving his service for the benefit of all.

The principle of the Commonwealth is the application to the field of government and social policy of the law of human brotherhood, of the duty of man to his neighbour, near and far. Like the opposing principle of militarism, it is as old as the need for conscious organisation, for the adoption of a policy in social affairs. In the earliest time, when men's duties and relationships were confined within a narrow personal circle, little effort was needed to enable him to discharge them. But from the day when man first felt the need for public right, for an impartial arbiter to stand between him and hot passion and bitter need, organisation has been the prop of social life and personal duty. Only through organisation, through citizenship and its related obligations, can man worthily play his part in a large-scale society. History has known organisations of every kind, designed with every sort of motive—tyranny, ambition, cruelty, greed or fear. A Commonwealth is an organisation designed with the ruling motive of love and brotherhood. It seeks to embody, not only in phraseology and constitutional doctrine, but in the actual conduct of public affairs, so far as the frailty and imperfection of man admit, the spirit and ideals of religion. *Whosoever will be great among you shall be your minister; and whosoever of you will be the chiefest shall be the servant of all.*

The doctrine of the Commonwealth, expressed in these words, has been set forth and applied from age after age to the current problems of humanity, from Plato down to President Wilson. It embodies, succinctly and unanswerably, the response of the soul of man to the twin challenge of Prussianism and Revolution. Yet there are criticisms which must be met. In theory, men will argue, the principle of the Commonwealth holds the field. Religion and philosophy, conscience and idealism, proclaim it. Yet how weak is its influence, how paltry

its achievements! Christianity has preached the doctrine of mutual service through twenty centuries, yet behold the shambles of to-day! Prussianism, as we have seen, pays lip service to the Christian State, and the Revolution, in its perorations, drops the language of conflict and makes its appeal to brotherhood. Yet, for present purposes, for effort in the world as it now is, both prefer systems of violence. Admirable and flawless in theory, is the principle of mutual service, men may ask, compatible in practice, here and now, with the nature of man as we see him and know him? Can we ask of the toiling masses, encrusted with ignorance and prejudice, with false traditions and blind animosities, weighed down by the load of daily care and suffering, that they should guide their lives by the light of so high and distant a beacon?

The answer to such doubters is to exhibit the principle of the Commonwealth in living operation and to recall the manifold evidence of its all-pervading vitality. If the instances which follow are drawn from the record of one only of its manifestations, the British, it is not for want of appreciation of what France and America and other members of the League of Freedom have achieved in their own field. For them it would be a presumption to speak. An ally may watch and wonder at an ally's confidence and endurance; but the secret springs of faith, the conditions of such heroic endeavour, are withdrawn from his gaze.

Consider, then, as regards the British Commonwealth, the indictment of Prussianism. "You claim," it says, "to be a Commonwealth, to unite beneath one law a quarter of the human race, to have achieved, as it were by accident, in a fit of absence of mind, as one of your writers has put it, without conscious purpose or the guidance of systematic knowledge, the realisation of our own cherished dream—a Roman peace diffused throughout five continents. Yet, whatever future the gods may

reserve for Prussia, Britain and her Empire at least seem stricken with mortality. You talk of the law of mutual service. Is it graven, like the laws of Prussia, in the hearts and minds of your citizens! Have you laboured, as we have laboured, to create a race worthy of your imperial purpose? Have you tamed the sectional instincts, uprooted the selfish desires, chastened the unruly wills of your scattered populations? We look out over your Empire and behold everywhere the dry rot of disunion, the seeds of disloyalty and decay; here a rebellion, there a conspiracy, here an ignorant denial of duty, there a direct withdrawal of aid, here a cry for secession, and there, at the very heart, voices preaching anarchy and sedition, rallying unchecked in their defence the ignorance you have foreborne to enlighten, the passions you have foreborne to subdue. With too easy a rein you have ridden them, your millions at home and overseas! Wealth you have given them and comfort and, by our leave, a long lease of peace. But in your anarchy and scepticism, your contempt for knowledge, your wilful blindness to stern realities, we see little trace of your proud doctrine of mutual service, nor is the lazy and good-humoured tolerance of British rule the true fulfilment of the law of Christ."

Truth is contained in this indictment. Yet were it the whole truth, the British Commonwealth would long since, in these testing years, have succumbed in the ordeal and gone the way of older dominions. If it survives intact, if it has grown in confidence and vitality, in the consciousness of its purpose and ideal, it is because, side by side with its failures, so much more visible and clamorous than the disappointments of Prussia, the spirit of mutual service is alive and vigorous among its nations, moving from strength to strength in the cause, not of the Commonwealth alone but of humanity. The war indeed, if it has revealed shortcomings, has not found the British character or British institutions wanting. It

has endorsed and confirmed them. In fact, the Commonwealth has proved itself capable of achieving these very triumphs of unity and public service which Prussianism claimed as its monopoly, only to be exploited by its own tried and tested methods—triumphs moreover on Prussia's own chosen field of war. Six million men and more, untouched by the goad of compulsion, offered their lives to the cause of human freedom. Women awoke, as never before in history, to the duty of public service and to the consciousness of their individual gifts and powers. The nations of the Commonwealth near and far, tutored and untutored, poured out their contribution of human devotion and material treasure. Among the weaker races thousands unfitted for the combat went willingly to labour in a strange land. Untrained in the issues of international policy, unaccustomed to withstand the blandishments of foreign intrigue or to tolerate the suspense and privations, the curtailments of liberty, the summary and indiscriminate procedures of wartime, vast populations worked and waited, steadily and in good heart, neither impatient nor vindictive, holding fast to the ideal. Confirmed in its inner faith the Commonwealth has begun to strengthen its outward unity also. For the first time the common purpose of its peoples, at home and overseas, has been embodied in executive institutions. Men from five continents have come together to frame common decisions. East and West, under the stress of danger, found the unity underlying age-long difference and met for deliberation in equal partnership. While Prussianism holds down its conquests by slavery and oppression, while the Revolution has broken up a continent into its primitive elements, across the mountains, in India, among populations twice as numerous and far more varied than the peoples of Russia, the spirit of responsibility is awakening and the charter of self-government has been proclaimed. In Ireland, too, where old wrongs still remain to be

righted, Irishmen sitting in orderly convention are seeking to shape the destinies of their country in a spirit equally removed from ascendancy and revolution. If the record of the British Commonwealth under the stress of war is less resounding than the martial bulletins of Prussia, less stirring and fantastic than the sweeping edicts of the Revolution, if its plans and achievements are dressed in the sober tints of ordinary life, it is because the Commonwealth exists not to gratify a conqueror's ambition or to demonstrate or refute a dreamer's doctrine, but to enable its citizens to grow to the full stature of their moral being. Not by the triumphs of the battlefield and the forum will the Commonwealth seek to be justified, but by the character and the influence, the noble example and the inspiring memory of its men and women.

But the Bolshevist, too, has his indictment. We need not repeat it. Its substance stands on an earlier page : the fetid slum and the murky alley ; the denial of light and air and health ; the sunless outlook and the soulless labour ; the back bowed down not by drudgery only but by servile fear ; the mind shut out from the contemplation of knowledge and beauty ; inequalities of wealth and power and circumstance darkening every aspect and relation of social existence.

The indictment cannot be denied. For a century Mammon has bestridden, and still bestrides, the world. His standards, conflicting at every stage with the standards of the Commonwealth, have been embodied in law, in custom and in the social code. Yet here, too, change is on the march. In these islands men are unlearning the outworn shibboleth of "Business is Business" and seeking new and fruitful applications of the doctrine of the Commonwealth. The first and most necessary step, to enlarge the range of popular responsibility and control has already been taken. Amidst the unremitting stress of war, the electorate has been doubled and women called

in to fill their rightful place in the common life. Education, the key of the future, is at last being extended, if as yet but timidly. Labour has received a charter of its equality with the other agents of production and has been called, through its representative organisations, into partnership with management, to control the conduct of their common services. The burden of the State is being placed more and more upon the shoulders of those who best can bear it: the yield of the taxes on incomes and profits and on the inheritance of the rich amounted in 1916–17 to £400,000,000 or double the entire budget of 1914.

Yet these changes, startling as they would have seemed four years since, and coming on the heel of events which might well, as a hundred years ago, have clogged the wheels of progress, are but the symbol and presage of what is yet to come. For in these years of strain and darkness, of common anxiety and common danger, many inward barriers have been broken down and men have learned to face the meaning and consequences of their faith. If the ideal of the Commonwealth is to be truly realised, if the free service of each for all is to be not merely a profession but a reality in the industrial field, men must turn their minds, as they are already turning them, to a wide reform and reordering of the conditions of life for the mass of the people. Shorter hours of labour, and an annual holiday on full pay for rest and travel; protection for all who work against the accident of unemployment; more control by the workman over the conditions of his occupation; buildings for him to work in designed not merely for machines but for men, planned for convenience and even for beauty; a home, not a brick box, to live in; a town, not a mean monotony of streets, to stir his civic pride; better schools and a longer education for his children, so that they may grow, body and mind, to the full stature of manhood; the absorption by the community, rather

than by the capitalist, of the surplus profits of production ; justice, informed and impartial, to support and enforce the claim of freedom wherever it is denied or endangered ; above all, an open gateway for every one, young and old, into the realm of knowledge and beauty, and the recognition, not in laws only but in social customs and institutions, of the spiritual basis of the Commonwealth and the equality of all its citizens in the eyes of society as in the eyes of God—such are the conditions through which, for all who work, the spirit of public service will replace the spirit of private gain as the dominating motive of their toil.

Thus the principle of the Commonwealth, tested in action and moving along its own quiet and well-tried paths, is proving itself more militant than Prussianism and more revolutionary than the Revolution. Once more it is assailed by its enemies : once more, as in bygone days, the hope of the world depends upon its victory : once more it is rallying to its defence the hearts and minds of all who know what freedom means and inspiring in them the fortitude and perseverance needed, as aforetime, to hold and break the onset of militarism. And when it has overthrown the power of Prussianism and rid the world for ever from the menace of its dominion, it will have nothing to fear from its other enemy, the destructive forces of the Revolution. For the war has renewed men's faith in it : its purpose has been clarified and confirmed by the ordeal : and even in the dust and heat of the conflict it is beginning to build up the new order of civic freedom and international justice which will govern the coming age of peace.

> Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring,
> Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil,
> Still do thy sleepless ministers move on,
> Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting.

INDEX OF WRITERS QUOTED OR REFERRED TO

A

"A. E.," 346–7
Acton, 20, 21, 47–8, 72–3, 137, 151–2
Addams (Jane), 38, 80–1
Andreieff, 233
Angell, 23, 35, 280, 291
Aquinas, 158
Aristotle, 155, 193
Arnold (Matthew), 6, 362
Ashley (Sir W.), 239

B

Bacon, 138
Bakunin, 347
Becker, 322
Bennett (Arnold), 75
Bernhardi, 3
Bernstein, 300
Bismarck, xxi, 301, 336
Blatchford, 229
Bloomfield, 139
Booth (Rt. Hon. Charles), 239
Boudin 279–80
Bourne, 190–2
Brontë (C.), 229
Brooke (Rupert), 97
Browning, 254, 255
Bülow, 18, 303
Burke, 13, 169
Byron, 9

C

Cambon, 2
Carlyle, 3, 177
Cobden, 291
Coleridge, 8
Coulton, 150
Cox, 253–4
Cramb, 25
Curtis, 144–5, 160, 327

D

Delbrück, 300, 304–5, 312

E

Ensor, 235
Erasmus, 109
Eulenberg, 319

F

St. Francis, 107

G

Gladstone, 1
Gierke, 159
Ginzberg, 98
Goethe, 12

H

Halévy (Daniel), 347
Herkner, 309, 328
Hilton, 219
Hobson (J. A.), 39
Hooker, 156–7, 355
Hoxie, 232, 265
Humboldt, 11

I

Isaiah, 154–5

J

James (William), 94–5
Jansson, 323
Johnson (Dr.), 123
Jones (Thomas), 257

K

Kallen, 78–9
Kerr, 147

Kerschensteiner, 317–8
Kipling, 181
Kreuz Zeitung, 335

L

Lankester, 139
Levinstein, 186

M

Maine, 200
Mansbridge, 111
Marvin, 180
Marx, xix, xxi, 219, 345, 347
Masaryk, 94
Mazzini, xvi, 1, 349
Mill, 46, 64, 174
Milton, 152
Morier, 169–70
Morris, 173, 184, 194
Muir, 93
Müller, 306

N

Naumann, 216 ff., 325–6
New Republic, 280, 300, 315, 347
Nichols (Robert), 97–8
Nietzsche, 3, 22, 182

O

Owen (Robert), 225, 228

P

Paul (St.), 153
Plato, 111, 134, 155, 183

R

Rathenau, xxiv, 307
Renan, 158, 196
"Rob Roy," 236–7
Rohrbach, 312–13
Rolland, 38
Ruskin, 184

S

Sadler, 7, 10, 14, 102
Scott (Sir Walter), 123
Shakespeare, 256
Shaw, 63
Smart, 150, 183–4, 248
Smith (A. L.), 138
Smith (Adam), 201–2
Spiethoff, 309–10
Sykes (Sir Mark), 54, 74

T

Taussig, 184–5
Taylor, 193, 253, 264
Thackeray, 75
Thring, 103
Thucydides, 19, 318
Treitschke, 3
Tressall, 235
Trotsky, 351

U

Unwin, 227

V

Virgil, 142

W

Wallas, 23, 57, 87, 185–7, 329
Webb, 39, 87, 129, 216, 286
Wilamowitz, 3, 17
Winstanley, 229
Withers, 179
Wordsworth, 11

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